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Introduction
Biopower’s supreme ambition is to produce, in a  human body, the abso-
lute separation of the living being and the speaking being, zoē and bios, the 
inhuman and the  human— survival.
— Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive
An numa’ piniti ha taotao When you hurt somebody
Nangga ma na’ pinitimu Expect to be in pain
Maseha apmamam na tiempo For even if it takes time
Un apasi sa’ dibimu You’ll pay for the pain you caused
— Chamorro proverb
On January  21, 1942, Luis  C. Crisostomo reported to the Japa nese police 
headquarters in Saipan, one of several islands in the Marianas governed by 
the Nanyō- chō, or the Japa nese South Seas Government. The U.S. territory 
of Guam, the southernmost island in this archipelago, had already fallen to 
the Japa nese military a month  earlier. Like the other Chamorro men who 
received the order, Crisostomo did not fully comprehend the nature of the 
request; the sudden directive only indicated an urgent transfer to Guam. 
Other wise, he was told to arrive at one  o’clock in the after noon. The Japa-
nese police then informed Crisostomo, a twenty- one- year- old man, of his 
new role as an interpreter for the Japa nese administration in Guam. With 
no choice in this  matter, he relented to the police. As his wife, Marikita Pa-
lacios Crisostomo, explained, the police “forced” him to heed  these  orders. 
“They just took him.”1
The next day, Luis C. Crisostomo boarded the vessel Nantaku Maru for 
Guam. Approximately twenty- three men joined him, all of whom  were 
tasked to serve as interpreters. Immediately dislocated from their families 
in Saipan, they  were instructed to perform multiple translation duties for 
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the Japa nese administrative, agricultural, educational, medical, military, 
and police units. They all served one goal: to colonize and change Guama-
nian attitudes “from the American influence and to obey the rules,  orders 
and regulations of the Japa nese, and also to see that they place themselves 
like Japa nese.”2 On January 23, 1942, only two days  after their summons, the 
group landed in the port village of Sumay, a Japa nese naval base that once 
 housed the U.S. Marine Corps barracks. They also joined ten Saipanese 
male interpreters who had previously invaded Guam on December 8, 1941, 
a few hours before the Japa nese military bombed and assaulted the island. 
With his newfound identity as an interpreter, Crisostomo registered at the 
Minseibu, the Japa nese civil administration, located in the capital of 
 Hågatña. At first, he merely worked as an interpreter. He then briefly re-
turned to Saipan in May 1942 to seek the blessings of the Palacios  family 
and to marry their  daughter Marikita Palacios. Afterward, the  couple left for 
Guam and moved to the village of Hågat. Once  there, Crisostomo assumed 
the dual responsibilities of an interpreter and a police officer.
With the arrival of the supplementary force of Chamorros in January 1942, 
the Japa nese conscription of native interpreters and police officers was well 
 under way. By 1944, the Japa nese had forcibly recruited seventy- five men 
and three  women as interpreters from the islands of Rota and Saipan. The 
transformation of Luis C. Crisostomo from the son of farmers into a proper 
man of Japa nese authority and law had likewise begun. Like the other 
Rotanese and Saipanese interpreters, he adapted to his new roles as an inter-
preter and police officer in ways that revealed his gendered, material, and 
po liti cal investments in colonial modernity and nationhood.3 Through in-
vestigative methods and torture tactics fashioned by the Japa nese military 
and police, Crisostomo specifically attempted to subjugate the Chamorros 
of Guam to the Japa nese empire, thereby making Guamanians into the like-
ness of obedient and lawful Japa nese subjects. His efforts ceased, however, 
when the U.S. military reinvaded the island in the summer of 1944. A few 
months  later on January  1, 1945, the U.S. military police located Crisos-
tomo and placed him in a stockade. Suspected of committing “war crimes” 
against U.S. nationals, he remained in the internment camp  until a military 
tribunal subpoenaed him for trial on June 4, 1945.  Until then, he labored, 
as a prisoner, for the U.S. military. As his wife, Marikita, elaborated, “My 
husband told me that while he was in prison they  were taken out on work 
details and Guamanians would come up to them and say, ‘You are monkeys 
now. You beat the Chamorros, and now you are monkeys.’ Some would say, 
‘Come  here so I can kill you.’ ”4
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Now depicted as an animal, Luis C. Crisostomo faced a judge and jury 
of white military officers, who found him guilty of assaulting thirteen indi-
viduals and killing two men in Guam. On June 22, 1945, two- thirds of the 
military commission voted to execute him by hanging by the neck, a  legal 
pro cess that stripped his ties to Japan, recognized him as an “American,” 
punished him as a “war criminal,” and expunged him from the nation as a 
nonsacrifice. In this manner, he was a sacred man of the war, that is, homo 
sacer to his native community and to the emerging American po liti cal order. 
As Giorgio Agamben argues, homo sacer is a life “that may be killed but not 
sacrificed.”5 “What defines the status of homo sacer is therefore not the origi-
nary ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong to him, but 
rather both the par tic u lar character of the double exclusion into which he is 
taken and the vio lence to which he finds himself exposed.”6 This double ex-
clusion (also called inclusive exclusion) allows a sovereign entity to kill with 
impunity, a violent force over an extrajuridical sphere and a violent inclu-
sion and exclusion of certain beings and actions from the sphere of the law.7
As similarly illustrated by the Chamorro proverb, at the beginning of this 
introduction, abandonment, pain, and suffering result from the failure to 
maintain native life in the Mariana Islands. In this re spect, one’s cultural 
and po liti cal obligation to another is read as an expected and mutually 
beneficial relation; to disregard this custom— what Chamorros describe 
as inafa’maolek, or “to make good”— subjects one, as both self and clan, to 
shame, vio lence, and even death. Luis C. Crisostomo clearly knew of  these 
obligations, as did the Guamanians who fell  under his disciplinary purview. 
As the saying goes, “Un apasi sa’ dibimu,” or “You’ll pay for the pain you 
caused.” When placed in the context of what Agamben also calls the “state 
of exception,”  here understood as the extrajuridical space between Ameri-
can and Japa nese claims to Guam and the wider Mariana Islands, one’s re-
lation to a community hinges on the vio lence of sovereignty, made lawful, 
between the living being and the speaking being, zoē and bios, the inhuman 
and the  human. One can thus be remade in the image of a community, as in 
a “monkey,” just as much as one can be remade in the image of a nation, as 
in a “war criminal.” Taken together, they constitute homo sacer, the sacred 
man that dwells outside (zoē) and inside (bios) the rule of law.
In Sacred Men: Law, Torture, and Retribution in Guam, I examine the figure 
of homo sacer in the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program from 1944 
to 1949. My argument is twofold. First, I demonstrate that the navy’s tri-
bunal prosecuted Japan’s nationals and its native subjects in an effort to 
impose the U.S. rule of law in Guam and other formerly Japanese- occupied 

































islands.8 Following Agamben, I take the site of the military commission as 
a threshold from which the  matter of sovereignty became highly contested 
during World War II and its immediate aftermath in the 1940s. More was at 
stake than the military’s classification and separation of the living being, 
zoē, from the speaking being, bios, among the accused Chamorro and Japa-
nese war criminals. Additionally, indigenous Chamorro memories of being 
tortured by the Japa nese police in Guam had, in fact, functioned as vital 
testimonies for the navy’s court— testimonies that reified the distinctions 
between loyal wards, on the one hand, and war criminals, on the other. By 
treating native testimonies as bios, a form of po liti cal life that resonates 
with what I call the ko’ko- hilitai relation, I then arrive at the second part of 
my argument. Herein I foreground a native proverb about reciprocity and 
retribution in an effort to highlight the epistemological basis in Chamorro 
testimonies about harm and injury.
In Chamorro society, numerous proverbs about life and death abound. 
They illustrate the strength and vitality of cooperation, love, and reciprocity. 
While they often take the form of short messages, the proverbs also invoke 
larger and older stories about Chamorro banter, humor, jealously, loss, sur-
vival, and vio lence. Collectively, they impart lessons about how to re spect 
and revere  every living  thing, including the land and the sea.  Whether the 
proverbs discuss the origin of the coconut tree, the significance of sharing 
a meal with strangers, or the danger of making too much noise in the jun-
gle, they all seek to foster harmonious relations among the living and the 
dead. Unlike the U.S. rule of law and its separation of the living being and 
the speaking being, Chamorros frequently make no distinction between 
such  things. Animals, plants,  humans, and spirits share the same space in 
Guam, a point that the Chamorros of World War II had culturally expressed 
by way of the bird (ko’ko) and the lizard (hilitai) proverb. But contrary to the 
plethora of proverbs that encourage reciprocal relationships, the proverb of 
the ko’ko and the hilitai can also be understood for its lessons about retri-
bution, vio lence, and death. In this book, I show how this impor tant prov-
erb can shed insight on the po liti cal utility and consequence of gossip and 
rumors— that is to say, testimonies—in a military court of law. My merging 
of Chamorro and Eu ro pean philosophies of vio lence is thus intentional. In 
this re spect, the Chamorro proverb of the ko’ko and the hilitai and Giorgio 
Agamben’s theories of biopower can help us unpack the force and mean-
ing of the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program. By employing this 























































Map I.2.  Guam
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Rota, and the Marianas and offer new approaches for the study of biopower 
more generally.
On Agamben and Empires
In this book, I expand upon Agamben’s discussions about the state of 
 exception, homo sacer, and the paradigm of the camp. On the state of ex-
ception, he writes that it is “neither external nor internal to the juridical 
order, and the prob lem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a 
zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other 
but rather blur with each other.”9 As Agamben explains, the “state of ex-
ception is not a dictatorship ( whether constitutional or unconstitutional, 
commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in 
which all  legal determinations— and above all the very distinction between 
public and private— are deactivated.”10 He makes it very clear, as well, that 
many countries invoke vari ous states of exception, as in their declarations 
of civil wars, cultural festivals, or martial laws. Agamben also stresses 
that the “state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant 
paradigm of government in con temporary politics.”11 As he argues, “This 
transformation of a provisional and exceptional mea sure into a technique 
of government threatens to radically alter—in fact, has already palpably 
altered— the structure and meaning of the traditional distinction between 
constitutional forms. Indeed, from this perspective, the state of exception 
appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolut-
ism.”12 For Agamben, the mysterious figure subjected to the state of excep-
tion, homo sacer or sacred man, is that who therefore may be killed and yet 
not sacrificed. He clarifies the origins of homo sacer as such: “An obscure 
figure of archaic Roman law, in which  human life is included in the juridical 
order [ordinamento] solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capac-
ity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred texts 
of sovereignty but also the very codes of po liti cal power  will unveil their 
mysteries.”13 Homo sacer is bare life, the nonspeaking being. As Agamben 
explains, the “fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that 
of friend/enemy but that of bare life/po liti cal existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/
inclusion.”14
As the  legal scholar Tom Frost elaborates, bios, or po liti cal life, “is not 
defined imminently by itself, but is defined through its being held in re-
lation to ‘natu ral life,’ what it is not, mere existence, zoē, which exists as 
a universal transcendent referent.”15 Defined in a negative functional rela-
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tion, po liti cal life is held in relation to what it is not, natu ral life, a negative 
relationality that, for Agamben, underpins modern po liti cal existence.16 
This ban— what Agamben theorizes as the meaning of x being produced 
by its relation to a non- x— suggests that bios can only gain meaning from 
what it is not. As Frost details, zoē is thereby not “completely subsumed 
and transformed into bios, but instead continues to exist. This zoē remains 
in the po liti cal order, existing as politicized zoē, or bare life.” Importantly, 
“The implications of this are that individuals  will be de- subjectified, be-
come expendable and be killed with impunity in any po liti cal order,  because 
creating leads to the biopo liti cal creation of  human detritus.”17 For  these 
reasons, the biopower of modern democracies— whether by way of colo-
nialism, homophobia, incarceration, militarism, or racism— produces more 
bare lives as much as it reproduces the economic, po liti cal, and social con-
ditions that make homo sacer in the first place.18
In Agamben’s texts, homo sacer manifests as four creatures: “zoē or bio-
logical life, bios or po liti cal life, bare life (sometimes rendered as sacred life 
or naked life, from the original Italian term ‘nuda vita’) and a new ‘form- of- 
life,’ occasionally rendered as ‘happy life.’ ”19 In this book, I mainly focus on the 
first three variations of homo sacer as my study does not address Agamben’s 
“happy life” dilemma as to how to make no separation between zoē and 
bios in the law. Nor do I seek to resolve the means by which sovereignty 
and right no longer have a hold over life.20 Instead, I explore the aporia that 
led to the making of the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program and 
its declaration of “democracy” in militarist terms. Such an approach lends 
itself to related studies about why and how indigenous  peoples have, as the 
 legal scholar Paul Havemann asserts, become the “paradigm non- people, 
non- citizens, homines sacri.”21 At worst, they “have been excluded and con-
demned to placelessness in ‘zones of exception’ such as reserves, mission 
schools or camps and other forms of segregation  under the regime of the 
sovereign’s draconian ‘protection.’ ”22 Before the law, indigenous  people 
and their claims to “authenticity,” however construed, are also suspect; they 
are “not a representative of objective cultural difference, but rather a mem-
brane of cultural difference,” as the anthropologist Elizabeth A. Povinelli 
once put it.23  Whether they are Aboriginal Australians struggling to attain 
native title, American Indians seeking to revise treaties, or Kanaka Maoli 
articulating a new nation, their efforts for recognition are usually perceived 
by states as “past tense presences.”24 But by addressing the strug gles waged 
by colonized  peoples in Japan and the United States, we can “make vis i ble 
an active subjectivity that can operate as an alternative to the abandoned 
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and hopeless figure of the Muselmann, that most extreme embodiment of 
the form of (de)subjectivation defined by Agamben as homo sacer.”25 As the 
po liti cal theorists Simone Bignall and Marcelo Svirsky explain, a “renewed 
attention to Agamben’s core concepts such as ‘the camp’ and ‘homo sacer,’ 
considered in terms of the colonial context and with re spect to the rich 
histories of colonial rebellion and re sis tance, can enable a more nuanced 
understanding of the forms of agency available to individuals and  peoples 
that have been rendered homo sacer by a politics of ‘inclusive exclusion.’ ”26 In 
this re spect, I foreground in this book the American, Chamorro, Chamorro- 
Japanese, and Japa nese attorneys, carpenters, farmers, investigators, nurses, 
prostitutes, and soldiers who engaged the animal life and po liti cal life of 
the American and Japa nese empires. We can then examine why and how 
Luis C. Crisostomo became a police officer  under Japan and a war criminal 
 under the United States, as well as analyze the ways in which Japa nese civil-
ians and soldiers alike experienced related colonial conditions.
On the Military Colony of Guam
On the material and spatial politics of Auschwitz, a Nazi extermination 
camp, Giorgio Agamben states that it constitutes “the very paradigm of po-
liti cal space at which politics becomes biopo liti cal and homo sacer is virtually 
confused with the citizen.” He explains, “The correct question to pose con-
cerning the horrors committed in the camps is, therefore, not the hypocriti-
cal one of how crimes of such atrocity could be committed against  human 
beings.” As he asserts, “It would be more honest and, above all, more useful 
to investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power 
by which  human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and 
prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer 
as a crime.”27 With Guam as the main site of this study, I find this island 
as similarly invoking the juridical procedures of the camp insofar as the 
Chamorros, Chamorro- Japanese, and Japa nese retained no (or partial) po-
liti cal rights. This is not to conflate the vio lence of the Nazi genocide of Jews 
with the vio lence of American and Japa nese punishment and possession. 
By situating Guam as a military colony, I instead focus on its biopolitics of 
exception and exclusion.28
In an act of war with Spain in 1898, for example, the American military 
invaded Guam, as it did Cuba and the Philippines. The U.S. Navy usurped 
Spanish rule over the Marianas as well, severing the po liti cal ties between 
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The latter came  under German 
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rule from 1898 to 1914, followed by Japa nese naval and administrative gov-
ernance  until 1944. The U.S. Navy in Guam appointed naval governors to 
rule the island like a ship with the indigenous Chamorros as its wards. From 
1898 to 1941, the Chamorros, as U.S. nationals, also possessed no rights 
as per the protections of the U.S. Constitution.29 As with other territories 
like American Sāmoa and Puerto Rico, the U.S. plenary doctrine, coupled 
with the dictates of military rule, determined, by force, which populations 
received partial or total protections offered by the state.30 Chamorros, Japa-
nese nationals, and other nonwhite communities that resided on the island 
garnered none whatsoever  under the navy. As the  legal scholar Natsu Taylor 
Saito argues, the Supreme Court has used the doctrine since the nineteenth 
 century to grant Congress and the U.S. government “plenary— full or com-
plete and therefore unchallengeable— power with re spect to national security 
and, by extension, over immigration  matters on the theory that regulation 
of the borders is a power inherent in sovereignty.”31
With the navy as the governing body of laws, and with the  legal support 
of the plenary doctrine, Guam consequently received an “uneven applica-
tion of the Constitution.”32 Addressing the historical impact of the Con-
stitution in the colonies, the critic Amy Kaplan states that “ there  were no 
consistent guarantees of due pro cess or the right to criminal and civil juries 
or full protection  under the  Fourteenth Amendment; in other words,  there 
 were no clear rights to be protected against unfair procedures.”33 Given 
the island’s role as a coaling station for naval ships, the American govern-
ment focused on Guam as a port, with  little regard for the civil rights of the 
Chamorros. The appointed naval governor therefore “exercised complete 
executive, legislative, and judicial power.”34 In the navy’s view, law enforce-
ment never posed a prob lem  because the Chamorros  were an “inherently 
law- abiding and peaceful  people.”35
While the navy’s public position on Chamorro relations with colonial 
law pre sents an image of interracial harmony, the everyday realities of naval 
governance, segregation, and militarism  were far from peaceful. As the an-
thropologist Laura Thompson observed, “Social intercourse between the 
[naval] officers’ families and natives was frowned upon and the system of 
etiquette was designed to ‘keep the natives in their place.’ Segregated schools 
 were introduced whereby native  children of both classes attend schools for 
natives while the  children of the naval colony went to white schools.”36 In 
many re spects, the navy created, administered, and enforced a plethora of 
laws to discipline Chamorro bodies into subservient, non- rights- bearing 
subjects of the state.37 The navy also charged Chamorros for a variety of 
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“crimes,” such as assault, battery, burglary, prowling, and sex.38 With the 
assistance of Marine Corps personnel and native patrol officers, the navy 
policed many Chamorro cultural, religious, and social practices, from whis-
tling in the streets to adopting  children into their extended clan networks.39 
Trial by jury was also not introduced  because, in the navy’s estimation, “it 
was not desired by the inhabitants nor considered suitable.” More precisely, 
the navy refused to introduce trial by jury  because of the fear that Chamorro 
“jurymen would be governed by familial influences rather than by the law 
and evidence,” a position that would change in the course of the tribunal’s 
development.40 Furthermore, the navy made no concerted effort to crimi-
nalize the relatively small community of Japa nese nationals in Guam. Prior 
to the formation of the tribunal in 1944, American naval punishment mainly 
entailed the cleaning of streets, the drying of copra, the gardening of veg-
etables, the making of roof tiles, the paying of fines, the raising of pigs, 
or the sewing of clothes. All profit went to the naval government.41 Very 
seldom did crimes like assault and murder appear in its court rec ords.42 The 
navy only severely punished individuals suspected of having Hansen’s dis-
ease, or leprosy, by exiling them to the Philippines.43
In Guam, the rule of law  under the American naval government sub-
sequently functioned in militarist, racist, and totalitarian terms. It is a 
colony, then and now. Reflecting on the colony in modern Eu ro pean phi-
losophy and practice, the po liti cal theorist Achille Mbembe explains that 
“the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally 
in the exercise of a power outside of the law (ab legibus solutus) and where 
‘peace’ is more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end.’ ”44 Elaborat-
ing further, he argues that “colonies are zones in which war and disorder, 
internal and external figures of the po liti cal, stand side by side or alternate 
with each other. As such, colonies are the location par excellence where 
the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended— the zone 
where the vio lence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the ser-
vice of ‘civilization.’ ”45 Understood in  these terms, Guam represents a zone 
where the normalized state of exception serves the “civilized” Americans and 
enables regimes of militarized vio lence and white supremacist statecraft to 
converge as legitimate law.
The Nanyō- chō in the adjacent islands of Rota, Tinian, and Saipan dif-
fered no less in this re spect. For both Japan and the United States, the rule 
of law aimed to “establish a semblance of order and administrative control 
rather than to build an elaborate system of justice.”46 As I have argued else-
where, each empire attempted to indoctrinate Chamorros and  others in 


































an effort to cultivate their loyalties.47 A loyal population implied an orderly 
citizenry and noncitizenry. While the archipelago remained divided along 
this fault line of governance, each colonial power understood the value of 
law and its threat of vio lence in subduing the native population. In Saipan, 
for example, Chamorros equated education and law with discipline and 
punishment, a point shared by Edward T. De La Cruz. Known as Toshiwo 
Tamaoki  under the Nanyō- chō, he recalled, “At school we sometimes  were 
made to stand in the sun as punishment.”48
With more than ninety thousand  people in Saipan by 1941, most of whom 
labored for the island’s sugar industry, only two police officers  were on duty 
at any one time (figure I.1).49 As with other Japa nese colonies in  Korea, Oki-
nawa, and Taiwan, governors- general suspended the rule of law or tailored 
it to the specific requirements of colonized  peoples.50 Following this seem-
ingly exceptional practice, Japa nese government officials and their corre-
sponding police units punished  people for almost any act deemed illegal. In 
Saipan, this carceral apparatus began in 1915 with the Japa nese naval police 
force, followed by the making of the colonial police in 1922. In each case, 
the Japa nese police recruited Chamorros over the Refaluwasch in the North-
ern Mariana Islands.51 Believing that Chamorros  were more “civilized” than 
other natives  because of their long history with the Spanish Empire, Japa-
nese police officials “tended to  favor the Chamorros of the Marianas as the 
most advanced and adaptable of the Micronesian  peoples.”52 Yet the Cham-
orros remained in subordinated positions to the Japa nese in the police.53 
The Japa nese police also enlisted young and impressionable Chamorro men 
 because, in  doing so, the Japa nese government si mul ta neously sought to 
erode the authority of native elders and leaders.
In their preparation for invading American- occupied Guam, the Japa nese 
police utilized the  labor of native men as “weapons,” a tactic frequently em-
ployed by colonial powers during World War II.54 Although it is unclear how 
many Chamorro police officers from Rota and Saipan became interpreters, 
the seventy- five males and three females tasked to be interpreters already 
understood the power of the police. Faced with a partial English- speaking 
native population, as not every body spoke En glish in Guam, the Japa nese 
enlisted  these native interpreters to mediate the “signs, intentions, and 
meanings from one language to another.”55 The first wave of  these inter-
preters comprised ten Chamorro men in their early twenties, all of whom 
participated in the civic, patriotic, and sport activities of the Seinendan, 
or Young Men’s Association in Saipan.56 Their recruitment began with the 
delivery of a four- by- five- inch note to their homes on November 27, 1941. 
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 Addressed to each man, the paper read, “Saipan Govt. Office, Head of Dept., 
Police Affairs, Nishi Gunzō.”57 On the same day, the young men reported to 
police director Nishi Gunzō to confirm their affiliation with the Seinendan. 
Gunzō then ordered them to meet at his  house a few days  later, on December 5, 
at five  o’clock in the after noon; he then instructed them to “correct” the 
trace of an unidentified island on a piece of paper.58 In the Japa nese colonial 
imagination, the island may have been a map of Guam, and the exercise 
may have been a way to gauge the men’s understanding of its topography. 
 Whether that was the case or not, none of the men succeeded in ascertain-
ing the purpose of this activity.
With no further explanation as to the meaning of  these events, Nishi 
Gunzō ordered the ten Chamorro men to convene at the Naval Guard Unit 
at Tanapag Harbor on December 6 at five  o’clock in the after noon. As the 
interpreter and police officer Jose P. Villagomez recalled, the “Chief of Po-
lice told us that we could not refuse what was asked by the officials.”59 They 
 were simply told “to help the Emperor and Japan.”60 Specifically, the Japa-
nese navy advised the Saipanese interpreters to warn the  people of Guam of 
an impending military invasion and to encourage them to seek refuge in the 
mountains. The young men also had to cut any American communication 
lines and identify any American military fortifications in the shoreline areas 
of Guam. With no extra clothing or food, they then boarded the Japa nese 
I.1.  Japa nese police station in Minami- mura (South Village) in Saipan, ca. 1937.
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landing craft, Daihatsu Ranchi, for Rota around two  o’clock in the morning. 
They landed briefly in Rota to eat and rest,  after which they  were separated 
into two groups of five. On the morning of December 8, 1941, Martin Borja, 
Antonio Camacho, Jose Cabrera, Juan Manibusan, and Francisco Sablan 
landed off the coast of Inalåhan in southern Guam. Jose Cabrera, Jose Guer-
rero, Segundo Sablan, Celeste Torres, and Jose Villagomez then arrived in 
Litekyan in the northern part of the island.
The former group hid in the jungle from both the Americans and the in-
vading Japa nese military. However, the other five interpreters encountered 
American naval personnel who, suspecting them of being “infiltrators,” 
imprisoned them in the Hågatña jail along with the previously interned 
Japa nese residents.61 Two days  later, on December 10, the American naval 
government surrendered to the Japa nese military and released its prison-
ers. On the other hand, the group in Inalåhan met, by chance,  Father Jesus 
Baza Dueñas, a prominent Chamorro community leader, on December 13. 
The priest escorted them to his home and prepared a meal for them. In the 
after noon,  Father Dueñas then drove the interpreters to the nearby village 
of Yoña, where a Japa nese army encampment had been recently erected. 
Upon their arrival, a Japa nese soldier and a Saipanese interpreter exchanged 
the following conversation:
Where are you from?
We are Saipan Chamorros.
Where are you  going?
We came  here before the war started.
By whose order?
The Naval Guard Unit.
Why?
As interpreters.62
As  these comments reveal, the Japa nese military had seized Guam from the 
American empire.  After all, the unknown Japa nese soldier spoke as if he 
governed the island. His ignorance about Saipanese interpreters demon-
strated the lack of po liti cal agency accorded to Chamorros.
Antonio Camacho, the interpreter involved in this dialogue, remarked, 
“We came  here before the war started.” His casual reference not only de-
noted his involvement in the Japa nese invasion of the island but also sug-
gested that “we,” Chamorros as po liti cal life, always resided in the Marianas 
long before the invading Americans and Japa nese. Without a doubt, this 
linguistic and po liti cal metastructure of translation exacerbated relations 
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among “Americanized” and “Japanized” Chamorros in Guam, a  matter 
that would resurface repeatedly in the war crimes  trials examined in this 
book. In  every translation, the interpreters for the American and Japa nese 
empires addressed what the historian Vicente L. Rafael describes as the 
“irreconcilable demands between a faithful and  free rendition of the origi-
nal, but also between the tendency to reproduce as much as to resist the 
dominant conventions of meaning and signification.”63 To put it another 
way,  every speaker of the tribunal faced the predicament of asserting, merg-
ing, or disavowing one or more linguistic worlds in an effort to render par-
tial meanings about law, torture, and retribution. In  these ways, numerous 
Chamorros faced enormous difficulty in making intelligible their concepts 
about life and death in a  legal and po liti cal space dominated by English- and 
Japanese- speaking military officials who had, for the most part, no regard 
for them.
On Torture, Testimony, and the Ko’ko- Hilitai Relation
What did the Rotanese and Saipanese interpreters and police officers say 
and do that warranted their inclusive exclusion in the navy’s commission? 
How did their Japa nese military and police counter parts, many of whom saw 
Guam as their property, become implicated in this assertion of the American 
po liti cal order? In this book, I take torture and confession as the forms of 
punishment that hardened and ruptured colonial, native, and settler po liti-
cal and social relations across the board. As the  legal scholar Paul W. Kahn 
explains, “The object of torture was confession, which had the dual purpose 
of providing information and acknowledging sin— whether against God or 
the sovereign.”64 In Kahn’s view, “Confession was a necessary aspect of the 
ritual of punishment. It was literally the last act of the  dying man. This was 
not  because of lingering uncertainty over guilt— whether he actually com-
mitted the crime— but  because the sovereign’s power over life required the 
moment of acknowl edgment.”65 “Without acknowl edgment,” he empha-
sizes, “the sovereign might exercise vio lence but not power.”66
In Japanese- occupied Guam, torture commenced with a report submit-
ted to one of the many police stations scattered across the island’s villages. 
The memo often detailed an assaulted person, an insulted official, a sto-
len chicken, or a suspected spy, among other accusations. Around one or 
two investigations occurred each day. The interrogations also took place 
in facilities that previously served the American naval government, such as 
the medical office in Hågat and the rec ords repository in Hågatña. In  every 
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case, the interpreters and police officers arrested the alleged criminal, usu-
ally a man, and recorded his name, date of birth, place of residence, and 
marital status. While a person was being investigated, other police officers 
would depart for the scene of the alleged crime, interview  people, assess 
the site for clues, and cross- check information. The torturing of individuals 
happened before, during, and  after any interrogation session. With no re-
course to a trial, the interpreters and police officers often beat, slapped, and 
whipped the suspected person, as well as exposed him to the sun without 
food or  water for long periods of time. Quite often, the Chamorro and Japa-
nese interrogators used the chilin guaka, a bullwhip, as a favored weapon. 
The Guamanian farmer Joaquin A. Limtiaco, a survivor of numerous tor-
ture sessions, described the chilin guaka as “a tendon 3/4” in dia meter and 
about 3½ feet long, tied to a wooden  handle about 12 inches in length.”67 
During his and other confessions, the accused criminals usually acknowl-
edged their guilt for committing what ever accusation they faced. In  doing 
so, they identified other relatives, neighbors, and rivals as accomplices. As a 
result, torture emanated outward from the body of the victim to the bodies 
of his clan, village, and island; its power seemed totalizing.68
With re spect to the tribunal, what mattered was the way Guamanians un-
derstood gossip as testimonies, a form of po liti cal life, bios, that very much 
informed the court’s dehumanization of  every war criminal. Unlike federal 
courts that do not admit rumors as evidence, the navy’s military commis-
sion adhered to its procedures regarding its use of gossip as testimony.69 
Given that the tribunal featured Guamanian and Chamorro- Japanese no-
tions of the past in this regard, I understand gossip, hearsay, and rumor to 
mean a “form of interaction that in most socie ties variously provokes scorn, 
derision, and contempt, but also enormous interest.”70 Discussing the con-
tradictory nature of gossip, for example, the anthropologist Niko Besnier 
asserts that it “embodies the complexities of social life. . . .  Through 
gossip,  people make sense of what surrounds them, interpreting events, 
 people, and the dynamics of history.”71 As testimony, gossip provided Gua-
manians, especially  those involved in the military and police apparatuses 
of the U.S. Navy, with a po liti cal voice. Although the tribunal never viewed 
gossip as a knowledge system that  shaped American pre ce dents, I intend to 
demonstrate other wise.
Turning to the Chamorro proverb that opened this introduction, I show 
how the proverb of the ko’ko (bird) and the hilitai (lizard) informed Gua-
manian testimonies about what constituted proper and improper native 
be hav iors and attitudes during the war. From this relation, we can then 
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understand how the Chamorro custom of inafa’maolek functioned  under 
extreme duress. As the Chamorro historian Christine Taitano DeLisle ex-
plains, inafa’maolek often operates as a system of reciprocity alongside 
other values like “respetu  (re spect), gai mamåhlao (literally, ‘to have shame’ 
but loosely ‘to save face’), mangingi, the sniffing of an elder’s hand to take 
in his or her essence and wisdom as a sign of respetu, and chenchule, a gift or 
form of compensation.”72 The Chamorro scholars Tiara  R. Na‘puti and 
Michael Lujan Bevacqua similarly explain that inafa’maolek functions “on 
the assumption that mutual re spect must prevail over individualism.”73 They 
suggest that inafa’maolek compels Chamorros to maintain “positive rela-
tionships” among a group.74 At the same time, this custom informs how 
they express jealousy, hate, and vengeance. As the Chamorro educator 
Faye Untalan elaborates, “ People try to shape how you think, how you live, 
how you behave. And it has to meet their norms or their values. If it does 
not, then the retribution comes in.”75 As such, she stresses that gossip can 
be “very mean- spirited,” even urging some  people to chastise and reject 
 others. In this re spect, we can ask, what happened to the knowledge sys-
tem of inafa’maolek when the tribunal utilized gossip to condemn or vin-
dicate war criminals  under Japan’s empire? And how did Guamanian and 
Chamorro- Japanese forms of racism and retribution function as po liti cal 
life in rendering the Japa nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese as the zoē and bios 
of “war criminality”?
As one version of the proverb indicates, the “hilitai (monitor lizards) 
 were black and could sing beautifully. The hilitai was so proud of its voice 
that it showed off by singing to all the other animals.”76 Yet a few of the ani-
mals like the totot (Marianas rose- crowned fruit dove) said, “You may have 
a better voice than me, but my colors are prettier than yours!”77 Jealous, 
the hilitai sought the assistance of a friend, the ko’ko (Guam rail), to paint 
yellow dots on its skin. The ko’ko agreed to help on the condition that the 
hilitai beautify the bird with white stripes as well. And so the ko’ko kept its 
promise, but the hilitai only partially painted the bird, in a hurry to show 
other animals its yellow and black patterns. Angry and offended, the ko’ko 
caught up to the hilitai and immediately pecked its beak and tongue.  Today, 
the white stripes on the ko’ko appear incomplete, whereas the hilitai, with 
its forked tongue, no longer arrogantly sings (figures I.2 and I.3). As the 
educator Lawrence J. Cunningham explains, “The importance of this story 
is not in the explanations for the characteristics of  these animals. The real 
message is the core Chamorro value.  People who do not meet their obligations 
 will be punished.”78 The actions and attitudes of the hilitai, a cunning figure 
I.2.  The ko’ko. Photo graph by Anthony Tornito, Department of Agriculture, Guam.
I.3.  The hilitai. Photo graph by Dave Gardner, Pacific Con sul tants Group, Guam.
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in native thought, portend extreme danger and risk for anybody who does 
not directly disclose his or her intentions to a group. In this manner, its 
“forked tongue” can represent the direct and implied texts of the speaking 
being and the living being. Without the negative relation that the hilitai rep-
resents, moreover, the native custom of inafa’maolek would lack influence 
and relevance in the maintaining of relations.
Other proverbs about the hilitai demonstrate its significance in Cham-
orro culture and history. As one saying goes, “Yanggen inaca hao ni ayuyu ti 
hun sinet’ta hasta que palapak i hilo,” or “When you are bitten by a coconut 
crab he  will not let you go  until the thunder roars.”  Here, the proverb indi-
cates the strength of the ayuyu’s claws, but it also signals the length of time a 
rumor, good or bad, may adhere to a person. Alternatively, as the Chamorro 
genealogist Malia Ramirez observes, the proverb warns that one should not 
get into a violent situation from which one cannot get out.79  After all, the 
ayuyu is one of the few animals that can tear apart a coconut’s exterior, 
puncture its hard shell, and consume its fleshy white meat. When placed 
in the context of the hilitai as a deviant subject, however, the lizard’s intel-
ligence outwits the power of the coconut crab. As another proverb reveals, 
the hilitai “is said to be fond of eating the tail- purse of the ayuyu . . .  that it 
willingly offers its tail to the crab for bait, and while the crab chews on the 
lizard’s tail the lizard twists about and chews at the crab’s vitals.”80
By turning to the proverb of the ko’ko and the hilitai, I demonstrate that 
Guamanian gossip invoked the “animal” lessons of reciprocity and punish-
ment in ways that negotiated testimonies about the suspected Japa nese, 
Rotanese, and Saipanese war criminals. Lest I be misunderstood as roman-
ticizing native life, let it be clear that my analy sis of gossip is by no means 
trivial. It is ontological. Taking a cue from Agamben, my reference to the 
ko’ko and the hilitai shows that Chamorros did not necessarily adhere to 
the animal/human distinction that proved so fundamental to the making of 
the military commission and its creation of homo sacer. Although the po-
liti cal function of gossip often reified the animal/human dualisms of the tri-
bunal, as with the Guamanian racism and retribution directed against  every 
suspected war criminal, the usage of native gossip in the court illustrated 
how Guamanians sought “to gain the fullest pos si ble expression of po liti cal 
identity, agency, and autonomy.”81 When viewed through the broader lens 
of Chamorro knowledge of the material, natu ral, and spiritual domains, the 
animal/human binary does not hold up; the dichotomy remains a fiction 
in light of origin stories about animals and plants, on the one hand, and 
in the  matter of familial and unknown spirit encounters with  every living 
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being, on the other.82 As in many Chamorro clans, familial stories of the 
recently deceased often disclose the presence of an apparition, the smell 
of a fragrant flower, or even the voice and physical touch of the loved one.83 
Comparably, stories about benign and malevolent spirits— that is, the 
taotaomona— usually foreground the ghostly display of animals,  humans, 
and other entities. As the Chamorro writer Tina Camacho Pablo observes, 
“Many Chamorros believe  these stories of the super natural to be true.”84
Elsewhere, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander socie ties view 
animals as playing “a more significant cosmological and po liti cal role, 
even though animals, as a linguistic and cultural category, are often con-
spicuously absent.”85 With re spect to the Hawaiian notion of kino lau, for 
example, the po liti cal theorists Jonathan Goldberg- Hiller and Noenoe  K. 
Silva explain that it “means that many plants, animals, birds, clouds, and so 
on are the bodies of deities,  either the power ful akua nui (major akua) like 
Kāne, Kū, Pele, Haumea, and  others, or less power ful but just as meaningful 
‘aumākua,  family spirits.”86 As with the ko’ko and the hilitai, the animals, 
plants, and spirits of Hawai‘i act on the world.87 In  these ways, Chamorros 
often view land as an animate being, if not as an extension of themselves. 
The land, like the  people, is alive, hence the popu lar phrase used by Cham-
orros to describe themselves as taotao tano’, or the “ people of the land.” In 
fact, most areas throughout Guam and the Marianas are nicknamed  after 
Chamorro clans. The hills, rivers, valleys, beaches, trees, birds, and ocean 
all convey their stories from the older and recent past. Historically, Cham-
orro  mothers, godmothers, and grand mothers even buried the placentas 
or umbilical cords of their  children in their villages, a common practice 
throughout the Pacific Islands to demonstrate cultural connectedness to 
land. As DeLisle elaborates, inafa’maolek conceptions of stewardship in-
voked “traditional birthing practices, like the burying of the placenta or 
the umbilical cord.”88 Comparably, the Chamorro attorney Michael Phillips 
notes that land is “literally the base of Chamorro culture. It incorporates 
special relationships: of clan,  family, religion and beliefs.”89
When analyzing native gossip and retribution, the ko’ko- hilitai relation, 
and the white racism of the court, we can then ask, how did the navy’s tri-
bunal employ Chamorro testimonies to possess Chamorro lands in Guam, 
Rota, and the wider Marianas archipelago? And how did the commission’s 
understanding of “Japa neseness” expedite or hinder  these acts? Indeed, 
how did the court separate man from the non- man and the animal from 
the  human?90
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The Threshold of Empire
In this book, I treat the military commission as the threshold from which 
the United States renewed or made anew its sovereignty in Guam, Rota, 
and the wider Marianas archipelago. How did this “lawful” pro cess occur, 
and for what reasons? In the summer of 1944, the U.S. government knew 
that the question of sovereignty remained unsettled in light of the United 
States’ armed conflicts with the Japa nese military in the Marianas and the 
Asia- Pacific region. Even with Japan’s surrender to the United States in Au-
gust 1945, U.S. imperial claims to Guam, Rota, Tinian, Saipan, and other Pa-
cific Islands  were tenuous at best. Had American sovereignty been unequiv-
ocally true and juridically apparent, the U.S. Navy would not have issued 
Proclamation No. 4, titled “Exceptional Military Courts,” on July 21, 1944. 
As I intend to demonstrate in this study, the American military created a tri-
bunal in Guam, the first of its kind for the navy, for more than the purpose 
of prosecuting individuals accused of committing war crimes against U.S. 
citizens and nationals. Rather, Proclamation No.  4 functioned as an ex-
ceptional form of jurisprudence in its inclusive exclusion of non- American 
subjects: that is, the Chamorro, Chamorro- Japanese, and Japa nese inter-
preters, police officers, and soldiers of the Japa nese empire. That Guam 
functioned as a military colony of the United States— and not as a state as 
per domestic laws or as an in de pen dent country as per international laws— 
largely enabled the navy to assert its  legal claims to the island. This state 
of exception allowed for the development of the tribunal, its se lection of 
war criminal types, and its reassertion of the American empire— processes 
that occurred in Guam but that potentially could happen in other U.S. ter-
ritories. As Agamben argues, the state of exception is “neither external nor 
internal to the juridical order, and the prob lem of defining it concerns pre-
cisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do 
not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.”91 In this re spect, the 
tribunal “marks a state of exception— a supposed deviation from ‘normal’ 
war— and employs a set of procedural logics that have as their main goal the 
conceptual and material excision of the war criminal from the landscape of 
legitimate war- related killing.”92
In his analy sis of vio lence, the phi los o pher Walter Benjamin would de-
scribe the U.S. Navy’s tribunal as the law of the “state” from which its gov-
ernment, military, and police sought to contain or extinguish vio lence from 
within (e.g., strikes) and vio lence from without (e.g.,  enemy militaries). As 
he explains, vio lence threatens the law not “by the ends that it may pursue 
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but by its mere existence outside the law”; the navy’s jurists thereby un-
derstood that Japan’s military vio lence possessed what Benjamin theorized 
as the “lawmaking character” of the “ great criminal.”93 As I show in this 
study, the tribunal often construed Japa nese military torture, in par tic u lar, 
as existing outside the law so as to eradicate its lawmaking effects in Guam 
and elsewhere. Attempting to uphold its “law- preserving” function, the tri-
bunal feared such torture “for its lawmaking character, being obliged to 
acknowledge it as lawmaking whenever external powers force it to concede 
them the right to conduct warfare.”94 Subsequently, the court drew from 
its carceral logics to suspend the separation between “lawmaking” and 
“law- preserving” vio lence. In this manner, the military police, interroga-
tors, witnesses, and jurists participated in the carceral and security logics 
of the state. As Benjamin astutely observed, the “law of the police” marks 
the point at which “the state . . .  can no longer guarantee through the  legal 
system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. Therefore 
the police intervene ‘for security reasons’ in countless cases where no clear 
 legal situation exists.”95 That the tribunal functioned in this manner is an 
understatement; its unclear  legal status merely reflected the paradigm of 
the military colony of Guam, an aporia that must be analyzed for its lawful 
vio lence.
Yet, as recent  legal readings of the American military commission re-
veal, the tribunal only functions as an “exceptional” act of the law. This 
position has especially received critical purchase since the American confine-
ment of suspected “terrorists” at the navy’s prison fa cil i ty in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba. Contrary to  these understandings of the commission, however, I 
situate the tribunal in Guam as a foundational, established, and lawful exer-
cise of colonial power before the War on Terror. To be clear, I do not view the 
military commission as a site of “justice,” nor do I condone the incarcera-
tion of  people at Guantánamo and other “exceptional” and secret prisons. 
An analy sis of the U.S. carceral state, now unpre ce dented in its imprison-
ment of one in  every one hundred adults, demands a robust assessment of 
the distinct and shared conditions that led to the disciplinary logics and 
tactics in Guantánamo and elsewhere.96
What I find equally disturbing are academic treatments of what the  legal 
scholars Laurel E. Fletcher and Eric Stover call the “Guantánamo effect.” 
As they rightly assert, the phrase “Guantánamo effect” describes the cu-
mulative effect of indefinite detention, abusive interrogations, and pro-
longed isolation of the detainees at the U.S. naval prison in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.97 Yet they do not examine, let alone flag, the long histories of the 
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military commission in the context of indigenous  peoples and the Ameri-
can empire. What gets reproduced  here and in much of the  legal lit er a ture 
is the notion that the rule of law practiced at Guantánamo is “exceptional,” 
an anomaly in what is other wise the constitutionally sound rule of law. As 
the critic Marita Sturken asserts, Guantánamo is a “famously exceptional 
aberration: it is a U.S. Naval Base on the island of Cuba, yet not within the 
jurisdiction of Cuba, a site ‘owned’ by the U.S. through a perpetual lease 
since 1903 that the [George W.] Bush administration claimed is outside of 
U.S. law.”98 Studies of the American commission subsequently reify the 
position that  these tribunals represent the weakened “rule of law,” if not 
a breakdown in law.99 As the  legal scholars Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Oren 
Gross observe, “One of the most trenchant critiques of exceptional courts 
in general and military courts in par tic u lar is their deviation from the ordi-
nary pro cess of detention, pretrial pro cess, and the conduct of the trial.”100
Po liti cal euphemisms such as “aberration,” “deviation,” and “exception” 
inform the scholarship on the military commission and hence restrict our 
understanding of the military court’s relationship to U.S. empire, pun-
ishment, and race. While the tribunal has by no means served the same 
purpose, and while it has affected diff er ent populations for a variety of po-
liti cal reasons, the available  legal studies on this subject have been  limited 
by virtue of their disavowal of American Indians, Japa nese Americans, Pa-
cific Islanders, and other marginal subjects in the history of the tribunal.101 
Without a broader insight into  these pre ce dents, the current lit er a ture on 
the tribunal suffers from its primary focus on Guantánamo. This bias con-
sequently inhibits our analyses of law and vio lence as much as it impedes 
our interventions against lawful vio lence. As the  legal scholar Jace Weaver 
reminds us, a wider understanding of the tribunal and its relation to the 
princi ple of stare decisis allows us to analyze how  every “violation of civil 
liberties becomes part of the next” pre ce dent.102
When we place the tribunal in the context of American and Japa nese co-
lonialisms, we can therefore take stock of how the U.S. Navy transformed 
and normalized the laws about war in order to securitize its activities as 
legitimate and necessary in Guam.103 This was precisely what the navy and 
other military agencies meant by “justice.” As I show in this study, the navy 
viewed justice not as an effort to reconcile two or more aggrieved parties; 
rather, it took justice to mean the normalization of biopower by way of car-
ceral and colonial logics. With the tribunal as its apparatus of normalized 
biopower, the navy changed Guam from a small coaling station of 1898 into 
a “main operating base” of 1945.104 As a military base, the island began to 
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conduct numerous offensive attacks  under the rubric of anticommunism or 
humanitarian aid from World War II to the Cold War era to the pre sent.105 
As D. C. Ramsey, vice chief of naval operations, argued in August 1, 1946, 
“Guam with the adjacent Marianas, and to a slightly lesser degree the other 
islands of the Pacific seized from the Japa nese constitute the essence of the 
proposed naval system for control of the western Pacific and for the security 
of the United States. The bases now established, and being built up, are 
located on the islands having the largest populations.”106 By the late 1940s, 
Guam had effectively become a part of Amer i ca’s empire of bases, stretch-
ing from the Pacific to Asia and from Eu rope to Africa and elsewhere.107 
The island is now one of more than fifty- three hundred American military 
bases globally, of which an estimated one thousand are located outside the 
United States.108
Outline of the Book
This book opens with part I, “The State of Exception,” in order to discuss 
the “passage” of colonial rule from Japan to the United States in Guam. But 
rather than treat the state of exception as an aberration of law, I demon-
strate how the American military selectively applied vari ous laws and regu-
lations in its seizure of Guam and its population from Japan. Given that the 
American military understood this claim in terms of military necessity, I 
argue that the American reinvasion of the island sought to normalize its no-
tion of warfare and security as true and just over anything presented in the 
Japa nese laws of occupation in Guam and the Marianas.  Whether the U.S. 
Navy turned to The Penal Code of Guam, Naval Courts and Boards, or the plenary 
doctrine in advancing this position, it construed its rule of law as morally 
benign and virtuous. That is why the navy issued Proclamation No. 4, titled 
“Exceptional Military Courts,” on July 21, 1944, an act that supported the 
military’s construction of war criminality from which its tribunal asserted 
whiteness as property and sovereignty.
Starting with chapter 1, “War Bodies,” I examine how and why the U.S. 
Marine Corps and U.S. Navy created internment camps and prisoner stock-
ades for the confinement of Chamorros, Japa nese, and other subjects of the 
Japa nese administration and military. I specifically focus on the establish-
ment of American military and police intelligence units in the island and 
address how they racially classified acceptable and deviant be hav ior among 
their presumed wards, on the one hand, and their suspected war criminals, 
on the other. I begin to sketch, as well, the complex collusion between 
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American and Guamanian forms of racism and retribution, demonstrating 
how this biopower defined war criminality. In chapter 2, “War Crimes,” I 
contextualize the origins of the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program 
in Guam within a longer history of the commission and within the national 
and international debates on war criminality at the time.
In part II, “The Bird and the Lizard,” I demonstrate how native gossip, 
as bios, codetermined the navy’s classification of acceptable and deviant 
be hav ior among the living being and the speaking being of its accused war 
criminals. In chapter 3, “Native Assailants,” and chapter 4, “Native Murder-
ers,” I specifically take stock of the genealogy from which intranative antago-
nisms emerged and materialized. Whereas chapter 3 examines the assault 
and battery charges among the Rotanese and Saipanese men, chapter 4 ac-
complishes the same objective with re spect to the murder charge. I explore 
how and why the navy’s commission rendered the accused Rotanese and 
Saipanese as homines sacri, an effort that produced “test cases” and other 
pre ce dents for the apprehension of Japa nese nationals.
In part III, “The Military Colony,” I advance Agamben’s thinking on the 
camp with re spect to the American military colony, the out- of- sight but 
nevertheless violent form of biopower.109 In the last two chapters, I thus 
show how the navy’s military commission drew from this paradigm of bio-
power as much as it extended its rule of law to Guam and its neighbor is-
land, Rota. In chapter 5, “Japa nese Traitors,” I analyze the navy’s treason 
trial of Samuel Takekuna Shinohara, a Japa nese national and resident of 
Guam. Central to this discussion was how the navy portrayed Shinohara, 
an Issei, as violating whiteness as American property and sovereignty. In 
chapter 6, “Japa nese Militarists,” I then examine how the tribunal invoked 
international laws on espionage in its making of three Japa nese nationals 
into the image of murderers and, hence, “belligerent” occupiers of Rota. I 
also discuss the related assault and murder charges in Guam but emphasize 
the significance of the Rota case in terms of the navy’s efforts to expand the 
military colony beyond Guam. I then conclude with some reflections on 
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war bodies
During the summer and fall of 1944, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy es-
tablished several intelligence and police units in Guam. Although relatively 
new in their makeup and sometimes disor ga nized in their objectives,  these 
agencies subjected the indigenous and settler populations of the island to 
the logics of the U.S. carceral state. In this chapter, I show how the American 
military drew from its histories of discipline and punishment in its efforts 
to classify the disloyal from the loyal, the criminal from the noncriminal, 
and the ally from the  enemy among the  peoples of Guam. The purpose was 
threefold: first, to detain and segregate the criminal, disloyal, and  enemy 
subjects; second, to generate a public image of emasculated Japa nese and 
Japanized subjects; and, third, to lend moral credence to the American  legal 
apparatuses by casting suspicion and, hence, guilt upon suspected war crim-
inals and other deviant types. Chamorros from Guam, especially individuals 
with backgrounds in the military and the police, likewise incarcerated any-
body deemed a threat by the U.S. military. This pro cess exacted native forms 
of retribution and vio lence;  here, Guamanians often portrayed themselves 
and Americans as the virtuous ko’ko, thereby vilifying the Japa nese, Ro-
tanese, and Saipanese as the cunning hilitai. In  doing so, the American mili-
tary colluded with Guamanians to create bodies of war criminality— bodies 
that invoked the carceral and colonial logics of modernity in the Pacific.
Bodies of Military Intelligence
The U.S. Navy’s military intelligence units partly created the juridical lan-
guage, moral landscape, and racialized sphere through which indigenous 
and settler bodies  were classified, segregated, and incarcerated in the 
1
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Mariana Islands. Unlike its more secretive, expansive, and increasingly 
invasive manifestations of the post-9/11 era, the U.S. Navy of the late 
1930s and early 1940s lacked a structure to effectively or ga nize “intelli-
gence” across its war- waging campaigns in the Pacific.1 Even the  Office 
of Naval Intelligence (oni), an agency responsible for negotiating leg-
islative funds for and sharing administrative information about its in-
telligence apparatuses, found  little support at the national level. As the 
military historian Alan Harris Bath reveals, “oni lacked direct access to 
naval policy makers, a situation that continued throughout the Second 
World War. Although it was consulted from time to time, it was unable 
to convince leaders in the Navy Department of the need for intelligence 
or of its significance in decision making.”2 The demand for trained per-
sonnel, the concern to censor dissent, the uneven interpretation of mili-
tary laws, and the effort to form an indoctrinated workforce plagued the 
rise and spread of the navy’s intelligence units. The U.S. Navy oni knew 
this well.
Lamenting the disor ga nized direction of naval intelligence, Captain 
Ellis M. Zacharias of the U.S. Navy reflected on this state of affairs in a let-
ter dated January  27, 1942, to the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet. His letter was a call to action. “The greatest single weakness of our 
Naval Intelligence  today,” he wrote, “lies in the fact that our officers are 
selected for reasons other than special fitness for this kind of work.”3 In 
his estimation, the navy assigned officers to intelligence work for “trivial 
and irrelevant reasons,” with some individuals being recruited  because 
“they  were of foreign extraction or could speak, sometimes haltingly, in a 
foreign tongue.”4 As a result, Captain Zacharias opined, naval intelligence 
“became inferior in quality.”5 This inferiority stemmed from three  factors: 
first, the navy’s general reluctance to train officers with a rigorous academic 
knowledge of “foreign” socie ties; second, the navy’s failure to indoctrinate 
its personnel about the importance of military intelligence; and, third, the 
navy’s hesitation to treat seriously  matters of espionage as they pertain to 
shore bases and establishments. He exclaimed, “Ranking officers belittle 
the thought of spies or the suggestion of dangerous sabotage from within, 
they laugh at the possibility of subversive threats to our morale, they have 
spoken disparagingly of the Intelligence ser vice . . .  and resent and even 
combat efforts aimed at effecting security.”6 While Captain Zacharias of-
fered thin examples by way of justifying  these claims, his comments still 
illustrated the kinds of predicaments military intelligence units faced at the 
onset of the war.
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As a solution for addressing the “inferior” standards of military intel-
ligence, he urged the navy to create intelligence officers whose training and 
objectives would make for a more capable, willing, and offensive global mil-
itary. In an appendix attached to his letter, titled “The Standards of a Good 
Intelligence Officer,” Captain Zacharias characterized the ideal intelligence 
officer as possessing “a  mental alertness which  will enable him to cope with 
agile and clever opposition, fortified by ample financial resources.”7 An of-
ficer must also be suspicious, aggressive, and imaginative enough to “visu-
alize the pos si ble plans of  enemy agents and at the same time be sufficiently 
analytical to properly evaluate the information which comes to him.”8 Like 
their “foreign” intelligence counter parts, the naval officers needed to be 
knowledgeable about the geography, history, language, policy, and war-
fare of  enemy countries, as much as they should be cognizant of espionage 
and counterespionage tactics. Captain Zacharias’s suggestions thereby re-
flected an effort to produce knowledge about the Pacific Islands.
At the onset of the war, the navy or ga nized all classified materials  under 
the aegis of “Combat Intelligence” and “Radio Intelligence,” military units 
that developed tactical information for the navy. During that period,  there 
was no centralized agency through which military intelligence could easily 
be shared across the armed forces in the Pacific. The navy soon realized that 
a central organ ization was needed to transmit information across vari ous 
military commands, especially since the U.S. campaign to invade Japanese- 
occupied territories in Guam and the Pacific demanded reliable networks of 
communication. On September 7, 1943, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific 
Ocean Areas (jicpoa), was formed in response to  these needs. Although 
its formation was deemed a success, the fact that its ranks consisted largely 
of reservists or part- time military personnel indicated that full- time mili-
tary intelligence staff had yet to be realized in the then burgeoning organ-
ization. In light of  these challenges, jicpoa “grew with the war  until it 
could supply all types of the most detailed information on  every phase of 
Japa nese military, Naval, industrial, agricultural, po liti cal, and social de-
velopment.”9 Reflecting a middle- class sensibility in the recruitment of 
intelligence officers, the reserve officers consisted of “ lawyers, forest rang-
ers, architects, newspapermen, geologists, engineers, scholars and teach-
ers—[who became] qualified linguists and experts in the short space of two 
and three years.”10 As the largest producer of intelligence material, jicpoa 
evolved into the “only U.S. agency in which military and naval intelligence 
are formed into a single comprehensive organ ization servicing all the needs 
of ground, air, and naval forces of a theater commander.”11
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By intelligence, jicpoa meant “information of the  enemy, his organ-
ization, equipment, capabilities, and intentions. . . .  In brief, intelligence 
must be clarified, centralized and professionalized, and so constituted and 
situated in relation to the top command and to  those responsible for na-
tional policy.”12 Based in Pearl Harbor (Pu‘uloa), O‘ahu, jicpoa had grown 
to nearly five hundred officers and eight hundred enlisted personnel by 
1944. Among their tasks, the most notable included the development of 
propaganda in the forms of leaflets and broadcasts; the creation of aerial 
maps and photos of Japa nese civilian and military populations; the impris-
onment and interrogation of Japa nese prisoners of war; and the translation 
and interpretation of Japa nese military documents. By being located in 
Pearl Harbor, the closest military base to the western continental United 
States, jicpoa stressed its reach to military units during their forays into 
the Pacific. As one official report noted, jicpoa’s “geo graph i cal coverage 
for briefing was impressive. During the months of June and July 1945, mem-
bers of the staff  were in such widely separated places as Ie Shima, Okinawa, 
Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the Philippines, Hawaiian Islands, the Aleutians, 
and with the British Pacific Fleet in Sydney.”13
In the summer of 1944, jicpoa claimed to have saved many lives in the 
Mariana Islands based on its distribution of approximately 400,000 pro-
paganda leaflets that urged the indigenous and settler populations of the 
archipelago to surrender to the invading U.S. military forces. As a crucial 
component of  these forces, jicpoa “lent assistance to the island com-
mands in their mopping-up campaigns in Guam, Tinian [and] Saipan.”14 
The U.S. Marine Corps, for example, established “Intelligence Collecting 
Teams” to “follow closely in the rear of assault units and gather documents 
and material of intelligence value. . . .  All personnel  were instructed to turn 
over intelligence material to the collection teams or to the intelligence sec-
tions, who then forwarded it to higher headquarters.”15 As the Intelligence 
Section of the Third Marine Division reported in May 1944, “All individuals 
must be impressed with the fact that no item is too insignificant to be of 
intelligence value. A document or article which, at first glance, may appear 
to have no importance whatsoever may well be the vital link in a chain of in-
telligence information which a higher echelon is attempting to complete.”16
Preparing the Marine Corps for its assault in the Japanese- occupied is-
lands, the Intelligence Section emphasized, “ Every man should be made to 
realize that his failure to turn in immediately any intelligence information 
in the form of documents or material found by him could easily result in the 
deaths of many of his comrades due to the proper authorities not receiv-
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ing the information in time.”17 In addition to notebooks and other written 
items,  these objects included automatic weapons with ammunition, com-
munication equipment, dog tags, electronic and power plant equipment, 
and radar apparatuses, to name a few. With  these considerations in mind, 
the Intelligence Section warned that the failure to heed  these instructions 
would result in Marines “aiding the  enemy and betraying their comrades”; 
all manner of collecting war time “souvenirs” was likewise discouraged.18 
The Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas thereby contributed 
 toward the criminalization of bodies, ideas, and activities in Guam, the 
Mariana Islands, and other Pacific islands. In turn, the U.S. Navy’s War 
Crimes Tribunals Program  later treated such classification as lawful.
Classifying War Bodies
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Michel Foucault argued that the 
spectacle of public execution, or the sovereign imposition of power onto a 
suffering violator of monarchial law, no longer held prominence in Eu rope 
by the late nineteenth  century. The public torture of criminal bodies was on 
the decline; since that period, sovereign entities began to transfer punish-
ment from the bodies of criminals to the bodies of populations. As Foucault 
observed, “Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the con-
stituent ele ment of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations 
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights.” Referring to the 
white, rights- bearing body of colonial modernity, he said this of the body: 
“The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes 
upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the in-
dividual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as a property.” He 
continued, “If it is still necessary for the law to reach and manipulate the 
body of the convict, it  will be at a distance, in the proper way, according to 
strict rules, and with a much ‘higher’ aim. As a result of this new restraint, 
a  whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate 
anatomist of pain.”19  These technicians included chaplains, doctors, edu-
cationalists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and wardens, as well as military 
intelligence officers and enlisted personnel.
While Foucault’s general treatment of punishment resonates with the 
ways in which the navy crafted its intelligence apparatuses in Guam and 
the wider Mariana Islands, his notion that modern punishment deprives the 
body of rights and property can only go so far when considering the indige-
nous and settler  peoples of the Pacific— that is, the non- European socie ties 
34 chapter 1
of modernity. In Guam, individuals  under Japan’s empire became subject to 
the U.S. rule of law, as evidenced in the military’s classification of their bod-
ies. The intelligence briefs, administered by the military intelligence units 
and distributed to sailors and soldiers, are instructive in this regard. As one 
Marine report noted, “The military importance of Guam is  great. When 
you capture Guam, we  shall have advanced to within 1300 miles of Tokyo 
and  shall be only some 800 miles from Japan’s main bases. . . .  Guam is 
an American territory and the  people are American nationals. We  will be 
welcomed as liberators, not as enemies.”20
 After reclaiming Guam as an “American territory,” the brief identified 
Guamanians as Christian, peaceful, and good- natured. However, if they 
ignored the threats of military physical punishment, as the Marine intel-
ligence form warned, they  will, as a “law abiding” society, react favorably 
to the mere mention of the word “law.” Even as so- called loyal natives, the 
threat of the law always placed Chamorros outside of it, never fully a part 
of the polity yet often subjected to its vio lence. Marines and other military 
personnel in Guam thus fashioned themselves as a liberating and lawmak-
ing invading force. Of par tic u lar relevance  were the ways in which the mili-
tary intelligence briefs further categorized indigenous and settler bodies in 
Guam.
Whereas Guamanians  were generally perceived as both liberated and 
loyal subjects of the United States, military intelligence units sometimes in-
structed military personnel to suspend their preconceived prejudices about 
the Japa nese nationals, many of whom, the brief stated,  were “ really loyal 
Chamorros.”21 Clearly, the report described Chamorro- Japanese families on 
the island, of which  there  were 326 Japa nese nationals who had intermarried 
with Chamorro clans. As the memo indicated, “This information is given to 
you [the Marine] in order that you may guard yourselves against hasty con-
clusions when a person with oriental features is found. . . .  A  great number 
of  those classed as Japa nese are  really loyal Chamorros and it is well that you 
leave the screening of all  these  people to the Intelligence Section, which is 
best fitted to do it.”22 While this brief provided working definitions of in-
digenous and settler identities for the Marines, military police officers and 
military intelligence officers primarily “screened”  these categories, refined 
the “criminal” hierarchies, and segregated the bodies. Another military po-
lice memo declared, “Our job is to give  every pos si ble aid and assistance 
to the loyal and to confine the disloyal. . . .  This  will mean that many loyal 
 people  will be confined while awaiting individual examination. All con-
cerned must use  great tact and resourcefulness. This applies particularly to 
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Military Police who  will come in contact with the  people.”23 Wary of the in-
ternational implications of their tasks, the brief emphasized, “It is impera-
tive that this be done. Failure to treat our own loyal  people well would give 
the  enemy valuable propaganda to influence the  people of the Philippines 
against us. . . .  On the other hand, it is imperative that all disloyal persons 
be seized and segregated from the loyal.”24 With the war still being waged, 
the American intelligence and police units knew about the  legal and po liti-
cal stakes in repossessing Guam.
Drawing on The Penal Code of Guam and military proclamations, especially 
the laws that upheld interrogation and imprisonment, the military police 
became “the only police force available to see that the civilians comply with 
the Military Government and local laws.”25 As one report revealed, police 
personnel became “empowered to arrest violators of both type of laws.”26 
They likewise exercised “discretion in carry ing out that power.”27 With the 
military police having jurisdiction over all civilians, one of its first duties 
included the pro cessing of Chamorro interpreters and police officers from 
Rota and Saipan. As the military police and intelligence units prepared for 
 these investigations, the Rotanese and Saipanese sought refuge from the 
reinvading American forces. Sometime in July  1944, for example, nearly 
three hundred civilians employed by the Minseibu, the entire Kempeitai po-
lice force, and other Japa nese military and police officials left Hagåtña. By 
that time, the American military had been bombing the island’s capital for 
several weeks. As the Saipanese Nicholas T. Sablan recalled, “We  were try-
ing to escape danger” from the bombs of American airplanes and the shells 
of American ships.28 The Rotanese and Saipanese interpreters, including 
their  family members and one Guamanian prisoner, thus accompanied the 
Japa nese contingent to seek shelter from the Americans.
At first, they traveled to the villages of Etton, Fonte, and Otdot. The Japa-
nese officials then allowed the Rotanese and Saipanese to bring their rela-
tives to Manengon, an area where the Japa nese military had congregated 
most of the Guamanian population. According to Sablan, the Japa nese po-
lice forces followed them to Manengon, where the group remained for two 
days. The remaining Japa nese civilians and military personnel departed for 
the agricultural unit in Tai. But  because the American Marines had already 
landed on the island and  were fast approaching, the group traveled to the 
northern village of Upi. Once  there, the Japa nese civilians left the military 
and police forces, at which point the Japa nese Imperial Army ordered the 
Rotanese and Saipanese to accompany the army to the coastal village of 
Tarague. Fearing for their lives, the Saipanese Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero 
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said, “We, the remaining interpreters following the Japa nese police force, 
de cided to get away from the danger that was then  going around the Japa-
nese group. We waited  until our Japa nese companions had left and then 
proceeded to Santa Rosa mountain.”29 He continued, “One of our compan-
ions had some food with him and we de cided that as soon as that food was 
exhausted, we  were to go out and surrender ourselves. At the end of five 
days and five nights, we de cided early in the morning that  because one of 
our Saipan boys by the name of Henry Pangelinan understood the En glish 
language and also a native of Guam  going with us by the name of Pedro 
Zamora, that  these two men go out first to where the Americans  were and 
to inform them that we  were then in the woods.”30
Afraid of the American military, the Rotanese and Saipanese prayed 
among themselves and cautiously planned for their surrender, knowing 
that they might be tied up as a group, laid on the ground, and crushed 
 under the weight of American tanks.31 On August 15, 1944, Henry Pange-
linan and the Guamanian prisoner Pedro Zamora left the group for the 
Americans, that is, the direction where the “nearest gunfire was heard.”32 
“On our way to surrender,” stated Pangelinan, “we prepared a white flag. 
While we  were fixing that white flag, we heard an American whistle at us. 
So when we heard the whistle, we got so scared, we held up our hands and 
[Pedro Zamora] called out, ‘Chamorros, we are Chamorros.’ ”33 Pangelinan 
and Zamora then escorted the military police to their group. Disavowing 
their affiliation with the Japa nese due to their fear of the Americans, the 
other Rotanese and Saipanese similarly approached the Marines. As Pedro 
Sablan Leon Guerrero explained, “As soon as we got out of the woods, one 
of the guards asked if anyone of us was a Japa nese. We replied that we  were 
all natives. . . .  The guards went  toward us and patted us on the back and 
told us we  were already liberated.”34
The military police then pro cessed the Chamorro interpreters and po-
lice officers, with the exception of Luis C. Crisostomo, who was alive but 
missing from the group.35 Every body was fed as well. On the following day, 
August 16, 1944, the military police transferred them to a building in the 
village of Tomhom with other “surrendered” individuals. As Guerrero re-
called, the military police “came over and gave us soap and  water and told 
us to get out of the building, stretch ourselves, and wash our clothes but 
not go far.”36 He felt much relief and gratitude, especially since the mili-
tary police treated him better than his stripped and handcuffed Japa nese 
counter parts. What ever forms of “liberation” the Rotanese and Saipanese 
experienced, however,  were quickly diminished when the military police re-
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located them to the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp the next day. 
Attentive to the American military’s racism, Saipanese Manuel Borja Tudela 
understood that since “the beginning we  were segregated.”37
In a joint effort to classify the indigenous and settler populations of 
Guam, the American military’s intelligence and police units thus segre-
gated the war time populations along two signifying axes: the civilian and 
the prisoner of war. The American military “believed that interpreters 
( unless accompanying the Japa nese armed forces), civil policemen, or war-
dens of jails who served the Japa nese Military Government in Guam stand 
in the position of civilian employees of that government and should be in-
terned as civilians.”38 Therefore, the navy interned numerous Chamorros 
from Rota and Saipan  under the civilian subcategories of “civilian detainee” 
and “civilian internee.” As the Marine captain and intelligence officer Nick 
Savage explained, “The term civilian detainee is applied to persons locked 
up  because he or she may represent a dangerous ele ment in society, locked 
up  under military law against whom no formal charges have been lodged.”39 
On the other hand, he stated that the “term civilian internee applies to per-
sons who had been charged and sentenced for a crime or who had been 
formally recorded as representing an  enemy country or holding sympathy 
 toward an  enemy country.”40 As Savage’s comments reveal, the navy had 
wide latitude in arbitrarily determining who constituted the “dangerous” 
members of society.
In everyday and official discourse, the military likewise used  these terms 
interchangeably in its screening and detaining of civilians in “protective 
compounds”; hence, civilians  were incarcerated without any formal crimi-
nal charges levied against them. Once they  were interned, the military cre-
ated a census of “civilians” as per four identities: “(a) Chamorros believed 
loyal [to the United States] (b) Chamorros believed disloyal or whose loy-
alty is in doubt (c) Other civilians (d) Apprehended violators of Military 
Government, proclamations,  orders or notices, and of local criminal laws, 
 until such time as local jails and prisons are opened.”41 Detailing  these cat-
egories further Captain Savage recalled that the “major job” of classifying 
civilians produced “Okinawan fishermen in one category and the Japa nese 
 women comfort troops in another category, and the Saipanese and Tini-
anese and the Chamorros as another category, and the allegedly disloyal 
half Japa nese and half Chamorro Guamanians in another category.”42
Commenting on the role of the protective compounds, Major General 
Roy S. Geiger of the U.S. Marines informed the interned that the compounds 
protected them from incurring injuries due to the ongoing conflicts on the 
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island. “It is necessary,” he said, “to remain in the compound . . .  because 
 there may be some  enemy civilians among you and  there may be  others who 
sympathize with the  enemy.  These  will be sent to the prison stockade as 
soon as discovered.”43 He added that the “Marines that are on guard around 
the compound are  there to protect [civilians] as well as to prevent the dis-
loyal from escaping. The Marines in the compound are  here to assist you. 
They  will show you how to make your shelters and have tools which you may 
use in making places of protection for you and your families.”44 Once in-
terned in August 1944, the indigenous Chamorro and Asian settler popula-
tions, numbering 18,000 and 1,250, respectively, received food and medical 
supplies.45  These camps  were located in the villages of Hågat, Tamuning, 
Tutuhan, Yigo, and Yoña. Many individuals thanked the U.S. military for 
the much- needed assistance; Guam Chamorros felt especially relieved to 
witness the demise of the Japa nese empire.
Yet the act of detaining  these  peoples represented more than a mea sure 
of population control and racialized classification. As the sociologist Or-
lando Patterson would put it, the camps in Guam partly invoked the “sym-
bolic instruments” of enslavement. In fact, Patterson identifies “capture in 
warfare” and “punishment for crimes” as two of the eight means by which 
slaveholders have historically acquired slaves.46 Slave masters all over the 
world, he expressed, “used special rituals of enslavement upon first acquir-
ing slaves: the symbolism of naming, of clothing, of hairstyle, of language, 
and of body marks.”47 While military officials never described interned ci-
vilians as “slaves,” the protective compounds nevertheless drew from the 
carceral history of the United States. By describing  these individuals as “en-
emies,” the American military rationalized interning them, much like how 
the U.S. penal state exists to shield civil society from so- called criminals 
and outcasts.48
The navy further illustrated this parallel in its incarceration of prisoners 
of war. Comparable to its treatment of civilian detainees and civilian in-
ternees, the military categorized prisoners of war  under the vague premise 
that they served the Japa nese armed forces in some way. According to one 
Marine account, the captured prisoners of war “ were, or professed to be, ex-
tremely stupid, having no knowledge of any units or activity other than their 
own. Nearly all tactical information obtained from Prisoners of War proved 
to be thoroughly unreliable. With a few exceptions the documents captured 
 were of no value to the conduct of operations.”49 On the contrary, though, 
the Marines tempered their dismissive and racist views of prisoner agency 
by stating that the “lack of information from Prisoners of War and the ab-
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sence of valuable documents may reflect a growing security consciousness 
on the part of the  enemy.”50 Japa nese military officers, for example,  were 
often less cooperative in interrogations, indicating reluctance on the part of 
some men to disclose information.51 Other prisoners of war included busi-
nessmen, dentists, doctors, and teachers, as well as any Asian employed by 
the military. If soldiers  were identified as prisoners of war, the U.S. military 
then transferred them to the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp, also 
known as the “prisoner stockade,” in Hagåtña. Intelligence officers  later 
determined if they participated in war crimes. The prisoners of war also en-
gaged in training and disciplinary drills.52 Their  labor was utilized as well.
As with the detained civilians, the military also exploited the  labor of 
prisoners of war, with civilians working for “any military proj ect consistent 
with military security.”53 Or ga nized by the Civilian Affairs section of the re-
established U.S. military government, the civilian laborers included “able- 
bodied” men over fourteen years of age, Koreans, “non- military Asiatics,” 
and “ enemy nationals.”54 The el derly, the sick, and  women, including the 
religious, medical, and po liti cal elites,  were excluded from the military’s 
 labor pool. Specifically, the military targeted individuals who could build 
stockades and related facilities, thereby engendering a masculine yet ul-
timately emasculated  labor force. For this reason, interned civilians and 
prisoners of war, including Chamorro volunteers, sometimes participated 
in similar proj ects. As one naval memorandum declared, prisoners of war 
“may be used to perform work that is essential— i.e. work that would have 
to be done  whether or not prisoners of war are available.”55
Yet the military largely placed its “essential”  labor demands on prison-
ers of war in construction work and, to a lesser extent, agricultural produc-
tion (figure 1.1). Other forms of  labor involved “ handling of stores, repair of 
motor vehicles, laundry work, and up- keep of buildings and grounds.”56 On 
the other hand, the military discouraged prisoners of war from “work that 
directly contributes to the war effort, work that is unhealthful or danger-
ous, or work of a classified nature that might offer an opportunity for sabo-
tage.”57 Other wise, an armed guard received instructions to ensure that “all 
members of his detail are within sight and control”; guards  were forbidden, 
as well, from delivering derogatory remarks to and fraternizing with the 
prisoners of war.58 The military likewise informed  these guards to “show a 
pow what is to be done, be sure they understand it, then keep them moving. 
An Oriental cannot be rushed. If pushed and hurried he  will quit.”59
The compounds then segregated the prisoners of war and other laborers, 
already racialized as loyal and disloyal subjects, by issuing cloth armbands 
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to allow the guards to better identify and supervise their duties. As the 
military instructed, “Arm bands  will be red for Japa nese, red and white 
striped for Koreans, and white for all other nationalities.” Further, English- 
speaking laborers and interpreters for the military wore a plain armband 
beneath their respective colored bands. In  these circumstances, the color 
red may have signified po liti cal danger. And whereas red and white may 
have meant po liti cal ambivalence, white may have symbolized neutrality or 
loyalty to the United States. Although the military did not explain the rea-
sons for choosing  these colors, its treatment of laborers clearly followed 
carceral and militarized routines.  These activities included attaching letters 
and numbers to the armbands; assigning military enlisted men as supervisors 
to the laborers; maintaining daily rec ord books on laborer responsibilities; 
organ izing eight- hour work shifts over a six- day period; and appointing 
armed guards to monitor Asian laborers.
Explaining the relationship between  labor and imprisonment, the 
scholar Angela  Y. Davis writes that “in the philosophical conception of 
1.1.  Japa nese prisoners 
being searched at a pow 
camp on Guam. The original 
caption reads, “At Jap pw 
camp on Guam, prisoners 
are seen  under surveyance 
of camp officials. Prisoners 
being searched at gate as 
they return from work” 
(no photo number, Rec. 
September 11, 1945). U.S. 
National Archives, College 
Park, Mary land.
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the penitentiary,  labor was a reforming activity. It was supposed to assist 
the imprisoned individual in his (and on occasion her) putative quest for 
religious penitence and moral re- education.  Labor was a means  toward a 
moral end.”60 For the navy, its personnel sought to reestablish a  legal and 
po liti cal hierarchy that was temporarily usurped by the former Japa nese oc-
cupational military government in Guam.  Toward this goal, the navy sub-
jected prisoners of war to “hard  labor” that exceeded “the physical exertion 
required of troops,” a pro cess by which the navy disciplined the prisoners 
into subjects of U.S. colonial law.61 As in other cases, the navy was not alone 
in its endeavors to punish any prisoner of war.
Chamorros who resisted the navy’s demonization of the Japa nese became 
the objects of local ridicule all the same. Silvina Charfauros- Cruz Taumo-
moa, for example, provided the following account of how her grand mother 
of the Gutgohu clan assisted the Japa nese prisoners of war in the village 
of Hågat when the men  were tasked to clean debris and collect the skele-
tal remains of their comrades. As Taumomoa observed, “Only my grand-
mother would give cold  water, pull the fainting  under a shade and apply 
cold compress.” The native  women of the village condemned Taumomoa, 
one of the few elders to help the prisoners of war, for  these actions. Contin-
ued Taumomoa, “The  women would then make remarks like, ‘ These men 
killed your son and ours. Why are you helping them to live? They should die 
as they deserved!’ My grand mother would simply answer that, ‘The war is 
over, and my son is dead. No amount of bitterness would raise him from the 
dead.’ ” Stressing solidarity for Japa nese and Asian  women, Taumomoa’s 
grand mother said, “ ‘But let me tell you,  these men have  mothers and wives. 
And somewhere in Japan, they are crying as I cried, wishing as I wished that 
my sons would all come home safely.’ ”62
Elsewhere, Guamanian forms of retribution complemented the web of 
native gossip and spite that made critiques of the navy’s laws difficult and 
dangerous. In this re spect, some members of the navy utilized native  labor, 
racism, and vio lence to develop their intelligence and police units, just as 
some Guamanians appropriated the military’s logics to their own ends. 
Created by the U.S. military government in November 1944, for example, 
the Guam Combat Patrol captured any “Japa nese stragglers” who had yet 
to surrender to the Marine Corps and navy. Consisting of Chamorros from 
Guam, the native police force ranged from as few as eight men to as many as 
twenty- four individuals during its existence from 1944 to 1947. Describing 
its mission, the editors for the Guam Gazette reported, “ ‘Surrender or die,’ 
was the order given Guam’s Combat Patrol to deliver to the remaining Japa-
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nese Armed Forces hiding in the hills.” As Staff Sergeant Juan U. Aguon, a 
Chamorro, noted, “We always get them— dead or alive!”63 Further elabo-
rating upon their role, the editors for the Navy News disclosed that “con-
tinuous small reconnaissance patrols must be used at pre sent to ferret out 
the renegades  because the Japs quickly go into hiding when they encounter 
large searching parties.”64 As the Intelligence Section of the Third Marine 
Division in Guam put it, Guamanian men  were chosen for their “knowl-
edge of trails,  water points, and caves . . .  in hunting down small groups 
in hiding.”65 Describing the Japa nese as stragglers or animals to be preyed 
upon, the Navy News thus understood them as “desperadoes [who are] shot 
down at sight if they attempt to resist when they are apprehended.”66 By 
April 1946, the American military estimated that the Guam Combat Patrol 
had killed “174 Japa nese guerillas,” with only twelve being captured and 
detained.67
In princi ple, the American military charged the Guam Combat Patrol to 
locate and arrest any remaining Japa nese individuals in the island (figure 1.2). 
But that seldom proved the case, as illustrated in the racist coverage by the 
military’s media and as evidenced in the racist actions by Guamanians. Ac-
cording to Adolf Sgambelluri, the son of the former police officer Adolfo 
Sgambelluri, the American military wondered why the patrol had not 
captured any Japa nese civilians or prisoners of war three months into its 
operation. As Adolf Sgambelluri recalled, the Marine captain Nicholas 
Savage said to Adolf ’s  father, Adolfo Sgambelluri, “What the hell? How 
come you  haven’t caught any stragglers?”68 Suspicious of the Guam Combat 
Patrol’s activities, Savage then instructed Adolfo Sgambelluri to investigate 
this case and to apprise him thereafter. The latter eventually concluded that 
the Guam Combat Patrol had murdered all the Japa nese stragglers three 
months into its operations. As his son explained, the patrol “hated the Japa-
nese so bad, they would make the [surrendered] guy run. . . .  So when the 
guy runs down the road they shoot him in the back and kill him.” He con-
tinued, “My  father found out who  these guys [in the Guam Combat Patrol] 
 were, wrote the report, and it went to [Captain Nicholas Savage], and [he] 
took it up to the commanding general of the landing force.”69
Knowing that murder was illegal and grounds for naval punishment, 
Sgambelluri’s “ father put in a caveat that the Chamorros have suffered for 
the last two years, been tortured, and  they’re ‘getting even now.’ ”70 Unsur-
prisingly, the American military failed to arrest the unidentified members 
of the Guam Combat Patrol responsible for murdering anybody they classi-
fied as “Japa nese stragglers.” The collusion between military classifications 
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of zoē, animal life, and native retribution coalesced  here; this po liti cal nexus 
thrived, as well, in the circulation of native rumors and hearsay, the interro-
gations of suspected war criminals, the solicitation of witness testimonies, 
and the development of court proceedings. Rather than hold  these Guama-
nians accountable for their actions, the military instead awarded the men 
of the Guam Combat Patrol, including  those who perished during their mis-
sions. They received the Bronze Star Medal, the Purple Heart, and the Silver 
Star Medal for attempting, as one periodical noted, to “eradicate” Japa nese 
stragglers from the island.71
Although the final death and capture statistics for the Guam Combat 
Patrol are unknown, vari ous monthly reports indicate that numerous Japa-
nese died  under the vigilante efforts of  these Chamorro men.72 While a few 
Japa nese survived, it is clear that the Guam Combat Patrol shored up the 
navy’s racism in ways that supported the broader incarceration of Japa-
nese, Rotanese, Saipanese, and other suspected individuals in Guam. As 
1.2.  The Guam Combat Patrol discussing stolen food. The original caption reads, “The 
Native Military Gov. patrol fighters scouring the jungles of Guam, for Japs. The day’s 
hunting starts as members of the Native Military patrol hears a native explain that 
during the previous night chickens, eggs and produce had been stolen by Japs from his 
farm on the edge of the jungle. L- R Sgt. Juan Aguon, patrol leader, Pedro San Nicholas, 
Jesus Yosida, Ignacio Riverin and Antonio Manibusan, members of the patrol” (photo 
number 01204 cincpac, Rec. June 1, 1945). U.S. National Archives, College Park, 
Mary land.
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Vicente M. Diaz and Laura Marie Torres Souder argue in their critiques of 
the war, providing Chamorros with  limited positions of power in the form 
of the Guam Combat Patrol, monitoring the state of hygiene in the camps, 
and introducing medical aid and canned foods produced a series of cultural 
and historical pro cesses. In other words,  these foundational events of the 
war generated economies of dependence among the interned populations, 
reified the carceral state by which the U.S. military governed indigenous 
and settler subjects in the Pacific, and created Chamorro cultural systems 
of obligation and reciprocity to the U.S. nation that problematically persist 
to this day.73
Bodies of War Criminality
Largely unbeknownst to the indigenous and settler populations, the es-
tablishment of protective compounds and the Island Command Prisoner 
of War Camp merely constituted the first stage in the making of the War 
Crimes Tribunals Program. Although numerous Chamorro clans eventually 
returned to their respective villages throughout the island, and although 
many Asian settlers reconnected with their displaced communities, the 
gestures of supposed humanitarianism provided by the internment camps 
belied the carceral aspects of  these sites. As the military commission came 
to fruition in December  1944, the intelligence and police units in ven ted 
new bodies of war criminality that speak to Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer 
as the original foreclosure of po liti cal life that the sovereign claims in the 
name of democracy.
The making of the protective compounds in Guam thereby  limited the 
po liti cal life, bios, of the interned Japa nese settlers and indigenous Cham-
orros, similar to Foucault’s perception of the function of prisons in modern 
society. As he astutely observed,  these war bodies constituted “the organ-
ization of a field of prevention, the calculation of interests, the circulation 
of repre sen ta tions and signs, the constitution of a horizon of certainty and 
proof, the adjustment of penalties to ever more subtle variables; all this 
also leads to an objectification of criminals and crime.”74 As the navy at-
tempted to control the fields of signification by which war criminality was 
made legally meaningful, Agamben’s sacred man surfaced in the navy’s 
calculations of criminality. As an appendage of the U.S. polity, homo sacer 
emerged via the navy’s reinvasion of Guam  because his image as an “Ameri-
can” law- abiding subject was suppressed during the Japa nese occupation 
from 1941 to 1944.
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That is to say, the U.S. military reduced the interned individuals to bio-
logical life, zoē, or a restricted sense of po liti cal life, bios, so as to impose 
its categories of war criminals and other deviant types. That Guamanians 
often dehumanized their Chamorro counter parts from Rota and Saipan as 
the proverbial hilitai reflected both indigenous notions of reciprocity and 
retribution as much as they illustrated the American military’s erasure of 
Japa nese po liti cal life, bios, among the Rotanese and Saipanese. The in-
carceration of  these subjects in American- made compounds and prisoner 
stockades thus established a landscape wherein all  things Japa nese  were 
eliminated and remade in criminal terms. As Mbembe reminds us, the 
“subject in the colony . . .  is nothing but an appearance. He/she has a body. 
The colonizer can seize, harass, lock up the native, compel forced  labor, 
make him or her pay taxes or serve as cannon fodder.”75
As the navy understood it, war criminality involved  people who com-
mitted “murders, atrocities and other violations of the laws of war against 
members of the armed forces of the United States or against other Ameri-
cans, including the  peoples of any de pen dency such as the Philippines.”76 
With the establishment of the national War Crimes Office in December 25, 
1944, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal instructed all military units in 
the Pacific to “arrange for the immediate or eventual apprehension, trial 
and sentence of such war criminals.”77 As the War Department emphasized, 
“Personnel performing investigative, intelligence, police, photographic, 
or medical functions  will during the normal course of their duties make 
 every effort to detect and develop information regarding war crimes and to 
prepare and report evidence.”78 Failure to heed  these  orders, the War De-
partment forewarned, could enable “many of the persons responsible for 
outrages against humanity . . .  to go unpunished  because of the failure to 
preserve evidence or to obtain essential information at the time of discov-
ery and at the scene of the crime.”79 As the negotiating agency between the 
State and the Navy Departments, the War Department coordinated  matters 
concerning war crimes against U.S. military personnel and “other Americans” 
in Asia, Eu rope, and the Pacific Islands. Given the navy’s governance of 
several Pacific islands since 1898, the secretary appointed the judge advo-
cate general of the navy with cognizance over  legal issues relating to war 
crimes.80
Specifically, the secretary referred to the “Navy’s Pacific” as the U.S. ter-
ritory of Guam and the former Japanese- mandated islands of the western 
Pacific; other Pacific branches included “China, India- Burma, Japan, the 
Malay Section, Netherland East Indies, the Philippines, the Ryukyu Section, 
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and the Solomon Islands Section, areas where Australia, the United States, 
and other allied countries conducted war crimes investigations.”81  Under 
its war time jurisdiction, the navy consequently examined allegations of war 
crimes in the Bonin Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Gilbert Islands, the 
Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Palau Islands.82 Intelligence 
materials about war crimes gathered by military commands in  these areas 
 were forwarded to the judge advocate general of the navy, who furnished 
 legal information upon request and made “recommendations with regard 
to procedure and personnel.”83
Advancing the now official mandate to investigate war criminals among 
the interned populations in Guam’s protective compounds and in the pris-
oner stockade, the navy also created the Advance Intelligence Center (aic) 
on the island to assist the Office of the Judge Advocate General, jicpoa, the 
military police, and other related intelligence units in the criminalization of 
indigenous and settler bodies. Formed in January 1945, and based in Guam 
at the Advance Headquarters of the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(cinpac), the aic held responsibility for “photographic reconnaissance, 
target se lection, geography, interrogation and translation, escape and in-
vasion, psychological warfare, flak intelligence, reference library, aviation 
charts and photo laboratory, and distribution.”84 Although aic’s main task 
was to support U.S. war efforts in Asia and the Pacific, its “interrogation 
and translation” section played a central role in interrogating prisoners of 
war in Guam.
Erecting a Quonset hut near the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp, 
the aic screened and identified potential war criminals among the nearly 
seven hundred prisoners of war interned in the stockade. In the pro cess, the 
aic often encountered prisoners of war who said  little about their war time 
pasts, if not altogether resisted the agency’s interrogation methods. As one 
intelligence report indicated, the military’s “investigations are progressing 
slowly  because of the well or ga nized efforts being made by the Japa nese 
involved to conceal  these crimes to avoid implication.”85 “At the end of the 
war,” the memorandum continued, “many of them  were instructed as to 
what to say in case they  were questioned by the allied forces concerning 
disappearances of [American] prisoners of war. At pre sent many of them 
are still conspiring to keep their activities secret.”86  Whether the aic ques-
tioned prisoners of war as to the locations of missing Americans or the 
manner in which they died, the intelligence unit adhered to several goals in 
making its evaluations.
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The first purpose of the interrogations was to “perpetuate all available 
evidence as to permit trial of the accused at a  later date”; the second objec-
tive aimed to “collect evidence which, when properly combined with evi-
dence from other sources, may fix responsibility at levels above that of the 
immediate perpetrator.”87 As  these par ameters illustrate, the investigations 
employed a vertical hierarchy by which to ascertain bodies of war criminal-
ity, from the low- ranking soldiers to the high- ranking commanders of the 
Japa nese military. If the aic determined a war crime was committed or wit-
nessed by a prisoner, then aic cross- checked with administrative officers 
in vari ous intelligence units to gauge if said war crime was already being 
investigated. If that was the case, then aic added information to that ongo-
ing investigation (e.g., personal statements). Other wise, files  were opened 
whenever new allegations of war crimes emerged. Each file identified the 
name(s) of the accused war criminal(s), with subheadings for the name(s) 
of the alleged victim(s), as in this prescribed format: “tanaka, Juichi; alias 
‘The Bug- Eye”/moto, Taro;/1st Lt. John J. Doe— Victim.”88
While  these and other files often listed “victims” as white military men, 
war crimes investigating officers  were also trained to imagine their “vic-
tims” as “white, female, adult,  house wife.”89 Predictably, the American 
military gendered its victims as domestic, vulnerable, and white in its war 
crimes investigations, as if to signify a feminine and  violated nation. The 
defense and prosecution teams of the military court  later invoked  these 
tropes of innocence, albeit in differently situated ways for colonial, indig-
enous, and settler bodies alike. Furthermore, individuals suspected of war 
crimes  were not segregated from the wider prison population “so as to 
avoid disclosure that individuals are being held for  future trial.”90 It was not 
 until the military court summoned the accused prisoners for trial that their 
identities as war criminals  were publicly exposed; they  either remained in 
the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp in Hagåtña or  were transferred 
to the new War Criminals Stockade in the village of Tomhom. In fact, none 
of the interned Japa nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese individuals accused of 
war crimes ever received their charges  until one to three months before they 
faced their  trials. In this secretive environment, the navy’s intelligence units 
identified their suspected war criminals among a pool of nearly 135,000 ci-
vilian and military personnel examined in Guam and the western Pacific up 
to the end of the War Crimes  Trials Program in 1949.91
In  these interrogations, the navy intelligence units clearly subjected in-
terned civilians and prisoners to the surveillance mechanisms of a police 
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state. Whereas the U.S. Constitution theoretically prevented the military 
from engaging in police activities without the consent of Congress or the 
president, as reflected in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, the navy had his-
torically employed police logics in its colonization of indigenous  peoples 
in the Pacific and elsewhere.92 Since the act no longer applies  today given 
its repeal during the Reagan administration’s war on drugs in the 1980s, 
and especially due to Reagan’s endorsement of military training and war-
fare tactics among the police, some critics now argue that the lines that 
distinguish the military sphere from the police sphere have altogether dis-
appeared.93  Those domains, however, coexisted intimately in the military 
colony of Guam. As a central component of the navy’s carceral and intel-
ligence apparatuses, the policing of war criminals began with the identifi-
cation of individuals allegedly involved in war crimes. This was the pro cess 
by which aic, jicpoa, and  others compared their respective files on war 
crimes. Once individuals  were targeted as “war criminals,” military intel-
ligence units examined their modus operandi. As naval commander George 
H. Brereton explained, in “police investigation the ‘M.O.’ of an unknown 
criminal is often of considerable value in connecting him with a par tic u lar 
type of crime.”94
With the identities of the accused and the victim established, and with 
a modus operandi on which to draw, naval intelligence units meticulously 
created a context to produce the “guilt” of the war criminal in question. 
When describing the accused beyond his or her name, for example, Com-
mander Brereton urged investigators to “make  every effort to get an accurate 
and complete description of the suspect, his ser vice connections, relations, 
friends, prior occupation, hometown, habits and personal characteristics.”95 
Second Lieutenant Ralph De Vries confirmed this tactic, as intelligence of-
ficers like himself frequently asked an accused individual when “he came 
to Guam, what he did  here, just so we could get his life history.”96 In  these 
cases, De Vries “investigated the  people who  were suspected of beatings 
and murder with reference to Guam citizens.”97 In the pro cess, the pheno-
type of the nonwhite war criminal emerged. His age, build, and height mat-
tered, as did his eye, hair, and skin color. Other racialized attributes— from 
his body amputations to his scars and from his tattoos to his gold teeth— 
were recorded in police notebooks.
Further reifying the body of the war criminal, intelligence officials used 
six interrogation techniques that charmed, forced, or intimidated the ac-
cused war criminal into providing information. The first method confronted 
the accused with “overwhelming evidence”; the second tactic employed a 
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“harsh” interviewer and a “friendly” interviewer; the third style suggested 
immunity for the accused; the fourth approach exaggerated the offense; the 
fifth strategy applied hypnotism; and, fi nally, the six procedure utilized a 
polygraph.98 For the investigators, the accused individuals revealed their 
guilt by their twitching hands, refusal to cooperate, declarations of inno-
cence, sweating, changed facial skin color, or dry mouths (as indicated by 
their request for a drink).99 Additionally, investigators aimed to retain the 
personal statements of any witnesses  under oath, as prepared and written 
by the witnesses, the investigators, and, in some cases, the assigned inter-
preters. As one memorandum on war crimes interrogations asserted, “It is 
most desirable that the [investigator] examine  under oath all witnesses who 
have or purport to have knowledge of such atrocity or crime.”100 Eventually, 
Chamorro, Chamorro- Japanese, and Japa nese men and  women constituted 
the court’s witnesses not  because of their knowledge of war time events per 
se but  because of their deep hatred of and, in a few cases, sincere sympathy 
for the accused war criminals in Guam. Investigators thus turned to  these 
witnesses, notably Guamanians, to provide “personal knowledge” of crimi-
nal activities, even exploiting their antagonisms  toward the accused war 
criminals.101 But if said information came from another person, the inves-
tigators requested the identity and whereabouts of the individual in case 
their main witness could not attend the trial.102
Using cameras, investigators also took photos “wherever pos si ble” of 
the alleged crime scene and, if pos si ble, of the alleged victim.103 If a body 
was found, which sometimes occurred, investigators photographed it, as-
sisted a medical officer in examining any wounds, gathered evidence from 
the body (e.g., bullets, clothes), and searched it for any kind of personal 
identification. Other than using the victim’s body as evidence, investiga-
tors likewise searched for fingerprints “on smooth surfaces, such as highly 
polished desks, win dow panes, light bulbs, drinking glasses, polished sur-
faces of weapons, glassware, cookery,  etc.”104 While finding fingerprints 
proved difficult given the poor conditions of the investigation sites, as many 
homes, graves, and buildings  were damaged or obliterated during the war, 
the related objective of creating casts and molds of footprints, tire tracks, and 
other physical markers seemed nearly impossible. Given  these circumstances, 
many war crimes investigators resorted to locating written evidence, as in a 
diary or a memo, in order to substantiate their claims about the guilt of war 
criminals.  These methods likewise applied to the interrogations of civilians 
in the protective compounds where the issue of Chamorro complicity with 
the Japa nese empire surfaced.
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Knowing that few Chamorro interpreters for the Japa nese spoke En glish, 
all of whom came from the “Japanized” islands of Rota and Saipan, the navy 
enlisted Guamanians to translate the Chamorro and En glish languages. 
Along with personnel associated with aic, jicpoa, and other intelligence 
units, the navy sought the help of Guamanians  because of their intimate 
knowledge of the  people, the island, and, above all, the suspected war 
criminals. The police officer Adolfo Sgambelluri was one such individual 
who, disguised as a civilian detainee in the camps, investigated “Chamor-
ros that  were collaborating with the  enemy.”105 Another Guamanian by the 
name of Pedro Dueñas Camacho performed similar duties for the American 
military. As he recalled, “I had the position of being one of the impor tant 
men . . .  helping the Government and at the same time trying to locate 
all  these natives who are Japa nese collaborators, that is my job. I got their 
names and arrested some of them and sent them to the stockade.”106
As a Marine who supervised the conditions of interned Chamorros in 
the protective compounds, Captain Charles H. Kraus praised  these Guama-
nians for their “familiarity with the  people, language and so on.”107 In his 
view, “the most impor tant assistance of the native police was in the intel-
ligence field.”108 Unlike the interrogations of prisoners of war, which imme-
diately categorized them as disloyal subjects, the first tier of interrogations 
in the protective compounds attempted to segregate the disloyal from the 
loyal. Quite often, the disloyal civilians  were described as “Japa nese, Saipan 
natives, and natives with Japa nese sympathies.”109 Commenting on the po-
liti cally charged relations among the Chamorros of the Mariana Islands, 
Kraus noticed the “strong antagonisms that existed between Saipan and 
Guam Chamorros. Apparently this was caused by the fact that a large num-
ber of the Saipan civilians had been imported by the Japa nese as interpret-
ers and  labor supervisors. They, doubtless,  were selected  because of their 
strong pro- Japanese feelings.”110 “Upon discovery of a questionable char-
acter,” he continued, the accused “and his  family, if pos si ble,  were sent to 
the [Hagåtña prisoner] stockade.”111 With the aid of the Guamanian police, 
then, the navy identified “300 civilians [who]  were confined by [the navy] 
 under charges or suspicion of being collaborators in some way.”112
At this point, civilians accused of participating in war crimes  were trans-
ferred to the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp, where they, along 
with their families,  were segregated among the prisoner of war population. 
This second removal varied from camp to camp as the navy conducted its 
interrogations of civilians. Contrary to the prisoners who knew  little or 
nothing about the navy’s separation of war criminals among them, thereby 
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retaining their relative anonymity as accused subjects  until summoned by 
the military court, the civilians removed from the protective compounds to 
the prisoner of war stockade  were immediately subjected to public expo-
sure and humiliation. For the accused Chamorros from Rota and Saipan, 
they became objects of cultural ridicule and shame— what Captain Kraus 
called “spite”—as much as they became subjects of the military’s carceral 
apparatuses.113
Guamanians affiliated with Japan’s empire found themselves in a similar 
predicament. The American military, for example, incarcerated the Fran-
quez  family  because of their war time association with Samuel Takekuna 
Shinohara, a Japa nese national and the se nior interpreter for the Minseibu 
in Guam. As Rita T. Franquez recalled, her  mother, Maria, was the sibling 
of Shinohara’s wife, Carmen, by virtue of their ties to the Torres clan. The 
military consequently interned both families, deemed “guilty by associa-
tion,” in a camp “with a double barbed wire fence and machine guns placed 
at the corners and along the fence at regular intervals.”114 Describing the 
interior of the fa cil i ty, Franquez said, “The crowded Japa nese pow camp 
we  were imprisoned in was flooded when the monsoon rain started. The 
rectangular canvas that served as a roof was strictly a rooftop cover but open 
on all sides which did not keep wind or rain out. The floor, of course, was 
dirt and flooded.”115 Rita T. Franquez, who had been a young girl at the time, 
also remembered how the elders and parents took turns holding their ba-
bies to keep them dry from the “the mixture of mud and feces” that sloshed 
beneath them.116
But whereas Shinohara was imprisoned for war crimes he allegedly com-
mitted, a rumor that had become widespread among the camps, the Fran-
quez  family disputed having participated in any kind of criminal activity 
directed against U.S. citizens and nationals. Seeking to rectify this situa-
tion, Maria T. Franquez requested to meet the unidentified commandant 
of the camp. Rita summarized their meeting as follows: “She fi nally got to 
see the Commandant of the prison. She demanded we be charged with: 
1) a civil crime, 2) religious crime, 3) a military crime, or 4) some kind of 
international crime immediately as we had been prisoners for a very long 
time  there already.”117 Maria  T. Franquez “threatened that in the absense 
[sic] of a crime we could be charged with, we  were  going to climb the fence 
and they would have to machine gun us down.”118 Given that the interned 
individuals  were suspects of vari ous types, the elder Franquez utilized the 
military’s language of war criminality as a means to clarify their  legal sta-
tuses. While such efforts partly conceded to the power of the military, 
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Maria T. Franquez’s attempt to climb the barbed wire fence with her  family 
at  great peril to their safety signaled a stronger opposition to colonizing 
forces in Guam (figure  1.3). The  matter of militarized incarceration was 
not lost on the Chamorro  mother. Explaining her insights, Rita said, “She 
commented no  matter who our captors  were,  whether Japa nese, Spanish or 
American, they had one  thing in common. They all seemed to have hated 
the Chamorro  people with a very arrogant and disparaging attitude with-
out any re spect to our humanity nor our rights as victims of super power 
strug gles.”119 With the assistance of the Chamorro educator Agueda Iglesias 
Johnston and other friends and relatives, the military eventually heeded the 
Franquez  family’s request and released them from the prisoner of war camp 
at an undisclosed time. While a few Guamanian families escaped the mili-
tary’s confinement, that was not the case for the Rotanese and Saipanese.
The War Criminals Stockade
The intelligence and police units interned numerous Japa nese, Rotanese, 
and Saipanese individuals and families, once deemed a threat to society, in 
the protective compounds or the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp. 
1.3.  Chamorro  women  doing laundry. The original caption reads, “Suspected Jap 
sympathizers interned in a prison camp on Guam” (photo number navaer-452a, Rec. 
arch 20, 1945). U.S. National Archives, College Park, Mary land.
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But only men accused or convicted of war crimes resided in the War Crimi-
nals Stockade in the village of Tomhom, as with Tadao Igawa, Samuel T. 
Shinohara, Akira Tokunaga, and Juan Villagomez. Describing its environ-
ment, Rear Admiral John D. Murphy, the war crimes director, wrote, “The 
detention building in which the prisoners are  housed are [sic] located within 
an area enclosed with a double fence of barbed wire. The area is lighted 
with flood lights, and an auxiliary generator is kept in working order and 
available to be put on the line in case of main power failure. Armed sen-
tries patrol outside the barbed wire enclosure.”120 Alongside the detention 
building stood two barracks that sheltered the forty- eight Marine officers 
and enlisted men assigned to the War Criminals Stockade. Private First 
Class Hubert R. Brinkley, a Marine, had this to say about the incarcerated 
individuals: “Personally I would not trust a P. O. W. that close to me due to 
the fact that they had been charged with assault, cannibalism, murder, and 
general mistreatment of American P. O. W. Some of them had already been 
tried, and sentenced according to their vari ous charges.” Concerned about 
the welfare of the guards, he said, “I had the security of the stockade and 
the safety of the other guards on my mind . . .  while I was on duty.”121
Outside, the prisoners shared a pit latrine. If they wished to use the toilet 
or the shower, they had to run to and from each location. As part of their 
exercise regimen, they also cut grass, dug ditches, or performed sit- ups for 
up to thirty minutes each day; the military used their  labor for minor con-
struction and repair tasks as well. In terms of resources, the navy provided 
medical assistance, offered recreational time, screened movies, and loaned 
library books to the prisoners. Clergy representing the Buddhist, Christian, 
and Protestant faiths often visited the stockade and counseled the prison-
ers. Inside the detention building, the prisoners slept in cells secured by 
padlocks. Only basic toiletries, clothes and linens, items of worship, and 
reading materials  were allowed in the cells. Other wise, the military indi-
cated that their “quarters should be devoid of unnecessary comforts, con-
ve niences, decorations, particularly photo graphs and pictures of ‘pin-up 
girls,’ Japa nese officials or so called heroes.”122 Without protection from 
mosquitoes, the navy also sprayed the toxic insecticide ddt in the cells, 
where, supposedly, the prisoners suffered “very  little.”123 As per the navy’s 
policy, at least one Marine guard was posted in front of the cells at all times.
With the exception of witnesses who temporarily dwelt in a separate part 
of the fa cil i ty, the accused and convicted war criminals abided by a strict 
set of rules.124 The first order required that each man “come to attention 
whenever an officer approaches your hut and when you are spoken to by a 
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member of the guard.”125 Other rules demanded that the prisoners main-
tain clean cells, request permission to speak and use the toilet, concede 
to having their letters censored, and refrain from touching any part of the 
barbed wire gates and fences. Their only semblance of protection came in 
the form of a rule that forbade any guard from assaulting them; the rule 
“pertained to the mistreatment of Japa nese and Native P.O.W.”126 If “struck 
or punished” by a sentry, for example, the prisoner had the right to contact 
a se nior officer about said allegations.127
Sometime in May or June  1946, seven Japa nese prisoners of war took 
advantage of this regulation by claiming that the guards had abused them 
during their stay in Guam (figure 1.4). Of  these Japa nese men, only Vice Ad-
mirals Kaoru Arima, Masashi Kobayashi, and Kunizo Mori identified their 
purported assailants as, respectively, Marine privates Donald  W. Purcell, 
Raymond L. Romero, and Rocco L. Piacente. The  others— all lower- ranking 
personnel formerly employed by the Japa nese Imperial Navy— failed to 
identify the guards despite being able to recall their beatings. Whereas they 
argued that the guards had forced them to eat their meals within one min-
ute, a few separately charged that they had extracted their gold teeth for a 
guard, masturbated a guard’s penis, performed oral sex on a guard’s penis, 
participated in excessive drills, or received hits and spit to the face, back, or 
stomach.128
In his statement dated July 2, 1946, Vice Admiral Kaoru Arima argued 
that the guards had assaulted them for having caused World War II in Asia 
and the Pacific Islands. As he put it, several unidentified guards approached 
him on May 27, 1946, and accused him of being “responsible for the hap-
penings of the Death March of Bataan, attack on Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
Canton, and the attack of Pearl Harbor.”129 One sentry then hit Vice Admiral 
Arima “with the broom on the seat of my pants for about 15 times, slapped 
me about 15 or more times, and fi nally grabbed my head with both hands 
and twisted my neck several times. In  doing the last act another guard 
helped the first guard. The  others stood by and watched.”130 By physically, 
sexually, and verbally assaulting the prisoners, the guards conveyed owner-
ship over them as subhuman and nonhuman bodies, zoē, that now fell 
 under the reach of the U.S. penal state in Guam. Corporal Tsugio Asanuma 
relayed this sentiment when three guards demanded his four gold teeth as 
souvenirs on May 24, 1946. As he explained, the unidentified Marine sen-
tries attempted to “jab” his gold teeth with a club, but failed in releasing the 
teeth from Asanuma’s mouth. Having “no other alternative,” the Japa nese 
corporal “found and used a nail to pry loose my gold teeth.”131
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In its investigation of  these allegations, the navy collected statements 
from the guards, revealing that “no one admitted to such acts, or to seeing 
them performed.”132 As David  N. Morris, a Marine private, claimed, “To 
the very best of my knowledge,  there was not at any time  orders given to 
abuse or mistreat the Nips. Neither was  there ever homosexual acts im-
posed upon them.”133 Donald Purcell, another Marine private, stated, “I 
neither saw nor heard of homosexual or abusive acts.”134 Captain John N. 
Rentz, the commanding officer of the First Battalion, Third Marines, de-
fended the guards. As he observed, “During the period of my command, 
no sentry ever spit upon a prisoner. No sentry ever forced a prisoner into 
a homosexual act. No prisoner was ever forcibly awakened in the  middle 
of the night.”135 Even the American corpsman and the Japa nese medical 
officer agreed that no Japa nese prisoner had been harmed by the sentries; 
drawing from their daily rec ords of “sick calls,” they found no evidence 
of abuse at the War Criminals Stockade. As Lieutenant Tsutomu Ogawa 
stated, “I hereby certify that it has never been brought to my attention that 
any Japa nese prisoners have received injury as a result of mistreatment by 
the guards.”136
1.4.  War Criminals Stockade. The original caption reads, “Japa nese War Criminals 
Stockade Area, Guam, M. I. 1. The stockade gates. 2. The stockade guard  house. 3.  
The emergency generator can be seen in the background” (photo number 406888,  
Rec. September 27, 1949). U.S. National Archives, College Park, Mary land.
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Taking  these  factors into consideration, the navy concluded its investi-
gation of the War Criminals Stockade on July 22, 1946. It determined that 
the Japa nese prisoners had fabricated  every charge except for one regard-
ing excessive drills. In this re spect, only Private Raymond L. Romero was 
found guilty of forcing Vice Admiral Masashi Kobayashi “to stand at atten-
tion while holding heavy stone.”137 When asked to rationalize his actions, 
Romero argued that “the Jap prisoner kept bother ing me all during my 
watch by wanting to go to the head. I took him to the head about six times, 
and then I told him if he both ered me once more, I’d make him stand  there 
all night. He gave me a big smile and asked me to give him a light as he 
wanted to smoke, in the  middle of the night. So I took him out of the cell 
and made him stand outside at attention [for a few minutes] with a rock 
in his hands.”138 By way of summary court- martial, Romero then received 
five days of confinement in the military’s brig with bread and  water. The 
navy deemed its investigation complete. As Captain J. A. Moriarty Jr. pro-
claimed, “Since this investigation, with a view to assuring proper treatment 
of all Japa nese prisoners, Commander Marianas has directed the Com-
manding Officer, Marine Barracks, to make regular periodical inspections, 
interrogate the prisoners relative to mistreatment and take all steps neces-
sary to prevent any violation of international law relative to persons held 
captive by the United States.”139
As with Guamanian forms of retribution directed against the Japa-
nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese, however, several Marine guards continued 
to assault the prisoners in the War Criminals Stockade. Like their native 
counter parts from Guam, the sentries rarely received punishment for their 
actions. At least this was the impression given by another set of Japa nese 
prisoners. Commenting on this new round of allegations, Captain Moriarty 
wrote, “Well, the fat is in the fire again. The ten persons who returned to 
Tokyo with Lieutenant Tremayne have brought a very unfavorable report of 
conditions in the War Crimes Stockade at Guam since last August, 1947.”140 
Unlike the previous group of Japa nese men who  were prisoners when the 
navy called for an investigation, the ten Japa nese men who filed the new 
report  were recently released prisoners at the War Criminals Stockade. That 
is, the military acquitted them of all charges in the summer of 1947. No lon-
ger bound by the navy’s laws,  these men identified fifteen Marine guards as 
their supposed assailants, as well as offered detailed descriptions of said 
abuses.
As with the case in 1946, the Japa nese prisoners  were reduced to objects 
of sexual desire and revulsion. They alleged having incurred vari ous beat-
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ings from March 1946 to July 1947. Former prisoner Eigo Chiba, for exam-
ple, witnessed the guard by the name of “Morris” order “hygiene- officer 
ensign Yoshizawa to get down on his hands and knees. He got on top of him 
and made him say ‘I am a  horse’ while [Morris] shouted ‘I’m Hirohito’ and 
made him walk on his hands and knees.”141 Chiba himself also performed 
excessive drills; several guards physically attacked him as well. Elsewhere, 
Hideo Hataoka, a medical petty officer first class in the Japa nese navy, had 
an unidentified sentry shove “a considerable quantity of toilet paper into 
my anus. As a result I suffered from constipation for about 12 days and the 
pain I had to endure during  those days was beyond explanation.”142 On 
May  30, 1946, two guards then entered his cell and kicked his back and 
chest. As Hataoka recalled, “Being unable to stand the pain I crumbled. 
They urinated on my back and made me lie in the  water. Then they forced 
me to lick the urine on the floor.”143 The next day the guards returned. “One 
of them held me tight,” explained Hataoka, “and the other forced his penis 
into my mouth and emitted semen and made me drink it.  After it was over 
they would not even let me wash my mouth.”144 Another prisoner, Mayuki 
Ijima, expressed this form of same- sex rape in Japa nese terms. As he put it, 
“I was forced to carry out an act called ‘Shakuhachi’ (homo - sexuality using 
the mouth) by one of the guards. I stubbornly refused at first, but on being 
threatened with a pistol, I was obliged to perform the act.”145
Indeed, the manner by which the Marine sentries exacted homoerotic 
control over the prisoners was widespread. As the former warrant of-
ficer mechanic Yoshio Fujino claimed, a Marine corporal by the name of 
“Lokey” often greeted him in the morning with the saying “hubba, hubba,” 
a popu lar flirtatious phrase of the 1940s.146 In early September 1947, Fujino 
described how another guard called “Choeki” then “threw dentifrice all 
over my head and with shaving cream he painted by [sic] eye- brows, nose, 
eyes and chin. He made me say ‘I am a cute boy’ and visit each cell in  every 
ward.”147 Feminized in drag attire, Yoshio Fujino relented to such torture. 
Anybody who resisted the guards found  little respite, as Shigeru Yatsuhashi 
realized when he refused to “lick” the testicles of Private Morris. As a result, 
Morris assaulted him a “dozen times,” leaving Yatsuhashi with “ great insult 
and physical pain.”148
In light of  these allegations, the navy conducted an investigation on the 
“three main instigators in acts against the prisoners.”149 They included an 
unidentified Marine sergeant and two Marine privates. Yet the navy did not 
pursue the investigation further for fear that the supreme commander for 
the Allied powers (scap) would reprimand the se nior officers at the War 
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Criminals Stockade. With one case of prisoner abuse already proved in 
1946, the navy appeared reluctant to make public another round of mili-
tary assaults against Japa nese prisoners. As Captain Moriarty elaborated, 
“At our request, no letter  will be written through official channels regarding 
 these incidents.”150 He emphasized that “if this bit of information reached 
scap, they too would be very unhappy. I believe it  will be pos si ble to keep 
the latter information from scap officials, providing some action is taken 
in Guam.”151
The Men of Colonial Modernity
A year  later, in March 1948, the War Criminals Stockade had not received any 
new reports regarding its prisoners. Perhaps the living conditions improved 
for them. Perhaps the guards ceased all forms of racial and sexual vio lence. 
But if we take seriously the comments by Captain Moriarty, we can infer 
that the navy censored other Japa nese allegations of torture. It was as if no 
harm could befall the guards and prisoners of the War Criminals Stockade, 
a place where se nior military officials often maintained the relative secrecy 
of their activities, if not delighted in the prisoners’ moral transformations. 
The navy chaplain H. W. Buckingham reported in the same month, for ex-
ample, that “many prisoners are reading Japa nese New Testament.”152 “It is 
recommended,” the lieutenant commander continued, “that regular visits 
be made by both Protestant and Catholic chaplains to administer consola-
tions and sacraments of their faith.”153 Rear Admiral John D. Murphy, the 
war crimes director, similarly reveled in the ideological utility of the prison. 
As he expressed, “Not one single complaint or even a suggestion of a com-
plaint was indicated. . . .  It was obvious to the inspecting officer that the 
morale of the prisoners was high and that their discipline was excellent.”154 
According to Rear Admiral Murphy, they never conducted “a jail break or 
attempted jail break”; instead, “the greatest concern to stockade personnel 
is the likelihood of prisoners committing suicide. Special instructions are 
given guards . . .  and all reasonable precautions are taken.”155
That numerous military officials affirmed the War Criminals Stockade’s 
promotion of “high” prisoner morale yet did not underscore their contra-
dictory concern that prisoners might commit “suicide” merely illustrated 
the power and reach of the U.S. carceral state in Guam. By the time Rear 
Admiral Murphy had declared the supposedly beneficial qualities of this 
prison, the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program had already been 
in existence for nearly four years. But without its usage of intelligence and 
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police units and without its reliance on Guamanian forms of retribution 
and vio lence, the military tribunal would have lacked the  legal and po liti cal 
force to try its subjects, speak its truths, and mete out its sentences. Com-
bined, the Marine Corps, the navy, and the Guam Combat Patrol subjected 
indigenous and settler  peoples in Guam to the disciplinary logics and tac-
tics of colonial modernity. In  these hypermasculine, emasculated, and ho-
moerotic spheres of racial classification and confinement, the U.S. military 
created and managed new bodies of war criminality, a double exclusion 
wherein deviant and disloyal bodies— natives and nonnatives alike— can be 
killed but not sacrificed by the nation.
war crimes
The military’s racist classification of indigenous and settler  peoples in 
Guam was not a randomly selected event, nor was it entirely unique in scale 
and composition. The national and international discussions on war crimi-
nality that occurred in the 1940s similarly expressed the racial hierarchies 
used by the military’s intelligence agencies, as much as they reflected the 
ambivalent, contradictory, and vindictive positions of jurists,  legal schol-
ars, and military officials in the United States and elsewhere. As early as 
August  2, 1944, the U.S. War Department began to shape the scope and 
meaning of  these debates with the publication of What  Shall Be Done with War 
Criminals? Authored by the Harvard criminologist Sheldon Glueck, the text 
described the mid- twentieth- century nature of war crimes and war crimes 
tribunals. With the war still waging, Glueck used his association with the 
War Department to proj ect a victory on the part of the United States and 
its allies. As he boldly asserted, the United States “ will have a hand in the 
trial and punishment of Japa nese war criminals whose offenses took place 
in Wake, Guam, the Philippine Islands, the Aleutians, and other Pacific 
areas.”1 Just how the United States would accomplish the task of incarcerat-
ing war criminals on a global scale remained unclear.
In this chapter, I reckon with this dilemma of imperial judgment as 
well. By examining what war criminality meant for the United States and 
its military agencies, I show how the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals 
Program developed a language of white supremacist statecraft and punish-
ment as legitimate law in Guam. As with the incarceration of Chamorros, 
Japa nese, and Asians in vari ous camps, the navy turned to its rules and 
proclamations— all steeped in the logics of the carceral state—to make 
lawful its then- burgeoning military commission. National and interna-
2
war crimes 61
tional debates on war criminality, as much as issues of culpability, staffing, 
and translation, informed the making of the tribunal in Guam. With  these 
 factors in mind, I discuss how the tribunal brokered justice, expanded its 
jurisdiction, and fashioned its subjects.
War Criminality and the State of Exception
In Sheldon Glueck’s treatment of war criminality, questions of the carceral 
and the colonial likewise resonated with how, if at all, U.S. federal laws on 
the individual “offender” would inform the prosecution of Japa nese and 
Nazi war criminals. As he ascertained, “We regard  every offender as an in-
dividual. His assets and liabilities are studied and a program is planned to 
make the most of his abilities . . .  curb his bad habits, and gradually restore 
him to a useful and law- abiding place in society.” But, he inquired, “Should 
this policy be followed for the war criminals?” Although he did not provide 
a definitive response, he treated individual offenders and war offenders as 
separate categories entitled to legally distinct forms of incarceration. As 
Glueck explained, ordinary offenders “can afford to experiment with the 
humane approach, and the public, even the victims and their families, can 
be made to agree to a policy of rehabilitation.”2 On the other hand, for “war 
offenders of the Axis type, who have committed thousands of shocking 
atrocities, mea sures of cure and rehabilitation of the individual offender 
according to his needs would be interpreted (especially by the surviving vic-
tims of Axis brutality) as undeserved leniency.”3
Invoking the Moscow Declaration of 1943 as the Allied model for pun-
ishing German war criminals, Glueck offered several forms of punishment 
that could arise from this agreement and that could be levied against war 
criminals in Eu rope and elsewhere. The options available to the Americans, 
En glish, and Soviets included execution, imprisonment, reeducation, and 
rehabilitation, with the prominent offenders left alive to be “studied by psy-
chiatric clinics . . .  so that we might learn what made  these men defy the 
laws of civilization and lead millions of their fellow countrymen to an orgy 
of death and destruction.” Lest any of  these options emasculate or humiliate 
offenders into “martyrs,” Glueck suggested that Japa nese and Nazi offend-
ers be sentenced to “prison terms at hard  labor for life, perhaps on lonely 
islands in distant seas, whence escape would be impossible.”4 By casting 
islands as sites of exile, he featured a form of punishment once employed 
by Eu ro pean governments in their transportation of convicts, lepers, and 
revolutionaries to islands in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. As the 
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literary critic Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey reminds us, colonial governments 
often perceived islands as remote locales scattered far from their metro-
poles and inhabited by “colonized and enslaved populations who, without 
access to maritime vessels,  were less likely to escape.”5
Although islands as proposed carceral sites never resurfaced in Glueck’s 
assessment of war criminality, what must be underscored was the lack of 
international consensus regarding the prosecution of war criminals. Cen-
tral to  these discussions was the traditional definition of war criminality, 
broadly construed as “crimes against humanity.” As Glueck opined, war 
criminals of this magnitude could be understood as persons who violate 
“(a) the laws and customs of legitimate warfare or (b) the princi ples of crim-
inal law that are generally observed in civilized  legal systems, or who have 
ordered, consented to, or conspired in the commission of such acts.”6 But 
as he rightly observed, the conditions of World War II spurred a series of 
“crimes” that  were not recognized by the Geneva Convention of 1929 and 
its rules on “civilized” warfare between nations and their soldiers. Its laws 
concerning the protection of civilians, medical personnel, and prisoners 
proved insufficient for jurists, scholars, and tribunals that  were coming to 
terms with the new laws on crimes against humanity.7 Murder, rape, and 
theft committed by military personnel at their own initiative and not at the 
behest of  orders constituted  these crimes, as did treaty violations and acts 
of treason on the part of government officials. However, national courts 
and war crimes tribunals had yet to draft vari ous procedures on  these and 
other crimes of the “Axis type,” an effort that other jurists realized as well.
In a speech to the American Society of International Law on April  13, 
1945, Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson was one such jurist. In his 
talk, he offered a more tempered perspective on the American prosecution 
of war criminals than that presented by the criminologist Sheldon Glueck. 
As Justice Jackson proclaimed, “I have no purpose to enter into any contro-
versy as to what  shall be done with war criminals,  either high or  humble.”8 
Yet, even with this caveat, he still offered his preference for executing war 
criminals on the condition that national  trials refrain from participating in 
 these acts. He said, “If it is considered good policy for the  future peace of 
the world, if it is believed that the example  will outweigh the tendency to 
create among their own countrymen a myth of martyrdom, then let [the 
war criminals] be executed. But in that case let the decision to execute them 
be made as a military or po liti cal decision.”9 Careful not to conflate consti-
tutional legalism with military doctrine, Justice Jackson further cautioned, 
“We must not use the forms of judicial proceedings to carry out or ratio-
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nalize previously settled po liti cal or military policy. Farcical judicial  trials 
conducted by us  will destroy confidence in the judicial pro cess as quickly 
as  those conducted by any other  people.”10 By “farcical judicial  trials,” he 
meant war crimes tribunals that could wield the power of politics and mili-
tarism and not of law. “Among us,” he remarked, “ there are some who can-
didly would use courts as an instrument of power and many more who  favor 
all of the premises of that philosophy without recognizing the conclusion. 
The ease with which men thoughtlessly fall into step with this philosophy 
is strikingly demonstrated by the attitude of many  people  toward the trial 
of war criminals.”11
Cautious about the tendencies of courts to operate as “policy weapons,” 
Justice Jackson defended what he believed  were the fair princi ples of judi-
cial review granted to individuals who faced civil courts. Addressing the at-
torneys, he continued, “The ultimate princi ple is that you must put no man 
on trial  under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see 
him freed if not proven guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any 
case,  there is no occasion for a trial.”12 He forewarned, “The world yields 
no re spect to courts that are merely or ga nized to convict.”13 As  these com-
ments indicate, Justice Jackson remained cognizant of the ways in which 
war crimes tribunals can leverage militarist, po liti cal, and nationalist sen-
timents over and beyond the rule of law. A surface reading of his remarks 
indicates that he viewed law, militarism, and politics as unrelated spheres 
of influence, a seemingly naive perspective for somebody who, on May 2, 
1945, would be appointed as the U.S. chief of counsel in the prosecution 
of Axis war criminals. This partly explains why he guardedly welcomed the 
possibility of “bringing  those accused of war crimes to trial.”14 As Justice 
Jackson emphasized, “I repeat that I am not saying  there should be no  trials. 
I merely say that our profession should see that it is understood that any 
 trials to which  lawyers worthy of their calling lend themselves  will be  trials 
in fact, not merely trails in name, to ratify a predetermined result.”15
Having previously dissented in Korematsu v. United States (1944), the 
 Supreme Court’s ruling on the legality of interning Japa nese Americans 
during World War II, Justice Jackson may have anticipated gross violations 
of the law wherein vari ous court systems could “ratify a predetermined re-
sult”  under the pretense of national or international law.16 As evidenced in 
this case, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion and relocation of 120,000 
Japa nese U.S. citizens and noncitizens from the West Coast of the United 
States. The majority decision endorsed the military’s fear that the Japa nese, 
as a race, conspired to spy and commit acts of sabotage against the U.S. state, 
64 chapter 2
especially in cities, harbors, and military bases along the coast. Recogniz-
ing the racist ele ments of this decision, Justice Jackson opposed the ruling 
on the grounds that it  violated the Constitution.17 Therefore, the  legal codi-
fication of racism— what the Lumbee scholar Robert A. Williams Jr. calls 
the “rights- denying jurispathic power” of the law— underscored discus-
sions of war criminality that may have troubled Justice Jackson. In this re-
spect, Jackson knew that one court’s decision could influence another’s and 
thereby normalize racism as just. In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme 
Court sanctioned the military curfew and exclusion  orders previously de-
cided in Hirabayashi v. United States (1942), thereby making  legal the denial of 
habeas corpus to and the racial incarceration of Japa nese Americans.
In  legal terms, this pro cess has been described as the doctrine of stare 
decisis wherein, as in U.S. courts, like cases should be de cided alike.18 For 
Williams, stare decisis remains a central tenet of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and its ongoing reliance on nineteenth- century rulings that  were informed 
by racisms  toward American Indians. By examining the landmark cases on 
American Indian rights by Chief Justice John Marshall, wherein American 
Indians became domestic “wards” of the United States in the early nine-
teenth  century, he shows how  these cases have become the pre ce dents for 
denying numerous civil liberties, economic opportunities, po liti cal rights, 
and treaty protections to American Indians and, tellingly, to other racial-
ized or minoritized  peoples of “like cases.”19 As Williams explains, “Stare 
decisis, by its very nature, represents a per sis tent danger for the protection 
of minority rights in [the U.S.]  legal system, threatening to expand the orig-
inal princi ple of racial discrimination justified by a par tic u lar  legal pre ce-
dent to new purposes and applications.”20  Until the Supreme Court strikes 
down such pre ce dents, moreover, the expansion of racial discrimination 
has no foreseeable limit. As he affirms, “Even without possessing a hostile 
intent  toward any par tic u lar minority group, a judge who feels bound to en-
force prior pre ce dents  because of the doctrine of stare decisis can perpetu-
ate, in the most subtle of fashions, a system of racial in equality.”21
Given  these circumstances, Justice Jackson may have understood the 
emerging debates on war criminality and war crimes tribunals as crossing 
the lines between law, militarism, and nationalism. With the doctrine of 
stare decisis as a looming  factor in  these discussions, he alluded to the in-
ternment of Japa nese Americans in his blunted criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s failure to protect their rights to due pro cess. Although he never 
identified the Japa nese Americans in his speech, the allusion was discern-
ible. As Justice Jackson indicated, “The assurance of our fundamental law 
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that the citizen’s life may not be taken without due pro cess of law is of  little 
avail against a foreign aggressor or against the necessities of war.”22 Implic-
itly referring to Executive Order 9066 and to its logic of military necessity 
in which the civil rights of Japa nese Americans  were denied, he said, “It 
 ought to be clear by this time that personal freedom, at least the kind and 
degree we have known in this country, is inconsistent with the necessities 
of total war and incompatible with a state of militarization in readiness for 
one.”23 In addition to admonishing national courts that  were corrupted by 
the “necessities of war,” as in Korematsu v. United States, he also criticized 
the arrogance of “extreme nationalists” who believed that international law 
always worked on their side.24
As  these sentiments illustrate, Justice Jackson engaged the postwar 
dangers of nationalism, retribution, and stare decisis before the American 
Society of International Law. He even provided a generous reading of U.S. 
constitutional law as redeemable despite his direct and implied critiques of 
its vio lence. So long as the military did not seek the judiciary’s counsel in 
enforcing its decisions, Justice Jackson believed in the distinct but impor tant 
roles of the judiciary and the military.25 For this reason, he was not opposed 
to the making of military war crimes tribunals. In his  later capacity as chief of 
counsel in the prosecution of Axis war criminals, for example, he expressed 
optimism in the justice proffered by the war crimes  trials in Eu rope. Invok-
ing the supposed universalism of American responsibility, he wrote, “ After 
we entered the war, and as we expended our men and our wealth to stamp 
out  these wrongs, it was the universal feeling of our  people that out of this 
war should come unmistakable rules and workable machinery from which 
any who might contemplate another era of brigandage would know that they 
would be held personally responsible and would be personally punished.”26
Ultimately, Justice Jackson called for the separation of law from policy 
(or law from militarism) in the defining of war criminality and in the mak-
ing of war crimes tribunals, a task that, contrary to his beliefs, proved mate-
rially and po liti cally untenable. As in the case of Guam, constitutional law, 
international law, and naval law, among other  legal codes and doctrines, 
mutually constituted what Giorgio Agamben has theorized as the state of 
exception. Contrary to Justice Jackson’s conviction that law operated as a 
fair and autonomous sphere, the law, when employed in the U.S. territory 
of Guam, functioned as a harbinger of militarized vio lence and white 
 supremacist statecraft. When analyzed in terms of the law’s historical rela-
tion to American Indians, Japa nese Americans, and other “rights- denying” 
subjects of the United States, the conflation of law, militarism, and policy 
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often became the norm rather than the exception. As such, Justice Jackson’s 
treatment on war criminality was fundamentally about internationally ex-
panding the U.S. carceral state. The dialogue on war criminality advanced 
by naval attorneys and officials merely reiterated the militarist and punitive 
character of U.S. law in the Pacific.
Take, for instance, Lieutenant Commander James  J. Robinson of the 
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Navy. As an attorney and 
military officer, he shared his views on the  legal charges regarding war 
crimes  trials before the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar As-
sociation on April 20, 1945. At a conference held in Washington, DC, the 
lieutenant commander recounted a series of Japa nese atrocities commit-
ted against American prisoners at a  labor camp located in Palawan Island, 
Philippines. Robinson’s talk drew from media accounts and American sur-
vivor memories of the Japa nese military’s attempt to execute the prisoners 
on December 14, 1944. He summarized the plot as follows: Upon noticing 
that American bombers  were flying above their  labor camp, the Japa nese 
soldiers ordered the prisoners to enter the air- raid shelters, at which time 
the soldiers proceeded to throw lighted torches, paper, and gasoline into 
the shelters. The Americans who tried to escape the area  were immediately 
clubbed, bayoneted, or shot. A few Americans even ran to a nearby cliff, 
climbed down its face, and jumped into the ocean, thereby hoping to swim 
away from the camp. Only 9 of the original 150 American prisoners sur-
vived the tragedy. Recalling witness testimony of a failed escape, Robinson 
shared the following image: “One American who was shot in the  water was 
dragged out through the slime and was being stabbed with bayonets as he 
staggered along the shore surrounded by his captors. While he was beg-
ging them to shoot him rather than burn him to death, the Japa nese poured 
gasoline on one of his feet and set it on fire, then on the other foot and set 
it on fire, and then, as he collapsed, they threw gasoline over him and he 
was enveloped in the flames.”27 Moralizing the Americans as victims, the 
lieutenant commander then raised the question that dominated debates on 
war criminality. With the Japa nese soldiers from the camp now imprisoned 
by the U.S. military, he asked, “What are we  going to do with them?”
For the Americans who fought the Japa nese or the Nazis, Lieutenant 
Commander Robinson surmised that  these Americans would most likely 
respond with the phrase “shoot them.” Knowing that this act would con-
stitute a “war crime,” he opposed any form of immediate vio lence  toward 
individuals who  were accused of war crimes. As he put it, “To shoot the 
perpetrator of a war crime immediately upon capture may [give] immunity 
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to the superior officers, the master- minds or any other fellow- gangsters of 
the dead criminal. . . .  Moreover, the contents of the confessions of war 
criminals and the court rec ords of war crime convictions  will provide in-
formation and support needed, at the peace  table and elsewhere, in mak-
ing appropriate provision for the prevention of  future war crimes or even of 
 future wars.”28 Lieutenant Commander Robinson thus reasoned that if the 
United States and its allies  were to successfully prosecute soldiers and their 
superior officers, then the full force of the law should be applied. It is neces-
sary, he declared, “to follow princi ples and rules of international law, crimi-
nal law and military law, well- established in pre ce dent and practice among 
the nations.”29 As he argued, “The  trials should be conducted, depending 
upon the circumstances of the case, in the regular national civil courts of 
the countries whose  people have been outraged by the offenses, or in mili-
tary commissions or tribunals, especially tribunals of mixed membership, 
that is, membership drawn from more than one nation or from more than 
one of the armed ser vices or from both military and civilian personnel or 
from any combination of  these sources.”30
That Lieutenant Commander Robinson could casually list the ways in 
which hybrid, military, or national courts could extend their “outrage” 
 toward individuals and groups accused of war crimes was indicative of at 
least two  factors. First, several definitions of war crimes had become in-
creasingly widespread and provisionally accepted among the United States, 
the United Nations, and the international community. Violations of the laws 
of war, an act reflecting the general ele ments of a “crime” (e.g., the time of 
the prohibited offense, the territory in which its commission is forbidden), 
and the crossing of an international boundary surfaced as central markers 
of war criminality.  These definitions likewise resonated with the notions 
of criminality previously defined by Glueck and Jackson, as would the A, B, 
and C war crime classifications that  later informed several tribunals. Sec-
ond, the elasticity of international law enabled vari ous court systems to se-
lectively define war, crime, and war crimes to their own ends, if not allowed 
courts to violate the rules of war.31 Despite the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1929, and other covenants on “civilized” 
warfare, the international law on war crimes did not adhere to a universal 
set of rules, let alone possess the enforcement power to ensure that coun-
tries abided by them. Hence, international law became a con ve nient proxy 
for countries that sought to broaden the scope and meaning of war crimes. 
As the  legal scholar Gerry J. Simpson explains, “The attempt to develop a 
more general notion of criminality in international law has proved trouble-
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some given the structure of the system itself.” As he notes, “International 
law is seen simply as the contractual relations between States. When States 
commit wrongs they become delictually liable to other States and not to 
some transcendent public administrative organ.”32
As elusive as definitions of war criminality may appear in international law, 
however, states and courts nevertheless invoked the foundational concept of 
“piracy” in their respective  trials and proceedings. Discussing its etymology, 
the anthropologists Shannon Lee Dawdy and Joe Bonni observe that the word 
“piracy” originates from “the classical Greek root ‘peirates’— meaning an at-
tempt or an attack.”33 Associated with a kind of violation, then, piracy became 
“the first international crime, or the first offence to give rise to universal ju-
risdiction” in international law.34 With the pirate as its referent, the figure of 
the war criminal was “characterized as an  enemy of mankind— ‘hostis humani 
generis’— operating outside the bounds of law and outside the jurisdiction of 
national law.”35 For this reason, Arthur G. Robinson, rear admiral of the U.S. 
Navy and president of the Military Commission in Guam, could declare in 
1948 that war crimes  were “international crimes in the sense that they are 
crimes against all civilized nations, like the crimes of slave trading and of 
piracy— and in this re spect the war criminal, like the pirate . . .  is an  enemy 
of mankind . . .  and as such he is justiciable by any state anywhere.”36 With 
the war criminal likened to the pirate and made “justiciable” by any state, it 
often became commonsensical for jurists,  legal scholars, and military offi-
cials to levy judgment against the Japa nese and Nazis accused of committing 
atrocities against the United States and the Allied forces.
In this re spect, states frequently utilized the signifier of piracy in defin-
ing war criminality as that which disrupts “a customary flow of goods and 
ideas.”37 This interruption, a pro cess often likened to conflict, deception, 
or theft, “frequently involves a kind of real or symbolic vio lence, such as the 
taking of a ship or hacking of a system.”38 Along  these lines, courts  were 
not merely concerned about determining the “guilt” or “innocence” of war 
criminals. As with piracy, war criminals  were targeted for interfering in the 
normal state of affairs, which, for Asia and the Pacific, meant the stability of 
Eu ro pean and U.S. colonialisms. As the critic Lisa Yoneyama asserts, Japa-
nese po liti cal and military leaders  were punished and executed not for the 
“atrocities they committed against the  people of Asia and the Pacific— that 
is, for Japan’s ‘crimes against humanity’— but for disturbing the peace and 
order preserved  under white Eu ro pean and U.S. domination and for violat-
ing their colonial entitlements, properties and privileges in that region.”39 
As in the case of Guam, the island became a site where the navy reasserted 
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its hegemony over Japan, which, the naval courts held, possessed no ju-
risdiction over Guam and its  people. As the  trials examined in this book 
demonstrate, the navy drew from a plethora of concepts, laws, and rules 
in its racialized claims to justice for the injured and the dead. But what, 
exactly, did the navy mean by justice and jurisdiction? Given the widespread 
debates on war criminality, what courts did the navy eventually employ, and 
why? And how did the navy, alongside other military agencies, further ex-
pand the U.S. carceral state in the Pacific?
Naval Justice and Jurisdiction
In 1945, the U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel defined naval justice as the 
“maintenance of naval discipline, without which the Navy cannot function 
as an efficient fighting organ ization.”40 With the waging of war as its cen-
tral premise, the Bureau projected naval discipline as the “true basis of de-
mocracy, for it means adherence by the individual to the set of rules which 
has been found best suited to govern relations between individual mem-
bers of society in order to protect the interests of the  whole.”41 Contrast-
ing criminal courts and the navy’s brand of justice, Rear Admiral O. S. Col-
clough, judge advocate general of the navy, reiterated, almost verbatim, the 
definition of naval justice as disciplinary and martial in nature. He wrote, 
“This difference has been expressed succinctly as follows— the objective of 
criminal law is the protection of society; the objective of military law is the 
maintenance of that standard of discipline which is the sine qua non of an ef-
ficient fighting organ ization.”42 That kind of justice would be, as he put it, 
of global reach by the end of the war. As Rear Admiral Colclough expressed, 
“From a geo graph i cal standpoint, prior to the war, the administration of 
naval justice was roughly  limited to the United States and its territories, 
Cuba, Iceland, and the Philippines. During the war it embraced not only 
Eu rope, the Atlantic, and the Pacific, but practically the entire world.”43 As 
an expanding apparatus of discipline, naval justice was achieved by exacting 
punishment against its disobedient ranks and its perceived enemies. For 
the navy, punishment was “potent but dangerous, useful but destructive; 
astonishingly effective when rightly used, alarmingly destructive when used 
wrongly.” The “value of punishment lies in the object lesson it furnishes 
the wrongdoer, and  others, that the offense must not be repeated. This is 
referred to as the deterrent theory of punishment.”44
In accordance with the navy’s deterrent theory of punishment, military 
tribunals became the instruments of inquiry par excellence by which naval 
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justice was sought and attained. Reflecting on the inquiry as a relation of 
knowledge- power, Michel Foucault asserts that the “inquiry is precisely a 
po liti cal form— a form of power management and exercise that, through 
the judicial institution, became, in Western culture, a way of authenticat-
ing truth, of acquiring and transmitting  things that would be regarded as 
true.”45 As per the navy’s culture of discipline, military tribunals ascer-
tained “truths” by way of punishing individuals and groups who  violated 
the abilities of the navy to wage war. From the trial and execution of the 
British spy Major John André in 1780 to the arraignment and massacre of 
thirty- eight Dakota in Mankato, Minnesota, in 1862 during the American 
Civil War, military tribunals acquired, over time, the power of extreme au-
thority, discipline, and vio lence.46 Whereas civil courts have often afforded 
individuals the constitutional right to  trials by jury and the availability of 
habeas corpus, military tribunals grant  those  under their purview neither 
of  these rights and protections. As the  legal scholar Louis Fisher observes, 
military tribunals have been generally “hostile to civil liberties, procedural 
due pro cess, and elementary standards of justice.”47 Operating without the 
judicial constraint granted by the civil courts and the Constitution, military 
tribunals have wielded “much wider discretion as to the punishment to be 
imposed than is ordinarily given to civil courts.”48
The rationale for justifying the  legal power of military tribunals is explic-
itly expressed  under article 1, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, wherein 
Congress  shall provide for the “common Defense” and “general Welfare” 
of the United States.49 Take, for instance, clauses 13 and 14, which grant 
Congress and the president the license to “provide and maintain a Navy” 
and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces.”  These are two of several passages that provide “abundant au-
thority” for the appointment and use of military tribunals.50 Along  these 
lines, the Constitution “invests the President as Commander in Chief with 
the power to wage war and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress 
for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the Armed 
Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offences against the law of na-
tions including  those which pertain to the conduct of war.”51 The president 
can also appoint, as he has in the past, military tribunals and prescribe 
the rules  under which they have to operate.52 With its power drawn from 
the Constitution, Congress, and the president, military tribunals have not 
been, for the most part, “subject to review by the Federal Courts,” includ-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court.53 At times, the Supreme Court may inquire 
 whether a tribunal has jurisdiction over a person or an offense or  whether 
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a sentence imposed was within the scope of a tribunal.54 But if the military 
tribunal “had lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, its action is 
not subject to judicial review merely  because it made a wrong decision on 
disputed facts.”55 Moreover, all errors of decision belong to the military tri-
bunal and not to judicial courts.56
With re spect to World War II, the United States employed three types of 
military tribunals, all of which  were recognized as legitimate courts by the 
United Nations. The tribunals included, first, the courts- martial; second, 
the military commission or exceptional military court; and, third, military 
government courts and military tribunals established by the military gov-
ernment. The courts- martial is the most frequently used system of inquiry 
for the navy, having been formed to “determine if a person subject to naval 
law has committed a violation of the Articles for the Government of the Navy 
and, if [the court] finds him guilty, to adjudge an adequate punishment.”57 
As with the Articles of War and the Naval Courts and Boards (1937), the Articles 
for the Government of the Navy provide the rules and procedures for determin-
ing the scope of naval law, the appropriate conduct of persons, and the cri-
teria for discipline and punishment.  These and other articles of naval law 
pertain to the courts- martial and to the other military tribunals, and have 
likewise been periodically revised. But whereas courts- martial focus solely 
on the prosecution of individuals  under the purview of naval law, the other 
military tribunals have wider latitude in terms of their command struc-
ture, procedural composition, and territorial jurisdiction. Indeed, military 
commissions and military government courts employ naval personnel as 
well, as in determining the convening authority of naval officers. But  these 
“exceptional” military tribunals differ from the courts- martial in terms of 
their ability to prosecute civil crimes, military violations, and war crimes, 
among other disruptions to military law, occupation, or warfare.58 Such ex-
ceptional courts could likewise be administered by a convening authority, a 
naval governor, or a military commander, and the proceedings could occur 
wherever the United States asserts its claim to sovereignty as an occupier.
With the knowledge that military tribunals can assert naval justice (and 
po liti cal hegemony) in times of war, coupled with information gained from 
debates on war criminality of the “Axis type,” Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal established the War Crimes Office on January 13, 1945. Located in 
the War Department, the War Crimes Office coordinated the administrative 
efforts on war crimes  matters between the Navy, War, and State Depart-
ments. As his official memo to the Navy Department indicated, the national 
War Crimes Office aimed to “collect evidence against  enemy persons who 
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commit murders, atrocities and other violations of the laws of war against 
members of the armed forces of the United States or against other Ameri-
cans, including the  peoples of any de pen dency such as the Philippines, and 
to arrange for the immediate or eventual apprehension, trial and sentence 
of such war criminals.”59
Secretary Forrestal’s  legal directives  were especially forceful in their grant-
ing of police- like authority to naval commanders in war zones across Asia 
and the Pacific. As he declared, naval commanders  were “directed to take 
necessary action” in obtaining, investigating, and forwarding information 
on war crimes to the judge advocate general of the navy and to the Navy De-
partment.60 Affirming the carceral dimension of the military, Rear Admiral 
Arthur G. Robinson likewise argued that it is “the duty of the victor to [punish 
 those who  violated the law and customs of war], just as it is the duty of the 
police and the court to apprehend, to confine, to try, and to punish  those who 
violate domestic criminal law.”61 As he asserted, “The ‘police,’ the forces of 
law and order, must be stronger than the criminals. If not, the power of so-
ciety to punish for wrongdoing would perish, for the criminal and his kin do 
not apply the standards of lawful society to punish the wrongdoer.”62
Invoking what Rear Admiral Robinson eventually called the “natu ral and 
proper” authority of a victor, the War Crimes Office proceeded to sanction 
violent acts of intrusion, inquiry, and incarceration on an unpre ce dented 
scale across the world. In Asia and the Pacific Islands alone,  these forms 
of policing led to the incarceration of more than three thousand individu-
als, with approximately another one thousand receiving death sentences.63 
While hybrid, military, and national courts from Australia to Singapore played 
impor tant roles in the postwar incarceration of their respective enemies, 
the United States “was consistently in the forefront in the development and 
effectuation of the entire war crimes program.”64 In January 1945, the War 
Crimes Office and its affiliated branches had thus advanced a U.S. penal 
regime suited for the war and its aftermath, a regime the critical ethnic 
studies scholar Dylan Rodríguez describes as “an indispensable ele ment of 
American statecraft, si mul ta neously a cornerstone of its militarized (local 
and global) ascendancy and spectacle of its extracted (or coerced) authority 
over targeted publics.”65
Yet, as I revealed in the previous chapter, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. 
Navy, along with their intelligence agencies, had already begun to classify 
and criminalize Asians and Pacific Islanders in Guam as early as July 1944. 
The military’s classification of such “targeted publics”— that is, the crimi-
nal, the disloyal, the  enemy, and so forth— occurred at least five months 
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 earlier and without the secretary’s declaration to investigate war crimes. 
That the American military unilaterally interned and investigated  these 
and other deviant types had much to do with how the United States viewed 
Guam as its colony. For this reason, the American military conducted its 
interrogations of Asians and Pacific Islanders without any  legal or po liti-
cal constraints, acts that would other wise be construed as “exceptional.” 
As Rear Admiral John  D. Murphy, director of the War Crimes Tribunals 
Program declared, “It goes without saying that the work of investigations 
was the foundation upon which all subsequent war crimes actions was [sic] 
based. It was the first step in the long detailed task of detection, apprehen-
sion, and preparation of evidence for cases before the military tribunals in 
the prosecution of the accused” (figure 2.1).66 The navy thus interrogated 
anybody at any time. In this re spect, the navy’s  legal advisers and offi-
cials argued that Japan never lawfully claimed the island and its  peoples, a 
point emphasized in its  trials of war criminals from Japan and the Mariana 
Islands.
2.1.  Rear Admiral John D. 
Murphy, director, War 
Crimes, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(photo number 406854, 
Rec. September 27, 1949). 
U.S. National Archives, 
College Park, Mary land.
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Following this logic of conquest, the War Crimes Office established dif-
fer ent war crimes tribunal branches in the Eu ro pean, Mediterranean, and 
Pacific regions.67 In the Pacific, the General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (scap) drafted the “Regulations Gov-
erning the  Trials of Accused Criminals” on December 5, 1945. This policy 
granted any Allied nation the authority to create military courts for the trial 
of war criminals.68 According to the regulations,  these nations possessed 
jurisdiction over war crimes cases involving the waging of war and the tak-
ing of life since the “Mukden incident,” also known as the Japa nese military 
invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931. With a temporal frame of the 
1930s to the 1940s at their disposal, the United States and its allies appre-
hended representatives of Japan’s imperial government who  were accused 
of war crimes. This network of inquiry relied, as well, on the integration 
of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy personnel into the Pacific branches.  These ef-
forts, the War Crimes Office projected, would “result in closer cooperation 
among all the military ser vices, a more centralized control over activities 
pertaining to war crimes, and a more efficient exchange of information be-
tween war crimes officers in the field and the United States War Crimes Of-
fice in Washington, D.C.”69 While this interser vice arrangement benefited 
the War Crimes Office, the navy eventually received sole control of the war 
crimes cases in the Pacific Islands, whereas the army predominated the 
war crimes cases covered by scap. For the navy, the areas that represented 
the Pacific Islands encompassed the Bonin Islands, the Caroline Islands, 
the Gilbert Islands, the Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Palau 
Islands, with the army mainly focusing on Japan and the Philippines.70
The army, navy, scap, and other agencies defined war crimes as such: 
Class A, “crimes against peace,” or the planning and initiating of a war of 
aggression; Class B, “conventional war crimes,” or the violating of the laws 
or customs of war; and Class C, “crimes against humanity,” or the murder-
ing and committing of inhuman acts against civilian populations.71 Based 
in Tokyo, and led by General Douglas MacArthur of the U.S. Army, scap 
primarily dealt with Class A war criminals of the International Military Tri-
bunal of the Far East. In addition, scap communicated with other U.S. war 
crimes agencies in China (Shanghai), India (New Delhi), the Pacific Islands 
(Guam), and the Philippines (Manila), among  others.72 In his capacity as 
commander, MacArthur had the power to “(a) appoint special international 
military courts (Which term  shall be held to mean tribunals of any kind) composed 
of military or naval officers or civilians of two or more of the United Na-
tions, for the trial,  under any applicable law, domestic or international, . . .  
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of Far Eastern war criminals . . .  and (b) to prescribe or approve rules of 
procedure for such tribunals.”73
Unlike the courts- martial,  these military tribunals wielded a triangula-
tion of power invested in the Constitution, the Congress, and the president, 
not to mention an array of regulations that emanated from the War Crimes 
Office and its affiliated branches. For  these reasons, the tribunals could “le-
gally assume jurisdiction over all criminal offenses committed in occupied 
territory and over civil cases affecting the military government.”74 As noted 
 earlier, the tribunals also held jurisdiction to try war crimes and accused war 
criminals without having to possess jurisdiction over the person and place 
of the offense. As Rear Admiral Robinson opined, “ Under the familiar terri-
torial princi ple of jurisdiction familiar to our domestic courts and our ordi-
nary crimes— the convening authority is required to have jurisdiction over 
the person who committed the offense, and of the place where the offense 
was committed.”75 “This traditional concept,” he argued, “is clearly inap-
plicable to crimes in violation of the laws and customs of war. War crimes is 
one of a number of exceptions to this concept. . . .  The international nature 
of the crimes and the realistic necessity of their punishment by the injured 
or victor nations [are impelling reasons] for departure from the ordinary 
concept of territorial jurisdiction.”76 As strikingly violent as  these layers of 
hegemony appear, though, the carceral and colonial mechanisms of naval 
justice and jurisdiction still hinged on another impor tant  legal princi ple. 
The U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program would not have emerged in 
Guam, a military colony of the U.S. empire, without the plenary power doc-
trine. From this vantage point, we can analyze the navy’s development of a 
military commission in the island, including its demarcation of “criminal” 
and “noncriminal” subjects among the population.
The Commission and the Colony
As disclosed in the introduction, the plenary power doctrine is a corner-
stone of the U.S. empire, where it has been historically employed to uphold 
and protect its white citizenry, expand or fortify its national borders, and 
wage its protracted wars of conquest and settlement. As the  legal scholar 
Natsu Taylor Saito argues, the plenary power doctrine remains “core U.S. 
law relating to American Indian nations, immigrants, and external colonies 
such as Puerto Rico and Guam.” Wherever the United States exerts the ple-
nary doctrine, she notes, “harsh consequences . . .  are generally ignored 
or dismissed as aberrations, perhaps  because— like the law of slavery—it 
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is exercised over relatively powerless  Others.” Yet analyses of the doctrine 
“reveal a systematic denial of both domestic and international  legal protec-
tions to  those who most need them.”77
With nonwhite  peoples as its primary target, and with the acquisition 
of land,  labor, and natu ral resources as its aim, the navy subsequently 
imposed the plenary power doctrine in Guam.78 Reflecting on the signifi-
cance of the doctrine’s ties to military rule, where the law follows the flag 
but not necessarily the Constitution, the editors for the U.S. Navy Report 
on Guam, 1899–1950 ascertained, “When the United States acquired Guam, 
neither the constitution nor the laws of the country  were extended to the 
new possession. The sole administrative authority vested in the Navy, as the 
agent of government, was that derived from the President as Commander 
in Chief.”79 Naval governors then assumed control over the island much as 
“they had commanded naval vessels or naval establishments on previous 
tours of duty.”80 As expressed by the former naval commander Roy E. James, 
himself stationed in Guam in the 1940s, “Law and order often became ‘dis-
cipline,’ legislation became ‘commands’ or ‘ orders,’ education became 
‘training,’ and so on.”81 Through the plenary power doctrine, Guam became 
a site where “the essential ele ments of National Security and Local Security 
are inter- woven and inseparable.”82 It was this context, an island without 
the full application of the U.S. rule of law but nevertheless bound by its  legal 
exceptions, that greeted Admiral C. W. Nimitz, the commander in chief of 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
On July 21, 1944, Admiral Nimitz arrived in Guam on the pretense of re-
claiming the island from the Japa nese government.83 With the U.S. military 
invading the island on the same day, he declared, in the vein of colonial pos-
session, Proclamation No. 4, titled “Exceptional Military Courts.” Article 
I of the proclamation specifically stated, “Exceptional Military Courts for 
guam and adjacent  waters are hereby established.  There  shall be Mil-
itary Commissions, Superior Provost Courts and Summary Provost Courts, 
the constitution and competence of which are set forth in article III.”84 As 
stipulated in article III of the proclamation, one or more military officers, 
some of whom could be appointed by a military governor, convened each 
court. Similarly, military officers served the dual role of judge and jury on 
 these courts. Many of the military officers  were also drawn from the naval 
reserve, with a few individuals coming from the air force and army. Describ-
ing the general composition of  these courts, Rear Admiral Robinson stated 
that the conveners “ were experienced trial  lawyers from civil practice who 
had remained in the Navy  under their reserve commissions. . . .  They  were 
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of an unusually high caliber and  were con spic u ous for their marked ability 
as trial  lawyers and their apparent devotion to the work in which they  were 
involved.”85
Many of the military officers received their academic training in naval 
law and international law. Upon their arrival in Guam, they adhered to the 
navy’s required tour of duty; this meant that officers and enlisted personnel 
 were compelled to reside  there for at least eigh teen months, the average 
tour of duty on the island.86 But  because of the  labor shortage attributed 
to the war, the commission operated with fewer personnel than expected. 
Staff members utilized in war crimes work  were even “begged, borrowed 
and stolen for this purpose.”87 The “technical and clerical pro cesses of re-
cording and filing information was in itself beyond the capacity of available 
personnel. However, it can definitely be said that some evidence of spe-
cific crimes was obtained and that valuable leads which formed the basis 
of subsequent successful investigations  were obtained.”88 Highlighting the 
uneasy demand to fill positions but also maintain the capacity of the com-
mission, Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall said, “The work of all regularly 
assigned investigators, prosecutors and defense counsel was of an usually 
high character. It is hard to believe that as much work could have been ac-
complished with so few officers.”89
Despite the upbeat nature of some military officials, the navy knew that 
its staffing shortages would hamper its ability to address unforeseen  legal 
and po liti cal dilemmas (figure 2.2). Even with the power accorded to its tri-
bunal in Guam, the navy still approached its claims to formerly occupied 
Japa nese islands with caution. As Judge Advocate and Admiral Thomas 
Leigh Gatch expressed on April 10, 1945, “The occupation of islands in the 
Pacific Ocean Area is giving rise to many novel and difficult  legal prob lems, 
particularly in the fields of international law, trial of war criminals and pris-
oners of war, and international aspects of naval justice.”90 “In many cases 
now arising,” he said, “good pre ce dents do not exist and when decisions are 
made in  these cases law is actually being made. It is impor tant that such de-
cisions be correct, other wise they must inevitably result in  later embarrass-
ments and difficulties.”91 Cognizant of its limitations, the military court 
attempted to follow  legal pre ce dents and adhere to international laws on 
war crimes.
In this sense, the navy sought to curtail any media coverage of racism 
among its staff, a premise that belied the racist foundations of the court. 
In light of the allegations and rulings concerning the abusive treatment of 
prisoners at the War Criminals Stockade, for example, military officers in 
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the tribunal argued that “continuous instruction and indoctrination of all 
ratings and ranks was essential in order to assure compliance with require-
ments of international law.”92 Their report continued, “This was more no-
ticeably true as relatively new and inexperienced personnel began replac-
ing the war time personnel. Prejudices against the Japa nese appeared to be 
more pronounced in the seventeen to twenty year old replacements.”93 In 
practice, however, the navy rarely took stock of its racisms; instead, it di-
rected its vio lence against anybody accused of crimes. The navy’s usage of 
American, Chamorro, and Japa nese court interpreters is a case in point.
Specifically, the tribunal understood that interpreting “between oriental 
and occidental languages is not comparable to coding and decoding mes-
sages, but requires a distressing amount of circumlocution and rearrange-
ment of thought.”94 When working with interpreters, the military commission 
subsequently urged the prosecution and defense counsel to use “short, 
 simple questions as  free from artifice as if examining a small child.”95 The 
tribunal thus infantilized “oriental” languages— that is, languages spo-
ken by Asians and Pacific Islanders— because “complicated questions,” 
“conditional questions,” “long questions,” and “sarcastic questions”  were 
purportedly beyond “comprehension” of  those on trial.96 As a result, no 
“criticism of an interpreter, direct or implied, was permitted to be made in 
2.2.  The War Criminals Stockade detachment (photo number 406877, Rec. September 27, 
1949). U.S. National Archives, College Park, Mary land.
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open court by counsel of  either side”; with En glish elevated as the system of 
signs from which all thought emanated, all translation discrepancies  were 
resolved in court recess and with the approval of the court- appointed chief 
translator.97
With re spect to the twenty- five  trials concerning the Mariana Islands, 
the military commission provided thirteen interpreters for the prosecution 
and defense counsel. They included two Americans: Frederick  A. Savory 
and Eugene F. Clark; seven Guamanians: Jorge Cristobal, Tomas A. Iglesias, 
Juan Manibusan, Isabel T. Perez, Joaquin C. Perez, Vicente C. Reyes, and 
Isabel Perez Zafra; and four Japa nese: Kan Akatani, Yoshio Akatani, George 
Kumai, and Kimio Tsuji. Of  these individuals, Jorge Cristobal, a chief stew-
ard in the navy, served as a translator in twelve cases, the most afforded 
to anybody. His first opportunity to work as an interpreter emerged at the 
behest of Admiral William Halsey, then appointed as an American naval 
officer in Aotearoa New Zealand in July 1944. As Cristobal recalled, the ad-
miral said, “ ‘I’m  going to have you transferred to the Third Marine Divi-
sion as an interpreter.’ He told me that the Marines  were about to invade 
Guam and take it back from the Japa nese. He knew I spoke Japa nese, and I 
could translate for the Chamorros also.”98 At the invitation of the admiral, 
Cristobal left his role as the officer’s mess attendant in New Zealand and 
accompanied the Third Marine Division in its reinvasion of Guam.  Later in 
the month, Cristobal “went in on the third wave landing at Asan Beach, and 
I was right  there in the  middle, looking like a Marine. I was wearing a hel-
met and every thing was Marine for me! I went down that rope ladder from 
the ship to get into the amtrac, and I had a carbine with me. It was light to 
carry, and it could fire eleven shots without reloading.”99
Excited about his newfound Marine identity but fearful of the Japa nese 
gunfire directed at him, Jorge Cristobal landed on the shore of his home-
land, only to witness two other Marines die nearby. “I  couldn’t explain my 
feeling as I went ashore, but I went right in  there with the rest of them. I 
crawled right up  there, and three or four guys followed me  there in between 
Asan and Piti. Of course, I was very familiar with that  whole area.” Eventu-
ally, Cristobal re united with his  family, assisted the Marine Corps and navy 
as a scout, and “became a war crimes commission interrogator.”100 Having 
once lived in Japan as a porcelain maker in the 1930s and having worked as a 
steward for the U.S. Navy thereafter, he was well suited for translation ser-
vices. As a result of its experiences in working with Cristobal, the tribunal 
de cided to select other interpreters like him. On his role as a naval inter-
preter, he said, “A lot of  people  don’t understand. The terminology is dif-
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fer ent. . . .  Because, you know, the primary interrogator has the locations, 
where are they, how many  people, all  those  things like that.” Elaborating 
on the fear of being interrogated, Cristobal also stated, “It does make too 
much hard work to do that  because when you talk to a person who is very 
scared, too, an  enemy. Sometimes they  don’t answer you back, right quick. 
 Because they feel like  they’re  going to be killed. I would feel the same, too, myself.” As 
he explained, “The [accused war criminals] that  were caught  here in Guam; 
 there  were sixteen or seventeen of  those guys that  really know the locations 
of where the enemies are; but they very  silent sometimes. . . .  They  won’t 
talk anything at all. But common sense  will tell you, if you ask them, ‘Why 
did you kill them?’ He’s not  going to tell why. At that time, they  were pretty 
well stunned, too. Their mind is not clear.”101
It is quite plausible, then, that the tribunal hired Cristobal as an inter-
preter for many cases  because he had survived the Japa nese military bomb-
ing of Pearl Harbor, his  family had persevered  under the Japa nese military 
occupation of Guam, and he had “liberated” Guam as a Marine. That he as-
sisted in many  trials merely illustrated the degree to which the navy would 
hire biased translators to legitimize its rule of law and assert its po liti cal 
sovereignty. On the other hand, staff assigned to the military commission, 
the War Criminals Stockade, and related units did not entirely express en-
thusiasm in their tours of duty in Guam. Nor did every body possess the  legal 
and linguistic utility of men like Jorge Cristobal. In fact, numerous naval 
officers and attorneys resigned early or returned to the continental United 
States, demonstrating that the nationalist zeal often ascribed to military 
ser vice was never ubiquitous. In December 1945, for example, Lieutenant 
Commander O’Brien desired “separation from the ser vice”; First Lieuten-
ant Small was not interested in “staying in the ser vice,” as  were Lieutenants 
John K. Murphy and William Mahoney; and Lieutenant Franklin Williams 
simply wanted to be “released as soon as pos si ble.”102 The dilemma of hav-
ing a reliable and impartial staff of military officers was compounded fur-
ther by the real ity of the then reemerging apparatus of naval discipline in 
Guam.  Because the island took several years to recover from the war, the 
U.S. naval court system sought to reestablish itself from the 1940s to the 
1950s. To resolve this predicament, the naval government selected the mili-
tary commission to  handle civil crimes and Class B war crimes  trials during 
the war and thereafter. As the chief of Naval Operations clarified, “When 
Military Courts are used in the administration of civil judicial  matters in oc-
cupied territories and hear cases involving violations of local laws, regula-
war crimes 81
tions, or  orders established by military government for the civil population, 
the words ‘for Civil Affairs’  shall be added to the title of such courts.”103
As the navy understood it, the tribunal  shall also “have jurisdiction over 
all persons in the custody of the convening authority at the time of the trial 
charged with war crimes committed against United States nationals and 
any white person whose nationality has not prior to ordering of the trial 
been established to the satisfaction of the convening authority.”104 Unlike 
the seemingly race- neutral directives issued by the War Crimes Office, the 
commission in Guam was more candid in its privileging of whiteness as 
a phenotype of injury alongside the presumed loyalty of U.S. citizens and 
nationals. As with the caricatured white female victim of  earlier investiga-
tions conducted by American intelligence personnel, so, too, did the tribu-
nal privilege white masculinity, property, and sovereignty in its regulations 
and court proceedings.
In this regard, the navy often recognized and protected white Americans 
(usually men) over indigenous  peoples, a common pattern shared by Anglo 
war crimes tribunals. White privilege and protection in  these tribunals 
often adhered to this hierarchy: first, white American citizens and military 
personnel; second, white Allied military personnel; third, white Allied citi-
zens; and, fourth, indigenous and other nonwhite  peoples.105 By defining 
whiteness as the  legal category of personhood, then, the navy’s commission 
in Guam primarily sought to identify and safeguard white citizens and mili-
tary personnel; the trope of native loyalty also upheld this racial and racist 
hierarchy, one that con ve niently coincided with the postwar settlement of 
white military personnel in the island. As the historian Hal M. Friedman 
observes, populating the islands with “white Americans was considered 
one way of eradicating Japa nese influence, assimilating the [indigenous] 
population to American rule, and consolidating U.S. control.”106
Consequently, the military tribunal afforded its subjects “the Anglo- 
Saxon right of presumption of innocence  until proven guilty,” a rights 
framework that primarily benefited white heterosexual men.107  Under the 
 legal and po liti cal purview of scap, the military commission also had 
the power to determine, at  will, the scope of its regulations. That is to say, 
“the proceedings of the Military Commission  will be governed by the Naval 
Courts and Boards, except that the commission is permitted to relax the rules 
for naval courts to meet the necessities of any par tic u lar trial, and may use 
such rules of evidence and procedure, issued and promulgated by the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers . . .  as are necessary to obtain 
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justice.” In other words, “the commission may adopt such other rules and 
forms . . .  as it considers appropriate.”108
Clearly, vari ous debates on war criminality helped to shape the making 
of the War Crimes Office and the international drafting of A, B, and C war 
crimes classifications. U.S.  legal discussions on  these topics forewarned 
the implications of linking law with militarism and politics, a pro cess that 
failed to cohere nation- to- nation agreements on the treatment of war crim-
inals other than to ensure that they be tried like “pirates” in international 
law. Selectively heeding  these debates and mea sures, the United States 
synthesized, revised, and projected a series of federal, international, and 
military laws on war criminality in an unpre ce dented manner across the 
world. To this effect, the carceral and colonial regimes of the United States 
merged with naval notions of justice and jurisdiction in the mid-1940s, en-
abling military tribunals to possess nearly unchecked rules and regulations. 
With a history of naval governance in Guam, one that is inherently tied to 
the plenary power doctrine, the island was chosen to become the main site 
for the navy’s military commission. Given its charge to try both civil and 
war crimes cases, the military commission drew from the authority of naval 
law and the four codes of law in ven ted by the naval government in the early 
1930s.  These codes included the Civil Code of Guam, the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, the Penal Code of Guam, and the Probate Code of Guam, another 
set of laws that coconstituted the extrajuridical threshold of the military 
commission. What was at stake for the navy, then, was not merely the ap-
prehension of criminal types. Rather, the question of po liti cal sovereignty 
ultimately informed the making of the military commission and its efforts 
to reestablish order on an island and for  people outside of the law.
By establishing the navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program in Guam on 
March 24, 1945, the United States represented itself as the claimant to the 
island’s sovereignty.109 As a military colony, the island— and, most vitally, 
Japan’s possession of it— compelled the United States to reassert its sover-
eignty at a time when the  future of U.S. colonialism in the Pacific was placed 
 under duress and, via Japan’s propaganda, anticolonial scrutiny.110 As evi-
denced in its review of the international law on sovereignty, the navy as-
serted that “the rights of sovereignty over Guam  were not lost to the United 
States by the Japa nese occupation of the island. . . .  That sovereignty had 
been previously exercised through the American Naval Governor of Guam. 
The laws promulgated by him, set forth in the Penal Code, Civil Code and 
Code of Civil Procedures of Guam, remained in effect during the Japa nese 
occupation  unless suspended by the Japa nese  under military necessity.”111
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According to the navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program, the Japa nese 
military never suspended the codes and, as a result, Japan never eroded the 
sovereignty of the United States. On this  matter, the judge advocate general 
clarified that even if the Japa nese military attempted to suspend the codes, 
as “belligerent occupants,” it lacked the authority  under international law 
to do so. As the navy’s  legal advisers observed, “Belligerent occupation is 
‘essentially provisional’ and does not transfer sovereignty over the occupied 
area, although the  legal sovereign is not in a position, during the period of 
occupation, to exercise its sovereign rights. . . .  The princi ple under lying 
 these rules is that although the occupant in no way acquires sovereignty 
over occupied territory through the mere fact of having occupied it, he in 
fact exercises for the time being military authority over it.”112 “In the case of 
Guam,” proclaimed the judge advocate general, “all that existed was a state 
of belligerent occupancy, temporary in nature, which never ripened into 
more.”113 By asserting the continuity of its po liti cal sovereignty, the navy, 
as the “protector” of its subjects, stipulated that its laws had to be obeyed 
in spite of Japan’s imperial presence. As the navy declared, “The protec-
tion which a state owes to its inhabitants does not cease when its forces are 
temporarily withdrawn so that the  enemy exercises the rights of any army 
in occupation. . . .  The occupying belligerent does not become an agent of 
the legitimate sovereign charged with the same obligation of protection. 
The belligerent exercises only a temporary authority for his belligerent pur-
poses. The laws of the legitimate sovereign continue in force. . . .  [And] 
the inhabitants are bound to obey them.”114 Extending the procedural and 
jurisdictional scope of  these claims, the navy’s  legal advisers also noted that 
the statute of limitations on crimes committed during the Japa nese occupa-
tion had no bearing on the operation of the military commission. All viola-
tions, the navy maintained,  were subjected to its “prosecution following 
American reoccupation.”115
As  these passages attest, the navy employed its War Crimes Tribunals 
Program to make certain U.S. sovereignty over Guam. Equally significant 
was the navy’s treatment of the island’s  people, who, despite their respec-
tive classifications by the navy as ally, criminal, or other wise, all fell  under 
its “pastoral” care. In this re spect, the navy’s “protection” of its subjects 
resonated with Michel Foucault’s theorization of the pastoral- shepherd- 
sheep as a relation of modern power and as a technology of surveillance. 
As Foucault argues, “The essential objective of pastoral power is the salva-
tion (salut) of the flock.”116 In the navy’s view, salvation partly meant the 
purging of “belligerent” types— what Foucault variously calls “wolfs” and 
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“corrupted” sheep—in order to reassemble the subjects  under its care. Like 
modern power, the power of the pastor was forceful, persuasive, and weak, 
as much as it was undetermined and malleable.
Regarding the issue of force, for example, the judge advocate general 
frequently demanded the loyalty and, hence, pastoral duty of the Chamor-
ros of Guam. As early as March 31, 1923, the navy asserted this claim of pro-
visional inclusion: “While a Native of the Island of Guam owes perpetual 
allegiance to the United States, he is not a citizen thereof nor is he an alien 
and  there are no provisions  under law  under which he may become a citizen 
of the United States by naturalization.”117 On April 24, 1945, the navy main-
tained that the subject status of Guamanians as “loyal natives” persevered 
even during Japan’s military occupation of Guam. As the navy argued, “The 
native Chamorros remained nationals of the United States and contin-
ued to owe allegiance to the Naval Government of Guam and to the United 
States. They owed to the Japa nese military government only obedience and 
neutrality. They did not owe allegiance to Japan nor could they be legally 
compelled to take an oath of allegiance to Japan or to the Japa nese Mili-
tary government.”118 Other naval officials  were more persuasive, but no less 
commanding and condescending in their presumptions of the island’s pas-
torate. As Lieutenant Commander Francis Whitehair exclaimed on July 25, 
1945, the “proper disposition of war criminals now . . .  is essential to gain 
the re spect, loyalty, and confidence of the civilians in the Navy’s charge, as 
well as to establish the desired prestige.”119
But what proves especially instructive for analyzing the navy’s classes of 
racial inclusion and exclusion was what Foucault described as the pastor’s 
“paradoxically distributive” power. As he states, the power is “paradoxi-
cally distributive since, of course, the necessity of saving the  whole entails, 
if necessary, accepting the sacrifice of a sheep that could compromise the 
 whole. The sheep that is the cause of scandal, or whose corruption is in dan-
ger of corrupting the  whole flock, must be abandoned, possibly excluded, 
chased away, and so forth.”120 As illustrated in the protective compounds, the 
prisoner of war camp, and the War Criminals Stockade, Foucault’s notions 
of the sacrificial sheep, the corrupted sheep, and wolves applied to  these 
carceral spaces. As a result, the American military gave the interned indi-
viduals the impression that a shift had occurred not only in the pastoral 
care of the nation but also in the constitution of its pastorate. Rear Admiral 
Charles A. Pownall, a naval governor of Guam, expressed  these sensibilities 
in a speech delivered to the island’s military, po liti cal, and religious elite 
on May 30, 1946. Rallying them as a “team,” he said, “We must re- energize 
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Guam as a team. In this team  there is no place or position for: (a) The ex- 
collaborationist with the  enemy, if  there be any. (b) The pessimist or defeat-
ist. (c) The crank. (d) The troublemaker. (e) The loafer” and other criminal 
types.121 The attention given  here to the nonpastorate is precisely the para-
dox to which Foucault refers. That is to say, the “salvation of a single sheep 
calls for as much care from the pastor as does the  whole flock;  there is no 
sheep for which he must not suspend all his other responsibilities and oc-
cupations, abandon the flock, and try to bring it back.”122
The Final Report
In the navy’s calculation of its subjects, the efforts to police individuals 
as markedly criminal or noncriminal  were equally exhaustive endeavors. 
As such, each person was subjected to naval justice and jurisdiction, even 
though many individuals creatively and actively challenged, often  under 
profoundly violent circumstances, the jurisprudence of the U.S. empire. As 
demonstrated in Foucault’s theorization of the pastor, we can analyze this 
naval projection of power in terms of its paradoxically distributive forms of 
racial classification, segregation, and incarceration. As a military commis-
sion, the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program exemplified this form 
of biopower in its interrogation of 135,000 “ enemy” civilians and military 
personnel from 1945 to 1949.123 Including its racialized surveillance and in-
carceration of individuals in Guam, this number could have risen to as high 
as 150,000. Belauans, Chamorros, Chuukese, Japa nese, Koreans, Marshal-
lese, Okinawans, and Taiwanese  were subjected to  these carceral regimes. 
Of  these groups, the navy investigated approximately 500 individuals for 
their supposed involvement in war crimes cases, with about one- fourth of 
them receiving consideration for trial.124  These cases included allegations 
of cannibalism, espionage, murder, rape, sadism, and treason, among 
other traditional and emergent categories of war criminality.
The historian Tim Maga observed that “of the 148 Japa nese nation-
als and Pacific islanders tried, 123 had been Japa nese military personnel. 
Thirty of the 148 received death sentences, and several  were commuted 
to life in prison.”125 The military commission specifically tried twenty- six 
war crimes cases, with the remaining cases being multiply (and sometimes 
contradictorily) classified as civil crimes cases or “war crime type” cases.126 
With re spect to the Mariana Islands, the navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Pro-
gram charged two Guamanian  U.S. nationals for civil crimes. Only one 
Guamanian U.S. national faced a war crime trial on the  matter of “sexual 
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perversion” or homo sexuality. On the other hand, the military commission 
accused two Rotanese, eight Japa nese, and eleven Saipanese men (one of 
whom faced two separate  trials) of committing war crimes in  either Guam 
or Rota. Other Chamorros became implicated in  these cases as well, from 
Chamorros of Japa nese ancestry to Chamorro  women conscripted for the 
Japa nese military’s sex  houses in war time Guam. At the completion of the 
tribunal on May 21, 1949, the Japa nese government owed approximately $10 
million in court fees to the U.S. Navy and its affiliated agencies. With this 
transaction at its behest, the War Crimes Tribunals Program claimed to 
have purged Guam of its “war criminals,” eradicated Japa nese  legal and po-
liti cal ties to the island, and reasserted a military brand of American sover-
eignty  here and elsewhere. At least this was the impression provided by its 
director, Rear Admiral John D. Murphy, in his summary of the commission 
called The Final Report.
Comprising five volumes, The Final Report represented the culmination of 
what began as a series of conflicting debates on war criminality in the United 
States and internationally. It symbolized, as well, the navy’s utilization of 
carceral and colonial logics in Guam. The U.S. Navy thereby employed jus-
tice as a violent proj ect— that is, unconstitutional in its  legal exceptional-
isms, militarist in its seizures of nonwhite bodies and lands, and racist in 
its avowal of the Chamorro loyal type. For Rear Admiral Murphy, however, 
The Final Report celebrated the military commission and its pedagogical sig-
nificance for training military personnel in the use of military warfare and 
international law. “It is essential,” he wrote, “that the accumulated experi-
ence covering five years of U.S. Navy activity be summarized and recorded 
in brief workable form (a) for use in  future planning and operations, (b) for 
the training and educational instruction of U.S. naval personnel, and (c) 
for historical reference and professional study in the field of international 
law.”127 Lest his critics question the commission’s ability to try both civil and 
war crimes cases, Rear Admiral Murphy also emphasized that the tribunal 
“was not aimed or directed  toward the objects of vengeance or retaliation. 
Its purpose was primarily one of deterrence.”128 His conclusion illustrated 
the character of imperial judgment. As he put it, “I believe the Navy military 
commissions convened in the Pacific have demonstrably acted in harmony 
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native assailants
As per its carceral dimensions, the military tribunal apprehended and pros-
ecuted individuals who  violated the sanctity and sovereignty of the United 
States. Chamorros who breached the rule of law thus became subjected to 
the U.S. Navy’s brand of imperial judgment, as much as they became impli-
cated in the po liti cal spectrum of the ko’ko and the hilitai.  Because Chamor-
ros  were neither American nor Japa nese citizens, the military tribunal also 
exploited their nonsubject statuses in order to justify its rulings. How the 
tribunal came to legally enact and morally uphold cases concerning “assault” 
and “assault and battery” charges is the topic of this chapter. By examining 
nine  trials, I discuss how the commission homogenized the cultural,  legal, 
and po liti cal differences among the accused Chamorros, remade them into 
“American” wards, and expunged them from the nation as nonsacrifices. 
Notwithstanding one assault case wherein the accused was a Guamanian, 
the other eight assault cases involved Rotanese and Saipanese, all of whom 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General deemed as having no “nationality 
of their own.”1 Drawing primarily from section 240 of The Penal Code of Guam, 
the tribunal defined “assault” as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a pre sent 
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” The related 
charge, “battery,” was construed as “any willful and unlawful use of force or 
vio lence upon the person of another.”2
Establishing a Pre ce dent
The tribunal entertained its first assault case on March 22, 1945. Miguel A. 
Cruz, a former sonchō, or Japanese- appointed commissioner, for the village 
of Dedidu, faced trial for allegedly assaulting Luis Cruz Camacho and 
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Vicente San Augustine on separate occasions in 1942. Presumably, Cruz, a 
Chamorro born and raised in Guam, struck Camacho on or about Septem-
ber 1, 1942, and choked, kicked, and abused San Augustine in the  middle 
of 1942. As with all the cases, the tribunal never focused on a specific date; 
instead, the court provided the prosecution with much flexibility in deter-
mining the time of any alleged offense. As the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General declared, “When a date is unknown and the offense is such that it 
occurred at a fixed time rather than continuously over a period of time it is 
suggested that the date be, when pos si ble, placed as follows: ‘between the 
dates of about 21 December 1941 and about 15 January 1942, exact date un-
known.’ ”3 With re spect to Miguel A. Cruz, the commission assigned Lieu-
tenant Alexander Akerman Jr. as his  legal counsel.4 The lieutenant, a mem-
ber of the U.S. Naval Reserve, argued that the court held no jurisdiction 
over Cruz’s case  because the alleged offense occurred before the issuing of 
Proclamation No. 4 on July 21, 1944. Further, the charge had already passed 
the two- year limit on the statute of limitations.
Yet the tribunal overruled  these claims, leading Cruz to plead “not 
guilty.” Given his duties as a sonchō, Miguel A. Cruz carried out the tasks 
administered by the Japa nese civil government, the Minseibu. As the Cham-
orro historian Pedro C. Sanchez observed, the sonchōs and kuchōs (district 
chiefs) “had no real commitment nor dedication to their leadership posi-
tion and the roles imposed upon them by what they and the  people felt was 
a temporary government.  These leaders  were caught between the Japa nese 
authorities on the one hand and the local  people on the other, who  were 
resisting them in their own way.”5 In this manner, sonchō Cruz acknowl-
edged having assaulted Luis Cruz Camacho and Vicente San Augustine in 
1942. According to sonchō Cruz, the former caused a  family dispute that led 
to a Japa nese police investigation, and the latter failed to bow to Japa nese 
officials during a sanitation inspection. For  these reasons, sonchō Cruz 
punished  these men, both of whom contested  these allegations. Luis Cruz 
Camacho, for instance, testified that sonchō Cruz beat him for parking his 
bull cart on the side of a road. Vicente San Augustine also said that the dis-
trict chief had slapped him for encouraging a laborer to quit working in a 
field. In turn, sonchō Miguel A. Cruz disputed  these counterclaims, but he 
did not refute the charge that he had assaulted  these men for violating Japa-
nese rules. As a sonchō, he took  orders from the Japa nese officials, as well 
as sought their advice in village  matters.  Because this was the first assault 
trial and civil crime assigned to the court, the defense and the prosecution 
anticipated high stakes in determining its outcome. As the national and 
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international debates on war criminality had already revealed, the tribunal 
knew that its decision would set a pre ce dent in the assault and battery war 
crimes cases regarding the Japa nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese. As defense 
counsel Lieutenant Akerman warned, “The decision  today  will have a far 
reaching effect on justice on this Island,  because during the Japa nese oc-
cupation many  people took positions  under the Japa nese, and as a result 
received  orders to slap.”6 He continued, “The question which must be de-
cided by this commission is, is it an assault, where a person, acting  under 
 orders of the Japa nese officials, slaps another person? The answer  will de-
cide not only the fate of the accused, but many  others, as  there are a number 
of Guamanians in the same position as the accused.”7 Yet the prosecution, 
led by Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Ammons, stated that 
this question held no bearing in the court. He surmised that if the tribunal 
 were to excuse Cruz for the reason that he followed Japa nese  orders, then 
“it would be impossible to bring anyone charged in a like manner to trial.”8
Heeding the prosecution’s position, the court found Miguel  A. Cruz 
guilty of all charges on March 26, 1945, thereby sentencing him to a one- 
year prison term in the Guam civil jail. But unlike the war crimes cases 
on assault that followed, Cruz did not petition the court to afford him the 
rights of a prisoner of war. As a U.S. national and Chamorro from Guam, 
he fell  under the sovereignty of the tribunal even though he was considered 
an official for the Japa nese government  because of his previous duties as a 
sonchō. In the succeeding cases, however, the tribunal dismissed  every at-
tempt on the part of Chamorros from Rota and Saipan to categorize them-
selves as prisoners of war. During the span of their  trials from March 1945 
to October  1945, a majority of the Rotanese and Saipanese requested to 
be treated as personnel formerly affiliated with Japa nese civil and military 
units in Guam.9
In refuting  these petitions for prisoner of war status, the tribunal did 
not engage the Geneva Conventions (humanitarian laws of combat) or the 
Hague Conventions (laws of warfare) in ways that could have offered greater 
protections for the accused.10 Nor did the U.S. government seek Japan’s 
 legal assistance for the Chamorros and Japa nese located in Guam at that 
time.11 The Marine Corps captain Nicholas Savage, an intelligence officer, 
expressed this uncertainty. As he observed, “It is my understanding that in 
the case of an internee as well as a prisoner of war, the Japa nese Imperial 
Government or protecting power has been notified, but that is carried out 
by [the U.S. Army Provost Marshal General’s Office] who took their infor-
mation from us and acted upon it. I am not positive of that, but we may 
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assume they did.”12 Although Japan eventually became involved in the tri-
bunals, especially regarding Japa nese atrocities  toward American military 
personnel, Japan did not know that its colonial subjects  were being tried 
for war crimes in the early months of 1945. This is not to say that the court 
did not take seriously the princi ple of discrimination between combatants 
(e.g., prisoners of war) and noncombatants (e.g., civilians).13 It very much 
did.14 For the tribunal, the Rotanese and Saipanese  were not combatants. 
They  were noncombatant “civilian detainees” and “civilian internees,” clas-
sifications developed by military personnel in August 1944.
Captain Savage clarified the princi ple of discrimination as such: “Cham-
orros from Saipan or Rota, who do not wear uniforms, who  were not of-
ficially members of the Japa nese police but  were acting as interpreters and 
informally as investigators,  those individuals have been classified as civilian 
detainees.”15 As he emphasized, they  were “wards of the Japa nese Govern-
ment and not citizens and they  were certainly not theologically Japa nese.”16 
By characterizing Rotanese and Saipanese as not having “uniforms,” Savage 
represented them as noncombatants in the classical sense of the term. 
Yet this definition does not account for indigenous laborers and soldiers, 
among other roles assigned to or forced upon them, in the colonial militar-
ies of World War II.17 Despite Savage’s failure to acknowledge Chamorros 
as having comparable “combat” statuses to segregated Japa nese American 
battalions in the U.S. Army or Navajo code- talker units in the Marine Corps, 
he nevertheless portrayed the Chamorros as having militarized positions 
in the Japa nese empire. As he surmised, Chamorros from Rota and Saipan 
“ were employed or paid by the civil administration, assigned miscellaneous 
jobs, sometimes to the police department, civil police, sometimes to the 
military police, sometimes in unloading or loading ships at Piti and Sumay, 
and sometimes as civilian construction workers at Agana or Oroto air-
field.”18 But the adjective “military” was not the same as the phrases “mili-
tary conscription” or “military employment,” positions no Chamorro could 
confirm as having, since they had lost all relevant documents during the 
American reinvasion of Guam.
Being classified as civilian detainees and civilian internees also served 
other purposes rather than simply rejecting the prisoner of war status 
afforded to combatants. As Savage implied, the law of armed conflict is 
gendered so as to construct masculinity in terms of the “male warrior, the 
defender of the security of the State.”19  Those who do not subscribe to this 
broad notion, as with noncombatants, are equated with “the female.”20 By 
rendering Chamorros from Rota and Saipan as civilian detainees or civilian 
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internees, the military tribunal thus treated them as feminine and female, 
a material and symbolic pro cess that rendered them as nonmale properties 
of the U.S. state. Signified as such,  these Chamorro men could be made into 
bare life— that is, feminized natives without politics—in the racial hierar-
chy of the combatant/noncombatant distinction.21
As the cases in this and other chapters reveal, the Rotanese and Saipanese 
became bare life, “morph ing” from po liti cal subjects to biological objects 
“that can be enslaved, tortured or killed with impunity.”22 As the theorist 
Helen M. Kinsella argues, “When the difference of combatant and civilian 
is legitimated by reference to putatively biological differences of men and 
 women, sexual difference is established not only as a natu ral fact but as an 
ontological basis for po liti cal and social differences as well. In other words, 
discourses of gender produce the distinctions of sex and sex difference we 
are now accustomed to identifying as the ground of  those differences.”23 The 
categories of civilian detainees and civilian internees had  little to do, then, 
with drawing distinct lines about who could be judged for assaulting or kill-
ing on the basis of what actions they committed in the past.24 Instead, the 
gendered, ontological, and racialized connotations of the “civilian” femi-
nized the Chamorro men as biological objects, zoē, and as newly acquired 
properties of the United States.
Of Thieves and Rapists, Liars and Slackers
With the civil crime trial of the Guamanian Miguel A. Cruz established as 
a pre ce dent, the military tribunal proceeded to address four assault cases 
from March 30, 1945, to September 26, 1945. The accused individuals, all 
of whom  were Saipanese,  were Jose C. Cabrera, Pedro Sablan Leon Guer-
rero, Henry S. Pangelinan, and Nicholas T. Sablan. The first person up for 
trial was Nicholas T. Sablan. Described by a military report as “notoriously 
cruel,” Sablan arrived on Guam on January  23, 1942, to work for Kaigon 
Keibeita, a naval unit, in the village of Sumay.25 In the island, he married An-
tonia Taitingfong and had one child. Sablan then received  orders to transfer 
to a Japa nese police station in Sinajaña. Occasionally, he served as an inter-
preter for other police officials, including the Kempeitai (military police), 
in the villages of Dedidu, Hagåtña, and Piti. As he explained, “During all 
the Japa nese time I was  under the Minseibu; I was placed to help the Navy 
but was getting paid by the Minseibu.”26 On March 30, 1945, Sablan faced 
the tribunal’s charges of four specifications of assault, all against men, and 
two specifications of assault with intent to commit rape, all against  women.
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As in the majority of war crimes  trials concerning Rotanese and Saipanese, 
the Chamorro men and  women who pleaded as “victims” came from Guam. 
Jesus B. Rodriguez, a police officer previously employed by the Minseibu 
and a former colleague of Sablan, was one such person. Accused by Sa-
blan and police chief Kedira of locking up a “certain Japa nese” and throw-
ing away the key at the Sinajaña jail, Rodriguez claimed that they tortured 
him. Recalling an eve ning in 1942 when Sablan arrested him, Rodriguez 
said, “When we got to the office, he hit me, kicked me and made me kneel 
down.”27 Disputing the accusation, Rodriguez reported that he “did not 
lock any Japa nese.” At that point, Sablan placed a tangantangan stick— that 
is, a local wood branch—on top of Rodriguez’s calves. As Rodriguez noted, 
“He stepped on the two ends and kept working it  until my legs  were swol-
len.”28 “ After he did that he ordered me to go outside and kneel.  Later on 
he called me in, took some twine, tied my hands in the back, and had the 
twine run up my neck. He took me out and tied me against the flagpole all 
night. The next morning around nine  o’clock he took me to jail and I was 
locked up.”29
 Whether or not Jesus B. Rodriguez participated in the locking up of a 
“certain Japa nese,” the mere possibility of this event warranted punishment 
so as to suppress any form of native re sis tance against Japan’s empire. As 
such, it was not a coincidence that Sablan tied Rodriguez to a flagpole for 
one eve ning, an act that severely bruised his arms and neck. Although Ro-
driguez did not confess to committing a crime, the confession was a central 
node of inquiry for Sablan and other interpreters and police officers.30 This 
was the case for Jose G. Salas, the second Chamorro in the trial who accused 
Sablan of assault. Salas recalled that, in January 1942, Sablan approached 
him, tied him to a camachile tree, and beat him for no reason. Afterward, 
Sablan asked Salas if he broke into Maria Brunton’s home, which was lo-
cated near the camachile tree, and stole unspecified items. Salas remarked, 
“In order to stop the punishment, I said, ‘I did.’  After that the accused took 
me to Sinajana and turned me over to the Japa nese chief by the name of 
Kedira.”31 According to Salas, Kedira investigated him, released him that 
eve ning, and ordered him to return the following day.
As instructed, Salas returned to the Japa nese police station in Sinajaña, 
only to be escorted by Chief Kedira to Maria Brunton’s  house, where Sablan 
again tied him to the camachile tree and beat him for a second time. As a 
bystander to the assault and as a witness for the prosecution, Brunton took 
the stand and relayed that neither Kedira nor Sablan allowed her to give 
Salas a cup of  water and that Salas was innocent of any accusations of theft. 
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As Brunton explained, “I knew that he did not steal at all for he referred 
to many items which  were not included among the missing  things in my 
 house.”32 But she kept  these thoughts to herself at the time of the interroga-
tion for fear of not knowing how Sablan and Kedira would respond. Eventu-
ally, they released Salas, the confessor of guilt.
Jose  L. Mangloña, the third person presumably assaulted by Nicholas 
Sablan, likewise experienced a “slapping” by him. Like Rodriguez, some-
time in 1942, he, too, had a tangantangan branch placed on his legs, with 
Sablan pressing his weight against it. But unlike the previous testimonies, 
Mangloña did not share much information other than to state that Sablan 
let him go when the police believed Mangloña did not commit a crime. 
His comments  were very brief, as if to signal his hesitation in retelling the 
past. In contrast, the last Chamorro man from Guam to testify as a victim 
had more to say. Pedro Dueñas Camacho, another resident of Sinajaña, 
detailed the reason for his punishment, ensuring that the “Saipanese” be 
labeled as responsible for the assault. Camacho informed the court that 
Sablan arrested him in September 1942 on the suspicion that he was hid-
ing two Americans, Radioman First Class A.  J. Tyson and Machinist First 
Class C. B. Johnson. Given the high- profile nature of this case, the Japa nese 
police drove Camacho to the police jail in Hagåtña, where, as Camacho 
put it,  there “ were five Saipan natives at this time.”33 Once  there, Camacho 
refused to admit sheltering the American men, even though he purport-
edly helped them. But upon hearing his refusal to reveal their whereabouts, 
Camacho said, “every one started to strike me, kick me, slap me. Nicholas 
Sablan came over with a lash made of No. 8 steel flexible wire and told me 
to get down on the floor with only my hands and feet touching the floor. He 
began striking me with . . .  forty or fifty lashes. At this time my body was 
bleeding all over.”34 Sablan and other police officers then placed Camacho, 
unconscious and unable to speak, in a “dark cell.” Not able to cull infor-
mation from him, Sablan discharged Camacho. As for Tyson and Johnson, 
the police found them a month  later at Mount Machanao, where they  were 
“shot on the spot.”35
Another person placed within a violent context was Dolores Santos 
Cruz, the first  woman to testify against Nicholas Sablan regarding the in-
tent to commit rape specification. Section 220 of The Penal Code of Guam de-
fined the charge as such: “ Every person who assaults with intent to rape, 
an infamous crime against nature, mayhem, robbery, or  grand larceny, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the Island prison for not less than one nor 
more than fourteen years.”36 As part of their investigation concerning sto-
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len goods from Maria Brunton’s residence, Sablan and police chief Kedira 
approached Cruz at her home. They met early in the morning sometime in 
January 1942. When Cruz denied stealing anything from Brunton’s  house, 
Sablan and Kedira warned her about the potential consequences for lying. 
But Sablan had other intentions, even asking Cruz when her siblings would 
return home from work. Satisfied with her response, Sablan and Kedira left. 
At ten  o’clock, Sablan then returned by himself, declined Cruz’s invitation 
to eat lunch in the outside kitchen, and walked to the second floor of her 
home. From  there, he called Cruz to follow him. As she observed, “When 
I got upstairs he had already taken off his shirt, undershirt, and his pants 
 were open.  After that the accused told me to sit down and not to leave the 
 house. When he stretched himself down on the floor, I got up from the 
chair and went over to the  house of my other  brother, Juan.”37 Sablan then 
rushed  after her, finding her on the second floor of Juan’s home. According 
to Cruz, “He held me with his two hands and pulled me down to the floor. 
I ran away from him. When I did not want to comply with his wishes, he 
slapped me on the face and knocked me down the stairs.”38
Fearful that she might get killed if she did not have “sexual intercourse” 
with him, Dolores Santos Cruz yelled for her  brother, who, upon entering 
the home, noticed Sablan. Acknowledging his presence as a figure of au-
thority, Juan Cruz then asked Sablan to “take good care” of his  sister and 
to not harm her. Sablan replied, “I’ll take care of her better than you can,” 
a reference to how Cruz, a  brother and a man, had been emasculated by a 
Japanese- appointed interpreter and police officer. As the feminist scholar 
Zillah Eisenstein asserts,  women and men are feminized in the pro cess of 
rape; every one is shamed.39 Without any physical re sis tance, Sablan then 
escorted Dolores Santos Cruz to the police headquarters in Sinajaña, but 
let her return home.  Later that day, Kedira and Sablan investigated Cruz 
once more about Burton’s stolen goods. They chose not to incarcerate her.
Whereas Dolores Santos Cruz did not receive any jail time, the second 
 woman to testify against Nicholas Sablan did so as a “civilian detainee” 
in the Island Command Prisoner of War Camp. Presumably incarcerated 
for “keeping  house” with a Japa nese police chief by the name of Shimada, 
Agueda Dueñas Diego discussed how Sablan nearly raped her.40 Although 
she knew Sablan “like a  brother,” given their mutual interactions with the 
Japa nese police, she supported the prosecution’s interrogation of him for 
reasons not disclosed to the court.41 On the stand, Diego, also known as 
Ida, recounted an eve ning in April 1944 when she was sleeping at the home 
of Tomas Oka in the village of Sinajaña. As she expressed, “The accused 
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came around at 12:30 midnight and woke me up. He called my name. . . .  
I got up, put on my dress and went to the door.”42 When Sablan explained 
that Chief Shimada wanted her for something “impor tant,” Diego grudg-
ingly put on her wooden clogs and left with him on a bicycle, even though 
her stomach ached. On the way to the police station in Tutujan, Sablan took 
a detour to an uninhabited ranch. Realizing that they  were not headed to 
meet the police chief, Diego tried to get off the bicycle, but Sablan restrained 
her. When they parked, Diego scolded Sablan, saying, “I  don’t want to get in 
the ranch and why are you telling a lie? You told me that I was wanted at the 
jail and why did you bring me to this place?”43
Adjusting his rationale, Sablan told Diego to enter the ranch  house and 
wait for Chief Shimada, who was scheduled to arrive soon. In her testimony, 
Diego recounted, “When I refused to get in he held me and tried to carry me 
into the ranch. I strug gled with him and tried to get away. He held me and 
threw me down on the grass among some rocks. My back got hurt from that 
fall.”44 Diego continued with her testimony: “When I asked him why he was 
 doing this to me, he replied that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with 
me  because he had always wanted. I said, ‘No.’ ” Sablan then repeatedly as-
saulted Diego, even choking her and attempting to lift her dress. Diego de-
scribed how she defended herself: “I pulled his hair with one hand and his 
ear with the other and pushing him at the same time so I could get up. . . .  
I kicked him and he kicked me. He got on top of me again and lifted my 
skirt. At this time he opened his pants and had his organ out. . . .  All dur-
ing the strug gle I had my legs crossed in order not to give him any chance 
to do anything.”45 Reminding Sablan that he had a wife and a child, Diego 
admonished him for his actions, at which point Sablan became enraged. At 
that point, she informed Sablan that she was  going to tell Chief Shimada 
about the assault. Immediately, Sablan “calmed down and apologized.”46 
Diego then agreed to not say anything if Sablan would let her return home, 
and he agreed. On the next day, Diego reported Sablan’s attempted rape to 
Chief Shimada.
Satisfied with Diego’s testimony, army Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Am-
mons of the prosecution excused her from the stand. With sufficient evi-
dence to portray Nicholas Sablan as an assailant and attempted rapist, the 
prosecution sought no further information about how Chief Shimada re-
sponded to Sablan’s vio lence. The defense counsel’s sole witness, Grace 
Taitano Flores, briefly appeared next, only to confirm that Sablan knew Diego. 
Nor did Lieutenant Alexander Akerman Jr., the defense attorney, ask Flores 
if she could vouch in any way for Sablan’s innocence. All the defense could 
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muster was that Sablan was  under “duress” during said beatings; with re-
spect to the two specifications on assault with the intent to rape, Lieutenant 
Akerman claimed that Sablan never assaulted Dolores Santos Cruz. As for 
the second specification, he informed the court that Sablan had a sexual re-
lationship with Diego. In his court statement, for example, Sablan wrote, “I 
admit, I asked her to have sexual intercourse with me. Before this time, Ida 
and myself  were very friendly and having sexual intercourse. . . .  The night 
Ida stated that she refused to have sexual intercourse with me, her reason 
for which was that she did not want Shimada to know about it, but I did 
not force her to have sexual intercourse with me.”47 Following this premise, 
Lieutenant Akerman attempted to defend Sablan with a logic akin to the act 
of rape itself. As he reasoned, Sablan was innocent  because “ there is a pre-
sen ta tion of law that when a man has had sexual intercourse with a  woman 
on one occasion, that on a subsequent occasion it  will not be his intent to 
rape but merely to renew this relationship.”48 Not heeding  these positions, 
the military tribunal sentenced Nicholas Sablan to ten years’ imprisonment 
on April 5, 1945.
Nearly two months  later, on May 23, 1945, the commission entertained 
the trial of Henry S. Pangelinan. Although Pangelinan was born and raised 
in Saipan, his parents  were originally from Guam. For nine months in 1930, 
he even visited the island, where he learned the En glish language; in 1932, 
he then left for Yokohama, Japan, where he pursued an elementary educa-
tion, worked at the Helms Corporation, and met his wife, Hideko Koyama. 
They returned to Saipan in 1937. On January 13, 1942, Pangelinan received 
an order to work in Guam. Educated in Guam, Saipan, and Yokohama, he 
earned the position of master at arms at the Japa nese jail in Hagåtña. De-
spite his affiliation with the Japa nese police, however, he befriended prom-
inent Guam Chamorros and informed them of impending danger during 
the war period. The Chamorro educator Agueda I. Johnston, for example, 
favorably portrayed Pangelinan as somebody who “had been friendly to the 
Johnston  family, telling them of the times when the Japs intended to raid 
the natives for American money or radios, or reporting news favorable to 
the Americans that he had heard over Japa nese radios.”49 His relationship 
with relatives in Guam and Saipan, coupled with his educational and travel 
experiences, may have led Pangelinan to move beyond the racialized polari-
ties of the war and to assist Agueda Johnston and  others.
Despite Pangelinan’s extensive educational background for the time, 
his responsibilities may have been more mundane than expected. As he 
recalled, “My duties  were to look  after the prisoners in the main cell. What-
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ever the prisoners need I had to report to the authorities. When the prison-
ers went out to work I had to check them, and when they came back I did the 
same.”50 He continued, “I was also in charge of sanitation. I had the prison-
ers go out on trucks. I took them to collect garbage and trash. That is about 
all I did  every day.”51 Given his relatively high status, perhaps Pangelinan 
chose to supervise the prisoners; he may have even been relieved, as well, 
from having to torture  others. As he expressed, “Other kinds of work  were 
handled by other members of the force.”52 Consequently, only one resident 
accused Pangelinan of assaulting him.
The other men who purportedly received beatings from Pangelinan  were 
three prisoners who  were previously incarcerated by the U.S. Naval Govern-
ment for burglary or theft.  After the establishment of the Minseibu, they 
continued their sentences  under the Japa nese police of Hagåtña.  Because 
the Japa nese government recognized their sentences, the tribunal assumed 
that “the Japa nese acknowledged the Penal Code of Guam as being in ef-
fect.”53 The commission likewise detailed how  these men became “trusties” 
for the Japa nese police, other wise known as individuals who had “ free rein” 
in assisting the interpreters and officers with daily tasks.54 For the court, what 
mattered was proving what constituted Pangelinan’s reputation for being 
“viciously cruel to the inmates of the prison,” an image that tainted the trust 
between him and the four Chamorro men.55 Facing one assault charge and 
one assault and battery charge, Henry Pangelinan reengaged them not as 
three prisoners and one civilian. Instead, he met them as newly employed 
 people  under the U.S. Naval Government in Guam.
Antonio Toves Atoigue, a driver and the first witness for the prosecution, 
characterized Pangelinan as insensitive to the  labor involved in finding, 
cutting, and transporting firewood. During one trip to the jungle in Febru-
ary 1943, Atoigue asked Pangelinan to find another person to help him carry 
a large log, but Pangelinan refused. Not able to transport the “very heavy” 
log, Atoigue returned to the Hagåtña jail only to realize that Pangelinan had 
reported him to the Japa nese police for disobeying work  orders. As Atoigue 
recalled, “ After I was questioned the accused tied my hands  behind me with 
a rope backwards and the rope was run across my neck holding my hands 
up and a piece of wood was run through my back and the accused started 
kicking it and the other Japa nese did the same.”56 Already imprisoned by 
the Japa nese police, Atoigue returned to a “dark cell,” where his hands re-
mained “tightly tied”  behind his back for twenty- four hours.
Another former “trusty” and a newly commissioned patrol sergeant by 
the name of Juan Blas Manibusan entered the court next to cast suspicion 
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on Pangelinan’s war time conduct. Of all the men in the trial, though, Mani-
busan viewed Pangelinan and his  family with high regard. On the stand, he 
said that Pangelinan “was, and always” is a friend.57 Pangelinan also saw 
Manibusan as a “very good man,” even convincing the Japa nese authorities 
to grant him parole on April 8, 1942.58 He then invited Manibusan to live, as 
a farm hand, with his  family at his ranch in Maite. As Pangelinan expressed, 
“I treated him like my son.”59 Why, then, did Manibusan suddenly turn on 
Pangelinan? Perhaps Manibusan’s postwar role as a police officer  under 
the U.S. Navy compelled him to express gratitude to a “liberator” by way of 
criminalizing a Saipanese. To this effect, Manibusan described an incident 
from sometime in October 1942 when Pangelinan punished him for “steal-
ing clothes and sugar from his ranch.”60 As he stated, “He started beating 
me with his closed fist and clubbed me with a material used in fencing, 
which lasted for about half an hour. Then the accused went to the kitchen 
in his ranch, took out a kitchen knife and started  towards me and his wife 
intervened and spared me.”61
Juan Flores Flores, another former prisoner and a chauffeur, alleged that 
Henry Pangelinan tortured him sometime in July 1942. As Flores put it, “He 
wanted to exchange his old clothes for my good clothes and when I  didn’t 
want to, he punished me.”62 Flores then received beatings from Pangelinan 
for one week. The last person to testify was Jose Diaz Cruz, the only civilian 
and another police officer  under the navy. As with the previous testimo-
nies, Cruz briefly recounted his encounter with Pangelinan. For him, pun-
ishment came as the result of his of ignorance rather than disobedience. 
Sometime in March 1942, he met Pangelinan in one of the prison rooms at 
the request of an unidentified Chamorro police sergeant. When Cruz failed 
to explain the purpose of his summons, Pangelinan assaulted him. As Cruz 
explained, Pangelinan “said that when a man comes  there he should know 
why he came  there and then he started slapping me with the palm of his 
hand and  after several slaps told me to kneel down.” Not afforded the op-
portunity to refute  these allegations, Henry Pangelinan was found guilty on 
May 29, 1945. The tribunal sentenced him to two years in prison.
On July  2, 1945, the court then entertained its fourth case on assault 
and battery. Confined for allegedly beating eleven individuals, Pedro Sablan 
Leon Guerrero, a Saipanese, originally arrived in Guam on January 23, 1942. 
Although he occasionally assisted the Japa nese police in Hagåtña, he pri-
marily investigated crimes with naval officials based in Yoña. Recalling his 
assignment, Leon Guerrero stated “that any order given by a superior offi-
cer to me must be considered by me as an order and must be complied with, 
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other wise it  will be too bad for me.”63 Kanzo Kawachi, a former assistant 
chief of police in Guam and a prisoner in one of the island’s stockades, ex-
plained the purpose of  orders in his capacity as a defense witness for Guer-
rero. As he said, “The interpreters received  orders from the higher authority 
as to  whether they  will punish the accused or not,  unless the interpreter 
has some  bitter argument with the accused, then the interpreter usually 
uses his own discretion in punishing the accused, without the  orders of the 
higher authority.”64 One order concerned the interrogation and torture of 
Chamorros suspected of harboring American military personnel or engag-
ing in U.S.- related activities.
Joaquin A. Limtiaco, a farmer, came forward as the first witness for the 
prosecution. From August 26, 1942, to October 20, 1942, he stated, Leon 
Guerrero had assaulted him on the suspicion of sheltering U.S. Navy en-
listed men. To this accusation, Limtiaco remarked, “I was asked  whether I 
had some Americans in hiding and I replied in the negative.”65 Unconvinced 
by Limtiaco’s response, Leon Guerrero and four other police officials beat 
Limtiaco at least three times a week during his nearly three- month impris-
onment at the Hagåtña jail. As Limtiaco recalled, Leon Guerrero “said to 
me, ‘I have never punished any Chamorro but this time I  will come near 
killing you,’ and he started beating me with a bull whip  after he made me 
take the position of crawling with the tips of my toes and the palms of my 
hands touching the floor.”66 Limtiaco continued, “ After they got through 
beating me up, they took me over to the bathroom, wet a towel over my face, 
took off my pants, and started pouring  water over my nose.”67 Unable to cull 
any “truth” from Limtiaco, a Japa nese naval officer by the name of Kimura 
then allowed Limtiaco to leave the jail on two conditions. They included 
searching for the missing Americans and providing updates to the police in 
Hagåtña once  every three days.
While it is not clear if Joaquin Limtiaco played a role in the arrest of 
Chamorros suspected of knowing the whereabouts of Americans in Guam, 
the court transcripts reveal that the sonchō of Yoña, Jose Salas Terlaje, iden-
tified the men and escorted them to the village police station. They included 
Ramon S. Baza, Juan B. Cruz, Juan L. G. Mesa, and Jesus P. Quitugua, all of 
whom recalled being assaulted by Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero and Japa nese 
naval officials on October 16, 1942. During the beatings, sonchō Jose Salas 
Terlaje was “told to sit on the side and listen to the answers given by the 
 people.” Afterward, the men stood before Terlaje and informed him “that 
they  were not  going to commit the acts that they had already committed 
and that from thereon they  will abide with all the rules and regulations.”68 
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A month  later, Manuel  B. Cruz and Jesus  C. Borja separately reported to 
the Hagåtña police station, where Leon Guerrero questioned them. For fail-
ing to confess their knowledge of the missing Americans, Leon Guerrero 
beat them on two diff er ent occasions. Cruz described his torture as such: 
Leon Guerrero “tied my two hands with an electric wiring and then tied 
me up to the beam of the building and then he took the whip, commonly 
called Chilin Guaka, and started striking me. . . .  When I felt the  handle 
being struck against my face and was about to be unconscious, Pedro, the 
accused, said, ‘Prob ably he is dead,’ and then the accused loosened the 
electric wire and he pushed me to the left hand side.”69 As a witness for the 
prosecution, Cruz then indicated how he received more lashings from Leon 
Guerrero, a form of punishment also imposed upon Jesus Borja and  others 
from Yoña.  After their beatings, they  were released.
The three remaining Chamorro men who testified against Pedro Sablan 
Leon Guerrero  were Ramon S. N. Camacho, Jose E. Espinosa, and Arturo C. 
Hines. They argued that Leon Guerrero falsely accused them of stealing a 
chicken owned by Francisco Taitano, a resident of the San Ramon district 
in Hagåtña sometime in December 1943. Inocencio Aflague, the sonchō of 
San Ramon, informed the men of this allegation, as well as accompanied 
them to the Hagåtña jail for further questioning. Upon arrival, Camacho, 
Espinosa, and Hines insisted that they  were cooking pork  earlier that eve-
ning, even claiming that Inocencio Aflague found no “chicken feathers 
around” their residence.70 As Ramon Camacho noted, “I found the accused 
sitting on his desk. He called me over and . . .  asked me  whether I stole the 
chickens and I told him I did not. He told me that he  will beat me up. He 
made me take the crawling position and started beating me up.  After the 
13th time that he struck me, I fainted and that was all I remember.”71 Jose 
Espinosa and Arturo Hines  were also tortured in this manner.
As with the previous investigation in 1942, sonchō Inocencio Aflague— 
like sonchō Jose Salas Terlaje of Yoña— witnessed the beatings and forced 
confessions of Camacho, Espinosa, and Hines. Knowing that Espinosa was 
“sickly,” Aflague, when called to the stand, even said that he tried to prevent 
Leon Guerrero from lashing the young man.72 Yet he failed in his attempt, 
a risky intervention that may have represented him as an American man of 
courage and innocence before the tribunal. On the other hand, Leon Guer-
rero testified to the contrary in describing what may have been Inocencio 
Aflague’s undesirable position as a sonchō. When examined by the judge 
advocate, Leon Guerrero claimed that sonchō Aflague urged “me to punish 
them a  little so that they can have something to fear.”73  After the two- hour 
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lashing session, Leon Guerrero released the men from the jail.  Whether 
or not sonchō Aflague participated in  these violent acts, his attendance— 
coupled with the awe and fear expressed by the incarcerated men— had 
already established the sanctity and sovereignty of imperial Japan. As the 
 legal theorist Paul W. Kahn explains, torture is a “form of sacrifice that in-
scribes on the body a sacred presence. Faith, politics, and torture  were 
conjoined in a spectacle of sacrifice designed to produce in the audience a 
kind of terror— a combination of dread and awe before the sacred mystery 
of sovereign power.” As he asserts, “Po liti cal power was stabilized by the 
transformation of torture from mere fear of violent injury to awe before 
the sacred character of the sovereign.”74
But now  under the reins of the U.S. Navy, Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero 
had lost his symbolic and material association with the Japa nese empire. 
Stripped of his ties to Japan, he was constructed by the tribunal as zoē, a 
feminized war criminal whose pleas lacked any  legal basis. For one  thing, 
the court dismissed the defense’s use of a Chamorro translation of Japa nese 
police  orders from December 27, 1941, as well as failed to locate Japanese- 
language equivalents of this and other regulations. Further, the tribunal did 
not entertain his request to contact Spain as his “protecting power,” the 
only such inquiry made by any of the Rotanese and Saipanese interpreters 
and police officers. In response to  these actions, Leon Guerrero called the 
court “highly prejudicial.” Seeking  legal support to address this bias and 
consequently delaying the proceedings for nearly a month, he argued that 
“the test of what petitioner should know, and what was proper for him to do 
in carry ing out his assigned duties, must be what he had learned  under Japa-
nese rule.”75 Denied  these requests, Leon Guerrero admitted to having pun-
ished seven of the men. But he did not assault four individuals, specifically 
Juan B. Cruz, Manuel B. Cruz, Pedro D. Perez, and Jesus C. Borja. On July 24, 
1945, the tribunal sentenced Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero to a prison term 
of five years and six months.76 Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller 
Ammons described him as an assailant who followed a “custom of cruelty.”
Two months  later, on September  26, 1945, the military commission 
entertained its fifth case on assault. But unlike the previous Chamorro 
defendants, who  were born on Guam or Saipan, Jose C. Cabrera, though 
Saipanese, was initially raised in Palau. As a series of atolls and islands lo-
cated south of Guam, the capital of Palau, Koror, served as the location for 
Japan’s civil administration. Cabrera lived  there since 1916,  later moving 
to Saipan at the age of eleven. He then became a man ag er at a soap fac-
tory. And, on December 8, 1941, the Japa nese police ordered him to invade 
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Guam. For the next three years, he served as an interpreter and police 
investigator for Japa nese officials in the village of Talo’fo’fo, often with the 
assistance of Miguel Quitugua, the kuchō, or district chief. Now faced with 
eleven specifications of assault and battery, Cabrera pleaded “not guilty” to 
the charges.
The first witnesses for the prosecution— Jose Delgado and Juan  S. 
Salas— portrayed Jose Cabrera as a man who did not follow the rule of the 
law, American or Japa nese. They separately argued that Cabrera tortured 
them for “singing” around six  o’clock in the eve ning, nearly three hours 
before the curfew time of nine  o’clock.77 They alleged that this incident oc-
curred sometime in January or February 1944 prior to fetching tuba, an alco-
holic beverage or vinegar made from fermented coconut sap. As they noted, 
Cabrera apprehended them, took them to his ranch, and instructed them to 
kneel on the ground; Cabrera then slapped Salas and scorched Delgado. As 
Delgado remembered, “The accused took a piece of wood [from Cabrera’s 
kitchen fire] which was glowing and burned me on the stomach.”78 In his 
defense, Cabrera testified that  these men  were drunk rather than sober, 
perhaps having left an eve ning tuba- drinking session in early January 1944. 
He also clarified that Delgado and Salas  were singing “an indecent song,” 
one that should not have been shared “on the street.” As Cabrera explained, 
“I told them that it was all right to drink and sing but  there was a certain 
place where that kind of song should be sung.”79 Although the court did not 
inquire as to the nature of the song, Cabrera stated that he warned them 
about its indecency. He emphasized, as well, that punishment was not 
warranted on account that the men  were walking outside, before curfew, 
around seven thirty in the eve ning. But a few days  later, Cabrera found the 
men singing the same song in the same place  after nine  o’clock at night. 
Taken aback by their failure to recognize his authority, he recalled the en-
counter in  these terms: “I spoke to Juan Salas and said, ‘Have you forgotten 
that about two or three nights ago I warned you something similar to this 
and why are you repeating it?’ He said, ‘I am happy.’ I said, ‘ Didn’t I tell you 
not to be out  after nine  o’clock and not to sing indecent songs?’ ”80 Cabrera 
then acknowledged having slapped the men for being “fresh” and for vio-
lating the curfew, but he refuted the claim that he burned Jose Delgado; as 
Cabrera expressed, “I only meant to scare him.”81
As in this episode of vulgar songs and singers, other witnesses similarly 
represented Jose Cabrera as a police officer who had no patience for “slack-
ers.” Six specifications of assault allegedly stemmed from what was Cabrera’s 
disregard for easygoing, irresponsible, and lazy individuals. Vicente  R. 
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Ulloa, a farmer from Talo’fo’fo, testified that Cabrera assaulted him in 
September  1943 for “being a slacker.”82 Ulloa argued that this attack oc-
curred at a Japa nese ranch, Kaigon Tai, at a time when Ulloa was plowing the 
land with his  water buffalo in preparation for the planting of seeds. Another 
witness, Juan R. Mesa, said that Cabrera slapped his face for missing a meet-
ing with the Seinendan, the Chamorro Young Men’s Association.  Others 
like Pedro S. N. Chargualaf, Albert T. Meno, Juan Tedtaotao, and Jesus A. 
Unpingco received beatings for, respectively, failing to send a message, 
“fooling too much,” reporting late to work, and forgetting to repay a loan.83 
It was then alleged that Cabrera assaulted the remaining two witnesses— 
Theresa Pablo Reyes and Jose A. Pablo— for stealing items.
For  these reasons, the Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Ammons 
characterized Cabrera as a “sadistic” person who subjugated the  people of 
Guam “into slavery by fear and force and to break their  will to resist.”84 Ac-
knowledging Cabrera as a mere creature of U.S. law without the rights of a 
citizen or prisoner of war, Ammons continued, “None of  these  people had 
a trial and it appeared as though the accused had unlimited power to deal 
with  these American subjects according to his own dictates and that the ac-
cused’s attitude was an absolute disregard for the right of the  people and for 
the existing laws of Guam.”85 In response to  these allegations, the defense 
counsel, Lieutenant Henry P. Bakewell of the U.S. Naval Reserve, noted that 
Cabrera was “a nice appearing fellow, and  there is nothing wrong with him 
that a  little education  will not fix.”86 The first American “educational” ses-
sion began with the court’s sentencing of Jose Cabrera to five years and six 
months’ imprisonment, effective September 28, 1945.
“They Treated Me  There Just as They Treated Me  Here— Like an 
Animal”
As  these war crimes  trials demonstrate, the tribunal treated the Rotanese 
and Saipanese interpreters and police officers as homines sacri, animals 
without any  legal or po liti cal rights. On the other hand, Guamanian testi-
monies of “loyalty” to the American state upheld the tribunal’s prosecution 
and eventual incarceration of the remaining four individuals accused of 
assault and battery, namely, Fritz Angocio Mendiola, Domingo S. Quinta-
nilla, Francisco P. Sablan, and Jose P. Villagomez. This was also the context 
that compelled the military tribunal to ask the first defendant, Domingo 
Quintanilla, if the Japa nese government in Rota and Saipan was “nice” to 
him during the war. To this question, Quintanilla responded, “No. They 
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treated me  there just as [the U.S. Naval Government] treated me  here— like 
an animal.”87
Originally from Rota, Quintanilla arrived in Guam on April 31, 1942, and 
had been employed at a charcoal plant, a papaya business, and a military 
airstrip. As with many of the interpreters and police officers, he was forced 
into militarized  labor for the Japa nese. As Quintanilla expressed, “I  didn’t 
leave voluntarily. A Japa nese policeman came over and notified me that I 
was  going to leave.”88 As one of the four remaining  trials on assault and bat-
tery, his case involved eight specifications, many of which involved disputes 
in  labor. In this regard, Quintanilla claimed that he tortured individuals 
who did not meet the  labor expectations of the Japa nese government. As he 
opined, “I was only told to see that they worked hard. . . .  Sometimes the 
Japa nese decide and sometimes they punish the  people themselves. If I in-
formed them that some natives  were ill and  couldn’t perform any work, they 
would tell me that I was siding with the Chamorros” from Guam.89 Quin-
tanilla’s trial commenced on October  15, 1945. Eight witnesses— mostly 
farmers and laborers from the villages of Dedidu, Inahålan, and Malesso’— 
testified as to how he supported the Japa nese empire.
Jose  P. Aguon and Juan  B. Rosario alleged, for example, that Quinta-
nilla assaulted them, respectively, for being sarcastic to a laborer and for 
seeking monetary compensation.  These separate incidents occurred at the 
charcoal plant in Dedidu sometime in January and April 1944. The Hagåtña 
airfield was another site where, in the summer of 1944, four men— Juan C. 
Benavente, Jose R. Gomez, Jesus A. Quinata, and Jose Espinosa Tedpago— 
each received beatings from Quintanilla for, according to Quintanilla, the 
infractions of laughing and joking, arriving late to work, arguing with la-
borers, and providing wrong work schedules. Yet none of  these men in-
curred a sentence in one of the island’s Japa nese jails. As this and related 
cases on militarized  labor illustrate, punishment was often swift, as the 
Japa nese officials needed men to hastily construct airfields, bunkers, and 
gun placements in 1944. But while the tribunal focused on the vio lence of 
Quintanilla’s physical beatings, the court sidestepped the question of his 
sexual assaults— that is, his “crime against nature”—in two allegations. The 
Penal Code of Guam, section 286, defined “crime against nature” as a person 
who commits same- sex activities with mankind or with any animal that “is 
punishable by imprisonment not less than one nor more than ten years.”90 
Unlike the related charge, “sexual perversion,” which targeted the “mouth” 
as a site of same- sex deviance, crime against nature construed “any sexual 
penetration, however slight.”91
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While neither of the prosecution’s two witnesses revealed anything that 
could have resembled “sexual penetration,” they offered seemingly matter- of- 
fact testimonies of same- sex intimacies that could have likewise criminalized 
them had it not been for their “loyal” strug gles in the imperial presence of 
Domingo Quintanilla. The first witness, Ricardo T. Mantanona, explained, 
“One day I was sick and the accused came over to our camp. He went directly 
to my cot and sat beside me. He started fingering my testicles. Then he 
began rubbing it for a  matter of 20 minutes.”92 With no reference as to how 
they may have pleasured or dis plea sured each other, he simply described 
how Quintanilla punished him for not working at the Hagåtña airfield in 
May 1944. As Mantanona said, “ After that he started hitting me, combined 
with kicking. What I received as a result of this beating  were blood coming 
out of my mouth and my face was all swollen.”93 Refusing to  labor further 
for Japan’s empire, Mantanona accepted the beating by Quintanilla even 
though his “sickness became worse.” His loyalty and re sis tance  were self- 
evident;  after all, he “never reported to work”  until the Americans had 
reoccupied Guam.94 The second witness, Ramon C. Garrido, was less candid. 
As he noted, “In June 1944, I was sick. The accused, Domingo Quintanilla, 
came over to my tent to find out why I  didn’t report to work. I told him I was 
sick. The accused said, ‘Let me feel you.’ When he touched me he said I 
had a fever. He told me however to go to work.”95 When Garrido disobeyed 
Quintanilla’s order to work, Quintanilla then hit him with a stick below the 
waist while Garrido was “lying in bed.”96
Comparable to how naval officials would  later censor Japa nese prisoner 
allegations of same- sex rape at the War Criminals Stockade in 1946 and 1947, 
the tribunal remained  silent in 1945 on how  these homoerotic assaults or 
exchanges could be construed as “crimes against nature.” This was a telling 
omission given that the U.S. military had already begun to incarcerate indi-
viduals accused of homosexual acts during World War II.97 Nevertheless, the 
court’s refusal to acknowledge same- sex intimacies supported its juxtapo-
sition of native “sacred men” against their native “American” counter parts 
in Guam. As expected, Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Ammons 
drew on this carceral logic to characterize Quintanilla’s actions as “slave 
 labor tactics” and his duties as “contrary to the laws of civilization.”98 The 
defense counsel, led by Lieutenant Commander Henry  P. Bakewell, then 
represented Quintanilla as a “child” who knew nothing about the politics 
of law, American or Japa nese. As Bakewell exclaimed, “While ignorance of 
the law is normally no defense, it is a defense in the case of  children. While 
the accused is not a child, he had no more opportunity to learn of the laws 
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of Guam than would a child. . . .  He was not a  free agent. He was himself 
a victim.”99 The court then sentenced Domingo Quintanilla to four years 
imprisonment.
In the next trial, another Chamorro interpreter, Fritz Angocio Mendiola, 
confronted fourteen specifications of assault and battery on October  18, 
1945. Originally raised in Rota, Mendiola received four years of elementary 
schooling  there, as well as drove a truck for a Japa nese sugar mill called 
Nanyo Kohatsu Kabushiki Kaisha. He then arrived in Guam primarily to as-
sist the Japa nese police on February 19, 1942. But, as Mendiola recounted, 
his duties shifted to supervising Chamorro laborers at the Piti navy yard and 
the Sumay air base, two impor tant military sites for the Japa nese govern-
ment. Linking authority with punishment, he described his role as such: “I 
was told that I could punish anyone that was fooling during working time 
or left the place without asking. The boss told us, Japa nese and interpreters 
from Rota, that we  were to boss the laborers and that if anything that was 
disobeyed we  were to go ahead and punish them.”100 Jose Santos Sablan, 
a former laborer and witness for the prosecution, stated that farmers and 
previously enlisted U.S. Navy personnel constituted the workforce of  these 
areas. The men came from the villages of Asan, Barrigada, Mongmong, Piti, 
and Sumay, among  others. Whereas most laborers  were paid with modest 
food rations, Sablan claimed that U.S. military personnel earned one yen 
and twenty- five sen for performing fourteen to sixteen hours of work per 
day. As a steward’s mate first class for the U.S. Navy, he said that the Japa-
nese military treated him as a “prisoner of war.” His partially embellished 
claim attempted to bolster his masculine image as a loyal American native 
before the tribunal. But Sablan’s comment lacked official endorsement, 
as the Japa nese transported white American prisoners of war to Japan in 
January  10, 1942. Chamorro enlisted men like Sablan  were left with their 
families in Guam and  were not interned in prisoner of war camps in Japan 
or elsewhere.
Jose Santos Sablan believed that Fritz Angocio Mendiola should be pun-
ished for having tortured him, an American military man, in March 1943. 
Another witness even said that Mendiola delighted in his punishments, 
at times “laughing” at the injuries and insults he inflicted upon  others.101 
Recalling having been assaulted by Mendiola from November  1942 to 
 December 1943, a total of twelve witnesses for the prosecution affirmed the 
violent nature of this young man from Rota. With no witnesses to compli-
cate this one- sided characterization of Mendiola, the tribunal featured the 
testimonies of Vincent Aflleje, Rafael C. Crisostomo, Jose B. Cruz, Nicolas 
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Cruz, Celestine B. Damian, Francisco S. Dueñas, Fecundo B. D. Garrido, 
Francisco Manibusan, Joaquin M. Muña, Jose Santos Sablan, Jesus M. San 
Nicolas, and Francisco M. Tajalle over a two- day period.  These men vari-
ously claimed that Mendiola had assaulted them for  these and other rea-
sons: attending a Catholic mass; breaking the  handle of a pick (a digging 
tool); disobeying a work order; drinking  water during a rest session; failing 
to perform a strenuous task; stealing a rice ration; and welcoming a new-
born baby.
Jesus M. San Nicolas, for example, argued that Mendiola instructed him 
to lift a heavy item at the navy yard in Piti sometime in November 1942. Not 
having the strength to fulfill this objective, San Nicolas refused to follow 
Mendiola’s order. As San Nicolas noted, “The accused ordered me to pick 
up a box which was very heavy. I told him I  couldn’t do it  because it weighed 
somewhere around 350 pounds. He said, ‘What happened to all the nour-
ishment you have been eating?’ I told him it was too heavy for one person 
to carry. He got angry and took a piece of board, 1" by 6" about three feet 
long and hit me four times; then with closed fist he hit me twice on the jaw. 
He told me I could not perform my work well  because I was still waiting 
for the Americans.”102 As in this and other instances, the signifier “Ameri-
can” demonstrated disloyalty to Japan or loyalty to the United States. Tak-
ing advantage of this politicized dualism, Judge Advocate and Lieutenant 
Col o nel Ammons revealed that the Guamanians “never gave up hope . . .  
that American justice would return.”103 In response, the defense counsel re-
peated the tired trope of Rotanese and Saipanese ignorance, equating their 
presumed  legal naïveté with childlike appearances and tendencies.104 As for 
Mendiola, he admitted punishing the laborers but only  because Joya, Sasak, 
and Wada— three partially identified Japa nese officials— had ordered him 
to do so. With another poor defense, the tribunal found Fritz Angocio Men-
diola guilty of all charges on October 19, 1945. As a result, he received five 
years and six months’ imprisonment in the island stockade.
Three days  later, on October 22, 1945, the Saipanese Jose P. Villagomez 
came before the military commission on account of seven specifications of 
assault and battery. Originally found guilty of murder in an  earlier trial on 
March 15, 1945, a topic explored in the next chapter, he appeared before the 
court once again. Having worked in Saipan as a police officer since 1935, 
he had acquired extensive experience in conducting interrogations for the 
Japa nese government before coming to Guam. Cognizant of his subordi-
nate but authoritative position, Villagomez understood his responsibilities 
as a police officer. As he expressed, “The punishment was according to the 
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 orders given. If my superior told me to slap, then I slap, if to whip, then I 
whip.”105 When Villagomez arrived in Guam in December 8, 1941, he abided 
by  these rules in his capacity as “a civilian, army, or navy man.”106 As an in-
terpreter and police officer stationed at the Hagåtña jail, Villagomez some-
times dealt with offenses committed in the neighboring villages of Anigua 
and Sinajaña.  These included accusations of espionage and theft, as well 
as suspicions of assisting the American military. Assaulted for being a spy, 
for example, Felipe Aguon Unpingco testified that Villagomez periodically 
clubbed him with a baseball bat at the Hagåtña jail over a period of five days 
in October 1942.
At the trial, Unpingco, a farmer, stressed the long- term effects of  these 
torture sessions: “I have continuous pain on the neck and I cannot raise 
my arms.”107 The remaining witnesses for the prosecution— that is, Juan 
Flores Flores, Jesus Mantanona Chiguina, Luis Cruz Camacho, and Joaquin 
Aflague Limtiaco— similarly testified about having been assaulted by Vil-
lagomez in 1942. Among  these men, Luis Cruz Camacho indicated having 
the longest sentence at the Hagåtña jail. Imprisoned for eigh teen days, he 
described one of Villagomez’s most favored forms of punishment. As Cama-
cho revealed, “The accused took two benches and then made me stretch 
my hands on one bench and my feet on the other forming a bridge. Then 
he got on my back and started jumping. When I fell, he made me take the 
same position; then he took a club about 4 feet long by one inch dia meter 
and started hitting me with it  until it broke.  After that he took a whip and 
whipped me from my legs all the way up to my neck  until I was numb.”108 
When asked by the tribunal if he punished Camacho in  these ways, Villago-
mez replied, on the stand: “No. I saw him for the first time this morning.”109 
In fact, he said, he never met Felipe Aguon Unpingco nor did he punish any 
of the men, claims eventually dismissed by the commission. As such, the 
tribunal found Jose Villagomez guilty of all the charges and sentenced him 
to three years’ imprisonment on October 22, 1945, the first and only day of 
his trial.
The last case regarding the Saipanese Francisco P. Sablan differed no less 
in terms of how the military commission repeatedly espoused its notion of 
“justice”— that is, white supremacist punishment and statecraft—as mor-
ally superior to its Japa nese counterpart. With Pearl Harbor as his national 
reference for American valor and triumph, Judge Advocate and Lieutenant 
Col o nel Ammons proclaimed, “As the world knows,  there is a difference in 
the concept of justice between the Americans and the Japa nese; that has 
been fully demonstrated before and since the 7th  of December  1941.”110 
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With twenty- four specifications of assault and battery, seventeen witnesses 
for the prosecution, and two witnesses for the defense, Francisco Sablan 
may have very well understood “American justice” as heavi ly favoring the 
views of the prosecution, if not the majority. Or he may have drawn parallels 
between the military tribunal and the Japa nese police system, viewing both 
as equally authoritative, masculine, and punitive.  These are the kinds of 
issues the Rotanese and Saipanese men may have contemplated.
In Sablan’s trial on October  29, 1945, three separate parties came for-
ward to incriminate him for his role as a police officer at the Hagåtña jail. 
The first, Juan Santos Tenorio, alleged that Sablan had assaulted him some-
time in October 1942 for stealing a fusinos (hoe). He was then released  after 
one day of questioning. Whereas this incident involved only one person, the 
other two events involved larger groups in the fall of 1943. Yet nobody testi-
fied as to Sablan’s supposed violent character from his arrival in Guam on 
December 8, 1941, to his arrest by the U.S. Navy in August 1944, a point lost 
on the part of his defense counsel. And notwithstanding the testimonies of 
Tenorio and one police officer, the remaining witnesses identified them-
selves as former prisoners of the Hagåtña jail.  These witnesses  were thus 
taken as legitimate sources of evidence in such  trials, with  little criticism as 
to the composition of their character. For this reason, attempts to escape 
prison and play dice— activities deemed illegal by the American and Japa-
nese penal codes— were valorized as heroic efforts to subvert the authority 
of the Japa nese police.
In October  1943, for example, Jose  A. Concepcion, Jose Mafnas Men-
diola, and Enrique Rabago left the Hagåtña jail for an undisclosed location 
in the nearby village of Otdot. As Mendiola explained, “We ran away from 
jail  because we  were hungry.”111 As the second party to accuse Francisco 
Sablan for his vio lence,  these men claimed that Sablan had tortured them 
over a three- day period. With  little focus on why they  were imprisoned in 
the first place, they diverted attention to Sablan’s cruelty. As Concepcion 
put it, the “accused took the three of us upstairs and lashed me with a bull 
whip and clubbed me with a baseball bat.”112 Afterward, they remained 
imprisoned. The third and final group to levy allegations against Sablan 
consisted of one Guamanian police officer, Felix Wusstig, and thirteen pris-
oners: Juan Borja, Ignacio T. Castro, Vicente R. Cruz, Vicente Sablan Cruz, 
Jose M. Eclevea, Juan F. Flores, Miguel Garrido, Ignacio Nededog, Vicente 
Pangelinan, Juan N. Perez, Manuel L. Rosario, Juan C. Tedtaotao, and Doro-
theo Zamora. With the exceptions of Eclevea and Rosario, all of them  were 
released from the Hagåtña jail  under the American occupation. The men 
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then took on responsibilities as farmers and laborers, with a few becom-
ing bartenders, commissioners, or nurses. As a group, they pleaded their 
innocence for playing dice on the eve ning of December 31, 1943, an activ-
ity that many thought was  legal  under the Japa nese occupation. Only Jose 
Eclevea and Juan Tedtaotao— individuals who  were originally sentenced by 
the U.S. Navy for their respective crimes of theft and attempt to commit 
rape— admitted that gambling was illegal  under the American government. 
As Eclevea announced, “Before the Japa nese time, we knew [gambling] was 
against the law, but not during the Japa nese time. We  were not informed 
about it.”113 Gambling and any “banking or percentage game played with 
cards, dice, or any device, for money, checks, credit, or other representative 
of value”  were considered misdemeanors  under The Penal Code of Guam.114
Exaggerating their ignorance about the laws on gambling, a few of the 
prisoners implicated Sablan for supporting the New Year’s cele bration. As 
Vicente Reyes Cruz clarified, the “accused lined up the boys and told them 
they  were  going to have a happy time” on the eve before January 1, 1944. By 
“happy time,” the prisoners assumed that Sablan had condoned the act of 
playing dice. They also observed that Sablan may have used this moment to 
remind them of their “right” to be Japa nese and to celebrate their newfound 
identity over anything American. As the Guamanian police officer Felix 
Wusstig recounted, “ There  were about 60 inmates and the accused made 
us get in line and questioned us if we  were still thinking of the Americans 
and then he said that up to that time we  were still thinking of bacon and 
ham and  there  isn’t one single American ship to help us.”115 He continued, 
“Then he said that he still could not understand why we had that American 
feeling, American hearts, and that we should be by right, Japa nese.”116 But 
rather than take this cue as a warning, the Guamanian prisoners and lone 
police officer embraced the “happy time” of playing dice. They  were wrong.
As Juan Tedtaotao observed, “On the night of December  31, 1943, we 
thought we would have a nice time, so we de cided to shoot craps. We  were 
in the toilet shooting craps when the accused came and found us. I was 
the first one he slapped. Then we all managed to run to the main cell. He 
followed us and started slapping and whipping in  there.”117 The other pris-
oners claimed that Sablan, branding a machete by his side, had entered 
the jail drunk,  after having consumed sake with the other police officers 
at a nearby building. In his defense, Sablan said that gambling was illegal 
 under Japa nese laws, a point reiterated by Henry S. Pangelinan, a defense 
witness and former interpreter for the Japa nese.118 And while Francisco Sa-
blan acknowledged having assaulted many of the men, he denied hurting 
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seven of them. All actions emanated from  orders given by his Japa nese su-
pervisors, Churoka and Shinaga. As with all of the cases on assault, Sablan 
faced a vengeful court. He was a child, if not property, before U.S. law. As 
Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Ammons opined, any “child 
knows it is wrong to assault his playmate, and each adult knows that he is 
not permitted to assault his fellow men without justifiable cause. I do not 
believe the accused’s mind was perverted to such a degree that he could not 
distinguish between what was right and what was wrong.”119 As a sacred 
man of the war, Francisco Sablan received the guilty sentence of six years’ 
imprisonment, with all charges proved. On October 30, 1945, he became a 
native war criminal.
Guaho Lokue Chamorro Yo
In becoming “war criminals,” the Rotanese and Saipanese may not have 
fully comprehended their role in the making and remaking of U.S. colonial 
law in Guam. Without having the  legal and po liti cal resources to mediate 
the court’s allegations, let alone not having the capacity to understand the 
En glish language, many of them apologized for their actions. Utilizing the 
refrain of cultural solidarity, “Guaho lokue Chamorro yo,” as in “I am also 
Chamorro,” they urged the tribunal to reduce or dismiss their sentences. 
As Henry S. Pangelinan remarked, “Gentlemen, I, myself, am a Chamorro. 
And had in mind the betterment and welfare of the  people of Guam and the 
constant desire to save my own  people from falling into the pitfall which 
the Japa nese had in store.”120 Jose P. Villagomez similarly expressed, “Even 
though I had an official position and order, I have considerations and sym-
pathies  toward  humans since I am a Chamorro and a Catholic.”121  Others 
did not know the Americans. As Nicholas Sablan pleaded, “I pray that the 
court consider that I am a  humble Chamorro and ever since my birth was 
 under the Japa nese Government and for that  matter I do not understand the 
Americans and its customs.”122
A few interpreters and police officers also emphasized the restrictive 
conditions  under which they performed their duties in colonizing the Guam 
Chamorros. As Domingo S. Quintanilla disclosed, “I am sorry it happened. 
I was ordered to do it. If disobeyed I would be punished. In fact, I myself 
was punished for not driving them hard enough. . . .  I heard it was wrong, 
and asked Boss. The Boss said it was Japa nese time, not American time. . . .  
I promise it  will never happen again.”123 Should a Rotanese or Saipanese 
refuse an order, he was tortured by a Japa nese police supervisor. Describing 
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this environment where vio lence begets vio lence, Fritz Angocio Mendiola 
said, “I was more than once threatened with a sword. I was beaten many 
times for refusing to oppress the Guam Chamorros. . . .  I always tried to 
avoid striking the Guam Chamorros, and did so only  after I was ordered and 
threatened. I was beaten so many times myself that I honestly believe that I 
felt worse than the Guam natives did.”124 Himself apol o getic for his actions, 
Francisco P. Sablan clarified what may have been a shared view among the 
men. As he stated, “In 1941, I came to Guam  under  orders of the Governor 
of Saipan. I never was instructed on Guam law and acted at all times  under 
 orders of my superiors. I did not know I was  doing wrong. . . .  I am sorry 
this happened, and it  will never happen again.”125 As Henry S. Pangelinan 
put it, “It is difficult for you to understand what one must do when they have 
to serve  under Japa nese masters. I ask that you take that into consideration 
in judging my case.”126
As their cases reveal, the military commission found  every Chamorro 
man from Rota and Saipan guilty of “assault and battery.” Following the 
civil crime trial of Miguel A. Cruz, a former sonchō, the court set a pre ce-
dent in determining what constituted this crime and its vari ous specifica-
tions in the context of Japanese- occupied Guam. That the tribunal began 
with this Guamanian sonchō is telling not only  because Cruz had the short-
est sentence of one year’s imprisonment among the nine men accused of 
 these charges. As the making of the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Program had 
already demonstrated, cases such as  these  were meant to renew and “test” 
the thresholds of constitutional, military, and international law in Guam. 
While Cruz may not have fully taken on the dimensions of a “sacred man,” 
given that he was an American national and subject to U.S. laws, his trial 
showed the degree to which the tribunal practiced impartiality. His case 
represented the military commission as nonpartisan in its apprehension 
and prosecution of any violator— Guamanian, Rotanese, or other wise—of 
U.S. laws.
Remade into “civilian detainees” and “civilian internees,” the Rotanese 
and Saipanese men lost any right to prisoner of war statuses  under interna-
tional law, as well as any protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution. As 
homines sacri, their bodies now constituted the thresholds of the state and 
its laws on crime in Guam. As Michel Foucault would argue, their cases rep-
resented the modern shift in punishment from being a public spectacle of 
mutilation and death to an institutional “economy of suspended rights.”127 
This erasure of rights pertained, moreover, not simply to the sacred men in 
question. Rather, the carceral and colonial character of the tribunal was fur-
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ther revealed in its disregard for American crimes presumably committed 
by Guam Chamorros during the Japa nese occupation. That the court failed 
to address other charges— notably, the stealing of clothes, hens, money, 
and sugar and the playing of dice— illustrated the tribunal’s selective ap-
plication of The Penal Code of Guam and the careful construction of acceptable 
and deviant native types. Neither the defense nor the prosecution addressed 
 these blatant omissions; at the very least,  these efforts can be read as the 
tribunal’s reshaping of its laws so as to accommodate its po liti cal objectives 
in expunging any Japa nese threat from the nation. Instead, the tribunal por-
trayed Rotanese and Saipanese as criminals of the state, whereas the court 
affirmed Guamanians as noncriminal and loyal wards.
By also referring to Rotanese and Saipanese “war criminals” as harbin-
gers of “slavery,” the tribunal appropriated the “world’s master trope for 
imperial forms of domination.”128 Not even the apologies and lamentations 
on the part of the men could alleviate the navy’s use of this meta phor, one 
that was likewise imposed upon Rotanese and Saipanese accused of com-
mitting murders in Guam. As with the condemnation of “blackness” in 
early twentieth- century Amer i ca, wherein black criminality became a tool 
to mea sure black fitness for citizenship, the court’s treatment of Rotanese 
and Saipanese “customs” as being akin to “slavery” excluded  these Chamor-
ros from the nation, on the one hand, and protected the tribunal’s jurists 
from the charge of racism in the colony, on the other.129 The tribunal had 
constructed a brand of native criminality that made its laws appear as be-
nign and lawful rather than as racist and unlawful.
native murderers
As in the nine  trials concerning native assault and battery, the U.S. Navy’s 
War Crimes Tribunals Program similarly apprehended individuals accused 
of committing murders in Japanese- occupied Guam. Notwithstanding the 
first murder case against a Guam Chamorro and U.S. national, Juan Muña 
Dueñas, the six Saipanese men tried for this war crime  were reduced to bare 
life. They included Antonio Camacho, Luis  C. Crisostomo, Juan Reyes, 
Manuel Borja Tudela, Jose P. Villagomez, and Juan Villagomez. Of  these men, 
only Jose P. Villagomez faced two separate  trials, one for assault and bat-
tery and one for murder. In this chapter, I examine  these cases, all of which 
invoked the court’s definitions of murder as per the Naval Courts and Boards 
and The Penal Code of Guam, both of which understood murder, verbatim, as 
“the unlawful killing of a  human being with malice afterthought.”1 Malice 
“may be express or implied. It is expressed when  there is a manifested or a 
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It 
is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”2 
Depending on the degree of murder, the punishment entailed  either death 
or imprisonment. As section 190 of The Penal Code of Guam noted, “ Every per-
son guilty of murder in the first degree  shall suffer death, or confinement 
in prison for life; and  every person guilty of murder in the second degree is 
punishable by imprisonment in prison from five years to life.”3 As per the 
systematic inclusive exclusion of par tic u lar types of natives from the U.S. 
nation, the military tribunal entertained its first civil crime case in ways that 
extended its racism and retribution.4
4
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Establishing Another  Legal Pre ce dent
Comparable to the case of the Guamanian Miguel  A. Cruz, the commis-
sion began its murder proceedings with another Guamanian by the name of 
Juan Muña Dueñas, an el derly farmer from the village of Talo’fo’fo. But un-
like other  trials wherein the naval intelligence personnel searched for sus-
pected war criminals, Dueñas approached military officials and confessed 
to murdering Manuel Pablo Mantanona, a former kuchō from Talo’fo’fo, on 
October 26, 1944. As he recalled, “ After that I took my gun and hand it to 
the  Marines. . . .  I  didn’t go.”5 But when Dueñas’s trial commenced two 
months  later on December 28, 1944, he changed his mind and pleaded “not 
guilty” for reasons not disclosed to the court.
When Juan Muña Dueñas was detained, the chief of the police, Lieuten-
ant Commander Jon Wiig, requested that he give a statement. But  because 
Dueñas did not comprehend the En glish language, Chief Wiig enlisted the 
translation ser vices of Juan Manibusan. When Chief Wiig was called to the 
stand as a witness for the prosecution, the tribunal asked him if he had 
apprised Dueñas of his “constitutional rights” as an American national 
 under military guard. Illustrating the court’s disregard for the rights of its 
subjects, Dueñas responded, “I did not give the warning in exact accor-
dance with Naval Courts and Boards. I think he was fully informed of his 
constitutional rights and he wanted to make a statement  after receiving 
the warning.”6 Based on the statement, then, Dueñas shot Manuel Pablo 
Mantanona  because of a dispute concerning the distribution of corn. Ac-
cording to Dueñas, Mantanona and his godfather, the sonchō Vicente C. 
Castro, conspired to deprive Dueñas of his share of fifteen out of thirty- 
five baskets of harvested corn. As Dueñas exclaimed, “The Commissioner 
[Vicente C. Castro] and Manuel Mantanona  were cheating me of my corn 
harvest, meaning that when I ask the Commissioner about it, he  will tell me 
to see Manuel Mantanona and when I ask Mantanona, he  will tell me to see 
the Commissioner.”7
In the statement gathered by Chief Wiig and in corresponding testi-
monies, Dueñas argued that the Kaikuntai, the Japa nese agricultural unit, 
designated his land as one of several areas in Guam to grow produce for 
the Japa nese military. As the Chamorro historian Pedro  C. Sanchez ex-
plained, the Kaikuntai “set up headquarters in Tai, between Chalan Pago 
and Mangilao. . . .  It recruited all Minseibu officials, teachers and police 
in the villages, and ordered them to mobilize as field hands all able- bodied 
 women and all  children over twelve years old. . . .  They cultivated sweet 
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potato, corn, taro, yam, tapioca and other food crops.”8 With his land divided 
into two lots, one for the Kaikuntai and one for his  family, the respective 
clans of Castro, Dueñas, and Mantanona planted and harvested corn. Dueñas 
was supposed to receive half of the produce, which, he revealed, was fair. 
But, in practice, Dueñas claimed that Manuel Pablo Mantanona repeatedly 
cheated his  family from his share of the corn during and  after the war.
According to Dueñas, the Castro, Pablo, and Mantanona clans of Talo’fo’fo 
also ridiculed the el derly farmer and his sons on several occasions. And, 
yet, Dueñas continuously sought a peaceful resolution even though  these 
families had threatened to destroy his life,  children, and land. Clearly, their 
strained relationship had  little to do with corn and more to do with power. 
In fact, several testimonies revealed that  these clans worked closely with 
and benefited greatly from their ties to both the American and the Japa-
nese military police. This arrangement partly explained why American and 
Japa nese investigators failed to  settle their conflict. As a result, Juan Muña 
Dueñas used his U.S. military– issued carbine to murder Manuel Pablo 
Mantanona on October 26, 1944. Whereas the prosecution enlisted ten wit-
nesses to confirm the accusation, the defense counsel provided no witness 
whatsoever. The tribunal then sentenced Dueñas to life imprisonment for 
voluntary manslaughter, as much as it created a pre ce dent for its proceedings 
on murder.9
From Striking a  Father to Watching a Baseball Game
What was at stake in  these murder  trials? As described in the previous chap-
ter, Chamorros accused of assault and battery received prison sentences of 
vari ous durations. Yet the tribunal did not levy the death penalty. As sec-
tion  246 of The Penal Code of Guam makes clear, prisoners who serve “life 
sentences” can incur the death penalty if they are found guilty of inflicting 
“ great bodily injury” upon  others.10 Other wise, The Penal Code of Guam indi-
cates that only persons found guilty of murder in the first degree can “suffer 
death.”11 With re spect to sentences not requiring the death penalty, then, 
the commission possessed the ability to judge such decisions.
Now faced with Chamorros accused of murdering  others, the military 
court deferred its final judgments to the secretary of the navy whenever 
sentences required the death penalty. As Judge Advocate General and 
Rear Admiral T. L. Gatch explained, “Except where a sentence of death is 
imposed, the officer ordering the trial is the authority taking final action 
thereon.”12 In making this point, the judge advocate general specifically 
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focused on the murder trial of Jose P. Villagomez, a case that raised “com-
plex questions of the status of Villagomez, of what law he  violated and what 
court can properly try him.”13 Was he a Japa nese national? Did he infringe 
upon the U.S. laws of Guam? Did the Hague Regulations and its Articles 
of War afford any protections to civilians like Villagomez? Judge Advocate 
General and Rear Admiral Gatch raised  these questions in March 1945, a 
month  after Villagomez’s murder trial in February and several months 
before his assault trial and battery trial in October of that year. As the se nior 
naval officer reasoned, “ Because it is the first case of this nature to be tried 
by a military commission, and  because the action taken may have an effect 
upon the Japa nese treatment of American prisoners; it is recommended 
that the Military Governor of Guam be instructed to send the rec ord to the 
Secretary of the Navy for examination.”
With Jose Villagomez and other Saipanese up for their murder  trials, 
the tribunal inscribed its power over  these sacred men so as to incorpo-
rate them into the nation only to be punished and expunged as nonsacri-
fices. With the death penalty looming as one potential sentence, the court 
thus reinforced the “civilian” status positions of men like Villagomez and 
the penal codes of the United States. As the judge advocate for his trial, 
Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Ammons, surmised, “He lived as a civilian and 
worked as a civilian. He has been classified as a civilian internee or civil-
ian detainee since first being taken into custody by the armed forces of the 
United States on or about the 10th day of August, 1944.”14 Downplaying 
Villagomez’s genealogy as a Chamorro from Saipan and disregarding his 
 legal and po liti cal ties to Japan, the lieutenant col o nel remade Villagomez 
into an “inhabitant” of Guam, a euphemism for an American colonial sub-
ject. As the military officer exclaimed, “The story of how or why he came to 
the Island of Guam is not impressive or material. From the first day he set 
foot on Guam and at all times since, he has been subject to the penal laws of 
Guam and upon violations thereof his status is now and has been the same 
as any other civilian inhabitant and no diff er ent.”15
With the assistance of the Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller 
Ammons, the prosecution began its trial of Jose P. Villagomez on February 26, 
1945. He was accused of murdering Vicente Sahagon Babauta in  August 1942. 
Immediately, the prosecution refuted any claim that Babauta had cut his 
 father sometime in that year, the alleged assault that led to  Villagomez’s arrest 
of the young man from the village of Dedidu. As a farmer, Babauta produced 
copra and pastured cows, among other tasks. He was also innocent, empha-
sized Hector C. Sgambelluri, the former sonchō of Dedidu and a witness for 
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the prosecution. As a Japanese- appointed official, Sgambelluri witnessed the 
torturing of Babauta at the Hagåtña jail, as well as recalled Babauta’s denial of 
having harmed his  father. At the same time, the sonchō acknowledged that 
Babauta’s parents  were involved in a dispute, and that his  father had a fresh 
cut on his face. But Sgambelluri never revealed the sources of the  family’s 
conflict or his  father’s injury. Nor did the defense counsel and the prosecu-
tion identify the  father’s name or solicit his testimony. What concerned the 
prosecution was how Jose Villagomez arrested, tortured, and killed Vicente 
Sahagon Babauta without due pro cess.
On the first point, the prosecution enlisted the testimonies of three 
Chamorro police officers formerly employed by the Minseibu and the Japa-
nese navy. They included Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero, Juan A. Roberto, and 
Juan Villagomez. The latter two  were cousins. Only Roberto was from Guam, 
whereas Leon Guerrero and Juan Villagomez  were from Saipan. Claiming 
to be a low- ranking police investigator, Roberto informed the tribunal that 
he took  orders from “all Japa nese police officers and also from Saipanese 
police officers.”16 As with  every Guamanian police officer, he attempted to 
absolve himself of any crime associated with the Japa nese empire. That no 
Guamanian police officer faced the tribunal for any charge demonstrated the 
efficacy of such evasive strategies, if not illustrated the power of the “loyal 
native” trope in the  legal imagination of the court. On the other hand, Leon 
Guerrero and Juan Villagomez remained interned as civilian detainees, fac-
ing, respectively, assault and murder charges. As a group, they identified Jose 
Villagomez as a member of the search party for Vicente Sahagon Babauta.
With Shimada as the se nior police officer, the police argued that Jose 
Villagomez and the search party arrested Babauta  later that eve ning. 
 Roberto, the lone Guamanian, stated that he only saw Babauta whenever 
he took him to the hospital for treatment. As if to demonstrate his care for 
the prisoners and his noninvolvement in the interrogations, Roberto said, 
“I had to help this man several times  because he  can’t hardly stand up.”17 
Whereas Roberto disavowed any vio lence on his part, the Saipanese offi-
cer Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero acknowledged being pre sent during the 
investigation. Leon Guerrero admitted, for example, that Jose Villagomez 
whipped Babauta with “three or four lashes.”18 Juan Villagomez, the other 
Saipanese officer, claimed to have  little knowledge of the case, stating only 
that Shimada and Jose Villagomez hurt Babauta. With nothing to lose, how-
ever, one Guamanian witness for the prosecution described the assaults on 
Babauta. As the former “office boy” for the Hagåtña jail, Jose Miner Eclevea 
observed the interrogation.
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Initially imprisoned by the Japa nese for theft in December 1944, Eclevea, 
aged seventeen, quickly gained the trust of the officers. Assigned to “take 
care” of the interpreters’ rooms, he had access to  every part of the police 
fa cil i ty. Eclevea indicated that at least five men— Antonio Camacho, Juan 
Reyes, Shimada, Ungawa, and Jose Villagomez— tortured Babauta on the 
eve ning of his arrest. The punishment began when Ungawa, a Japa nese 
police officer, instructed Babauta to lie on the deck, stomach down. As 
Eclevea recounted, “Shimada asked him to tell the truth, and while being 
questioned he was whipped. When Shimada was tired whipping he  will pass 
it on to Ungawa and from Ungawa to the rest of the Saipanese, Juan Reyes, 
Jose Villagomez, Antonio Camacho. . . .  The five of them took turns;  every 
time one of them got tired, he passed [the bullwhip] on to the  others; 
Babauta was punished from 10  o’clock in the night to 4  o’clock in the morning 
continuously.”19 Afterward, Babauta was allowed to rest in a cell  until nine 
 o’clock, when Jose Villagomez resumed the investigation. Villagomez then 
used a bullwhip to solicit the truth from Babauta.20
Refusing to confess to a crime  after undergoing more than six hours of 
torture, Babauta persisted in claiming his innocence. Yet the torture had 
already converted Babauta into a subject of Japan. As the literary critic 
Elaine Scarry expounds, torture is a “pro cess which not only converts but 
announces the conversion of  every conceivable aspect of the event and the 
environment into an agent of pain.”21 As a representative of “pain,” Babau-
ta’s bodily injuries served as a stark reminder of the power of the Japa nese 
police force. Sonchō Sgambelluri, officer Leon Guerrero, and “office boy” 
Eclevea variously witnessed the conversion of Babauta from a “farmer” to a 
“criminal” through the respective lenses of a village official, an interpreter, 
and a domestic worker. But the conversion and extension of pain  were not 
complete, as Babauta’s body was circulated, first, at the hospital and, sec-
ond, throughout the village of Dedidu. As if to signify Japan’s imperial reach 
into  every crevice of society in Guam, his body had to be seen, touched, and 
handled by multiple individuals across public, official, and private spaces. 
Take, for instance, the actions of Juan Roberto, the Guamanian police of-
ficer who repeatedly escorted the “very sick” man to the hospital over a 
course of several days.22
While it is not known how many times Babauta sought care at the hospi-
tal, the nurses implied that he had more than three trips. On one occasion, 
native nurse Rosa C. Farfan said that Babauta’s body was “shaking,” though 
he was able to walk. The second visit was worse. As nurse Farfan observed, 
“When he came by the hospital by stretcher I looked at his back and he 
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had contusions, black and blue marks from his buttocks up to his neck; 
black and blue and swollen.”23 During a diff er ent visit, Maria Quintanilla 
Matanane, another native nurse, applied “red medicine (mercurochrome)” 
across Babauta’s bruised and lacerated back.24 Rita Gogue James, the se nior 
nurse and the native liaison between the jail and the hospital, summarized 
the context. As she remarked, “When he was brought over to the hospital, I 
found out something was wrong with his neck and all the left side body was 
somewhat like para lyzed. He could not sit straight, and he had bruises on 
his body which appeared as though he had been beaten by a club.”25 Nurse 
James thus described a man who became increasingly ill over time.
As  every torture session demonstrated, one did not have to be pre sent 
to witness the power of Japan. When the Japa nese police fi nally released 
Babauta from the Hagåtña jail, he returned to his  family in the village of 
Dedidu. Taken by car, his  mother greeted him when he arrived home. As 
Ana Sahagon Babauta recalled, “When he was brought over to the ranch he 
could not get out of the car  because he was shaking.” Regarding his overall 
appearance, she noted, “He was yellow in color and his breath had a bad 
odor. . . .  I saw black and blue marks and he had a gaseous stomach.”26 
Babauta’s neighbor, Ramon Cruz Santos, and his godmother, Maria Arriola 
Uson, likewise confirmed the young man’s ailing condition. As Uson ob-
served, “He looked very grave; he could not urinate, could not move his 
bowels.” Babauta only said, “I am  going to die. I know I am  going to die.”27 
He then passed away at his  family’s ranch in Dedidu sometime in Novem-
ber 1942. His relatives laid him to rest at the Pigo cemetery, an area located 
far south of Dedidu. As with the other graves, his burial site faced the beach.
In response to  these allegations, Jose Villagomez emphasized that he 
“never whipped” Vicente Sahagon Babauta.28 Instead, Villagomez por-
trayed himself as an inexperienced police officer and interpreter, if not as 
a subordinate of the Guamanians and the Japa nese. As he expressed, “No 
interpreter could go through any investigation  unless it was ordered by Shi-
mada.  Unless I was ordered to conduct an investigation, I  will not do so, 
but on  those days I was new on the Island and I was following Adolfo Sgam-
belluri according to the way he carried out  things.”29 Like the Guamanian 
police officer Juan Roberto, Villagomez deflected any responsibility on his 
part. It is rather telling, as well, that the Guamanian police officer Adolfo 
Sgambelluri did not testify in this case, as Villagomez identified him as an 
investigator from which to learn policing techniques. When they searched 
for Babauta, for example, Villagomez offered to find the area in Dedidu 
where Babauta assaulted his  father with a machete. To this proposition, 
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Sgambelluri purportedly said, “You  don’t have to inquire any more since we 
know the district.”30 In this re spect, Villagomez implied that Sgambelluri 
and other Guamanians might have played more active roles— that is to say, 
knowing places, arresting suspects, and torturing  people—in such inter-
rogations. Yet  these  matters never surfaced in the  trials.
Supporting Jose Villagomez’s testimony, the defense counsel attacked 
the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. The counsel noted that no-
body could agree as to when Vicente Sahagon Babauta entered the Hagåtña 
jail. As Lieutenant Alexander Akerman  Jr. and Vicente  C. Reyes argued, 
“We have evidence of 3 or 4 witnesses that he was brought to jail on Au-
gust 1942;  others in October 1942.”31 The same logic applied to the num-
ber of individuals who  were accused of assaulting Babauta; some said two, 
a few said five, and one said six. That more than one person tortured 
Babauta was enough reason to question the prosecution’s claim that Jose 
Villagomez murdered him. As the defense counsel asserted,  there “was not 
one iota of evidence that the injuries described by some of the witnesses as 
having been inflicted by the accused caused the death of the deceased.”32 
Not heeding  these criticisms, the court proclaimed that Jose Villagomez 
assaulted Babauta twice— once on the eve ning of his arrest and again on 
the morning of his detainment. For the tribunal, such beatings caused Ba-
bauta’s death.
For  these actions, the commission found Jose Villagomez guilty of 
second- degree murder, thereby sentencing him to ten years of hard  labor. 
But the court was not satisfied with this outcome. Although the tribunal did 
not apprehend all the individuals accused of assaulting Babauta, the com-
mission targeted Juan Villagomez, a Saipanese police officer, as similarly 
responsible for causing the farmer’s death. Himself a witness for the pros-
ecution in the trial of Jose Villagomez, Juan Villagomez  later faced the mur-
der charge on October 31, 1945. But whereas the former’s trial lasted twelve 
days in February and March 1945, proceedings for the latter took two days 
to complete. The difference in duration had much to do with the court’s in-
terest in establishing Jose Villagomez as the primary murderer of Babauta; 
hence,  little attention was placed on Juan Villagomez with re spect to the 
murder charge. Juan Villagomez’s shorter trial reflected this sensibility, as 
the tribunal spent more effort in finding him guilty on four specifications 
of assault and battery. In addition to being accused of murdering Babauta, 
Juan Villagomez was alleged to have separately attacked the following four 
men in Guam: Gonzalo Ecleva, Jose  C. Guerrero, Jose  M. Martinez, and 
Blas T. Taimanglo.
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With re spect to the murder charge, Juan Villagomez provided partial 
statements as to his involvement in the interrogation of Vicente Sahagon 
Babauta. As a witness for the prosecution in Jose Villagomez’s trial, Juan 
Villagomez described himself as an aloof bystander. As he put it, “When 
that case was brought to the jail, I was not  there. I was out. When I went 
to the jail that night I was very sleepy; it was around 8  o’clock. As I entered 
the jail I heard some weeping  going on. The guard’s duty was to check 
 people coming in. I saw on the  table a piece of paper and on it was the 
name  Vicente Sahagon Babauta.”33 At that point, Juan Villagomez walked 
upstairs, where he noticed Shimada whipping Babauta in an interrogation 
room; Villagomez then went to bed. Shortly thereafter, Shimada called for 
Juan Villagomez. When he did not respond, Shimada approached him in 
his bedroom, presumably saying, “What is the  matter with you? You are 
the only interpreter that does not work  after working hours. You just went 
out  after working hours, while the  others [ were] working.”34 At Shimada’s 
request, Juan Villagomez then entered the interrogation room where he 
witnessed Jose Villagomez, his relative, assaulting Babauta.
But when he approached the stand in his murder case, Juan Villagomez 
admitted to having “slapped” Babauta “about six or eight times.”35 Main-
taining his position as an outsider to the investigation, Villagomez said that 
he spent no more than fifteen minutes in the interrogation room. However, 
two of the prosecution’s witnesses, Jose Villagomez and sonchō Hector C. 
Sgambelluri, disputed the type of punishment used by Juan Villagomez. While 
they agreed that Juan Villagomez briefly interacted with Babauta, they ar-
gued that Villagomez whipped him at the request of Shimada and Ogawa, 
another Japa nese police officer.36 With Juan Villagomez implicated in the 
death of Babauta, the tribunal then summoned the four men who claimed 
to have been victimized by Villagomez. Jose C. Guerrero and Gonzalo Ec-
levea separately testified to having been struck by Villagomez sometime in 
March or April  1942. As they recounted, they  were traveling along a road 
in the village of Barrigada around six  o’clock in the eve ning. Guerrero rode 
a bull cart, and Eclevea peddled a bicycle, with approximately twenty feet 
between the men. According to Guerrero, Juan Villagomez first met him on 
the path, at which time he ordered Guerrero to dismount from the wagon. 
Villagomez then punched and kicked Guerrero for being “an American,” 
even threatening his life with a gun.37  After recording his name, Villagomez 
let Guerrero return to his bull cart.
A few minutes  later, Villagomez asked Gonzalo Eclevea if he, too, was 
an American. Eclevea responded, “No, I was still a Chamorro.”38 But rather 
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than go along with Villagomez, Eclevea briskly questioned Villagomez’s use 
of a flashlight. As he noted, “As I was  going along Barrigada road someone 
flashed a light right in my face. It was the accused that did it. I asked him 
who he was and what authority he had to flash his light in my face. . . .  
Then he came over to me and told me I was acting fresh and started hitting 
me.  After he had hit me, my lips began to bleed. He broke my false teeth and 
cut my lips and for two days I could not eat.”39 Eclevea was then released. As 
for the third specification of assault and battery, Jose M. Martinez argued 
that he was beaten for stealing bananas from Juan Combado, a farmer from 
the village of Talo’fo’fo, sometime in June  1943. According to Martinez, 
Juan Villagomez beat him with a club “over 60 times.”40 The last witness and 
alleged victim of Villagomez, Blas T. Taimanglo, spent barely one minute on 
the stand. Although he stated that Villagomez punished him, he could not 
identify him before the court. When asked by the prosecution to “look” at 
the accused, for example, Taimanglo simply muttered, “I do not know this 
man.”41 As with the murder trial of Jose Villagomez, the tribunal welcomed 
 these convoluted testimonies as evidence. Likening Juan Villagomez to a 
slaveholder who broke the “ will” to resist among the Guam Chamorros, 
the tribunal found him guilty of all the charges and sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.
In the fourth and joint murder trial concerning Antonio Camacho and 
Juan Reyes, the court likewise imposed its regime of vio lence on the defen-
dants, who  were charged with murdering Pedro Gogue Sablan, a Guama-
nian, in early 1942. But unlike the Rotanese and Saipanese men who  were 
already imprisoned in Guam’s stockades, the court did not extract Camacho 
and Reyes from  these “American” locales. With the assistance of military 
intelligence and police personnel, the tribunal identified, detained, and 
transferred  these men from Saipan, a nearby “Japa nese” island, to Guam 
on January 19, 1945. With re spect to Antonio Camacho, the U.S. military 
initially mistook him for a civilian without any ties to war time Guam; the 
military even employed him as a “policeman” to guard an internment camp 
in Saipan.42 But upon recognizing his identity as a former interpreter and 
police officer for the Japa nese government in Guam, the military placed 
Camacho in a prisoner of war camp in Saipan on November 14, 1944. Juan 
Reyes suffered the same predicament, though the U.S. military did not hire 
him in any capacity.
The tribunal then established the “civilian” statuses of Antonio Camacho 
and Juan Reyes, opening their trial on April 27, 1945. Pleading “not guilty” 
to the charge of murder, Camacho and Reyes heard the prosecution’s 
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 witnesses recount the capture and punishment of Pedro Gogue Sablan. Jose 
Quidachay Villagomez, a garbage collector and a friend of Sablan, recalled 
the arrest in March or April 1942. He said, “Three of us  were taken at the 
same time. Pedro Sablan, Juan G. Rivera and myself.”43 Villagomez identi-
fied Antonio Camacho and the Japa nese officer Shimada as the individuals 
who arrested them in the village of Otdot. Accused of theft, they  were es-
corted to the Hagåtña jail and held in separate cells for a three- day period. 
Prior to their imprisonment, Villagomez noted that Pedro Gogue Sablan 
was “in good health.”44 The prosecution then attempted to establish An-
tonio Camacho and Juan Reyes as the primary assailants of Sablan. In the 
confines of his cell, for example, Jose Quidachay Villagomez “heard Sablan 
yelling” from an area located above him. Specifically, he claimed that Sa-
blan screamed “Ay, Nana!” (“ Mother!”)  every time “he was whipped.”45
Whereas Villagomez heard somebody beat Sablan, his friend and fellow 
inmate Juan G. Rivera saw Camacho and Reyes attack Sablan. Rivera was 
one of three eyewitnesses. Called from his cell for questioning, he went up-
stairs and found Juan Reyes “hitting Pedro Sablan with his fist, against the 
wall, then tripped him and when he was down started kicking him.”46  These 
beatings occurred on a Friday. But what proved especially disturbing was 
the testimony of the third eyewitness, the nurse Rita Gogue James. As a key 
witness for the tribunal, James often accused the Rotanese and Saipanese 
of torturing Guamanians. In Sablan’s trial, however, she also sketched how 
medicine served the punitive goals of  these police officers.
As the se nior native nurse, James explained that the Japa nese, Rotanese, 
and Saipanese police officers occasionally asked her to inject “one quarter 
grain of morphine sulphate and 1/150 grain of atropine sulphate” into the 
bodies of some prisoners (figure  4.1).47 At other times, only the Japa nese 
doctors at the hospital prescribed  these medi cations. But  these narcotics 
 were not used to help the prisoners in any way. As James emphasized, “ These 
 were not injections for the purpose of curing them, but rather to calm them 
down.”48 By relaxing certain inmates, the police officers reduced the “noise” 
in the jail, prepared said prisoners for  future punishment, and created a bet-
ter sleeping environment for the officers and inmates alike. As the nurse ob-
served, “They always had me inject  those that  were punished as to relieve 
them from making so much noise.” Reflecting on the official policy of the 
medi cations, James stated that the police officers did not “take care of them 
in case they had the intention of punishing and beating a person to the ex-
tent of death.”49 She thus detailed how the punitive mea sures enacted at the 
Hagåtña jail caused the injuries and deaths of the Guamanian prisoners.
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With re spect to Pedro Gogue Sablan, nurse James sought the assistance 
of an unidentified Japa nese doctor and requested to administer the medi-
cine to the inmate.  After the third request, she received permission to visit 
the jail and provide the shots. James described how, at the jail, she and the 
doctor waited outside an interrogation room “ because the door was locked 
while Pedro was inside being punished. Then a prisoner came and opened 
the door and I entered the room with the doctor and found Pedro being pun-
ished by the two accused.”  After the beating, she and the doctor followed 
Sablan to a “dark cell,” where they gave him the drugs to stop his “groan-
ing.”50 The following day James met Juan Reyes at the hospital. She carefully 
broached the topic of assisting Sablan, who was her nephew. Emphasizing 
her kindness to Reyes as an entry point into this discussion, James stated, 
“I told him that I had been very good to him; I gave him medicine and 
every thing he needed and then I mentioned about the punishment inflicted 
upon my nephew.” In response, Reyes purportedly said, “That is all right, 
never mind.”51 That Juan Reyes rejected nurse James’s plea to help her  dying 
nephew was as unsettling as the beatings themselves.
4.1.  Chamorro nurses and Japa nese medical staff, Hagåtña, Guam, ca. early 1940s 
(photo number ah5-111, Rec. August 2, 1945). U.S. National Archives, College Park, 
Mary land.
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Two individuals then discussed the effects of  these assaults on Pedro 
Gogue Sablan. Manuel, his  brother, said that Pedro “was badly injured. 
He had bruises all the way from his head down his back to his heels and 
arms. He could not lie flat on his back. He had to sleep flat on his chest and 
about a week  later, he could not take any position but a sitting position. 
He remained in a sitting position and even slept in that position.”52 Former 
inmate Jose Quidachay Villagomez agreed, saying that Sablan “could not 
work”  after the torture sessions.53 In early June 1942, Sablan passed away at 
the age of thirty- five.
With no consensus on the alleged time of Sablan’s detainment, the de-
fense attorneys, Lieutenant Alexander Akerman  Jr. and Vicente C. Reyes, 
requested that such testimonies be discredited. They likewise questioned 
 whether Pedro Gogue Sablan had any injuries in the first place. One of their 
witnesses, for example, claimed that Sablan did visit the Hagåtña jail but 
left the fa cil i ty unscathed. The defense counsel then called on Commander 
Ralph C. Smith of the Medical Corps. A licensed doctor from Texas and a 
U.S. Navy reservist, Smith argued that Sablan might have passed away from 
having “tuberculosis,” an illness common among Chamorros at that time.54 
While Smith refrained from declaring the cause of death, his testimony 
sought to cast doubt on the prosecution’s allegations.
But in the defense counsel’s enlistment of the witnesses Jose Q. Quinata 
and Joaquina  M. Ishizaki, it floundered in portraying the innocence of 
the Saipanese Antonio Camacho and Juan Reyes. As per its strategy, the 
defense utilized the testimonies of Quinata, a store owner, and Ishizaki, 
a weaver, to place Reyes as solely assigned to the village of Humåtac. The 
purpose was to show that Reyes never had the time to visit the Hagåtña jail, 
as he translated for Humåtac’s Japanese- language adult school “six days a 
week, none on Sundays.”55 If the prosecution alleged that Pedgro Gogue 
Sablan was detailed over a three- day period, then it was inconceivable for 
Juan Reyes to have participated in said interrogation given his weeklong 
duties in Humåtac. Yet this defense tactic failed for two reasons: first, the 
witnesses never discussed Antonio Camacho and how he, too, was far re-
moved from the activities of the Hagåtña jail; second, the defense counsel 
never attempted to rectify Juan Reyes’s  earlier testimony that he had, in 
fact, worked as an interpreter and officer in the villages of Hågat, Hagåtña, 
Humåtac, Machananao, and Piti.
In his closing remarks as the judge advocate and prosecutor, Lieutenant 
Col o nel Ammons did not entertain  these contradictory statements. As he 
announced, “No untruths  were evident in the testimony of any witnesses 
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4.2.  The death sentence of Juan Reyes, Guam, May 5, 1945. U.S. National Archives,  
College Park, Mary land.
for the prosecution in the rec ord of this case.” Trumping the efforts of the 
defense counsel, he said that they “cannot alter, modify or change the tes-
timony contained in the rec ord nor can the counsel for the accused, in his 
argument, re- enact the case by imagination or supposition contrary to the 
evidence presented and contained in the rec ord of the case.”56 Dismissing 
the defense counsel’s “imaginary” premises, the judge advocate found 
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Antonio Camacho and Juan Reyes guilty of first- degree murder on May 5, 
1945 (figure  4.2). The tribunal then sentenced  these Saipanese men “to 
death, to be executed by hanging,” with “two- thirds (2/3) of the members of 
the Commission concurring.”57
The Captain of Liars
The two last murder  trials, involving Manuel Borja Tudela and Luis  C. 
Crisostomo, proved no less violent in the tribunal’s adjudication of the de-
fendants. In Tudela’s case, the court charged him for assaulting Antonio M. 
Babauta on or about March 19, 1942, as well as accused him of murdering 
Francisco Cruz Salas on or about August 7, 1943. On the first specification, 
for example, the prosecution called the sixteen- year- old Babauta, a Guama-
nian, to take the stand and to describe how Tudela punished him. Know-
ing that Inalåhan’s village feast of Saint Joseph occurred in March, Babauta 
had no difficulty in recalling when Tudela summoned him to the home of 
sonchō Francisco C. Sablan. On the morning of this cele bration, Babauta 
claimed that sonchō Sablan, kuchō Antonio B. Carbullido, and an unidenti-
fied Saipanese  woman witnessed Tudela beat him and a Saipanese boy, Joa-
quin. Giving no reason for why the police officer interrogated him, Babauta 
simply portrayed Tudela as an assailant of innocent  children. With the na-
tive officials and fellow villa gers in attendance, Babauta mentioned that 
Tudela “took off my pants and he took a whip and started whipping me.”58 
Although Babauta could not remember Joaquin’s surname or state if Tudela 
punished him as well, Babauta hinted at something involving him and the 
other boy. As Babauta mentioned, “I told [Tudela] that I was not with a cer-
tain boy.”59 Claiming that his punishment lasted from nine to eleven  o’clock 
in the morning, Babauta then described how his nose and ears bled, how 
his left thigh became scarred, and how his right leg became numb in the 
months  after the interrogation.
The next witness for the prosecution and a previous kuchō, Anto-
nio P. Carbullido, saw Manuel Borja Tudela assault Antonio Babauta at the 
sonchō’s residence in Hågat. Given that Babauta resided at Carbullido’s 
ranch, the el derly farmer attended the interrogation. According to Carbul-
lido, Tudela questioned Babauta as to the whereabouts of Carbullido’s lost 
galaide, also known as an outrigger canoe, used for travel and work within 
the island’s reef areas. To this inquiry, Babauta answered that he had no 
idea what happened to the canoe. Instead, Carbullido described a chain of 
responsibility that led to the arrests of Babauta and the Saipanese boy, 
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Joaquin: first, Carbullido owned the canoe; second, Carbullido tasked Ce-
cilio Sablan, another villa ger, to manage the canoe; third, Sablan “lost” the 
canoe; fourth, Carbullido requested payment for the lost canoe; fifth, Sablan 
refused to offer any monies since, he alleged, the two boys— Antonio and 
Joaquin— lost the canoe; and sixth, Tudela apprehended Antonio and Joa-
quin on the suspicion that they  were guilty of  these actions. But rather than 
treat the boys fairly as per Japa nese police standards, Carbullido explained 
that the Saipan boy Joaquin received “not much” whipping.60 The farmer 
even claimed that Joaquin blamed Babauta, a Guamanian, for unmooring 
the canoe from the shoreline and presumably causing it to drift away. On 
the other hand, Babauta incurred severe abuse. As Carbullido remarked, he 
“was crying while the whipping was  going on. He hollered, ‘I am dead,’  every 
now and then when the whip landed. The accused said, ‘As young as you are 
you know how to tell a lie. If you grow up you  will be the captain of liars; so 
it makes no difference if you die.’ ”61
When Manuel Borja Tudela took the stand, he admitted to having pun-
ished the boys Antonio and Joaquin. But he refuted any allegations of favor-
ing Joaquin, the Saipanese boy,  because the boys  were equally responsible 
for losing the galaide. As Tudela recounted, “I questioned Antonio Babauta 
and [Joaquin] as they  were suspected by Cecilio of letting [the canoe] loose. 
They, the two boys, at the beginning started blaming each other, but  later 
on during the course of the investigation admitted that they did it.” To em-
phasize the parity in his punishment of Antonio and Joaquin, he continued, 
“I took a whip and whipped each boy about six or seven times.”62 Likening 
his interrogation to the punishment accorded to younger siblings, Tudela 
explained that he beat the boys “in the same manner as I whip my  sisters 
and  brothers whenever they do something wrong.”63 For the prosecution, 
however, Tudela represented a person who had no regard for the lives of the 
Guamanians, young and old alike.
Having portrayed Manuel Borja Tudela as an assailant of American sub-
jects and a violator of U.S. laws, the prosecution then presented witnesses 
who accused him of murdering Francisco Cruz Salas on or about August 7, 
1943. As the princi pal witness, former sonchō Francisco C. Sablan of Hågat 
detailed how he arrested Salas around two  o’clock in the after noon of Au-
gust 6, 1943.64 As per Tudela’s  orders, sonchō Sablan summoned Salas to 
the Hågat police station on the suspicion of possessing dynamite, one of 
several Japa nese violations in line with possessing firearms and radios.65 
When Sablan arrived at the jail, he noticed that two unidentified men  were 
being investigated; afterward, Tudela brought in Salas, a laborer at a Japa-
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nese rice field in Hågat. As sonchō Sablan recounted, “I saw Francisco C. 
Salas while he was being questioned about the dynamite and I also saw him 
being whipped.”66 In his recollection, the village commissioner identified 
Tudela and Takabana, a Japa nese police officer, as the assailants. But Sablan 
provided no reason as to why Tudela and Takabana accused Salas of owning 
dynamite. However, two witnesses, Rosa Aquiningnoc Salas and Maria U. 
Torres, only saw Tudela punish Salas with a “tangantangan stick.”67 Rosa 
Aquiningnoc Salas, the  daughter of Francisco Cruz Salas, described how 
she witnessed the torture session unfold from the nearby home of Maria 
Torres. According to Salas, the two- story Hågat police station was “about 
20 yards” from Torres’s porch, where she, Torres, and two other  women 
viewed Tudela beating Francisco Cruz Salas with a wooden club between 
seven and nine  o’clock on the eve ning of August 6.68 Given the porch’s prox-
imity to the interrogation room on the first floor, both Salas and Torres then 
placed Tudela and the deceased Salas in the same area and time period. 
 After nine  o’clock, Rosa Aquiningnoc Salas stated, somebody shut the door 
and prevented them from peering into the room.
By foregrounding  these testimonies, Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Ammons 
of the prosecution represented Francisco Cruz Salas as having been tor-
tured for at least four hours on August 6, 1943. During this time, the pros-
ecution alleged, Manuel Borja Tudela was pre sent at the Hågat jail from the 
early after noon to the late eve ning. In assessing Salas’s death sometime 
thereafter, the crucial questions remained. That is, did Salas eventually die 
by hanging himself voluntarily? Or did Tudela and Takabana execute Salas 
by hanging? Or did Salas pass away as a result of the beatings, with Tudela 
and Takabana staging his hanging? Witnesses for the prosecution implied 
that the latter had occurred. When he was called to the stand, for example, 
sonchō Francisco C. Sablan confirmed Salas’s passing on August 7, as well 
as questioned the origins of his injuries. He first recalled Manuel Borja 
Tudela’s visit to his home, wherein the interpreter notified him about Salas’s 
death. Around six  o’clock in the morning of August  7, the two men left 
for the Hågat police station. As Sablan noted, “I ate my breakfast and then 
went with Manuel Tudela for the police headquarters. When I opened the 
door I saw the body of Francisco C. Salas hanging on the hinge of the door. 
A fishline was twined three times around his neck, and his feet  were about 
three inches from the floor.” Two other unidentified men  were hanged as 
well, with, as Sablan put it, marks around their necks “which showed signs 
of strug gle but on the body of Salas,  there  were no marks and his tongue 
was not hanging out.”69 Kuchō Antonio  P. Carbullido arrived  later at the 
native murderers 133
jail, where he, too, saw the dead men. With re spect to the unknown men, he 
said, “One of them had a rope and was hanged to a fir tree, the other one had 
a fiber around his neck and suspended from an extension in the ranch.”70 
Like Sablan’s testimony, Carbullido questioned if Salas had indeed died 
by hanging. As Carbullido observed, “The bodies that I saw hanged, their 
 faces  were swollen and black and the tongues  were out. Francisco Salas’ 
face was not swollen and his tongue was not out. It looked as if he died a 
natu ral death.”71
Another witness for the prosecution, Jesus  C. Okiyama, informed the 
tribunal that he encountered the hangings as well. At the request of sonchō 
Francisco  C. Sablan, villa gers Okiyama and Jesus  B. Charfauros removed 
the noose from Salas’s neck. Given that Charfauros had passed away dur-
ing the war, only Okiyama testified as to how this pro cess took place. As 
Okiyama related, “When the commissioner ushered me in, he told me to 
come inside and when I got inside I found some Japa nese officials. They 
told me to untie the string that was suspending Salas’ neck. I could not 
untie the string right away. . . .  I held Francisco Salas by the shoulder and 
[Jesus B. Charfauros] cut off the string. . . .  I held Francisco Cruz Salas by 
the shoulder and [Charfauros] held him by the legs and we carried him and 
placed him down on the floor, the head facing the Japa nese officials.”72 The 
Japa nese officials included Takabana, the Hågat police supervisor, as well 
as the governor’s aide, the chief of police, and Dr. Isoda. The last three men 
represented, respectively, the Minseibu, the Hagåtña police station, and 
the hospital. Sonchō Sablan then described how Dr.  Isoda stripped Salas 
of his trousers, revealed his groin area, and examined his buttocks and 
penis. As a bystander, the commissioner stated that “when the pants  were 
pulled down, I saw black and blue marks and bruises in the region around 
his penis and on the front part of the hips.”73 Supporting the prosecution, 
Sablan emphasized that Salas evidenced no neck trauma that might have 
suggested death by hanging.
 Later, at around eight  o’clock in the morning, sonchō Francisco C. Sablan 
and police officer Manuel Borja Tudela brought the body of Francisco Cruz 
Salas to his  family. His wife, Joaquin Aquiningoc Salas, received him at the 
home of their relative, Maria  C. Aguigui. As in the previous testimonies, 
she disclosed nothing that implied her husband had been hanged. As Joa-
quin Aquiningoc Salas noted, “He had bruises on his forehead, cheek and 
nose. His back had black and blue marks and was swollen. One hand was 
also swollen.  There  were marks on his wrist which showed that he had been 
tied. His testicles  were enlarged and ants  were crawling on his back.”74 On 
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the  matter of her husband’s death, Salas then discussed how Tudela and 
the Japa nese officials requested “to be pardoned for the  mistake they had 
done.” Recalling her conversation with Tudela, she said, “When he asked 
for forgiveness I told him he did not do anything to me. I told him if you 
did something to any person to go that person and ask that person for for-
giveness  because you did not do anything to me.”75 Her husband’s pleas for 
forgiveness  were also absent from the discussion, an issue previously raised 
by their  daughter and witness, Rosa. Nor did Joaquin Aquiningoc Salas 
believe that her husband’s death was a “ mistake.” The spiritual guilt and 
shame rested on Tudela and not on the Salas  family.
In his defense, Manuel Borja Tudela testified that he had no role what-
soever in the hanging of Francisco Cruz Salas. He merely interpreted for 
Takabana, the police supervisor, and whipped Salas “not more than eight 
times.” Following Takabana’s  orders, Tudela then hit Salas with a wooden 
club “about five or six times.”76 In contrast to the prosecution’s allegation 
that he punished Salas for at least four hours, Tudela’s beatings may have 
lasted for as  little as fifteen minutes or as long as several hours. What ever 
the case, he assured the tribunal that he did not use his “ whole force” in 
whipping Salas, portraying the torture session as matter- of- fact in charac-
ter. While he may have intended to downplay the vio lence of such inter-
rogations, he unwittingly conveyed the converse by describing the spatial 
politics of the Hågat precinct. In this manner, his contrasting of the first- 
floor police room and the second- floor  family room disturbingly revealed 
the worlds in which the police officers dwelt. As he explained, “Takabana 
told me to stay with Salas in the [first- floor] room where this incident took 
place, and he went upstairs to clean up and have dinner with his  family. 
When he was through with his dinner, he came down and relieved me. I 
went upstairs also and cleaned myself up.”77 With no separation between 
the imperial realm of the police and the domestic realm of the  family, Tude-
la’s portrayal of the Hågat police station illustrated the intimate spaces by 
which the police maintained power. As with other police sites scattered 
across the island, the Hågat location exemplified what the anthropologist 
Ann Laura Stoler calls the tense and tender ties of empire, where “mac-
ropolitics are not lodged in abstract institutions but in their management 
of meanings, their construction of social categories, and their microsites 
of rule.”78 With the Hågat police station functioning in  these terms, Tudela 
then narrated how Takabana tied Salas’s hands to a bench, thereby restrain-
ing him. At that point, Salas “was still alive and was sitting up”;79 he also 
“looked sad.”80 “Then Takabana told me,” continued Tudela, “that I could 
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leave now  because  there was no extra bunk or bed in the quarters for me to 
sleep on and being a single man he prob ably considered that, and he told 
me to go home.”81
As per his recollection, Tudela left the Hågat jail around 7:45 pm, visited 
the residence of his aunt Maria Pangelinan  until 9:00 pm, and went to the 
home of his friend Baltazar Carbullido to sleep  until 5:30 the next morn-
ing. When he returned to the police station at 6:00 am, Takabana shared 
“not very good news” with him.82 As Tudela expressed, “Takabana told me 
that Salas hanged himself. I doubted his words and I went in to see the 
man. I asked him if I could see the body and Takabana replied that it was 
all right but I was not to open the door. I opened the door slightly and took 
a peep. I saw [Francisco Cruz Salas] hanging and he was very stiff.”83 With 
only Tudela claiming that Salas had hanged himself, the defense attorneys 
Lieutenant Alexander Akerman and Vicente C. Reyes attempted to dismiss 
the murder charge.84 As they opined, “It is submitted that  there was no 
evidence or no facts on which can be inferred any premeditation or malice 
aforethought in this case, and for lack of evidence, the charge of murder or 
hom i cide has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”85
The prosecution then relied on a medical expert, Lieutenant Com-
mander Harry M. Zimmerman, to establish what caused the death of Fran-
cisco Cruz Salas. Attached to Medical Research Unit No. 2 and the Guam 
Civil Affairs Hospital, the Yale- trained doctor argued that Salas “did not 
die of hanging or strangulation,” despite the fact Zimmerman did not ex-
amine Salas’s body.86 Given Zimmerman’s selective use of the evidence, 
Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Ammons concluded that 
“the deceased was beaten by the accused and  there is one  thing sure, Salas 
did not die as a result of hanging or strangulation.”87 “Now as to malice 
or premeditation,” the prosecutor continued, “I think the accused demon-
strated a wanton disregard for the rights and feelings of the deceased . . .  
and caused the death by  going much farther than an ordinary man in like 
circumstances would have gone, and in  doing so, demonstrated an aban-
doned and malignant heart.”88 As Ammons speculated, Tudela, “in an at-
tempt to cover up the crime committed against Francisco C. Salas, placed 
the cord around the neck of Salas  after he was dead and suspended his body 
from the door hinge. This must have been done  after he, Salas, had been 
dead for at least five hours.”89 Finding Manuel Borja Tudela guilty of assault 
and battery and first- degree murder, the tribunal transformed him into a 
sacred man of the war. He was sentenced to death by hanging on May 17, 
1945, with two- thirds of the court members concurring.
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The last murder trial focused on Luis C. Crisostomo, a twenty- five- year- 
old Saipanese accused of murdering two men and assaulting thirteen indi-
viduals in Guam. Among the interpreters and police officers, he was the last 
to surrender to the U.S. military, on January 1, 1945. Other men had yielded 
 earlier to the navy, in August and November 1944. Crisostomo had hidden 
in Guam’s jungles since the American reinvasion of the island in July 1944, 
moving from the villages of Fena and Hågat in the south to the coastal area 
of Litekyan in the north. Upon his capture, the navy detained him at the Is-
land Command Prisoner of War Camp. When Crisostomo appeared before 
the tribunal on June 4, 1945, the first murder charge specified that he killed 
Joaquin Mafnas, a bull cart driver, sometime in March  1944. The second 
murder charge alleged that he killed Pedro G. Dumanal, a suspected rebel 
against the Japa nese military, sometime in February 1944. Both men had 
resided in the village of Hågat, as did most of the  people who came forward 
as victims of Crisostomo’s vio lence.  Others lived in the nearby districts of 
Apla and Atantano.
With re spect to the assault and battery charges, one witness claimed that 
Luis Crisostomo beat the farmer Antonio Reyes in September  1943 with-
out providing any corroborated evidence whatsoever. Whereas this allega-
tion might have been another instance of outright vengeance, other Guam 
Chamorros argued that Crisostomo variously punished them for request-
ing to visit an ex pec tant  mother, spreading rumors about a downed Japa-
nese aircraft, and stealing cigarettes and money from their neighbors. 
A wide range of  people testified along  these lines, such as the farmers 
Joaquin A. Barcinas and Jose C. Guzman, the  house wife Flora C. Cruz, and 
the timekeeper Juan Muña Salas.  Others, such as Juan C. Babauta, Ramon 
Lizama Cruz, and Jose Cruz Reyes, asserted that Crisostomo had mistak-
enly accused them of stealing and slaughtering a carabao for their con-
sumption sometime in October 1943. But rather than interrogate them in 
one place at the same time, Crisostomo questioned them separately at his 
home in Hågat and at the police station. He beat them all.90 Yet the crux of 
the Crisostomo’s trial was his apprehension of Guamanians suspected of 
planning an armed rebellion against the Japa nese police and military units 
in March 1944. With the Americans having begun their bombardment of 
Guam in February 1944, the possibility of a native revolt occurring was not 
a  matter for conjecture. With the fear of an invasion, the Japa nese police 
and military sought to suppress any form of re sis tance.91 This subtext in-
formed Crisostomo’s interrogation of two Chamorro men and two Cham-
orro  women accused of possessing weapons.
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As the prosecution’s first witness in this  matter, the laundress Catalina 
Degracia Cruz explained that Crisostomo tortured her in Hågat and Atan-
tano sometime in March and April 1944. Two assaults occurred in one day 
at the ranch of Rosa Aguigui in Atantano, whereas the third series of beat-
ings happened at the Hågat jail over a span of five weeks. As she recalled, 
Crisostomo “kept asking me where was the machine gun. And  every time 
I told him I  didn’t know about that, he told me that I was telling a lie and 
kept on beating me. The accused said that he was  going to kill me  because 
I was not telling the truth.”92 During the initial beatings, a few Chamorro 
villa gers and Japa nese officials witnessed the interrogations. The Chamorro 
farmer Gervacio Ignacio Santos was one such individual. Testifying for the 
prosecution, he said, “ Every time the accused asked her about the machine 
gun and the  rifle, Catalina said that she did not know, and that God knows 
 there was no machine gun and  rifle; the accused said that  there is no God 
but the Emperor.”93 Shortly thereafter, Santos noted that several unidenti-
fied Japa nese officials had brought Catalina Degracia Cruz’s son, Inecto, 
from a work site in Otdot to the ranch area. With his  mother lying on the 
ground and urging him to confess, Inecto Degracia Santos faced his tor-
turer. Crisostomo then clubbed the young man and, as Santos put it, made 
his “bowels move.” “Then the accused clubbed the boy again about 6 times 
 until the boy collapsed and then picked him up and threw him into the river 
and was told to clean himself up.”94 As with his  mother Catalina, Inecto 
Degracia Santos was interrogated as to the whereabouts of dynamite, a 
machine gun, and a  rifle. When he confessed to seeing a machine gun, he 
abided by his  mother’s wishes in a vain attempt to halt the beatings. But 
rather than acknowledge the young man, Crisostomo clubbed him “ until 
he was unconscious.”95
Catalina Degracia Cruz then testified that her son had died, though 
she did not fault Luis Crisostomo in any direct way. Based on the testimo-
nies provided by her and other witnesses for the prosecution, the Japa nese 
Imperial Army may have executed Inecto Degracia Santos sometime in 
March 1944.96 As such, the tribunal did not hold Crisostomo responsible 
for  these killings. Nevertheless, the severe ways by which the Japa nese and 
Saipanese punished Guamanians suspected of harboring weapons dem-
onstrated the fatal circumstances that accompanied said allegations. This 
was also the context in which the court charged Crisostomo for murder-
ing the forty- eight- year- old bull cart driver Joaquin Mafnas. First, the pros-
ecution established that two Japanese- appointed village officials, sonchō 
Felix Torres Pangelinan and kuchō Vicente D. Lizama of the Apla district, 
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apprehended Mafnas in April 1944.97 At the request of the Japa nese police 
supervisor Takabana, sonchō Pangelinan and kuchō Lizama then escorted 
Mafnas to the Hågat police station.
Second, the prosecution featured witnesses who claimed to have buried 
the dead body of Joaquin Mafnas at the Hågat cemetery. According to Cerilo 
Reyes Barcinas, Juan Taijito Reyes, and Vicente Blanco Terlaje, Luis Crisos-
tomo ordered them to disregard their duties at an airfield and to transport 
Mafnas from the police station to the cemetery. When the men arrived at 
the Hågat precinct, they found Mafnas  behind the building. As Terlaje ob-
served, “The body was lying flat on the stomach and one leg was bent, the 
other stretched out and his clothes  were all wet. The body was stiff, and his 
skin appeared tight, maybe  because he had been dead for quite a while.”98 
Emphasizing that Mafnas perhaps died from drowning, Barcinas said that 
“while picking up the body and putting it on the cart,  water was dripping . . .  
from the mouth and nostrils.”99 Once the men had placed Mafnas on the 
cart, they covered him with banana and coconut leaves, took him to the 
Hågat cemetery, and buried him in an unmarked grave. Crisostomo then 
warned the men to not spread any rumors about their activities. Other wise, 
recalled Terlaje, “the same  thing would happen to us.”100
Third, approximately one year  after the passing of Mafnas and three 
months before the onset of the trial, several naval officials, prison guards, 
and village leaders brought Luis Crisostomo, now a prisoner, to the Hågat 
cemetery on March  12, 1945. Among them  were the same individuals who 
helped to bury Mafnas. Their goal was to locate his remains. But the task 
proved onerous given that the cemetery was “torn up by fox holes.”101 Reflect-
ing on their predicament, Second Lieutenant Ralph De Vries stated that the 
“three men could not quite decide where the body was located.”102 Although 
Crisostomo also dug several holes and provided some direction, nobody 
could positively identify Mafnas among the bodies recovered. As an officer 
for the military police and a witness for the prosecution, De Vries even specu-
lated that Crisostomo may have been trying to “mislead” the search party.103 
One hour into their digging, De Vries then asked Jose Iglesias Leon Guerrero, 
a plainclothes police officer, to solicit a statement from Crisostomo.
Initially, Crisostomo expressed no apprehension in responding to the 
request from Leon Guerrero, a man disguised as a fellow Chamorro villa ger. 
As the police officer explained, “Luis said, ‘I am  going to tell the truth, and 
no  matter where I go, I  will tell the truth and I  don’t care who hears it.’ ”104 
But as the conversation progressed, Crisostomo realized, perhaps for the 
first time, the role reversal occurring before him. That is to say, the hol-
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lowed sections of the earth, the exposed remains of unidentified bodies, 
the presence of three armed soldiers, the lingering smell of  human rot and 
gunpowder, and the usage of the Chamorro and En glish languages imbued 
his confession with a “proper relation to the sovereign.”105 As one witness 
described, he transformed from a “loud- talking” interrogator for Japan into 
a “pale” and “frightened” prisoner of the United States.106 Once an exten-
sion of the Japa nese empire, his new voice as a “civilian detainee” helped to 
sustain the faith of the American empire and its laws among the subjects of 
Guam.107 As the  legal theorist Paul W. Kahn put it, “Before  there is a theory 
of law,  there is a belief that law is the word of the sovereign.”108 The police 
officers did not offer any protections to Crisostomo  under U.S. and interna-
tional laws other than the right to “be quiet.”109 As the officer Jose Iglesias 
Leon Guerrero disclosed, “I said, ‘Luis, do you wish to state how Mafnas 
was punished? If you want to make a statement about it, it is your privilege 
to do so, but if you  don’t care to make any, you  don’t have to. . . .  If I am 
through with the statement according to the way you say it, are you willing 
to sign it?’ And he said, ‘Yes.’ ”110
As another witness to Crisostomo’s confession, Second Lieutenant 
Ralph De Vries “saw him sign the paper,” as did the three men who buried 
the middle- aged bull cart driver at the Hågat cemetery.111 Not satisfied with 
Crisostomo’s signature, the naval officials consequently compelled Cerilo 
Reyes Barcinas, Juan Taijito Reyes, and Vicente Blanco Terlaje to “sign a 
paper which said that Luis and Takabana killed Joaquin Mafnas.”112 By sub-
mitting their signatures to the naval authorities, they, like Crisostomo, 
acknowledged the murder of Mafnas, if not illustrated some degree of 
complicity. Their signatures thus represented what the literary critic Scott 
Richard Lyons calls “x- marks.” As he argues, an “x- mark is a contaminated 
and coerced sign of consent made  under conditions that are not of one’s 
making. It signifies power and a lack of power, agency and a lack of agency. 
It is a decision one makes when something has already been de cided for 
you, but it is still a decision.”113 Titled “Confession in the killing of Joaquin 
Mafnas,” Luis Crisostomo’s statement revealed the ways by which birds and 
lizards engaged the Japa nese past and the American pre sent. For Crisos-
tomo and his supervisor Takabana, Mafnas represented a military threat, 
given his suspected ties to Pedro G. Dumanal and his possession of dyna-
mite and weapons. As per the contents of the confession, both Crisostomo 
and Takabana clubbed, punched, and whipped Mafnas when he was splayed 
on the porch of the Hågat police station, when he was tied to a pugua’ (betel 
nut) tree, and when he was fastened to a  water pipe.
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Indeed, what proved central in the prosecution’s usage of this statement 
was not merely Crisostomo’s avowal of his vio lence per se. What mattered 
was the kind of vio lence attributed to the interpreter and not to the Ameri-
can members of the court. As with the tribunal’s treatment of the Japa nese, 
Rotanese, and Saipanese as harbingers of “slavery,” the court similarly 
focused on Crisostomo’s and Takabana’s employment of the “ water cure” 
as another exemplary instance of native barbarism and Japa nese savagery. 
As a result, neither the defense nor the prosecution referenced the  water 
cure as Amer i ca’s “most notorious form of torture” against its enemies in 
North Amer i ca and the Philippines.114 Only Japan and its colonial subjects, 
it seemed, endorsed this truth- telling practice. As Crisostomo related, 
“Takabana and I took Joaquin to the backyard of the office. Immediately, 
Takabana said to me, ‘Bring me one end of the  water hose.’ I turned on the 
valve and Takabana placed the end of the hose, where the  water was com-
ing from, at the mouth of Joaquin for about a minute, and on his nose too 
for about a minute.  After that, Takabana told me to drown him, but I said 
to him, ‘What are we waiting for? The man kept saying that [Pedro  G. 
Dumanal] never came.’ About two or three times we have investigated and 
we get the same reasons. But Takabana said, ‘Drown him and I  will be re-
sponsible.’ That was the time when I drown him from the mouth about 
one minute.”115 According to Crisostomo, Mafnas was “still alive” at eleven 
 o’clock that eve ning, but the torture had already taken a toll on his body. As 
the native police officer from Saipan confessed, “At about 4:00  o’clock in the 
morning, Takabana came and said, ‘Get up, Joaquin has died.’ ”116
With the murder of Joaquin Mafnas rehearsed by Luis Crisostomo, the 
prosecution turned to its second murder charge, regarding the death of 
Pedro G. Dumanal, another symbol of indigenous re sis tance to the Japa-
nese military and police. Among villa gers, Dumanal was known as a “ free 
spirit” who did not re spect the American and Japa nese colonial administra-
tions; as such, he often confronted individuals from their governments who 
threatened his  family.117 As the source of Crisostomo’s and Takabana’s fears, 
he especially represented an impending native revolt, given the allegations 
that he held and circulated weapons among the Guam Chamorros. The key 
witness for the prosecution, a carpenter named Jose Rivera Camacho, took 
the stand first. He described how Crisostomo attacked Dumanal with a ma-
chete in the midmorning of February 23, 1944. From atop a coconut tree, 
Camacho saw the men approach each other at the base of a hill in the vil-
lage of Apla. Whereas Crisostomo was alone, Dumanal was with a friend, 
 Lorenzo Punciano. Recalled Camacho, “Pedro was talking in Chamorro and 
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he said, ‘You are looking for me.  Here I am,’ ” to which Crisostomo replied, 
“ ‘Yes, I was looking for you.’ ”118 “I saw the two close together,” continued 
Camacho, “then I saw Luis raise his machete. He swung the machete, but I 
did not know exactly where it landed.  After that I saw the two rush at each 
other; then I saw the machete again thrusted. . . .  Then Pedro fell to the 
ground.”119 Both Crisostomo and Punciano then fled the area. Afterward, 
Camacho descended from the tree and approached the lifeless Dumanal, 
where he found Dumanal’s revolver “placed on the safe,” meaning that the 
weapon could not be fired.120
Jose Rivera Camacho then returned home quickly, hitched a carriage to 
his  horse, and caught up with Crisostomo on his way to Hågat. Along the 
bull cart path, they met Japa nese military and police officials. As Camacho 
noted, “I turned the carriage and picked them up. I took them back to the 
place where the killing took place. They carried on conversation  there, then 
 people started coming. Shortly  after that quite a number of Japa nese navy 
men came with weapons, machine guns, pistols and  rifles. . . .  They even 
touched the body and turned it over. They  were even kicking the body.”121 
Camacho and other men then dug a grave for Dumanal about sixteen feet 
from the road.  Later that day, an unidentified villa ger informed Maria 
Dumanal Blas that her  father had been killed. Living nearby, Blas then vis-
ited the makeshift gravesite to confirm the death of her  father. As a witness 
for the prosecution, she described how she removed dirt from the grave 
and came across one of her  father’s hands. As Blas remarked, “I knew my 
 father’s hand. . . .  He had quite a bit of hair on his hand and his hands re-
sembled my hands a  little. No one can fool me about my  father’s hands.”122
Based on the recollections provided by three witnesses, the prosecution 
represented the Saipanese Luis C. Crisostomo, armed with a machete, as 
the aggressor and the Guamanian Pedro G. Dumanal, armed with a locked 
revolver, as the victim. On the other hand, the defense team of Lieutenant 
Alexander Akerman and Vicente C. Reyes provided three witnesses whose 
testimonies demonstrated other wise. Juan Sarmiento, a poultry farmer, 
said that Dumanal often paraded around the village of Apla, claiming that 
he was “the commissioner.”123 Another witness for the defense, Manuel M. 
Borja, alleged that Dumanal assaulted him in the early morning of Febru-
ary 23, 1944, the day of his passing. Fi nally, the third witness and bystander, 
Nicholas Concepcion Grey, saw the fight unfold between Crisostomo and 
Dumanal. In fact, even the prosecution’s lead witness, Jose Rivera Cama-
cho, placed Grey in the vicinity.124 But unlike Camacho, who, atop a coconut 
tree, only heard the two acknowledge each other, Grey caught more of their 
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conversation given that he stood approximately twenty- five feet  behind 
Crisostomo. As Grey explained, “I heard Pedro Dumanal say that he was 
 going to  settle up the  matter for all the time he stayed in the woods and all 
the sufferings that he went through. Pedro Dumanal further said, ‘It was 
not so much for the sufferings I went through, but it is for the sufferings my 
 family went through.’ ”125
But contrary to the prosecution’s portrayal of a defensive Dumanal, Grey 
argued that Dumanal initiated the attack on Crisostomo. As he stated, 
“Before they got together, I saw Pedro Dumanal draw out his revolver from 
his pocket. Then I saw the accused rush  toward Pedro Dumanal. . . .  During 
the strug gle, I saw the machete in the hands of the accused. I saw him 
swing it  towards Pedro Dumanal’s hand.  After the accused cut Pedro’s 
hand, the revolver fell from the hands of Pedro Dumanal, then Dumanal 
fell to the ground.  After Dumanal fell to the ground, I saw the accused on 
top of him.”126 Lorenzo Punciano, Dumanal’s partner, then reached for the 
revolver while Dumanal attempted to choke Crisostomo. Glancing over to 
Punciano, Crisostomo purportedly said, “ ‘Oh, I see you, too, are in this. If 
that is in your mind, something  will happen to you that you  haven’t been 
expecting.’ ” Realizing the potential consequence of his actions, Punciano 
dropped the revolver and ran away. Crisostomo then stabbed Dumanal in 
the chest, as Dumanal pleaded, “ ‘Let me go, let me get up.’ ”127 According 
to Grey, the entire strug gle lasted barely five minutes.
In their closing remarks, the defense counsel asserted that Luis  C. 
Crisostomo “acted in self- defense,” meaning that his first- degree mur-
der charged should be dropped in  favor of the nonpunitive specification 
“justifiable hom i cide.”128 On the  matter of Joaquin Mafnas’s death, Lieu-
tenant Akerman and Vicente Reyes disputed the admission of the “con-
fession” as evidence, first during the halfway point of the trial and again 
at its conclusion. As they asserted, “In the case before this commission, 
it is uncontradicted and not denied that a foreigner was placed between 
two guns and this purported statement was obtained in this manner. Not 
only has the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
was voluntarily given, but it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that this purported confession was not voluntarily made.”129 Further, the 
defense counsel questioned the prosecution’s claim that Joaquin Mafnas 
died by “drowning through the nose,” given that none of their witnesses 
could corroborate this allegation.130 They only confirmed Crisostomo’s role 
in the burial of the bull cart driver and supposed conspirator of weapons at 
the Hågat cemetery. That Crisostomo was a “foreigner” caught between the 
native murderers 143
interplay of  orders and war, duty and right, mattered  little to the tribunal. 
The court subjected him, as homo sacer, to U.S. law and, in the violent seizure 
of his body, renewed the law’s force in its treatment of “foreign” subjects. 
He was remade in the image of his new sovereign as an inhabitant of Guam, 
treated as a war criminal, found guilty of first- degree murder, and expunged 
from the nation as a nonsacrifice. On June 22, 1945, two- thirds of the com-
mission voted to execute Luis C. Crisostomo by hanging by the “neck  until 
he is dead.”131 The transformation was complete.
The Merciful U.S. Government
As in the  trials concerning assault and battery, the U.S. Navy’s military 
commission represented the Saipanese men accused of murder as “war 
criminals” of the native type. The court found six of them guilty of first- or 
second- degree murder, with Jose P. Villagomez and Juan Villagomez receiv-
ing, respectively, sentences of a ten- year period of hard  labor and a lifetime 
term in prison. On the other hand, the tribunal condemned Antonio Cama-
cho, Luis C. Crisostomo, Juan Reyes, and Manuel Borja Tudela to death by 
hanging by the neck. Initially at stake for the latter was the death sentence 
(figure 4.3). Upon a closer review of their cases, however, Acting Secretary 
of the Navy John L.  Sullivan reduced their sentences to lifetime imprison-
ment at hard  labor. Writing for the Guam Gazette, editor Juan B. Manibusan 
relayed the news to his local readership. In an article titled “Three Obnox-
ious Saipanese Escape Death,” he communicated, “Three loyal subjects of 
the Land of the Rising Sun escaped death sentence when the Acting Sec-
retary of the Navy on 3 January 1946 commuted the sentence of death to 
imprisonment at hard  labor for the term of their natu ral life. They  were An-
tonio Camacho, aged 28, Luis C. Crisostomo, aged 26, and Juan Reyes, aged 
23, all natives of Saipan.”132 The fourth Saipanese, Manuel Borja Tudela, 
likewise received the same reduced sentence. As with the Rotanese and 
Saipanese men who requested clemency in the assault and battery  trials, 
 these four Saipanese men petitioned naval officials to reconsider their sen-
tences. They hoped to achieve even lesser sentences.
Take, for instance, a letter written by Jose P. Villagomez on July 19, 1951. 
In this letter, addressed to the secretary of the navy, he confessed to the 
wrongs he had committed. As Villagomez remarked, “I have completed al-
most six years of my original sentence, and during this period of my con-
finement I have been brought to realize the sheer folly of adhering to the 
fanatical and barbarous policies and brutal practices of the Japa nese Mili-
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tary Government.” Fanatical? Barbarous? Brutal? The American conversion 
of Jose Villagomez seemed apparent, as he never used  these terms to de-
scribe the Japa nese empire in his  trials.  Because of his confinement, he was 
“brought in close contact with the benevolent and demo cratic princi ples of 
the  great liberty loving, and mighty United States of Amer i ca.” Villagomez 
then decried Saipan’s previous subjugation  under Germany and Japan. As 
he stated, “It is an unfortunate fact that we Saipanese during the past half 
 century have been subject to the cruel and inhumane treatment of both the 
German and Japa nese Military Government.”133 Apologizing for his “evil” 
practices, Villagomez pleaded for another reduced sentence so he could re-
unite with his  family in Saipan.
In October of that year, Antonio Camacho, Luis C. Crisostomo, and Juan 
Reyes also drafted a letter for the secretary of the navy. They wrote, “It is 
true that we  were used, by force, by the Japa nese authorities, as instruments 
in some of the atrocities they perpetrated.  There was no choice left for us. 
 Either we slapped  people at their command or we  were threatened with ex-
ecution.” More vitally, they apologized to the clans whose  family members 
they assaulted or murdered during the war. As Camacho, Crisostomo, and 
Reyes revealed, “We have contacted all the  family of the  people we offended 
during the war and the victims of our forced cruelty and they are all willing 
4.3.  The War Criminals Stockade, Guam (photo number 406885, Rec. September 27, 
1949). U.S. National Archives, College Park, Mary land.
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to forgive us, and they understand why we, contrary to our reasoning and 
 will,  were forced to act the way we did.” With their families living in “pov-
erty” and bearing the shame of their war time atrocities,  these men asked 
the secretary of the navy to grant them the “lenient and merciful” ways of 
the U.S. government.134 Even the warden of the Guam Penitentiary, A. A. 
Jackson, vouched for the change in their attitude as “model prisoners” of 
the U.S. military. “They have been obedient,” he said, “cheerful and very 
industrious at all times. It is recommended that favorable action be given 
the attached petitions for clemency.”135 In response, the Office of the Sec-
retary of the Navy reduced each of their sentences once again, this time to 
imprisonment at hard  labor for forty- five years.
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japa nese traitors
Drawing from its pool of accused war criminals, the tribunal interrogated 
and tried numerous Japa nese men for committing crimes against U.S. cit-
izens and nationals. As with its feminization of Rotanese and Saipanese 
men as noncombatants without politics, the commission similarly racial-
ized suspected Japa nese war criminals. Knowing that they represented 
an  enemy and rival nation, however, the court recognized the Japa nese as 
citizens in domestic and international laws. In this way, the tribunal held a 
related but decidedly diff er ent position when addressing the  matter of Japa-
nese war criminality in the military colony of Guam. One crucial distinction 
between natives and nonnatives resided in the tribunal’s acknowl edgment 
of Japa nese po liti cal life, bios. Japa nese citizenship, Japa nese martial and 
combatant traditions, and Japa nese territorial claims over Guam— all leg-
ible markers of imperial governance— mattered to the commission and its 
 legal interpretations of sovereignty.
In this chapter, I analyze the treason trial of Samuel Takekuna Shino-
hara, a Japa nese national and resident of Guam, in an effort to demonstrate 
how the tribunal viewed him as a sacred man integral to the eradication of 
Japa nese sovereignty in the island. Central to this discussion was how the 
U.S. Navy portrayed Shinohara, an  enemy Issei, as violating whiteness as 
American property and sovereignty. For this reason, the treason charges 
and other specifications accused him as an assailant, thief, and or ga nizer of 
military brothels. But the commission si mul ta neously represented Shino-
hara as a “residential alien” who owed allegiance to the United States, an act 
that signaled the then- emerging shifts in American perceptions of Japa nese 
and Japa nese American subjectivities from external threats and subversive 
ele ments to budding Cold War partners with the United States.1 How and 
5
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why the commission constructed him as a sacred man whose criminality 
signified alien and traitor,  enemy and conspirator, is thus the subject of this 
chapter. I then conclude with Shinohara’s responses to  these allegations.
Spy, Traitor, and Other Allegations
Samuel Takekuna Shinohara migrated from Japan to Guam in 1905 and 
married into a prominent Chamorro  family, the Torreses of Hagåtña. His 
wife was Carmen, and together they had two  children, Cecilia and Gil. He 
 later became a successful entrepreneur, owning the Hagåtña Gas Kitchen, 
the Rooster Bar, and a small taxi operation.  These businesses catered to the 
residents of Hagåtña and the personnel of the U.S. Naval Government.2 Shi-
nohara was also the president of the Japa nese Society of Guam, as well as 
a fluent speaker of the Chamorro, En glish, and Japa nese languages. When 
the Japa nese military attacked the island on December 8, 1941, Shinohara 
then became involved in a war of profit and privilege  because of his business 
background and fluency in several languages.  These characteristics, how-
ever, proved troubling for the naval governor of Guam, George J. McMillin, 
who ordered the immediate arrest of Shinohara and other influential Japa-
nese citizens.3 The Japa nese bombing of Pearl Harbor (Pu‘uloa) and Guam 
on the same day led McMillin to racialize the Japa nese business community 
as potentially suspicious and threatening and, in his view, deserving of in-
carceration. Two days  later, though, McMillin surrendered to the Japa nese 
invading forces, at which time Shinohara and the other Japa nese civilians 
 were released from the jail. In a moment of role reversals, the Japa nese mili-
tary then incarcerated McMillin and other American military personnel in 
the same prison that had  housed Shinohara. A month  later, on January 10, 
1942, the Japa nese military transported McMillin and other white American 
prisoners of war to Japan.
As for Shinohara, he remained in Guam, where he extended his ser vices 
to the Japa nese military and the Minseibu. Along  these lines, the Guam 
historian Robert  F. Rogers describes Shinohara as a “Japa nese loyalist,” 
whereas the American historian Tim Maga depicts him as an “advisor and 
part- time ‘justice investigator’ for the new government.”4 One of his peers, 
a teacher named Kyomon Miwa, portrayed Shinohara in comparable terms. 
Recalled Miwa, “I arrived in Guam in September, 1942, as a school teacher. 
We  were told that, as the island of Guam was one of the first places to 
be conquered by Japan, Japa nese policies and installations  were to be tried 
out  here, and the experience gained was to be applied in the occupation of 
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other areas. When I first came to Agana I found that Mr. Shinohara was a 
prominent and influential person and it seemed that he was looking  after 
the welfare of many Japa nese families.”5 Another acquaintance, Hirose 
Hisashi of the 54th Naval Guard Unit, commended Shinohara for having a 
“brilliant mind and personal magnetism.”6
Whereas members of the Japa nese government and military often por-
trayed Shinohara in favorable terms, several prominent individuals in 
Guam felt other wise.  After the war, they specifically accused him of spying 
for Japan before its occupation of the island. For example, Ignacia Bordallo 
Butler, a Guamanian entrepreneur, had a conversation with Shinohara in 
1942 in which he supposedly remarked, “I was a spy for the Japa nese Gov-
ernment during the American time.”7 Providing more details to  these alle-
gations, the Guamanian educator Agueda Iglesias Johnston explained, “All 
of us suspicioned Shinohara.  Every time the Japa nese schooner came into 
port, the captain of it, a Jap named Okno, would come to visit Shinohara at 
this home. This schooner always seemed to time its visits to coincide with 
the times when the Pan American clippers  were in.”8 When the Japa nese 
military invaded the island, she said, a captain by the name of “Owata” vis-
ited Shinohara’s  house and assisted in releasing him from the jail.
Gonzalo  R. Eclevea, another Guamanian, discussed how Shinohara 
once spied on American naval facilities at the harbor in the village of Sumay. 
Sometime before the war, Eclevea witnessed Shinohara drive his car, an 
Essex sedan, near the work site. Seated in his vehicle for three to four min-
utes, Shinohara saw “all of our installations.”9  These buildings included 
“gasoline storage tanks, pipe lines, and fuel lines which  were to refuel the 
submarines and destroyers as they came along side.”10 Adding to  these sus-
picions, the Japa nese resident Shintaro Okada alleged that Shinohara en-
gaged the Japa nese military on several occasions. As he stated, “I went on a 
trip to Japan on the Gold Star about 1932. Shinohara also went on this trip. 
While we  were in Tokyo, Shinohara told me he had an appointment with 
the Taigunsho (Japa nese Naval Dept.). He went  there two or three times. I 
could not understand why he would be  going  there.”11
While neither  these individuals nor the tribunal furnished any docu-
mentary evidence of Samuel T. Shinohara’s role as an alleged spy for Japan, 
the recollections featured  here demonstrate the kind of gossip and racism 
directed against him (figure  5.1). With Shinohara construed as a disloyal 
and traitorous subject, his personhood represented a militarized brand of 
the “yellow peril” that the United States criminalized in its courts. As with 
the treason cases of Iva Toguri d’Aquino, the so- called Tokyo Rose, and 
152 chapter 5
Tomoya Kawakita, among  others, Shinohara’s war time activities similarly 
came  under suspicion. As the historian Naoko Shibusawa explains, “The 
Cold- War- era treason  trials, as well as the Red scare espionage  trials of the 
period, allowed the federal government to pillory disloyal individuals.”12 
In addressing  these cases, the United States sought to “prove, by the testi-
mony of two witnesses to the same act, (1) that  there was an overt act of aid 
and comfort to the  enemy, (2) performed with the intention of betraying the 
United States, (3) which has the  actual effect of providing aid and comfort 
to the  enemy.”13 If a civil court shows that two individuals witnessed a per-
son or group conduct the same “overt act” that provided aid and comfort 
to the  enemy, then said individual(s) could be found guilty of treason and 
potentially sentenced to death. As per U.S. constitutional and statute law, 
only U.S. citizens and nationals could be put on trial and only in the context 
of a civil court.
In its consideration of the treason charge in Guam in 1945, the U.S. Navy’s 
War Crimes Tribunals program selectively interpreted the meaning of this 
crime. That is, the court disregarded the princi ple that only American citi-
zens and nationals could be tried for treason. Initially, moreover, the tribu-
5.1.  Carmen Shinohara and 
Samuel Shinohara, Guam. 
Reproduced with permission 
from the Shinohara  family. 
Photo by Dr. Austin Shelton, 
University of Guam.
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nal accused four traitors to the U.S. government: one American national; 
one Japa nese national; one colonial subject of Japan; and one person whose 
po liti cal identity remained ambiguous.  These four men  were, respectively, 
Pedro Mantanoña, Samuel  T. Shinohara, Jose  P. Villagomez, and Juan  S. 
Onedera. Take, for instance, the Saipanese Villagomez, who was convicted 
of murder in February 1945. In a memo to the judge advocate general of the 
navy in April 1945, the commission considered trying him for treason.14
The court likewise accused Juan S. Onedera, a Chamorro- Japanese man, 
in June  1945, even providing Guamanian testimonies that he “put on a 
Japa nese soldier’s uniform.”15 One witness, Geronimo Mendiola, said that 
Onedera “was completely equipped with Japa nese field equipment includ-
ing a cartridge  belt and  rifle. . . .  He told us how big the American soldiers 
 were, showed us some American cigarettes he had and told us how he had 
killed some Americans with his  rifle.”16 Another witness, Jose T. Gutierrez, 
claimed that Onedera “had already killed three American soldiers. He said 
he was  going back to fight some more [in the coastal and village area of 
Asan].”17 The Guamanian Pedro Mantanoña, the only U.S. national identi-
fied by the court, faced similar accusations, but unlike Onedera and Vil-
lagomez, who never received any charges, the tribunal had drafted three 
specifications of treason for Mantanoña on January 23, 1945. The specifica-
tions alleged that he disarmed three Guamanian men and prevented them 
from joining “a group of armed natives who intended to help the armed 
forces of the Government of the United States in  battle against the  enemy” 
in July 1944.18  Because it did not find evidence to support its claim, however, 
the commission dropped the charge against Pedro Mantanoña and upheld 
its portrayal of Guamanians as loyal wards.
Ultimately, the tribunal tried Samuel T. Shinohara only for treason. The 
original charges, dated May 12, 1945, began with treason and read in part, “In 
that Samuel T. Shinohara, an inhabitant and resident of Guam . . .  did . . .  
on or about December 16, 1941, willfully, knowingly and treasonably adhere 
to Japan, an  enemy of the United States, and give aid and comfort to Japan.” 
The commission categorized Shinohara’s “overt act” in terms of theft, an 
act wherein he assisted the Japa nese military in procuring “the property of 
the Naval Government of Guam.”19 As per the court’s definition, the prop-
erty amounted to $8,300 in U.S. currency and $1,000 in U.S. checks. With 
Shinohara classified as an American subject who failed to adhere to his al-
legiance to the United States, the commission outlined the other charges 
and specifications.20 They included charge II, theft; charge III, assault and 
battery; and charge IV, taking a female for the purpose of prostitution, with 
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two specifications on coercion. Yet  these charges painted Shinohara as 
an  enemy Issei who had the ability to steal one American vehicle, assault 
one American citizen, and prostitute two American nationals. Further, on 
July  20, 1945, the commission released additional charges and specifica-
tions on treason, assault and battery, and the desecration of the flag.21 The 
additional treason charge contained three specifications, which focused on 
three overt acts— two in December 1941 and one in April 1942— believed to 
have aided the Japa nese military. The first specification alleged that Shinohara 
removed an electric generator from Ignacia Bordallo Butler, an inhabitant 
of Guam; the second alleged that he or ga nized the making of a Japa nese 
 labor organ ization, Dai Nisei. The third and final specification alleged that 
Shinohara offered provisions for the Japa nese military and naval forces in 
Guam.
On July  28, 1945, the military commission assembled over  these alle-
gations, as did Shinohara’s defense counsel, which was led by Lieutenant 
Emory L. Morris, U.S. Naval Reserve. Vicente C. Reyes, a Chamorro attor-
ney, acted as the interpreter and assistant for Morris. Initially, Lieutenant 
Morris dismissed the jurisdiction of the commission. He argued that Shi-
nohara was a “citizen and national of Japan” who “owes no allegiance to the 
Naval Government of Guam and the United States of Amer i ca, or  either of 
them, during the time Guam was occupied by the military forces of Japan.”22 
On July 31, 1945, for example, the defense counsel called on its first witness, 
Francisco  T. Flores, an employee of the naval government’s Department 
of Rec ords and Accounts. Referring to Shinohara’s cedula rec ord of 1920, 
Flores explained, “On page 36,  under column 640, the name Takekuma Shi-
nohara, native— Japan; district, state or country— Tagoshima; sex— Male; 
age—29; civil status— single; occupation— salesman;  actual residence— 
Lot No. 57, San Ignacio Street. Tagoshima as I understand it is somewhere 
in Japan, and San Ignacio Street was a street in Agana, Guam.”23 By bringing 
Flores to the stand, the defense counsel hoped to confirm Shinohara’s al-
legiance to Japan, thereby challenging the military commission’s jurisdic-
tion. In response, the tribunal asserted that Shinohara was a subject of the 
U.S. Naval Government  because his cedula rec ord was registered in Guam 
and not in Japan. As a result, Shinohara pleaded “not guilty” in spite of the 
allegations that he was in breach of his allegiance to the naval government 
and the United States. How, then, did the commission create this seemingly 
extralegal position? If civil courts are the venues for discussing the consti-
tutional clauses on treason, how does one analyze their uneven application 
in a military tribunal, their racialized usage in a military colony, and their 
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exceptional treatment of a Japa nese citizen? What do we make, as well, of 
the additional charges, the ones that focused on U.S. “property” claims to 
bodies and objects in Guam?
Properties of the Colonial State
In its judgment of Samuel T. Shinohara, the military commission did not 
begin with the original and additional treason charges directed against 
him. Convened by Lieutenant Col o nel and Judge Advocate Teller Ammons, 
the tribunal commenced by engaging the lesser charges and specifications 
on theft, assault and battery, desecration of the U.S. flag, and prostitution. 
The prosecution— also led by Ammons— aimed to accomplish four goals: 
first, to reestablish the property claims of the U.S. Naval Government as per 
the laws of possession; second, to find Shinohara guilty of violating  these 
property claims; third, to fault Shinohara for treason; and, fourth, to accord 
him the death sentence.
In its understanding of “property,” the navy drew from the U.S. law on 
property rights, a law historically premised on the enslavement of blacks 
and the dispossession of Native Americans in North Amer i ca. The  legal 
scholar Cheryl I. Harris theorizes this racially entangled but lawful pro cess 
as the white investment in property. As she asserts, “The origins of prop-
erty rights in the United States are rooted in racial domination. Even in the 
early years of the country, it was not the concept of race alone that oper-
ated to oppress Blacks and Indians; rather, it was the interaction between 
conceptions of race and property that played a critical role in establishing 
and maintaining racial and economic subordination.”24 For Harris, the in-
stitutional slavery of blacks as property to be assigned or inherited, and the 
erasure of first possession rights among Native Americans led to the  legal 
conflation of whiteness, privilege, and property. As she explains, “This rac-
ist formulation embedded the fact of white privilege into the very definition 
of property, marking another stage in the evolution of the property interest 
in whiteness. Possession— the act necessary to lay the basis for rights in 
property— was defined to include only the cultural practices of whites. This 
definition laid the foundation for the idea that whiteness—as that which 
whites alone possess—is valuable and is property.”25
With its white- oriented ideology, the tribunal claimed that the United 
States owned, as its possessions, the bodies and lands of Guam. Shinoha-
ra’s war time abuse of an American military officer, two American nation-
als, an American flag, and an American car— properties said to belong to 
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the United States— thus  violated the sanctity of whiteness as property and 
sovereignty, for which he had to be punished. In this section, I discuss how 
the tribunal treated Shinohara as the manifestation of the Japa nese empire 
in Guam. I begin with an examination of the theft and assault and battery 
charges, detailing how naval officials like Lieutenant James  E. Davis and 
Captain George J. McMillin informed the carceral imagination of the court 
and its Guamanian witnesses. I then close this section with an analy sis of 
Shinohara’s brothels and demonstrate how the Guamanian “prostitutes” 
Alfonsina Flores and Nicholasa P. Mendiola negotiated the Japa nese ianjo 
system and the American military commission.
Original charge II regarding theft, for example, alleged that Shinohara 
stole James E. Davis’s Chevrolet automobile, valued at $1,200, “in and about 
the month of February 1942, in the City of Agana, Guam.”26 If convicted of 
 grand theft, an act resulting in the seizure of items worth more than $100, 
Shinohara faced, as per The Penal Code of Guam, section 489, “imprisonment 
for not less than one nor more than five years.”27 During the third day of 
the trial, the commission inquired as to the owner of the Chevrolet vehicle, 
seeking the testimony of the defense witness Francisco  T. Flores.  Under 
oath, he said, “According to the rec ords of application for automobile reg-
istration I have  here, it shows that Lieutenant James Edward Davis regis-
tered in the year 1940 in the Department of Rec ords and Accounts.”28 When 
the judge advocate asked what kind of vehicle Davis owned, Flores replied, 
“Plymouth, practically brand new, with a light green color.”29 The court 
then established the responsibilities Davis held as an American naval offi-
cer, a navy chaplain, and the head of the Department of Education in Guam. 
Flores and other Guamanian witnesses also claimed that, subsequent to the 
Japa nese invasion of the island on December 8, 1941, the Japa nese military 
had detained Davis and, a month  later, had transported him to an unidenti-
fied prisoner of war camp in Japan.
The crucial question was  whether Shinohara indeed stole the vehicle, 
an allegation neither confirmed nor denied by Flores. He argued that al-
though Shinohara rode in the automobile during the war period, he never 
knew if Shinohara claimed owner ship over the vehicle. He was simply a 
passenger.30 On the other hand, the prosecution enlisted five Guamanian 
witnesses who, collectively, presented three points: first, Davis never sold 
the car to anybody  after December 8, 1941, as the government offices  were 
closed; second, Shinohara or his son, Gil, drove the car on vari ous occa-
sions; and, third, several individuals chauffeured Shinohara or his  family in 
public view.  These witnesses also implied that Davis’s American automobile 
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signified whiteness. The vehicle symbolized slogans like “Plymouth’s Got 
It!— more value, beauty, luxury than any other low- priced car in history,” 
works contained in a 1939 advertisement that sought to attract white Ameri-
can consumers in the post- Depression era of the late 1930s.31 As a vehicle 
for working- and middle- class white families, the Plymouth was created for 
urban lifestyles. Knowing that the Plymouth symbolized Amer i ca’s indus-
trial resilience, the prosecution’s witnesses thus conveyed what may have 
been appalling to the commission: that is, that Shinohara transformed 
Davis’s American- made automobile into a vehicle of imperial Japan.
Vicente  P. Herrero, the second witness for the prosecution, hinted at 
 these scenarios, saying that Shinohara might have attached a Japa nese li-
cense plate to the Plymouth. As he surmised, “ There must be a license plate 
by the Japa nese but what number and flower, I could not recall. . . .  I could 
not make out who is who from any of the plates, the cherry blossom, or the 
anchor.”32 Yet Herrero did not disclose  whether Davis’s vehicle was regis-
tered for Japa nese civilian use, as per the symbol of the “cherry blossom,” 
or for Japa nese naval use, as per the symbol of the “anchor.” The witness 
Jose P. Crisostomo was more forthcoming, stating that the Plymouth had a 
cherry blossom license plate, marked “number ‘2.’ ”33
On August 2, 1945, the fifth day of the trial, the commission opened the 
floor to the third original charge and the second additional charge on “as-
sault and battery.” The former charge asserted that Samuel  T. Shinohara 
struck Captain George J. McMillin, then governor of the U.S. Naval Govern-
ment, on or about January 20, 1942, in Hagåtña, Guam.34 The latter charge, 
differing only with re spect to the time of the assaults, alleged that Shino-
hara slapped McMillin in the face. Whereas the original charge indicated a 
period around January 20, 1942, the additional charge stipulated that other 
assaults occurred around December 10, 1941, and January 1, 1942. In each 
case, the prosecution turned to The Penal Code of Guam and to five Guama-
nian witnesses in arguing that Shinohara attacked the “official” embodi-
ment of U.S. property in Guam, Captain and Naval Governor George  J. 
McMillin. Section 240 of The Penal Code of Guam clarified assault as “an un-
lawful attempt, coupled with pre sent ability, to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another.”35 Section 242 also defined “battery” as “any willful 
and unlawful use of force or vio lence upon the person of another.”36
The first witness, Felix Q. Nauta, was a seaman second class of the In-
sular Force, U.S. Navy. He recalled the incident as occurring before 7:00 
am on December 10, 1941, the time of McMillin’s surrender to the Japa nese 
military. Nauta stated that “while we  were already captured by the Japa nese, 
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we  were sitting in the plaza with other native enlisted personnel facing 
 towards the east. Then I turned to my right . . .  and I saw Shinohara slap 
the Governor of Guam.” When the judge advocate asked Nauta to explain 
where the assault happened, Nauta responded, “Right in front of the Gover-
nor’s palace.”37 As per Hagåtña’s topography, the naval governor resided at 
the Plaza de España, the site of sovereignty first established by Spain in the 
1700s and  later appropriated by the United States in 1898 and the Menseibu 
of Japan in 1941.38
Two other witnesses, Francisco Santos Aguon and Eugenio  B. Borja, 
then recalled another assault on McMillin, which was said to occur between 
9:45 and 10:00 am on a day in late December 1941. As for the location, they 
identified a golf course in Agaña Heights where, among a gathering of Japa-
nese military personnel and Chamorro laborers, Aguon “saw Shinohara 
slap the Governor.”39 But unlike the previous testimony, Aguon and Borja 
embellished the past with a patriotic lamentation for the United States. 
Aguon had this to say about the scene in Agaña Heights, a hill overlooking 
the city of Hagåtña and its adjacent shoreline: “ There was a national flag, 
stars and stripes, planted on a buoy [in the bay] which made a target for a 
kind of heavy artillery, most likely 3- inch guns. I do not know definitely but 
it was a heavy gun.”40 Borja similarly noted that “we  were standing up  there 
facing the ocean and the [U.S.] flag was on the ocean. The Governor and 
Shinohara passed in front of us and the Governor told Shinohara, he said, 
‘ Will you tell the Japa nese to be nice to the Chamorros  because they  will be 
nice to them?,’ and  after Shinohara heard this he slapped the Governor and 
said, ‘You are no Governor.’ ”41
Based on  these testimonies alone, the prosecution’s Guamanian wit-
nesses portrayed McMillin as a vulnerable and defeated white figure of colo-
nial authority. In keeping with this theme of a  violated “Amer i ca,” the pros-
ecution then entered additional charge III, desecration of the flag, into the 
court rec ord on August 4, 1945, the seventh day of the trial. The charge al-
leged that Shinohara “did, in or about the month of February or March 1942, 
in or near Agana, Guam, publicly defile and cast contempt upon the flag of 
the United States of Amer i ca by using a flag of the United States of Amer i ca 
for the purpose of wiping off a bar.”42 Section 310a of The Penal Code of Guam 
defined the desecration of flags and the terms for punishment as follows: 
“Whoever, in any manner for exhibition or display . . .  publicly mutilates, 
defaces, defiles, tramples upon or casts contempt by word or act upon any 
such flag, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and  shall be punished by a fine not 
exceeding fifty dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days.”43
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Herbert Johnston, a civilian administrative assistant employed by the 
Military Government  Labor Department, opened the floor by indicating the 
location of the said charge. He described how the Elks Club, an exclusive 
joint for American military officers, transformed into Omiya Kaikan, a so-
cial space for Japa nese military officers, during the war. The desecration of 
the U.S. flag, Johnston asserted, occurred on this property, then managed 
by Shinohara. As he remembered, “On one occasion  there was a party . . .  
[where] they had dinner and when I got to the place, they  were clearing the 
hall for dancing. A lot of liquid was spilled on the floor. When the danc-
ing was about to start, I saw [Shinohara] wipe the floor with an American 
flag. . . .  I turned away and coughed and I did not see what happened  after 
that.” Johnston then described the flag as “navy standard size 9, about four 
feet long,” so as not to conflate bunting, or cloth decorated with patriotic 
colors, with the U.S. flag.44 Two former “waitresses” of Omiya Kaikan, Bea-
trice Santos Rios and Olita T. Santos, confirmed  these allegations, as did 
the former bartender, Jesus L. Fernandez.45
With Shinohara represented as both devious and violent, the tribunal 
turned to its claim that Chamorro  women in Guam belonged, as property, 
to the United States. The eighth day of the trial, August 6, 1945, illustrated 
 these sensibilities in the fourth original charge, “taking a female for the 
purpose of prostitution.” The two specifications noted, respectively, that 
Shinohara “in and about the month of February  1942” unlawfully took 
Alfonsina Flores and Nicholasa P. Mendiola “for the purpose of prostitu-
tion.” The specifications accused him of procuring the consent of Flores 
“by misrepre sen ta tion” and soliciting the consent of Mendiola “against her 
 will,” key distinctions that informed how the  women and  others understood 
prostitution.46 In The Penal Code of Guam, the chapter titled “Rape, Abduc-
tion, Carnal Abuse of  Children, and Seduction” outlined several definitions 
of prostitution and prostitution- related crimes. Section 265, “Abduction of 
 Women,” and section 267, “Abduction,” provide a useful context for under-
standing how The Penal Code of Guam codified prostitution as a crime and 
the role of coercion therein. As section 265 emphasized, “ Every person who 
takes any  woman unlawfully, against her  will, and by force, menace, or du-
ress, compels her to marry him, or to marry any other person, or to be 
defiled, is punishable by imprisonment not less than two nor more than 
fourteen years.”47 Similarly, section 267 read, “ Every person who takes away 
any female  under the age of eigh teen years from her  father,  mother, guard-
ian, or other person having the  legal charge of her person, without her con-
sent, for the purpose of prostitution or for lewd purposes, is punishable by 
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imprisonment not exceeding five years, and a fine not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars.”48
As  these sections demonstrate, the phrases “against her  will” and “with-
out her consent” provided some degree of protection for girls and  women. 
The phrases offered the prosecution some relief in its efforts to address 
the charge of prostitution and to seek justice for Alfonsina Flores and 
Nicholasa  P. Mendiola. At the same time, sections  265 and 267 assumed 
that  women belonged to their husbands, their parents, or their guardians; 
such heteronormative language portrayed  women as properties bestowed 
with meaning vis- à- vis heterosexual marriage or heterosexual genealogy, or 
both. Read in  these terms, The Penal Code of Guam interpreted the abduction 
of  women and abduction generally as criminal pro cesses that  violated the 
property claims of husbands, parents, or guardians. This terminology like-
wise resonated with international laws on rape and sexual assault, where 
such crimes have been “categorized as an outrage upon personal dignity, or 
as crimes against honor” rather than as vio lence against any person.49
Thus, the testimonies provided by Flores and Mendiola mattered inso-
far as they upheld the prosecution’s notion that they  were properties of the 
American government. Rape and sexual assault  were secondary to the pri-
mary charge that Shinohara abused American properties for the purpose of 
establishing at least two prostitution rings. The first alleged brothel catered 
to two Japa nese military officers, Governor Hiroshi Hayashi and the gov-
ernor aide- de- camp Sakai, both of whom resided in the “Kerners’  house” 
of San Antonio, Hagåtña.50 Owned by Albert and Mercedes T. Kerner, the 
Kerners’  house resembled what the anthropologist C. Sarah Soh calls a 
“concessionary” ianjo, or comfort fa cil i ty.51 As she notes, the concession-
ary ianjo is “divided into two subtypes: the ‘house of entertainment,’ which 
served primarily officers, and the ‘house of prostitution,’ which catered to 
the rank and file.”  Because the Kerners’  house served military officers, and 
 because Shinohara, a civilian, leased and managed the place, the site can be 
described as a concessionary ianjo with one exception. Unlike other ianjo 
that  housed many military officers, the Kerners’ home remained a brothel 
for only two officers in 1942. According to the prosecution, Alfonsina 
Flores was misled as to her exact role at the home, hence the specification 
of “misrepre sen ta tion.” Such misrepre sen ta tion began with an unexpected 
visit to the Flores ranch in the village of Malojloj. In February 1942, Juan C. 
Mesa, a chauffeur, Shinohara, and Sakai arrived at the Flores home, where 
they greeted Jose Dueñas Flores, the  father of Alfonsina. As a witness for the 
prosecution, Jose Dueñas Flores recounted, “The accused came to my ranch 
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with the Japa nese officer and a driver and the accused said, ‘We come  here 
to ask for your 17 year old  daughter to be a ser vice girl.’ ” To this request, 
Flores responded, “My  daughter is not capable to do that kind of work.”52
The  mother of Alfonsina, Rafaela San Nicholas Flores, then confronted 
Shinohara. She inquired, “I asked him how did he know [Alfonsina] was 
17 years old. I said to him, ‘Who told you about it?’ I further said to the ac-
cused, ‘You came from [Hagåtña] up to this place. You passed many other 
girls, why did you come directly to this ranch? You did that on purpose.’ ” 
Her husband, Jose, then argued that he was “ready to fight and kill  because 
[prostitution] is not the custom out  here,” to which Rafaela Flores coun-
tered, “ there is nothing we can say or  else we  will get killed.”53 With Al-
fonsina crying in the background, her parents complied with Shinohara’s 
forceful demands. But Rafaela Flores persisted in her critique of patriarchy 
and prostitution, requesting that she accompany her  daughter to Hagåtña 
and pressing Shinohara in other ways. Upon arriving in the city, she referred 
to Cecilia, Shinohara’s  daughter, asking him, “Now what are you  going to do 
about it? How would you like to have this done to your  daughter?”54 Berating 
the Japa nese empire, she said, “ ‘Even if you turned the Kingdom of Japan 
over to me, it  will never satisfy me. I would rather have my  daughter back.” 
Refusing to implicate his  daughter, Shinohara assured Rafaela Flores that 
Alfonsina would be cleaning a  house, with her  family receiving help in the 
 future. As her final appeal, Rafaela Flores then requested that the governor 
aide- de- camp Sakai marry Alfonsina.
Although Alfonsina was already engaged to a Chamorro man, Vicente 
Flores Blanco, her  mother insisted that she marry Sakai. If a wedding was 
pursued, Alfonsina and Sakai would have participated in mamaisan saina, 
other wise known as “requesting the permission of elders.”55 In the 1940s, this 
pro cess required the groom’s parents to meet at the bride’s home, where 
they, along with elders, requested the consent of the bride’s  family. Fami-
lies would then exchange items of cultural significance, such as pugua (betel 
nut), so as to link their  children and clans.56 For Shinohara, though, mar-
riage was not an option. Already crying, Alfonsina Flores recalled, “Then 
Shinohara said that I must listen and obey or  else I  will be beheaded.” She 
then recounted moving to the Kerners’  house, where she “was made to sleep 
with Sakai.”57
According to Alfonsina Flores, for six months she was “forced to stay” 
in the Kerners’ home, where Shinohara, as the “boss,” promised her 20 yen 
per month for her  labor.58 In the end, she collected 50 yen of the 120 yen 
promised. Her value, as property, also amounted to five pounds of tobacco, 
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the only compensation Shinohara provided to the Flores  family. During this 
period, however, Rafaela Flores visited her  daughter several times a week, 
demonstrating the accessible nature of the residence. Further, Alfonsina 
Flores frequently left the Kerners’  house at her own volition, often traveling 
to her  family’s ranch and the homes of other relatives. Neither the Japa nese 
soldiers in the area nor Shinohara tortured her for  these actions, perhaps 
 because of her newfound po liti cal relationship with governor aide- de- camp 
Sakai. At most, Shinohara could only say “cuss words” against Alfonsina 
Flores, an indication of her rise in status as an indigenous  woman and colo-
nial subject of the Japa nese military.59 She then quit when Sakai left Guam 
for an undisclosed location in the summer of 1942, at which time she re-
turned to her  family.
Another undeveloped account in this narrative concerned her older 
 sister, Alice, who was already living in the Kerners’ home upon Alfonsina’s 
arrival. Based on the testimonies of Alfonsina and her parents, Alice Flores 
may have performed “domestic” ser vices for the other Japa nese officer of 
the  house, Governor Hiroshi Hayashi. Interestingly, neither the defense 
counsel nor the prosecution addressed the role of Alice Flores other than to 
describe her duties as a  house cleaner and to identify her as Alfonsina’s sib-
ling. Was Alice Flores a prostitute, already assisting Shinohara during the 
war? Why, as well, did the Flores  family reveal  little about her presence in 
the Kerners’  house? And what led Alfonsina Flores to becoming the source 
of contestation in this narrative of war time prostitution and indigenous 
survival? Or was she a prostitute who accused Shinohara for failing to keep 
his promises and payments?
Despite the fact that  these questions remained unanswered by the court, 
Alfonsina Flores and her  family recounted several points that stressed Shi-
nohara’s ties to prostitution: first, Shinohara seized Alfonsina Flores as 
property of the Japa nese military; second, Shinohara threatened to kill the 
Flores  family; third, Alfonsina Flores resided in the Kerners’ home against 
her  will; and, fourth, Sakai may have raped her. On the latter point, Alfon-
sina Flores never mentioned the term “rape.” As such, she may have had 
a sexual or nonsexual relationship with Sakai, something akin to what 
the sociologist Seungsook Moon describes as “cohabitating prostitution,” 
where intimate liaisons can lead to long- term partnerships.60 Indeed, sev-
eral kinds of prostitution may describe Alfonsina Flores’s relationship with 
Sakai and Shinohara. At the same time, she knew better, saying, “They  were 
not  going to make a good girl out of me.”61
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The specification regarding Nicholasa P. Mendiola conveyed a compa-
rable pattern of abduction and coercion, but with some fundamental dif-
ferences. Whereas the prosecution portrayed Shinohara as transforming 
Alfonsina Flores into a prostitute, the prosecution characterized Nicholasa 
Mendiola as a prostitute manipulated to work in the second prostitution 
ring operated by Shinohara. Unlike the Kerners’  house that accommodated 
only two Japa nese military officers, the other concessionary ianjo, located in 
the village of Piti, favored military officers and enlisted personnel in greater 
numbers. It is quite probable that Shinohara may have been linked to  these 
and other brothels, but the prosecution did not pursue this inquiry. It in-
stead focused on proving that Shinohara forced Mendiola, against her  will, 
into one prostitution ring from February or March 1942 to June or July 1942. 
In  doing so, the prosecution may not have represented Mendiola as a “good 
girl,” but it certainly acknowledged her indigenous agency as a “modern 
girl.”62 As the historian Sarah Kovner argues, the “modern girl” in Japan 
and its colonies was an ideal of femininity variously embraced and resisted 
by  women across the empire in bars, cafes, dance halls, and restaurants.63 
This ideal blurred the eroticized roles between nonsexual  labor, rape, and 
sexual  labor in  these sites. Waitresses, for example, could have assisted bar 
customers, as much as they could have labored as prostitutes. A Guama-
nian police officer and witness for the prosecution, Adolfo C. Sgambelluri, 
confirmed the flexible identity and negotiating power Mendiola yielded as a 
modern, single girl in Guam.
In early 1942, a chauffeur, Samuel  T. Shinohara, Jesusa Taitano, two 
Japa nese navy personnel, and a female prostitute sought the assistance of 
Sgambelluri, who was then working for the Japa nese police department. As 
a group, they drove to the district of Anigua, an area adjacent to Hagåtña, 
where Nicholasa Mendiola resided. As Sgambelluri stated, “Upon arrival 
 there, [Shinohara] sent me in to call Nicolasa [sic] to the car as he would 
like to talk to her. Nicholasa was rather reluctant to come out. She made 
excuses. Fi nally she came out and while at the car, Shinohara asked her to 
come down with him to Piti and work at a whore  house where Japa nese 
enlisted personnel  were being entertained. She answered that she would 
 later on if she can get clothes to wear as she had on only rags.”64 Accord-
ing to Sgambelluri, Shinohara offered to provide Mendiola with clothes 
and “anything  else she wanted.”65 When the prosecution called her to the 
stand, she reiterated  these details but emphasized the importance of her 
two  children. As she recalled, “Then [Shinohara] asked me if I wanted to 
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work at the whore  house. I told the accused that I could not do it on account 
of my  children. He insisted and said, ‘Come and try it at least for three days 
and see how you like it,’ and I said, ‘No.’ ”66 Failing to persuade Nicholasa 
Mendiola, Shinohara threatened to punish her. At that point, she relented 
and accompanied every body to the ianjo in Piti. But  because the man ag er 
was not  there, they dropped off Mendiola at her home in Anigua.
Two weeks  later, she met Shinohara, who offered her a new position at 
a “saloon” where she, as a “bar maid,” would serve drinks. As Nicholasa 
Mendiola recalled, “I was willing to do that.”  After agreeing to pursue this 
job, she remembered being taken “to the hospital to have my physical ex-
amination and  after I had passed physically, I was given my paper.”67 Having 
under gone tests that may have assessed venereal diseases, both  under the 
U.S. Naval Government and then  under the Japa nese military, she described 
the most recent examination as if it was routine. When the defense asked 
her to define the purpose of  these exams, she observed, “I do not want to 
answer that question. It lowers my reputation, but if I must answer it then I 
 will.”68 Before the defense could reply, the military commission instructed 
Mendiola to not answer the question. But she did respond to Shinohara, 
who, two days  after her physical examination, returned to her home. With-
out any explanation as to how their negotiations unfolded, Shinohara 
then took her to the ianjo in Piti. During the trial, Mendiola only shared 
what she experienced upon entering the brothel. As she noted, “I found 
rooms in that building.  There was a boy. I stayed  there and it was  either the 
first or second night when the accused came and brought an officer. . . .  
[Shinohara] brought in two Japa nese officers and then the accused said, ‘Take 
care of  these men,’ and I said, ‘What for?’ and he said, ‘Well, your line of work.’ ” 
She refused, with Shinohara threatening to punish her. Mendiola recounted 
that she soon complied, saying that she and an officer “went into the room 
and slept together  because that was what we  were supposed to do.”69 Clari-
fying what she meant by “sleeping,” she said, “We had sexual intercourse.”70
For the prosecution and the court, Nicholasa P. Mendiola demonstrated 
that Samuel T. Shinohara coerced her into working as a prostitute for the 
Japa nese military. While she did not discuss the role of the “boy” in the 
Piti brothel, she illustrated her intimate familiarity with the vari ous “whore 
 houses” in Guam and indicated that she had the same level of autonomy 
as that afforded to Alfonsina Flores. Once charged with “vagrancy”  under 
the naval government, then becoming a “reformed” person before the war 
broke out, Mendiola assumed the position of a “modern girl” for four to five 
months.71 She also had sexual relations with at least one Japa nese military 
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officer, providing evidence of an existing prostitution ring in Piti where she, 
like Flores, became the sexual property of Shinohara and Japan. As Judge 
Advocate Teller Ammons declared, “The accused not only forced  these 
 women to cohabit with the  enemy Japa nese, but he went further; by fear of 
death and punishment, he forced  these two  women to subject themselves 
to the bestial desires of men of the accused’s own se lection, who  were mem-
bers of the  enemy invasion forces. They  were Japa nese. No lower trait of 
character can be found in any man.”72
As implied in Ammon’s racist and sexist comments, however, we should 
not read too much into the  legal rhe toric of coercion, abduction, and con-
sent as providing relief to Flores and Mendiola. In the last instance, The 
Penal Code of Guam, like the commission and prosecution, did not attempt 
to remedy the vio lence of prostitution inflicted upon  these  women. Several 
reasons explain this rationale where the  women  were paradoxically cast 
as unwanted “aliens” but valuable properties of the U.S. state. First, sec-
tion 175 of The Penal Code of Guam, “Importation and Deportation of Unde-
sirable Aliens,” identified prostitutes as one of several “classes of aliens” 
that are not allowed entry into Guam. The so- called aliens included “an-
archists,” “feeble- minded persons,” “ idiots,” “imbeciles,” the “mentally 
or physically defective,” “paupers,” “polygamists,” and “professional beg-
gars,” among  others.73 Should  such an individual arrive on the island, sec-
tion 175 stated that he should be “deported to the country whence he came 
at any time within three years  after the date of his entry into the island.”74 
In other words, The Penal Code of Guam defined prostitutes as an undesirable 
class of  people. Confounding this position was the real ity that American 
brothels existed in Guam before the war. In official terms, the U.S. mili-
tary rarely suppressed prostitution  here or elsewhere; if laws  were passed 
to this effect, they mainly addressed control of venereal disease.75 Second, 
the tribunal never accused Shinohara of providing the conditions that led 
to the possibility of Flores and Mendiola being raped, a subtext occurring 
throughout the trial but never made clear by the prosecution or defense. If 
rape was entered as a war crime in the trial, then the terms of punishment 
would have set a pre ce dent in naval law and thereby offer a fuller sense of 
justice for the  women. Third, and fi nally, the prosecution punished Shino-
hara for possessing Alfonsina Flores and Nicholasa P. Mendiola as U.S. na-
tionals and properties of the naval government.
By arguing that Shinohara transformed an American car into a Japa nese 
military vehicle, assaulted an American military officer and governor, des-
ecrated the American flag, and prostituted two American nationals, the 
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prosecution therefore asserted that Shinohara had  violated the sanctity of 
whiteness as property and sovereignty in Guam. In  these ways, the com-
mission represented him as bearing the martial and material markers of the 
Japa nese empire. But how did the lesser charges— allegations that placed 
Shinohara outside the zone of Japa nese sovereignty— render him as a “resi-
dential alien” who owed allegiance to the United States?
The Residential Alien as Homo Sacer
In this section, I discuss how the tribunal construed Shinohara’s inclusive 
exclusion with the American nation as per his four “overt acts” of treason. 
 These acts included organ izing a youth group called Dai Nisei, seizing an 
electric generator, stealing American monies from a bank, and supplying 
provisions for the Japa nese military.  These activities presumably aided the 
Japa nese  enemy. I then show how the court and other naval officials began 
to shift Shinohara’s national identity from an  enemy and foreigner of Japan 
to an ethnic minority and resident of an American military colony.76 For 
instance, the four treason charges afforded him the po liti cal rights of a resi-
dential alien, a  legal category whose loyalty was bound to the United States. 
Specifically, he was an Issei who betrayed his allegiance to Amer i ca, even 
though the United States had considered the Issei as “ enemy aliens” during 
the war.77 Drawing on section 37 of The Penal Code of Guam, “Treason, Who 
Only Can Commit,” the court stated that “ every person, resident in the is-
land of Guam” owes allegiance to the Naval Government of Guam or the 
United States.78 The Penal Code of Guam likewise required the constitutional 
rule of an “overt act,” verified by two witnesses, only differing in its under-
standing of punishment and attainders. In this re spect, the death sentence 
applied, as did the option of imprisonment “at hard  labor for not less than 
five years.”79
On the other hand, neither The Penal Code of Guam nor the military com-
mission invoked anything resembling attainders, meaning that the court 
could extend, as it did, punitive mea sures against the “properties” of Shi-
nohara. Without the protection of the Constitution’s second clause on at-
tainders, the commission held the authority to seize related assets that be-
longed to Shinohara and his  family, assuming, of course, that he perished 
as a result of receiving a death sentence. Indeed, Shinohara was still a sa-
cred man in Agamben’s sense of the term, and not only  because he was de-
prived of what the court construed as his Japa nese personhood. Shinohara 
remained a homo sacer  because of his crossing into the zone of indistinc-
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tion that comprised both American and Japa nese sovereignties in Guam. To 
be clear, this “crossing” entailed a pro cess that constituted an inclusive ex-
clusion not with one “city” as per Agamben’s theories on bare life and po liti-
cal existence but with two “cities”— Japan and the United States— claiming 
power over Guam. Crossing over into the United States thus required that 
Shinohara become a residential alien, but one condemned, as Judge Advo-
cate Teller Ammons put it, as a “traitor.”80
On the tenth day of the trial, August  8, 1945, the commission opened 
with additional treason charge I, specification 2, regarding the making of 
Dai Nisei, what the prosecution described as a Japa nese  labor organ ization 
in Guam.81 A total of seven men for the prosecution testified, six of whom 
came from Chamorro- Japanese families: Jose Caesarius Blas, Jesus Cruz 
Hara, Juan Santos Okada, Jesus Carbullido Okiyama, Felix Flores Sakai, 
and Jesus Baza Sayama. The lone police officer and perhaps the only non- 
Japanese person was Juan R. Rivera. In his testimony, Rivera recalled how 
this group emerged as a  labor organ ization for the Japa nese military in 
February  1942. He said, “I was inside the office of the Menseibu when 
Mr. Shinohara came in talking to Juan Castro, the native in charge of the na-
tive policemen. Suddenly Castro called me over and directed me to inform 
the bunch of persons listed in a paper to appear at Shinohara’s residence.”82 
Castro then instructed Rivera to track the individuals, instructing them to 
meet at Shinohara’s restaurant at 8  o’clock in the morning.
Jesus Carbullido Okiyama, one of the witnesses, filled in the details. At 
the first meeting with twenty to thirty Nisei pre sent, he said, Shinohara 
“told us that the United States of Amer i ca and the Imperial Government 
of Japan  were in a state of war, and that the Americans had been pushing 
the Japs around for a considerable length of time and the Japa nese could 
not stand it any longer and fi nally came to a show- down.”83 Okiyama then 
relayed how Shinohara categorized American racism as the grounds for lo-
calizing Japa nese anticolonialism in Guam, saying that “the Nisei, the half- 
caste of Guam, had been pushed around by the Americans and the time 
has come when we  shall do every thing pos si ble to help the Japs win the 
war.”84 The “act,” as Okiyama remembered it, concerned Dai Nisei’s role in 
providing “ser vices to any of the established Japa nese military units  here.”85 
With Shinohara identified as the founder and leader of Dai Nisei, Okiyama 
recounted that members of Dai Nisei helped “to build air fields” and other 
military facilities.
Although nobody agreed on the exact date of its formation, they con-
firmed Dai Nisei’s existence from early 1942 to the summer of 1944 when 
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the U.S. military invaded the island. Therefore, military conscription ap-
propriately characterizes the kind of  labor Dai Nisei performed for Sam-
uel T. Shinohara. Member Jesus Baza Sayama, for example, worked at an 
“air base” and “dug tunnels for air raid shelters.”86  Others made “tunnels” 
at the district of San Ramon, built “air base transmission lines from Agana 
to the Agana Air Base,” and performed biweekly “drills” at the San Antonio 
Plaza, among other tasks.87
On the thirteenth day of the trial, August 11, 1945, the prosecution en-
tertained additional charge I, specification 1, wherein Shinohara allegedly 
assisted the Japa nese military in taking Ignacia Bordallo Butler’s electric 
generator. This “act” occurred in or about December  1941, an event not 
clearly verified by three witnesses employed by the prosecution. The owner 
of the generator, Butler, testified first and provided the most details. She 
asserted that Shinohara, an unidentified Saipanese interpreter, and three 
unnamed Japa nese military personnel arrived at her residence in Hagåtña 
in early December 1941. One of the Japa nese men was an officer who wanted 
her generator, kept in her basement, for unknown reasons. Fearing for the 
safety of her  family and her husband, Chester Butler, who was an American 
prisoner of war in Japan, Ignacia Bordallo Butler did not resist the men’s sei-
zure of her generator. When the prosecution asked her to identify the U.S. 
manufacturer of the generator, she simply replied, “The Onan brand.”88 But 
the  matter of theft was not established, as she recalled receiving “a slip of 
paper written in Japa nese” from the group, which could have been a prom-
issory note.89 Yet Butler could not furnish the document for the court, as it 
was lost.
The ambivalence continued with the two last witnesses for the pros-
ecution. Carlos Bordallo, the younger  brother of Ignacia Bordallo Butler, 
mentioned having been pre sent at her home during Shinohara’s visit. At 
the request of his  sister, he led Shinohara and the other men to the base-
ment, opening its lock and witnessing the men load the generator onto a 
truck and leave the residence for an unidentified location. In support of the 
prosecution, Carlos Bordallo identified the three Japa nese men as belong-
ing to the “military,” but he failed to make explicit the generator’s role in 
advancing Japan’s war efforts. As he noted, “I do not know where they  were 
 going to use [the generator] but it was  going to be used.”90 Jose S. Okada, 
the final witness, clarified the generator’s usage. As a former electrician for 
the Japa nese navy, he claimed that the military transported the generator to 
a naval ship, where it powered film equipment to “show drama, news reels, 
and comics.”91 Yet Okada’s argument was equally flawed. As the defense 
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demonstrated, he never witnessed the “act” wherein Shinohara allegedly 
stole the generator in Hagåtña. Nor did Okada identify Butler as the owner 
of the generator, Onan as its manufacturer, or an unknown Japa nese mili-
tary officer as its heir apparent.
Undeterred by  these contradictions and inconsistencies, the prosecu-
tion solicited the testimony of Galo Lujan Salas, a Chamorro cashier for the 
U.S. Military Government of Guam, to address the third case of treason on 
August 13, 1945. On the  fourteenth day of the trial, Salas affirmed Shino-
hara’s “act,” original charge I, as the theft of “about” $9,300 on or about 
 December 16, 1941, said monies being the property of the naval government 
of Guam. As one of two witnesses, he recalled the event occurring at the 
naval government’s Rec ords and Accounts Office, in Hagåtña, in the early 
after noon of December 19, 1941. As the former cashier for the naval govern-
ment, he confirmed that monies and rec ords  were stored separately in two 
vaults at this office. At that time, Salas alleged that Shinohara, two Japa nese 
military officers, and four Japa nese armed guards escorted him to the of-
fice, then  housed in the R. E. Coontz building. As Salas recalled, “Shino-
hara stated that it is better for me to open the safe than to refuse or  else I 
 will be killed and then the accused told me he is one of the officials of the 
Japa nese Imperial Government. Then I put my right hand up to my head still 
thinking what was I to do  whether to open the combination or refuse.”92 
While Salas was pondering his next course of action, Shinohara conversed 
with the Japa nese soldiers, but Salas did not know what they  were saying. 
Soon thereafter and without any warning, Salas said at the trial, “one of the 
Japa nese soldiers tore my shirt  under my right hand by his bayonet. I stated 
to Shinohara I did not expect  those  things to be done to me, but Shinohara 
insisted that I open the safe, so then I opened the combination for they  were 
forcing me to do so or  else I  will be killed.”93
Salas then recounted how Shinohara “opened the door of the safe,” 
at which point “one of the Japa nese officers came along and took all the 
money and papers in the safe that belonged to the Naval Government.”94 He 
estimated that the Japa nese officer stole $7,639.41, a difference of $1,660.59 
when one considers the commission’s allegation that Shinohara assisted 
in the theft of $9,300. Despite this gross discrepancy, Salas emphasized re-
peatedly that Shinohara and the Japa nese military officers “forced” him to 
open the safe containing the monies that belonged to three groups. They 
included the naval government, which owned $5,100 in cash; the Bank of 
Guam, which possessed $1,300 in cash; and several residents of the island, 
whose combined checks totaled $1,239.41.  After opening the safe contain-
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ing  these monies, Salas then unlocked the combination for the vault hold-
ing the government rec ords. The paper monies, he said,  were placed in 
a white canvas bag, held by an officer, with Shinohara carry ing the loose 
coins in another pack. Another Japa nese officer took possession of the gov-
ernment rec ords. Afterward, Salas described how he, along with Shinohara 
and the Japa nese military personnel, left the Coontz building and walked 
to the former U.S. Marine Barracks. On his way, Salas recalled, he saw 
Vicente Zafra, the chief commissioner of Guam, standing beside the road. 
Although Galo Lujan Salas did not identify the person or individuals who 
stored the monies in the Marine Barracks, another building occupied by the 
Japa nese military, he offered ample evidence to suggest that Shinohara par-
ticipated in the theft of funds variously owned by the Bank of Guam, local 
residents, and the naval government. However, the second witness, Vicente 
Zafra, failed to describe anything resembling theft.
The prosecution then presented additional charge I, specification 3, 
to conclude its fourth and final case on treason. The tribunal alleged that 
Shinohara on or about April 1942 supplied the Japa nese military and naval 
forces with provisions and refreshments, an “overt act” whose legitimacy 
rested on the testimony of five Guamanian witnesses. The first person on 
the stand, Vicente M. Taimanglo, a truck driver, acknowledged Shinohara’s 
role in opening the bar, Omiya Kaikan, on February 16, 1942. As the for-
mer bartender and cashier for the officer- only club, Taimanglo stated that 
Shinohara often or ga nized several parties for Japa nese naval officers. As 
he explained, “In case an officer came, he would go to the list [of priced 
food and drinks] and pick out what he wanted in the list, then that was 
prepared and served to him by one of the girls, then a bill  will be ready for 
him and he pays one of the girls and then the girl turned over the money to 
me.”95 According to Taimanglo, Shinohara coordinated an “opening party,” 
a “farewell party” for the governor, and “only by invitation” parties with 
Chamorro “girls.”96
The last and fifth witness for the prosecution, Steward First Class Jorge E. 
Cristobal, then translated the bar’s name, Omiya Kaikan, in an effort to de-
fine the club as a government locale. He claimed, “Omiya, the word literally 
translated means shrine,  temple or a place of worship. Kaikan is a hall not 
necessarily a small building, but it is considered an assembly hall.  Those 
two words together I would say: Omiya Kaikan is an assembly hall for  either 
a church, court officials or nobles.”97 If one believed, as Cristobal presum-
ably did, that the offering of provisions to the Japa nese military in an “as-
sembly hall” counted as an “overt act” of treason, then Samuel T. Shinohara 
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clearly betrayed the United States. How did the defense counsel refute such 
allegations? In the next section, I address this question by further exploring 
the racisms and technical contradictions of the court.
In Defense of Shinohara
In the remaining days of the trial, Lieutenant Emory L. Morris of the de-
fense counsel featured eight witnesses to  counter  these charges alleged 
by the commission. In addition to his first witness, Francisco  T. Flores, 
he employed nine witnesses in the last five days of the trial, whereas the 
prosecution utilized thirty- six witnesses, nearly a 300  percent difference in 
number, over an eighteen- day period. But rather than address each charge 
and specification, the defense counsel focused on only a few allegations. 
For reasons not explained to the commission, the defense did not compel 
its witnesses to appraise two treason allegations— original charge I and ad-
ditional charge I, specification 1— and the prostitution allegation, original 
charge IV, specifications 1 and 2. This is not to say, though, that the defense 
counsel did not entertain  these issues in the closing argument. Regarding 
additional charge I, specification 3, for example, the defense counsel argued 
that Shinohara never furnished drinks and food (e.g., beef, cake, ice cream, 
soda, whiskey) for the Japa nese military. Jesus S. Sayama, one witness for 
the defense, also stated that Omiya Kaikan was not, as the prosecution ar-
gued, an “assembly hall” for strictly government or religious purposes. In 
fact, Sayama troubled the notion that Shinohara or ga nized parties for the 
Japa nese military, since the Japa nese Society of Guam, with Shinohara as its 
president, held events for Governor George J. McMillin and the U.S. Navy 
before the war.
With the “overt act” of provisions placed in doubt, Sayama then testi-
fied against another treason allegation, additional charge I, specification 2, 
which stipulated that Shinohara created Dai Nisei for the purpose of aiding 
the Japa nese military. He explained that several groups  were formed during 
this period, all with vari ous ties to the Chamorro public, the Japa nese com-
munity, and the Japa nese military. Confounding the prosecution’s position 
that Dai Nisei was the only group to assist the Japa nese military, Sayama 
listed Kohatsu (a Japa nese organ ization from Saipan), Nihon Jin Kai (Japa-
nese Society of Guam), and Seinendan (Chamorro Young Men’s Associa-
tion) as having comparable ties to the military. Further, Sayama argued that 
Dai Nisei was not a militarist organ ization but was rather a group where 
young, mixed- race Japa nese learned the Japa nese language, including drills 
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that would prepare them for fires and typhoons.98 He also explained that 
one should not conflate the meanings of Dai Nisei as second- generation 
Japa nese and Dai Nisei as an organ ization for second- generation Japa-
nese. Addressing this vital distinction, Jesus  S. Sayama mentioned hav-
ing known some of the prosecution’s witnesses, such as Jesus Carbullido 
Okiyama and Felix Flores Sakai, saying that they  were, indeed, “Dai Nisei,” 
second- generation Japa nese.99 Yet he hesitated to conjoin the double mean-
ing of the term by assuming that  these men participated in the Dai Nisei 
organ izations.
 After exhausting their witness testimonies on two treason charges, the 
defense counsel temporarily ignored the other treason allegations and pro-
ceeded to address the lesser charges. Two of their witnesses, Lourdes An-
derson and Margaret Anderson, came forward with re spect to additional 
charge III, the desecration of the U.S. flag. Their point was  simple: Shi-
nohara never placed the U.S. flag on the floor of Omiya Kaikan. Nor did 
Shinohara steal an American vehicle owned by Lieutenant James E. Davis. 
Refuting the property claims of the prosecution, the defense counsel even 
called on Bishop Miguel Angel Olano to testify against this charge.100 On 
the contrary, they argued that the Japa nese military had seized all vehicles 
in early December  1941 and not two months  later, into the new year. As 
Bishop Olano stressed, “ After two days of occupation, all cars  were confis-
cated by the Japa nese Government.”101
On the charges concerning the assault and battery of Governor George J. 
McMillin, the defense counsel did not directly ask its witnesses if  these acts 
occurred.  These allegations emphasized that Shinohara “slapped” McMil-
lin on three separate occasions: December  10, 1941; January  1, 1942; and 
January  20, 1942. The defense counsel instead drew from the testimony 
of Shinohara’s wife, Carmen Torres Shinohara, and his  daughter, Cecilia 
Torres Shinohara. Yet they did not fully examine the chronological and 
topographical contradictions previously outlined by the prosecution and 
its witnesses. The closest approximation to this effort came when the de-
fense counsel stressed that the prosecution’s Chamorro witnesses could 
not have seen the assaults that allegedly took place in Hagåtña. If they did, 
they offered vastly diff er ent accounts of the time and place. The court also 
erred in identifying January 20, 1942, as one of  these dates when McMillin, 
along with other prisoners of war, had already departed for Japan ten days 
 earlier.102 The defense counsel maintained its skepticism with re spect to 
the other dates, knowing that the men of the Insular Force, segregated as a 
group across the Plaza de España,  were among a large crowd of six hundred 
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American and Japa nese military personnel and  were located far from the 
vicinity where Shinohara allegedly slapped McMillin.103
In his closing argument, Lieutenant Morris reiterated  these fictions. He 
likewise insisted on the innocence of Samuel T. Shinohara, whose actions, 
following the 1907 Hague Regulations, adhered to the international laws on 
occupation and property. Take, for instance, the commonly cited En glish 
version of article 43, wherein the occupant is obligated to “take all mea sures 
in his power to restore and ensure, as far as pos si ble, public order and [civil 
life].”104 When the law was originally debated at the Brussels Declaration 
of 1874, the authors of the article sought ways to protect local inhabitants, 
thereby compelling the occupant to restore their daily life as quickly as pos-
si ble. But by the mid- twentieth  century, occupants often read this duty as 
the “authority to prescribe and create changes in a wide spectrum of af-
fairs.”105 In  either case, the occupant, like Japan, had the right to conduct 
itself as per international law. The expansive meaning attributed to “public 
order” and “civil life” in article 43 was no less ambiguous than article 53 and 
its clause on “property.” In countering the prosecution’s charges on theft 
and treason, the defense counsel specifically invoked the second section of 
article 53, which read, “All appliances,  whether on land, at sea, or in the air, 
adapted for the transport of persons or  things, exclusive of cases governed 
by naval law may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but 
must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”106 As Lieu-
tenant Morris expressed, “The evidence is clear and complete to the effect 
that the Japa nese authorities, as the occupant power, had the right to seize 
all automobiles in Guam; and did seize them on 10 December  1941, and 
within the next few days following that date.”107 As with article 43,  there ex-
ists wide latitude in the meaning attached to article 53, whose first section 
stipulates that “an army of occupation” can take possession of properties 
belonging to the  enemy state.108 Yet, as evidenced in its second clause, the 
occupant can take the properties of “private individuals” as well, provided 
that such properties are  either restored or compensated upon the declara-
tion of peace. With this broad sense of owner ship, the defense counsel as-
serted that the Japa nese authorities possessed the “right of requisition” (1) 
to confiscate all automobiles; (2) to take the money and checks belonging 
to the U.S. and the naval government; and (3) to remove Ignacia Bordallo 
Butler’s electric generator.109
But when it came to the prostitution charges, the defense counsel 
floundered in its attempts to absolve Shinohara. With re spect to Alfon-
sina Flores, for example, the defense counsel revoked the specification of 
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“misrepre sen ta tion,” stating that her case was one of “duress” in light of 
her fear of being killed or punished by the Japa nese military. Lieutenant 
Morris then blamed the Flores  family and not Shinohara. As he put it, “This 
girl’s older  sister, Alice, had been at the Kerner home one or two weeks. 
She apparently liked it  there and arranged for her younger  sister to come 
and join her. Gentlemen, the proper  people to be charged of this crime 
are the  father, the  mother and the other  people involved, and not [Shino-
hara].”110 Although the defense counsel hinted at a complex web of prosti-
tution among the Flores  family and  others, Morris did not pursue this  angle 
any further. He instead discussed the specification concerning Nicholasa P. 
Mendiola as having no grounds for duress.  Because of Mendiola’s statuses 
as a “vagrant” and an unmarried  woman, the defense counsel argued that 
she entered into prostitution “voluntarily.”111 Further, Shinohara should not 
have been charged with treason as the “two witness” rule was not uniformly 
applied in the specifications. With regard to the charges concerning the 
Dai Nisei organ ization, the defense counsel simply asserted that Dai Nisei 
never functioned as a group of laborers for the Japa nese military.
In lieu of  these arguments posed by the defense counsel, the military 
commission and judge advocate convened and determined their findings. 
With no pre ce dent in U.S. law on the  matter of charging a residential alien 
with treason, they turned to the En glish case of De Jager v. Attorney General of 
Natal (1907) as an international authority on treason. Specifically, the com-
mission cited the Crown’s successful prosecution of De Jager, a citizen of 
the South African Republic who lived in a British territory. During the Boer 
War, De Jager accepted an official position in the South African Republic 
forces.112  After the war, the Crown read his act as high treason, eventually 
convicting De Jager of this charge for failing to maintain his allegiance to 
the Crown. For the tribunal, this En glish case provided an international 
pre ce dent to justify the court’s proceedings. Along  these lines, the com-
mission issued its statement on the twenty- third and last day of the trial, 
August 27, 1945. It found Shinohara guilty of  every treason charge and the 
lesser specifications, except original charge II regarding the theft of an 
American vehicle and additional charge II concerning the desecration of 
the U.S. flag. As Judge Advocate Teller Ammons said, “The Commission, 
therefore, sentences him, Samuel T. Shinohara, a civilian, to death, to be 
executed by hanging the said Samuel T. Shinohara by the neck  until he is 
dead, two- thirds (2/3) of the members of the Commission concurring.”113
As homo sacer, the military commission included Shinohara within 
the fold of the U.S. nation, only to be cast out and sentenced to death as 
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a nonsacrifice. As per naval law, the U.S. secretary of the navy, the Office 
of the Judge Advocate General, and other  legal experts then determined 
if Shinohara’s death sentence was fully justified. As he awaited the review 
of his death sentence, Shinohara dwelt in solitary confinement at the War 
Criminals Stockade in Guam. In the next section, I discuss how he reflected 
upon his  future despite having remained  silent during the entire trial. As a 
person charged with the highest crime against the state, Shinohara saved a 
few words for its highest figure of naval authority, its secretary.
To the Honorable Secretary of the Navy
Almost a year  later, on July 4, 1946, Col o nel James Snedeker of the Military 
Law Division evaluated the  legal merits and flaws of Samuel Shinohara’s 
trial. In a memo addressed to the navy’s Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, he found no fault in the lesser charges. But Col o nel Snedeker disputed 
the commission’s findings on treason. For instance, he observed that 
“nothing in the laws of the United States warrants the conclusion reached, 
and international law, as such, is equally devoid of justification for this 
holding.”114 Given the potential implications of this case, Col o nel Snedeker 
reasoned that the judge advocate general “may be in order to re- examine 
the pre- trial opinion and to reconsider  whether or not Shinohara is prop-
erly chargeable with treason.”115 His concern partly hinged on the U.S. fail-
ure to protect Shinohara, as a resident alien in Guam, from the Japa nese 
occupation; without such protection, the United States had no basis 
to try Shinohara.116 Additionally, Shinohara’s status as a Japa nese citizen 
“was compellable to perform acts for his sovereign state when that state 
completely occupied and controlled Guam.”117 As a subject “duty bound” to 
Japan, he should not have been charged with treason in the first place. Based 
on his internal assessment of the trial, Col o nel Snedeker recommended 
that the original and additional charges on treason “be set aside.”118 But 
should  these charges on treason remain, he recommended that Shinohara 
“be afforded the opportunity of having the Supreme Court pass upon the 
princi ple involved.”119
Unbeknownst to Shinohara, though, the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General would not address Col o nel Snedeker’s memo  until spring 1948, 
almost three years  after he received the death sentence. In the meantime, 
Shinohara solicited the  legal assistance of Fredrick T. Suss, a lieutenant in 
the U.S. Naval Reserves. Their first course of action concerned the prepara-
tion of affidavits in an effort to appeal the court’s judgment. On October 18 
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and 19, 1946, for example, Lieutenant Suss compiled affidavits from four 
individuals, two of whom had previously assisted the prosecution.120 One of 
 these, Kyomon Miwa, took responsibility for forming the Dai Nisei Young 
Men’s Association, whereas another man, Juan Santos Okada, disavowed 
his affiliation with the same organ ization. Shinohara then submitted a 
five- page affidavit on November 3, 1946, which raised several issues.121 One 
concerned his imprisonment by the U.S. Navy: first, from December 8 to 
10, 1941, and, second, from August  23, 1944, to the time of his trial and 
postsentence confinement. In the former case, the navy never informed 
Shinohara as to why he was incarcerated; in the latter, the navy offered no 
explanation  until July 20, 1945, eight days before his court case began. At 
that time, Shinohara received only two thirty- minute consultation periods 
from a defense counsel not of his choosing.
Moreover, the defense counsel refused to call on eight of his recom-
mended witnesses, a group of Chamorro and Japa nese men. Likewise, Shi-
nohara encouraged Lieutenant Morris and Vicente Reyes to contact former 
naval governor George J. McMillin, knowing that he survived the war and 
could be available for the trial. Yet the defense counsel rejected this request 
as well, as much as it refused to entertain Shinohara’s disagreements with 
the translation of Chamorro and Japa nese terms during the trial. And when 
he pleaded with the defense counsel to speak as a witness, Lieutenant Mor-
ris and Reyes ignored him. Speaking in the third person, Shinohara wrote, 
“That he desired to take the stand in his own defense and requested this of 
his counsel who told him that his word had no weight before the court and 
though he urgently desired to deny the charges brought against him and to 
testify in  great detail, he was thwarted in this regard.”122 Once the findings 
 were issued, however, Lieutenant Morris asked Shinohara if he would like 
to testify in mitigation. But before Shinohara could respond, Reyes, a Gua-
manian, silenced him. As Shinohara recalled, “Reyes stated in words to the 
effect that Japan had lost the war and  there was nothing to say.”123 But  there 
was much to say in his petition to “The Honorable Secretary of the Navy,” 
James Forrestal, on January 2, 1947.
With the guidance of Lieutenant Fredrick T. Suss, Shinohara authored a 
forty- four- page petition that highlighted the critiques expressed in his per-
sonal affidavit, a military  lawyer’s review of his trial, and the defense coun-
sel’s closing argument.  These issues included the commission’s lack of due 
pro cess, its disavowal of international laws on property, and its selective 
interpretation of the “two witness” rule. At the same time, some topics ap-
peared in his petition that  were not addressed by his defense counsel.  These 
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included the ambiguity in the wording of the charges and in the everyday 
cross- examinations among the witnesses, as in the conflating of Shinohara 
with unidentified officers (e.g., “they”) rather than isolating Shinohara as 
the accused person (e.g., “he”).124 Comparably, Shinohara noted how the 
periodization of “in and about” in the charges enabled the prosecution to 
broadly determine the timing of said charges.125
He also opposed biases of the commission, as demonstrated in the 
court’s overruling of the defense counsel’s attempt to strike any testimonies 
on the Japa nese shooting of the U.S. flag across the Hagåtña harbor. As 
Shinohara observed, he had nothing to do with  these events. But with the 
war still raging between Japan and the United States, he correctly surmised 
as to how the image of a damaged U.S. flag replaced “considerate judgment 
with unreasonable passion for it kindled the flame of outraged patriotism 
which was already aglow in the heart of each American officer on the Com-
mission. That the court had in fact abandoned cool, considerate judgment 
in  favor of passion and prejudice is shown by the fact that it failed to strike 
out such improper evidence on the motion of the accused.”126 Although he 
revealed nothing about the passion and prejudice of the Japa nese empire, 
Shinohara astutely unpacked the American and Chamorro racisms and 
technical and  legal contradictions of the court.
With re spect to the Chamorro- Japanese and Japa nese witnesses, many 
of whom had families incarcerated by the Americans, he described how 
their fear of an unknown  future dictated the content of their testimonies 
more than any search for justice. As Shinohara ascertained, “Many of the 
witnesses against the petitioner  were of Japa nese blood and had parents 
confined by the American forces in the local stockade. They  were fearful of 
being momentarily seized by the Americans and thrown into prison  because 
of their ancestry.”127 As for the Guamanian witnesses, he argued that  those 
who testified against him  were “fearful of the troubled times and  were most 
anxious to impress the Americans with their own loyalty by condemning 
him whom the Americans accused of being a traitor.”128 As he rightly noted, 
“A fair trial  under such circumstances is well nigh impossible.”129 But contrary 
to his efforts to remain impartial, Shinohara infantilized the “Chamorro 
 people, who, as witnesses, have proven to be as unreliable as  children, tell-
ing the court what they think it wishes to hear and with no regard for the 
truth of their oaths.”130 He gave the example of the five Guamanian men 
who accused him of slapping the former naval governor George J. McMillin, 
the same McMillin who was now “willing to testify on behalf of the peti-
tioner” in an attempt to disprove  these charges.131
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In his petition to Secretary Forrestal, Shinohara shared  these and other 
views as a residential alien in Guam, his preferred status  after the war. Tak-
ing this position, he accepted the sovereignty of the United States, always 
remaining “complete and sincere” in his allegiance to the nation.132 As if to 
subvert the zones of indistinction, he decried what was perhaps the most 
fundamental  legal issue of the case, a point alluded to in his affidavit but 
altogether suppressed in the trial. That is to say, Shinohara argued that 
the tribunal held no jurisdiction to prosecute him, as the protection owed 
to him by the United States was removed when he was incarcerated on 
 December 8, 1941. As he noted, the “Naval Government did in fact with-
draw this protection . . .  by the evidence which showed that soon  after war 
was declared, the petitioner was seized by the government and thrown into 
prison with other Japa nese nationals. Thus the government unmistakably 
indicated by its action that it chose not to accept the temporary allegiance 
which the petitioner owed to it, but instead regarded the petitioner as an 
 enemy from whom no allegiance was expected.”133 The absence of an arrest 
rec ord, the lack of witness testimony about his alleged crime, and the gov-
ernment’s silence on the role of the  Enemy Alien Act in Guam led Shinohara 
to believe that the United States “had terminated what ever allegiance was 
owed to it by the petitioner by removing the protection upon which it was 
founded.”134
On April 28, 1948, the Office of the Judge Advocate General fi nally re-
viewed Shinohara’s trial, but it did not reference his petition in its report. 
Overall, its assessment paralleled the initial critique offered by Col o nel 
James Snedeker, usmc, of the Military Law Division. But the opinion of the 
Office of the Judge Advocate General differed in its view that the United 
States could legally try Shinohara and in its recommendation to set aside 
specific charges. Whereas Snedeker urged that all treason charges be re-
moved, the Office of the Judge Advocate General still found Shinohara 
guilty of treason with re spect to additional charge I, specifications 1 and 2, 
regarding, respectively, the theft of a generator and the mobilization of Dai 
Nisei. The other shift in the navy’s internal purview of the case concerned 
former naval governor and Captain George J. McMillin. In a statement ad-
dressed to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, McMillin “unequivo-
cally denied that the accused struck him in the face or other wise on the 
dates specified or on any other date.”135 As Shinohara had been trying to 
say all along, he never assaulted the naval officer. As a result, the Office 
of the Judge Advocate General dismissed all charges related to assault and 
battery. On July 8, 1948, John Nicholas Brown, acting secretary of the navy, 
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addressed  these reports, to which he said: “[It] is not clear in my mind that 
the offenses actually constituted treason. This point of view is not taken on 
 legal grounds, but is based purely on a lay reaction to the circumstances as 
I presently see them. I would appreciate an explanation which would clarify 
this point and establish the offenses as war crimes.”136
 After having analyzed the acting secretary’s memo and the other internal 
reports, G. L. Russell, judge advocate general of the navy, issued the fol-
lowing recommendation eigh teen days  later: “In view of the foregoing, it is 
the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that a sentence of fifteen years 
at hard  labor to be executed in Japan is commensurate with fairness and 
consistent with the law and existing regulations.”137 On August  24, 1948, 
Acting Secretary Brown, replied in kind. Concurring with the judge advo-
cate general’s conclusion, Brown proclaimed that “the sentence of death, 
to be executed by hanging by the neck  until dead, is hereby commuted to 
imprisonment at hard  labor for a period of fifteen (15) years. Time served in 
confinement by Shinohara since the thirteenth day of October 1945,  shall be 
regarded as time served with re spect to the sentence commuted.”138 Shortly 
thereafter, the navy transported Shinohara to the Sugamo prison in Japan, 
where he completed his sentence,  after which time he returned to Guam 
to live with his  family.139 But  because the navy upheld additional charge I, 
specifications 1 and 2, Shinohara, as homo sacer, remained a traitor to the 
United States, guilty of high treason, and symbolically expunged from the 
nation. The navy likewise sustained the lesser and original charge IV, pros-
titution, with specifications 1 and 2, demonstrating its commitment to 
protect its “properties” in Guam.
Reforming the Japa nese American in the Military Colony
As this treason case and pre ce dent reveal, the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tri-
bunals Program incarcerated Samuel Takekuna Shinohara to demonstrate 
the reach and vio lence of its rule of law. The navy’s racialization of him as 
a Japa nese  enemy and foreigner signaled a militarized brand of the “yellow 
peril” that had to be expunged from the nation so as to frame the United 
States as a virtuous country.140 The Guamanian and Chamorro- Japanese 
testimonies about innocence, patriotism, and victimization consequently 
provided the foil from which  these  legal determinations of Japa nese war 
criminality drew their moral and po liti cal legitimacy. Once again, we wit-
ness  here the po liti cal life of indigenous knowledge and retribution— the 
proverbial ko’ko of Guam—in codetermining the direction and force of the 
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court and its proceedings. But  because the commission and se nior naval of-
ficials commuted Shinohara’s death sentence, he was remade into a model 
Japa nese American of Guam. By way of gossip, statecraft, and theater, his 
trial publicly informed the Issei and Nisei that they, too, could rid them-
selves of any criminal tendencies, absolve their imperial pasts with Japan, 
and become reformed residential aliens of the military colony. Although 
the shifts in national and geopo liti cal perceptions of Japa nese and Japa nese 
Americans would take fuller shape in the 1950s, Shinohara’s contentious 
war crimes case foreshadowed popu lar American convictions that Japan 
had transformed from an external  enemy and subversive threat to a demo-
cratic partner in the Cold War era of empire.141
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With Samuel T. Shinohara represented as a traitor to the United States, pun-
ished as a nonsacrifice to the nation, and reformed as an ethnic minority in 
Guam, the tribunal addressed the remaining seven  trials concerning allega-
tions of Japa nese atrocities in the islands of Guam and Rota. The cases 
involved only Japa nese defendants, as the court never jointly prosecuted 
Chamorros and Japa nese from the police and military units. Instead, the 
tribunal segregated them  because of their perceived national, po liti cal, and 
racial identifications. In this chapter, I examine seven  trials wherein the court 
understood the accused Japa nese as treacherous and violent, akin to its sys-
tematic portrayal of Rotanese and Saipanese as prac ti tion ers of modern slav-
ery and torture. This is especially notable in the first four cases on assault and 
battery, wherein the war time actions of Akiyoshi Hosokawa, Kanzo Kawachi, 
Kyomon Miwa, and Hirose Ogawa came  under the judgment of white Ameri-
can jurists and native Guamanian witnesses alike. In the next two  trials, the 
court accused Tadao Igawa and Matsukichi Kobayashi of murdering Cham-
orros in Guam. At stake for  these Japa nese nationals was  whether or not 
they assaulted or murdered Guamanians believed to have known or assisted 
George Tweed, the last surviving American sailor on the island. The Japa nese 
military and police viewed Tweed, a radioman, as a threat to their daily opera-
tions.  Matters of espionage and the possession of weapons— allegations said 
to have challenged the authority of the Japa nese empire— also came  under 
consideration. In  these re spects,  these six cases on assault, battery, and mur-
der demonstrate how white supremacist punishment and statecraft colluded 
with native retribution in the shaping of the military colony in Guam.1
In the seventh and final murder case, the tribunal addressed the ques-
tion of Japa nese military vio lence in Rota, an island  under the sovereignty 
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of Japan. Despite the fact that American laws did not apply  there, the tribu-
nal prosecuted three Japa nese men accused of murder. Faced with potential 
death sentences, Shigeo Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira Tokunaga 
confronted the commission’s allegation that they or ga nized the executions 
of five men in Rota, an island located north of Guam and another home 
to Chamorro clans. But unlike the previous rulings that focused solely on 
Guam, the court defined  these men’s war criminality as a militarized brand 
of the “yellow peril” that had to be eliminated from the territory of Rota.
Japa nese Militarism in Guam
With the exception of Samuel T. Shinohara, the tribunal uniformly treated 
the Japa nese nationals as “prisoners of war,” a classification that accorded 
them the agency of male combatants. At the same time,  every Japa nese na-
tional was made into “an inhabitant of Guam,” as if to demonstrate their 
familiarity with The Guam Penal Code and other U.S. laws. In this sense, the 
court employed the princi ple of discrimination between combatants and 
noncombatants in seemingly paradoxical terms. By codifying and making 
punishable native and Japa nese war criminality, the tribunal thus upheld 
the po liti cal order of the military colony.2
In the four assault and battery cases that follow, Kyomon Miwa was a 
teacher and the only man to plead guilty. On the other hand, Akiyoshi Ho-
sokawa, Kanzo Kawachi, and Hirose Ogawa  were officers and enlisted men 
in the Japa nese Imperial Army or Japa nese Imperial Navy who asserted their 
innocence. They likewise refuted the jurisdiction of the United States in 
Guam. What ever their rank, the military personnel also saw their authority 
as superseding decisions made by civilian officials during the U.S. invasion 
of Guam in the summer of 1944.3 How the tribunal perceived this chain of 
responsibility amid a collective and among individuals likewise mattered in 
 these  trials.
In the first case on assault and battery, for example, the tribunal revoked 
Sergeant Major Akiyoshi Hosokawa’s claim that his superior officer Tosin 
Koda was responsible for torturing the Guamanians Manuel Q. Lizama and 
Joaquin Santos Salas in early June 1944. Opined Hosokawa, “The  orders that 
I received from the lieutenant in charge of the military police [Tosin Koda] 
 were that to question  these fellows, and also to stress punishment if neces-
sary if I find them telling a false statement.”4 Despite his efforts, the pros-
ecution maintained that Hosokawa, a member of the Military Police and 
the Twenty- Ninth Infantry Division, had unjustly punished  these two men. 
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When he was called to the stand, Manuel Q. Lizama, a gardener, argued 
that Sergeant Major Hosokawa arrested him on June 7, 1944, for possessing 
a  rifle and knowing the whereabouts of George Tweed, the last American 
sailor in hiding. Lizama denied both accusations. Not believing him, the 
military police officer beat Lizama on two separate occasions at the Kem-
peitai headquarters in Tutuhan, a small mountain located directly above the 
capital of Hagåtña. On the day of his arrest and first interrogation session, 
Lizama recalled, “the accused started whipping me with an automobile fan 
 belt and then started hitting my head with a book and also he hit me with 
his closed fists.”5 Two days  later, Sergeant Major Hosokawa jumped on the 
thighs of Lizama while he was in a kneeling position; the military officer 
also threatened to take his life with a sword. Afterward, Hosokawa detained 
Lizama in the Hagåtña jail. On June 13, 1944, the American military then 
bombed and destroyed parts of the police fa cil i ty, thereby allowing Lizama 
to escape the prison. Ultimately holding Akiyoshi Hosokawa responsible 
for said assault, the tribunal eventually found him guilty on September 13, 
1945, and sentenced him to one year in prison.
The second trial began shortly thereafter, on September 17, 1945. Charged 
with fourteen specifications of assault and battery, the forty- year- old naval 
police officer Kanzo Kawachi reconnected with his alleged victims in the 
space of the courtroom. They included the Guamanians Baltazar J. Bordallo, 
Pedro Dueñas Camacho, Isabel Taitano Cruz, and Joaquin Limtiaco. Of  these 
witnesses, only Joaquin Limtiaco appeared in the  earlier cases concerning 
the Rotanese and Saipanese police officers and interpreters.6 In the trial, 
he accused Kanzo Kawachi of arresting him on the suspicion of assisting 
Americans during Japan’s occupation of Guam. Recalling his beating at 
the Hagåtña jail in April 1944, Limtiaco said, “The accused questioned me 
about Americans. I told him I did not know anything about the Americans 
so he told me to open my mouth and he took his revolver and pointed it to 
my mouth and then he started pulling the trigger.  After that he commenced 
kicking me, then he took his revolver again and placed it to my ear.”7
Another witness for the prosecution, Pedro Dueñas Camacho, con-
firmed Kawachi’s history of torturing individuals associated with the miss-
ing American sailor.  After being summoned, Camacho and his wife, Mabel, 
arrived at the Hagåtña jail, where they  were instructed to sit and wait for 
Kawachi. It was a Sunday in April 1944. Two hours  later, they met Kawachi 
and the Saipanese interpreter Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero. Aware of the 
new allegations against him, Camacho immediately confessed to having as-
sisted other Americans in September 1942, a crime for which he had already 
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been punished. Camacho also insisted on having no relationship whatso-
ever with George Tweed. Along  these lines, he recalled, perhaps with some 
irony, how the naval police officer used an “American made” gun as a way 
to extract information about the American.8 As Camacho observed, “I told 
him I did not know anything about Tweed; then . . .  he kicked me, hit me 
with his pistol and fi nally he  stopped and told me that he would take me 
to the Army Military Police to be killed  because I was telling a lie.”9 Given 
that military executions emerged  after the American bombing of Guam in 
February  1944, Kawachi’s threat was legitimate. But before the naval po-
lice officer could continue, Mabel Camacho intervened. “I got up,” she re-
marked, “and told the accused that my husband  didn’t know anything about 
Tweed and that if he kept on [beating my husband with the pistol] that I  will 
report him over to the military police. Then the accused told me that my 
husband was telling a lie and that he knew about the Americans but would 
not say it.”10 Now standing, she continued with her account: “Then I said 
to him that he did not know anything about it and made him understand 
that I knew some of the officers in  those days and that if he kept on with the 
punishment, I  will report him.”11 In response to this counterthreat, Kanzo 
Kawachi “quit” the interrogation.12
Whereas Mabel Camacho protected her husband, Pedro, from further 
punishment, other Chamorro  women lacked the po liti cal capital to chal-
lenge the authority of the naval police officer. Isabel Taitano Cruz was one 
such person. On June 3, 1944, Kanzo Kawachi arrested her for wearing a hat 
that supposedly belonged to George Tweed. Initially, Cruz asserted that she 
never knew anything about Tweed, at which time Kawachi tortured her with a 
bullwhip and a ruler over a three- day period, causing bruises to Cruz’s back, 
legs, and shoulders. Kawachi also sexually assaulted Cruz in the presence of 
other police officers. As she noted at the trial, “He asked me if I was pregnant 
and I said, ‘No,’ then he said, ‘Come over  here’ and so I went over to him and 
he was feeling me over my breast, pressed my stomach and feeling my— I 
 can’t say that— and so he was laughing with the  others.  There was Pedro Leon 
Guerrero and a  couple more Japs. All acted as if they  were having lots of fun.”13
Perhaps fearing rape or death, Cruz relented to Kawachi’s interrogation. 
Admitting her knowledge of Tweed’s hat, she confessed, “A lady friend of 
mine gave me a hat. The sun was hot and she asked me if I would like to wear 
Tweed’s hat and I said, ‘I  don’t care if it’s anybody’s hat, it was so hot, and 
I  will wear it.’ So I took the hat home and threw it away. It was worn out.”14 
Afterward, Kawachi showed a picture of “Mr. and Mrs. Tweed and baby” to 
ascertain if Cruz truly knew the man. She did. As Cruz admitted, “He had 
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been around my place and . . .  I cannot help knowing him,  because I was 
around his  house,” indicating a potential relationship between the two.15 
What ever the case, she promised to help the Japa nese civilian and military 
police locate the missing American sailor. If she had succeeded, she would 
have received an award in the amount of two hundred yen and government 
support for her  family. She would have never had to work another day in 
her life.
It is doubtful, of course, if Kanzo Kawachi would have rewarded Isabel 
Taitano Cruz or  others for locating George Tweed. Instead, the converse 
proved true. That is to say, such interrogation tactics culled what the soci-
ologist Lisa Hajjar describes as “forward- looking information of security 
value” from vari ous individuals.16 In this way, the logics of security and inse-
curity orchestrated everyday life in the Japa nese colony. The last witness for 
the prosecution and a prominent Chamorro politician affirmed this truism. 
Baltazar Jerome Bordallo, also known as “B.J.” among Guamanians, testi-
fied that Kanzo Kawachi and two unidentified Saipanese men kidnapped 
him on August 17, 1943. Taken from his residence around one  o’clock in the 
morning, he was led to the Hagåtña jail, where Kawachi and other police 
officers tortured him for five days. As Bordallo recounted, “The routine was 
to ask me questions about the whereabouts of Tweed; and I would answer 
 every question that I did not know where Tweed was, and then the beat-
ings begins. Sometimes they beat me up standing, and sometimes the two 
Japa nese would tell me to get down on my fours and hit me on my back. I 
remember the last beating I received and that was to tie both my limbs and 
hang me to a beam, and I received . . .  at least 40 lashes on my back.”17
When he could no longer bear the pain, he thought about the safety of 
his wife and their thirteen  children, at which point he made an agreement 
with Kawachi.18 “The essence of the contract,” said Bordallo, “was that if I 
 don’t find Tweed within 20 days I was to turn myself over to the Japa nese 
authorities and forfeit my life. The contract was written in Japa nese.”19 Yet 
neither Kawachi nor other Japa nese officials executed Baltazar Jerome 
Bordallo  after he failed to locate the American sailor nearly three weeks 
 later.  Because Bordallo did “not break  under torture,” Kawachi believed he 
was innocent.20 The defense attorney Lieutenant Henry P. Bakewell hoped 
that the tribunal would feel the same way about his client.
In his case, the naval police officer blamed “Kimura,” the chief of the 
Naval Police, for ordering Kawachi to abuse the Chamorro men and  women 
suspected of knowing George Tweed. Further, Kawachi knew nothing 
about two of his purported victims, Pedro Dueñas Camacho and Joaquin 
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Limtiaco, let alone Mabel Camacho’s story of war time re sis tance. As his 
defense counsel asserted, the “accused maintains unshakenly that he has 
never seen them before.”21 Nor did the naval police officer strike Isabel 
Taitano Cruz, the Chamorro  woman accused of wearing a hat owned by an 
American. As Kawachi put it, “I did not have anything to do with the pun-
ishment of Isabel Taitano Cruz.”22 He also assured the court that no sexual 
molestation took place. “Since I noticed that lots of  these  women in Guam 
have big stomach, I think I asked her  whether she was conceived or not.”23 
Kawachi merely followed  orders.
As evidenced in other  trials, the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Pro-
gram rejected efforts on the part of the defense to levy responsibility on 
higher- ranking Japa nese officials. By denying Lieutenant Bakewell the op-
portunity to question Kanzo Kawachi’s chain of command, the tribunal 
found Kawachi guilty of assault and battery, except for one specification 
concerning Baltazar Jerome Bordallo. The court then sentenced Kawachi to 
a prison term of six years and six months at the Island Command Stockade 
in Guam.  These carceral logics also applied to Japa nese nationals who ex-
pressed remorse (figure 6.1). As the only person to plead guilty, for example, 
Kyomon Miwa accepted the consequences for hitting Maria C. Siguenza in 
November 1942.
As the defendant in the third trial on assault and battery, Miwa explained 
how he deeply regretted punishing Siguenza for failing to follow his instruc-
tions as a teacher. The incident took place outside the classroom, in the vil-
lage of Asan. As he stated at the trial, “We  were out in the rice paddies clean-
ing up the parasites. So during working hours, I told half of the  children 
to go on the right and the other half to the left side. Work had started al-
ready, and I happened to notice that they  were not  doing their work. Some 
of them  were giggling, some  were talking and  doing some eating.”24  After 
repeating his  orders four times, he turned to Maria  C. Siguenza, a child 
who happened to be near his side. As Miwa remarked, “I told her twice to 
stop eating. I think she was eating a mangoe [sic], but she did not take my 
word. So I hit her on the head lightly, then I asked her  whether that would 
make her listen to my  orders. Much to my surprise I saw that her head was 
bleeding.”25 He then brought Siguenza to the hospital, where she received 
medical treatment; afterward, he returned her home. Miwa also reported 
his actions immediately to the education superintendent at the Menseibu. 
Seven days  later, the Army Medical Department reprimanded him for beat-
ing a child, an act that  violated the rules and regulations of teachers.26 As 
such, an unidentified soldier then struck the back of Miwa’s head, causing 
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it to bleed. Now  under trial with the military tribunal, he continued to share 
his guilt and accept what ever consequences may come his way.  Because 
of his frank confessions  under both regimes of rule, the court sentenced 
Kyomon Miwa to six months imprisonment at the Island Command Stock-
ade in Guam. His trial began and ended on September 20, 1945.
The fourth and last case on assault and battery was just as brief. At the 
end of a trial held on October 12 and 13, 1942, the tribunal found  another 
Japa nese national guilty of torturing seven Guamanians: Joaquin A. Char-
fauros, Manuel  B. Cruz, Joaquin Limtiaco, Pedro  Q. Sanchez, Vicente  S. 
Sanchez, Jose  F. Topasna, and Jose  Q. Topasna. As witnesses for the 
prosecution, the men variously claimed that Hirose Ogawa, a naval po-
lice officer, clubbed, kicked, punched, or whipped them at the Hagåtña 
or Humåtac jail in September 1942, October 1942, or September 1943. In 
each allegation, very  little context was provided with regard to how the 
naval police officer investigated  these cases. The court represented him as 
a Japa nese militarist, a racialized caricature that complemented its native 
Rotanese and Saipanese counter parts. Now subjected to the American em-
pire, Japa nese nationals like Hirose Ogawa became “American” by federal, 
6.1.  Japan’s surrender to the United States. The original caption reads, “Japa nese pow 
at Guam, with bowed heads  after hearing Emperor Hirohito make announcement of 
Japan’s unconditional surrender” (photo number 490313, Rec. August 15, 1945). U.S. 
National Archives, College Park, Mary land.
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international, and military laws that recognized them as threats to society, 
on the one hand, and by court rulings that banned them from po liti cal life 
in the colony, on the other.
Executing the Ko’ko of Guam
The last three murder  trials focused on the Japa nese military executions of 
Chamorros in Guam and Rota. In this section, I examine the military com-
mission’s separate treatments of Tadao Igawa and Matsukichi Kobayashi, 
two Japa nese nationals charged with murdering, respectively, the Guama-
nians Vicente Lizama and Vicente Sablan Baza in June 1944. Although the 
court addressed related atrocities in subsequent years, its rulings on Igawa 
and Kobayashi concluded its assessment of Japa nese militarism in Guam. 
That the court ended with the spectacle of execution demonstrated its ef-
forts to pre sent a range of Japa nese war criminalities across the tribunal’s 
threshold of zoē and bios. In the construction of  these deviant types, Japa-
nese war criminality meant alien, traitor, and minority, as with Samuel T. 
Shinohara; it also signified a militarized brand of the “yellow peril” that was 
to be expunged from the nation.27
On April  10, 1945, the tribunal began its proceedings with Matsukichi 
Kobayashi, a cook and mechanic for the Kempeitai. 28 The court accused 
him of executing the Guamanian farmer Vicente Sablan Baza in June 1944. 
Along  these lines, the prosecution called on Baza’s  daughter, Beatrice, to ex-
plain how Matsukichi Kobayashi came to murder him. She said, “My  father 
was taken by the Japa nese twice. The first time he was taken, I went to find 
out  because I understood he was  going to be locked up.”29  After receiving 
information from the Saipanese Nicolas T. Sablan, Beatrice Cepeda Baza 
found out that her  father was imprisoned at the Hagåtña jail on suspicion 
of possessing a gun. She then requested to bring food to her  father  every 
day, which she did at the discretion of the Japa nese police. But when the 
American bombings increased in June 1944, Baza noted that her “ father es-
caped from jail  because the jail had been bombed already.”30 “On that same 
day,” she continued, “the Japa nese came to get him.”31 Yet neither Beatrice 
Cepeda Baza nor her  mother, Teresa, knew what happened to Vicente 
 Sablan Baza.  Whether this was a genuine or staged observation, Teresa Baza 
could only say, “I do not know.”32
The testimony provided by the Saipanese Jose P. Villagomez may have 
been a surprise for the Baza  family. On behalf of the prosecution, he said 
that Matsukichi Kobayashi and other members of the Kempeitai arrested 
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Vicente Sablan Baza at his home in Yoña. They then returned to the Kem-
peitai headquarters at Tutuhan. Around six  o’clock in the eve ning, they de-
parted for Fonte, a nearby valley. The police officers and interpreters also 
dug two graves. One was for Baza, another was for Vicente Lizama, a fellow 
escapee. Initially, the Japa nese police officer Kamitani intended to execute 
Baza, but Kobayashi intervened. As the witness Nicolas T. Sablan observed, 
“Kamitani held his sword with his two hands and said to the accused, ‘Let 
me strike him  because my sword is new; it has not been used.’ Then the 
accused asked to do it himself and he used the sword of Kamitani. Vicente 
Baza was the man who was beheaded at this time.”33 Kobayashi said, “Let 
me kill him.”34 Remembering the execution, Jose P. Villagomez concurred, 
explaining, “The accused was facing north and raised up his hands like this. 
Baza was kneeling like this and sort of stooping forward facing the hole, 
when he was struck. The head was not entirely separated from the body. . . .  
[The sword] went through his throat completely except for the skin of 
the front part of the throat.”35 The execution party then covered the bodies 
with dirt.
When he had the opportunity to speak, Matsukichi Kobayashi admitted 
to murdering Baza but only  because he was ordered to do so. Rather than 
express a willingness to kill the fifty- nine- year- old farmer, he revealed his 
commitment to upholding “an order to decapitate” given by First Lieuten-
ant Koda of the Kempeitai.36 Kobayashi understood his interaction with 
Kamitani at the execution site as such: “On the way out, I said to Kamitani, 
‘Please, lend me your sword,’ Kamitani said, ‘My sword is new, I do not know 
 whether it  will cut or not,’ then Kamitani said, ‘This is my sword so I  will 
like to try it,’ then I said to Kamitani, ‘Since I have been ordered to do this 
execution, I  will do it.’ ”37 Now feeling remorse for his actions, Kobayashi 
stressed that he did not work for the Kempeitai at his “own request.”38
In his defense, Lieutenant Alexander Akerman did very  little to examine 
the chain of command responsibility in the murder of Vicente Sablan Baza. 
Simply urging the commission to “vote for acquittal,” the defense attorney 
claimed that Matsukichi Kobayashi showed “no malice aforethought.”39 He 
was not guilty for this reason, a position refuted by the prosecution. Even-
tually found guilty of murder, Kobayashi was sentenced to imprisonment 
for life.40 But whereas Kobayashi received a relatively quick trial, one that 
disclosed few details about the execution of Vicente Sablan Baza and 
Vicente Lizama at Fonte, the case regarding Tadao Igawa proved other wise. 
Unlike Baza, who had no ties to the American military, Lizama previously 
worked for the U.S. Navy, a fact not lost on the American members of the 
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tribunal, who saw him as “property” of the United States. Hence, more at-
tention was accorded to Lizama’s trial. On February 8, 1946, the military 
court consequently addressed Igawa’s violation of American sovereignty by 
charging him with the murder of Vicente Lizama sometime in June 1944. 
Originally employed as a police officer for Japan’s South Seas Government 
in Tinian, Igawa received  orders from the Japa nese navy to work in Guam. 
He arrived at the island on September 9, 1942, where he assumed the respon-
sibilities of an officer in the Kaigon Kebetai or the Naval Intelligence Po-
lice. With an impending American invasion in June 1944, police officers like 
Tadao Igawa then fell  under the jurisdiction of the Kempeitai headquarters 
in Tutuhan.
At the time, the Guamanian Vicente Lizama was imprisoned at the 
Hagåtña jail  because of his affiliation with the U.S. Navy. The Japa nese po-
lice believed that Lizama, a former enlisted man with twenty- five years of 
ser vice, posed a security threat to them. As his wife, Vicenta  Q. Lizama, 
explained, “He was suspected of being a spy for being a long time in the 
U.S. Naval ser vice and that  because he had a gun. The gun, however, was 
turned over to the Japa nese during the early occupation.”41 Testifying for 
the prosecution, she said that her husband had fled the jail when the Amer-
ican military bombed and destroyed parts of the building. When Vicente 
Lizama returned to his  family in the village of Yoña, he did not fear the Japa-
nese police. As his wife disclosed, “He told me this: ‘I do not have to hide 
 because I have done nothing wrong.’ ”42 This reassuring remark provided 
only temporary comfort for Lizama’s  family, as the Kempeitai search party, 
led by inspector Tadao Igawa, found him in June 1944. The Saipanese inter-
preter Jose P. Villagomez made the arrest.43
The search party then met another group of civilian and military police 
officers, who had recently captured Vicente Sablan Baza. The two cases 
merged  here. The group then delivered the Chamorro prisoners to Sergeant 
Major Akiyoshi Hosokawa at the Kempeitai headquarters in Tutuhan. Ac-
cording to Villagomez, he left the police station to have lunch around eleven 
 o’clock in the morning. When he returned at around five  o’clock, he found 
Vicente Lizama and Vicente Sablan Baza tied to a camachile tree. The Kem-
peitai then released them, at which point the execution party was formed. 
The thirteen- member squad consistent of Antonio Camacho, Antonio R. 
Camacho, Vicente Camacho, Pedro Sablan Leon Guerrero, Hirata, Akiyoshi 
Hosokawa, Tadao Igawa, Kamitani, Kato, Matsukichi Kobayashi, Kowachi, 
Nicolas T. Sablan, and Jose P. Villagomez, all of them personnel assigned to 
police units in the army and navy. A few  were instructed to carry picks and 
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shovels. All  were preparing to walk to Fonte, a valley located approximately 
five hundred meters from the Kempeitai headquarters.
As a member of the execution party and as a witness for the prosecu-
tion, Sergeant Major Akiyoshi Hosokawa argued that Lieutenant General 
Takeshi Takashina ordered Tadao Igawa to behead Vicente Lizama.44 With 
Igawa designated as the executioner for Lizama, the thirteen- man squad 
left for Fonte. Once  there, several of the Chamorro and Japa nese police 
officers dug two graves, one for Lizama and one for Vicente Sablan Baza. 
Two meters apart from each other, Lizama’s grave lay north- south, whereas 
Baza’s grave lay east- west. The men stood above their graves. A coconut tree 
separated them, with a mango tree nearby as another marker of the site. 
Igawa adorned a formal Japa nese naval uniform, with a sword dangling by 
his side, whereas Lizama wore the navy dungaree shirt and pants of an en-
listed man. The contrast between authority and subjugation could not have 
been more stark: while Vicente Lizama appeared haggard and rankless with 
his older American navy attire and slippers, Tadao Igawa dressed in a naval 
uniform with his rating of one star and one anchor attached to his collar.
At the trial, Sergeant Major Akiyoshi Hosokawa described the moments 
leading to the execution. As he recalled, “We just dug the grave and asked 
the deceased if he had anything to say. He said, ‘I would like to have a 
cigarette.’ That is all.”45 But Vicente Lizama, now blindfolded, did have 
something to say for the Saipanese. As the interpreter and witness Nicholas T. 
Sablan noted, “Before he was made to kneel, Lizama said  these words: 
‘Farewell, Saipanese . . .  we  will meet in front of God.’ ”46 By not faulting the 
American or the Japa nese colonial governments for his execution, Lizama 
implied that Chamorros from Rota and Saipan  were responsible for his 
death, an action that only Yu‘us, or God, could forgive or condemn. The naval 
police officer Tadao Igawa then swung his sword at the neck of Vicente 
Lizama, severing it in one stroke. Matsukichi Kobayashi also executed 
Vicente Sablan Baza, but  because this trial focused solely on the murder of 
Lizama, the court only confirmed the death of the two men. The Japa nese 
officers then ordered the Saipanese interpreters to straighten the bodies 
of Baza and Lizama. The men filled the graves with dirt and said a prayer. 
Afterward, the group returned to the Kempeitai headquarters, where Tadao 
Igawa reported to their supervisor, Lieutenant Koda, and informed him of 
the successful execution.47
More than a year  later, in October 1945, eight members of Vicente Liza-
ma’s  family, the Guamanian police officer Juan Fejeran, and the Saipanese 
interpreter Nicolas T. Sablan arrived at the grave site in Fonte.  After Lizama’s 
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body was exhumed, his wife, Vicenta, identified the false teeth and clothing 
as belonging to him. At the trial, their  daughter, Soledad Lizama Concep-
cion, also related, “We first found the skull, next the upper limbs, then the 
back bones and the lower limbs, and a pair of home made sandals.”48 “I rec-
ognized,” she said, “the false tooth, the gold tooth and the initials [V.L.] on 
the sandals which the deceased was wearing.”49 With the death of Vicente 
Lizama established and with the four men claiming to have witnessed his 
execution, the military tribunal then called Tadao Igawa to the stand. When 
asked if he knew the name of Vicente Lizama, he replied, “I have forgotten 
the name of the person but I think that was the man I killed.”50 Expressing 
amnesia about his vio lence, Igawa simply sketched a scene of military order 
and obedience in the colony. Stressing that the execution was “ legal,” he 
said, “The reason why I believed it was a  legal execution was  because it was 
a general’s order, and I was told also by our com pany commander [Lieu-
tenant Koda].”51 Igawa commented, “In my mind this is not murder.”52 
Further, Igawa observed that Lizama had to be killed  because he posed a 
security threat to the Japa nese military. For this reason, Lieutenant Koda 
was “rather happy” with Igawa’s arrest and execution of Lizama.53 But a few 
minutes into his cross- examination by the prosecution, Igawa expressed 
remorse: “Since this was the first execution I had known I never heard of 
any objection or anything said of not  doing the  thing as told. . . .  Not that 
I wanted to decapitate the native but the  orders came from the higher au-
thorities and I had to do it.”54
Tadao Igawa’s defense counsel, consisting of Second Lieutenant 
 Edmund S. Carpenter and Sergeant Calvin W. Dunbar, similarly asserted that 
Igawa received  orders to kill Vicente Lizama. As homo sacer, Igawa ulti-
mately represented the bios of Japa nese militarism and war criminality, 
acts that existed outside the “civilized” laws of war. As the defense counsel 
stated, “It is difficult for the western mind to understand the exact position 
of the Kempetai [sic]  because we have never had a similar unit in our armed 
forces.”55 They concluded that “although the method of execution may first 
appear both frightful and unpleasant to the En glish mind, yet that is not 
true of the Oriental who sees in it a religious and cultural significance.”56 
Comparable to the tribunal’s portrayal of the Rotanese and Saipanese as 
masters of slavery,  water torture, and other atrocities, the court similarly 
recognized nationals like Tadao Igawa as “Orientals” whose capacities for 
vio lence exceeded anything familiar to the United States.57
Tadao Igawa’s criminality only mattered to the court insofar as his execu-
tion of Vicente Lizama constituted what the judge advocate called a “cruel 
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and dastardly act” to be punished and expunged from the nation.58 As Judge 
Advocate and Lieutenant William A. Buckles queried, “Could any civilized 
man, as we know a civilized man, draw back a large sword with both hands 
and then viciously, brutally, cruelly, with one power ful and crashing blow 
slash down on the helpless and defenseless figure before him with such 
force and vio lence as to completely sever the head from the body, without 
having enmity of heart?”59 On Igawa’s premeditation, the judge advocate 
asserted that Igawa apprehended Lizama, submitted the prisoner to his su-
periors, wore a formal naval uniform, traveled with the execution party, and 
used a sword to kill Lizama. With his superiors Lieutenant General Takeshi 
Takashina and Lieutenant Koda believed to have passed away, on February 18, 
1946, the tribunal sentenced the sixty- year- old naval officer Tadao Igawa to 
hanging by the neck “ until dead.”
Imprisoned at the War Criminals Stockade, Igawa was allowed to smoke 
cigarettes, write letters, and meet a Buddhist priest. The prison guards also 
inspected his cell in case he possessed an instrument with which he could 
“take his life.”60 On July 23, 1947, the acting secretary of the navy approved 
his death sentence. The tribunal then prepared his execution at the Joint 
Communications Activity Area in the village of Finegayan. On Septem-
ber 23, 1947, Marine Corps and U.S. Navy security officers informed Igawa 
that he was to be hanged the following day. When asked if he had any final 
words to share, Igawa replied, “I  will speak  here. I know no En glish, and 
during my trial I did not know what was said. My  lawyer hardly talked to 
me. I have not so far received a copy of my trial. Due to  these facts I can-
not reconcile my self with the sentence of the court.”61 The Marine Corps 
officer in charge of the execution, Lieutenant Col o nel George R. Newton, 
described Igawa’s face as having a “worried, puzzled look” upon receiving 
notice of his execution. “ After returning to his cell,” wrote the lieutenant 
col o nel, “igawa chewed his fingernails, picked at his arms and rubbed his 
legs. He conversed with the Priest fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes, show-
ing excitement at this time. At 1600 he began to write, tore up his letter sev-
eral times before finishing. From 2000  until 2230, when he retired, he read 
his prayer book and paced in his cell. He slept well, occasionally talking in 
his sleep, and was awaken at 0500.”62 In the after noon and eve ning, Tadao 
Igawa wrote a few letters to his  family and friends. To his  father and  mother, 
he said, “I would like to thank you for what you did for me while I was living 
and ask for your care for the  others.”63
To his wife, Yukiko, he remarked, “Since our marriage I have troubled 
you all the time without a moment of happiness and now with the ending 
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of this day I am to climb the steps to be hanged. I greatly appreciate your 
ser vice to me. Please take good care of our parents and  children. This is all 
I ask of you.” Regretful, he apologized to his partner, “I am very sorry to 
make you bear this  great responsibility, but please think this is our fate and 
take care of yourself. Please give my best regards to our relatives and to the 
 mother of Miyamoto. The weather is very good this morning. The leaves 
of the palm trees are shaken by the cool breeze that is blowing.” To his 
 children, Hiromi, Kohiko, and Ryuhide, Igawa stated, “Your  father  will be 
back home before you get this letter. But the life at home is very hard; so the 
3 of you please help your  mother and take good care of your grand mother 
and grand father.”64 Refusing to submit to the tyranny of the tribunal, Igawa 
concluded with a poem:
Being a person to be sacrificed
I have nothing to say,
I  will  ride the wind of the God
And be purified  today
 Here, Igawa understood himself as a sacrifice for Japan, a telling contrast 
in terms of how the American military commission judged him as a war 
criminal and nonsacrifice.
In an act that resembled the execution of the U.S. Navy sailor Vicente 
Lizama, the tribunal then stripped Tadao Igawa of his military uniform, 
dressed him in a plain shirt and trousers, and handcuffed him at six  o’clock 
on the eve ning of September 24, 1947. The Officer in Charge of Executions, 
Lieutenant Col o nel George  R. Newton, summarized Igawa’s last steps 
as follows: “Accompanied by the Buddhist Priest igawa was led past the 
witnesses to the foot of the gallows. Immediately thereafter he mounted 
the scaffold; leg shackles, hood, and noose  were placed, and igawa was 
dropped through the trap at 1951. Prayers  were said by the Buddhist Priest. 
He was declared dead by the two (2) official Medical Observers at 2002, 24 
September, 1947.”65 The official hangman was First Lieutenant Charles C. 
Rexroad of the U.S. Army.66 But, according to the son of the Guamanian 
police officer Adolfo Sgambelluri, three police officers pulled the lever for 
the trapdoor (figure 6.2). Whereas one hangman was usually an American 
official like First Lieutenant Rexroad, the two other hangmen  were often 
Guamanians like Adolfo Sgambelluri and Joe Gutierrez.67 As the younger 
Sgambelluri explained, “All three would pull si mul ta neously the trap [to 
hang the accused], but nobody knew who  really pulled to release the trap 
door.”68 Thus,  these Guamanians may have executed Tadao Igawa. Whoever 
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committed the act is irrelevant. Their participation in the gallows merely 
illustrated the nexus of law, torture, and retribution.
The American Military Colony in Rota
In the final trial, on January 26, 1949, the tribunal accused three Japa nese 
military personnel of murdering four Chamorros and one Spanish national 
in Rota, an island located immediately north of Guam. The Japa nese nation-
als  were Shigeo Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira Tokunaga, former 
soldiers of the Imperial Japa nese Army. Originally demobilized in October 
1946,  these men returned to their homes in Japan and found employment 
 there. Whereas Tokunaga worked at a construction com pany in Kumamoto 
prefecture, Koyama and Takahashi labored, respectively, at a  family farm 
and a public health center in Tokyo. Without the issuing of warrants and the 
6.2.  Diagram of equipment 
for execution by hanging. 
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disclosing of charges, the Japa nese police then separately arrested the men 
in 1948: Takashi on May 2, Koyama on July 31, and Tokunaga on Septem-
ber 25.  After pro cessing the men at local jails, the American military police 
turned them over to the Sugamo prison. On November 17, 1948, they arrived 
at the War Criminals Stockade, Guam, where they resided in solitary cells. 
Nearly a month  later on December 7, 1948, the navy’s intelligence personnel 
at the War Criminals Stockade coerced Koyama, Takahashi, and Tokunaga 
into providing “statements” without having access to  legal repre sen ta tion.
On December  10, 1948, the tribunal issued the four specifications of 
murder. The first specification alleged that Akira Tokunaga, then a captain 
and commanding officer of the First Battalion, shot “two unarmed native 
inhabitants of said Rota Island” on or about June 25, 1944.69 One native was 
presumed to be Bonifacio Estebes, whereas the identity of the other na-
tive was “unknown.” The second specification alleged that all three men— 
Koyama, Takahashi, and Tokunaga— bayoneted the Spanish national and 
Catholic  brother Miguel Timoner on or about July 5, 1944. The third specifi-
cation alleged that Takahashi and Tokunaga administered cyanide of potas-
sium to a native believed to be Ignacio de la Cruz, thereby causing his death 
on or about July 5, 1944. Fi nally, the fourth specification alleged that Akira 
Tokunaga shot “one unarmed native inhabitant of said Rota Island, names 
to the relator unknown,” on or about July 8, 1944.70 Having established  legal 
pre ce dents in the previous  trials on assault, battery, murder, and treason, 
the prosecution now turned to Japa nese military atrocities committed in 
Rota, an island once administered by the Japa nese colonial government.
As with the American occupation of Japan and its former colonies, the 
U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program addressed the Japa nese execu-
tion of five individuals in Rota not  because of its supposed altruism for 
the Chamorro victims. Rather, as the historian Yukiko Koshiro asserts, the 
United States utilized its postwar regimes of governmentality to “make the 
Japa nese comply with the American victors in the remaking of Japan and 
Asia.”71 At stake for the military tribunal was the sovereign  future of Rota, 
a geographic, moral, and po liti cal template from which the court sought 
to assert American laws in Asia and the Pacific. As with the neighboring 
islands of Guam and Tinian, the U.S. military had seized  these sites for the 
purpose of launching aerial assaults on Japan, with the atomic bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 being the most notable.72 With 
Rota, the Japa nese killing of one foreigner and four natives suggested that 
the Japa nese government failed in its “civilized” efforts to rule its subjects 
and lands. Hence, the trial aimed to eliminate Japa nese governance, on the 
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one hand, and to assert white American claims to property, on the other.73 
As the po liti cal theorist Carl Schmitt explained, “In  every case, land- 
appropriation, both internally and externally, is the primary  legal title that 
underlies all subsequent law.”74
In defending the Americans’ right to jurisdiction and land appropria-
tion in Rota, the prosecution cited a memo authored by Rear Admiral 
Charles A. Pownall on January 19, 1949. Reiterating the  legal reach of the 
tribunal originally outlined by Admiral C. W. Nimitz’s Proclamation No. 4 
on July 21, 1944, the prosecution argued that the commission “ shall have 
jurisdiction over all Japa nese nationals and  others who worked with,  were 
employed by or served in connection with the former Japa nese Imperial 
Government, in the custody of the convening authority at the time of trial, 
charged with offenses committed against United States nationals . . .  and 
white persons whose nationality has not prior to ordering of the trial been 
established.”75 In this manner, the tribunal appropriated international laws 
of conquest and possession. The establishment of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands (ttpi) in 1947, for example, demonstrated the “lawful” ways 
by which American sovereignty extended into former Japa nese colonies like 
Rota. As a charter of the United Nations, the ttpi terminated Japan’s sover-
eign rule over its colonies in  favor of the American construction of military 
bases and the American development of wage economies in  these sites.76 
As the historian David Hanlon argues, “The veil of legitimization provided 
by internationally sanctioned treaties or arrangements often can be used to 
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ship Agreement between the United States and the United Nations over the 
postwar status of the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall Islands served just 
this purpose.”77 In short, the United States utilized the ttpi to replace Japa-
nese militarization in  these islands with its own brand of empire.
Moreover, by 1949 the tribunal had already sentenced Japa nese nationals 
for murdering Americans and Pacific Islanders in the Chuuk and Marshall 
Islands, areas once administered by the Japa nese South Seas Government.78 
By asserting that vari ous Japa nese nationals murdered individuals sus-
pected of “espionage” or spying, the court relied on the laws and customs 
of war as per the Hague Convention of 1907.  Under  these circumstances, 
the Japa nese execution of suspected spies in Rota constituted violations of 
war between combatants, with  little  legal and po liti cal emphasis on and 
protection for civilians.79 Knowing that the U.S. Constitution, the Naval 
Courts and Boards, and The Penal Code of Guam lacked judicial force in Rota, 
the prosecution therefore selectively applied Proclamation No. 4, the ttpi, 
and the Hague Convention to justify its jurisdiction over the accused Shigeo 
Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira Tokunaga.
But the defense counsel differed on  these  matters of personhood and 
property. Consisting of Commander Martin E. Carlson, Junjiro Takano, and 
Sadamu Sanagi, the defense argued that the United States held no jurisdic-
tion over the foreign, national, and native inhabitants of Rota. Citing the 
League of Nations’ mandate that granted Japan’s establishment of laws over 
the island, the defense counsel reasoned that Rota was an “integral part of 
the Japa nese Empire.”80 As such,  every person was subjected to the laws of 
Japan from 1914 to 1944, with the laws of the Japa nese Imperial Army tak-
ing effect in the summer of 1944.  These laws included the Criminal Code, 
an Ordinance for the Treatment of Judicial Affairs, Japa nese Army Regula-
tions, Law for Criminal Procedure, Law Relating to the Application of the 
Criminal Code, and Regulations Governing the Security of Military Secrets 
in the South Sea Islands, among  others.81
In response, Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Commander Joseph  A. 
Regan objected to the introduction of  these “foreign laws”  because they 
lacked relevance.82 The military commission concurred. The defense coun-
sel then urged the tribunal on January 20, 1949, to consider separate  trials for 
Shigeo Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira Tokunaga. They realized that 
 because the defendants had provided statements to American intelligence 
personnel on December 7, 1948,  these materials would have incriminated 
one or all of them. Take, for instance, the petition by Yoshio Takahashi, a 
surgeon in the army and a gradu ate of the Medical Department at the Kyoto 
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 Imperial University. As he expressed, “ These affidavits made at the request 
of American Naval Officers while I was being held in confinement without 
charge being preferred against me and without benefit of Counsel, if 
offered into evidence and proved,  will if accepted, tend to implicate my co- 
defendants, one of whom was my superior and the other a subordinate.”83 
Shigeo Koyama and Akira Tokunaga provided similar remarks to the court.
Further, the defense counsel motioned for a change of venue  because 
“the action is brought in the wrong place or district, and  because a military 
court  here on Guam cannot legally try them for the offenses charged and 
alleged to have been committed on Rota Island.”84 On January 20, 1949, six 
days before the onset of the trial, Commander Martin E. Carlson asserted, 
“We are of the opinion that Rota Island is not a part of the military com-
mand of Commander Naval Forces Marianas.  There is no inherent authority 
in the convening authority, a commander of naval forces only, to appoint 
this military commission to try three Japa nese civilians for alleged offenses 
said to have been committed on Rota Island during the period from June 25, 
1944 to July 8, 1944.”85 In lieu of holding their trial in Guam, the defense 
counsel preferred “a change of venue to Tokyo, Japan, Rota Island, or Hono-
lulu, Territory of Hawaii.”86
While the defense counsel did not fully elaborate on why it chose Hono-
lulu, Rota, and Tokyo as potential venues for the cases, its rationale proved 
futile given that the military commission had conceded to the prosecution’s 
claims and counterclaims. Yet in each case, the defense counsel and prose-
cution erased Chamorro land stewardship and po liti cal power in Rota. This 
treatment became apparent in their disagreements over jurisdiction and in 
their avowal of the Rotanese as noncitizen subjects of Japan. For example, 
the prosecution understood them as a “tranquil, and presumably obedient” 
population.87 On the other hand, the defense utilized euphemisms to con-
ceal the exclusion of Chamorros from the national polity. As the defense 
stated, the “Native inhabitants of Rota Island  were not foreigners according 
to domestic laws of Japan. They  were generally treated in the same manner 
as Japa nese nationals.”88 Equally problematic, two of the accused Japa-
nese nationals— Akira Tokunaga and Yoshio Takahashi— remembered 
the Rotanese as if they  were mutual friends and partners in the Japa nese 
empire. As Tokunaga explained, “The native population of Rota Island was 
approximately 800. . . .  Their intelligence surpassed  those of the resident 
Koreans and Okinawans, and they willingly volunteered to cooperate with 
the Japa nese Forces.”89 Stressing that he had formed a “strong bond of 
friendship” with the Chamorros, he expressed, “I was overwhelmed with 
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gratitude whenever I observed  these  people in my tours of inspection work-
ing side by side with the soldiers with sweat streaming down their muddy 
 faces.”90 Yoshio Takahashi similarly observed, “As our relationship became 
closer, I came to know that they  were like the Japa nese who  were willing to 
do their best for their country without knowing the tragic destiny awaiting 
them.”91
As  these comments reveal, Takahashi and Tokunaga subscribed to what 
the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo calls “imperialist nostalgia,” or “a mood 
of nostalgia that makes racial domination appear innocent and pure.”92 By 
underscoring their supposed amicable relations with the Rotanese, they 
attempted to demonstrate their generosity and innocence to the military 
tribunal. As Rosaldo asserts, much of “imperialist nostalgia’s force resides 
in its association with (indeed, its disguise as) more genuinely innocent, 
tender recollections of what is at once an  earlier epoch and a previous phase 
of life.”93 Contrary to the romanticized memories of Rota, then, the 
 Rotanese recalled a diff er ent set of circumstances than  those described by 
the Japa nese. Manuel M. Ogo, for example, labored for the Japa nese mili-
tary at a time “when friendships between Japa nese soldiers and Chamorros 
 were illegal and severely punished, even by beheading.”94
With rumors circulating about their impending deaths at the hands of 
 either the Americans or the Japa nese, many Rotanese thus feared for their 
lives. With food shortages and the conscription of male laborers, they suf-
fered greatly. As Ogo put it, “We all lost weight . . .  even the Japa nese who, 
of course, had first claim to the food that was produced.”95 Albert Toves, 
another Rotanese, likewise experienced the hardships of war, but from the 
lens of a native intermediary. Identified by his Japa nese name of “Kondo 
Akira,” he worked as a supervisor for a com pany that cultivated castor 
beans from 1936 to 1944. He also advised Chamorro, Korean, and Taiwan-
ese harvesting crews in Rota and received a salary that “conformed to the 
standard salary for high- grade Japa nese supervisors.”96 That status then 
changed dramatically when the American military began bombing Rota on 
June 11, 1944.
With the imposition of military law, Toves lost his job as a supervisor 
and became a cook for the Japa nese Imperial Army. In the pro cess, he wit-
nessed the forced relocation of Chamorros from the village of Songsong to 
the village of Tatachuk. As a privileged person, however, Toves remained 
in Songsong with his  family  because of his culinary responsibilities for the 
army. But that was not the case for most Chamorros. As he stated, “Other 
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Chamorros had previously been evicted from Songsong and sent to live in 
[Tatachuk], a newly- created, apartheid- type village.”97 Toves then inter-
acted closely with nineteen field commanders on a daily basis as he was 
their primary cook. At one meeting, he overheard them talking about how 
the war “was failing on all sides of us.”98 As he revealed, “I  didn’t have to 
listen very closely to what they  were saying, for just looking at their  faces 
told me all I needed to know. . . .  It made me remember the signs that Japa-
nese war- protestors used to put up along the highways in Japan that showed 
a ferocious fighting cock (Amer i ca) shaking a baby chick (Japan) to death, 
and that had a sign printed  under it that said ‘a chick must not attack a 
rooster.’ ”99
As the remarks by Ogo and Toves demonstrate, Chamorros from Rota 
interpreted the war as disruptive and destructive. As a result, neither the 
defense counsel nor the prosecution took seriously the collective and con-
tradictory notions of “Amer i ca” held by the Rotanese. Unlike their portrayal 
of “loyal” Chamorros who often welcomed the return of the Americans to 
Guam, the court possessed no comparable caricature from which to pre-
sent Americans as “liberators” in Rota. The Rotanese notions of Americans 
 were too anticolonial, racially charged, or po liti cally subversive. As Ogo dis-
closed, he and many native men  were prepared to resist the American mili-
tary: “Each one was ordered to equip himself with a sharp bamboo spear 
which he must keep constantly by his side so that when invasion occurred 
he could join in a banzai charge that would repel the American invaders.”100
Casting the Americans as imperial aggressors, he added, “ Under the 
direction of our honchos, we practiced our attack on imaginary hordes of 
American barbarians coming through the surf, who, if we failed, would 
surely cut off our ears and tongues and who knows what  else, for that was 
their purpose in coming to Rota!”101 To entertain  these volatile memories of 
the war would have thus questioned what Aileen Moreton- Robinson theo-
rizes as the “moral high ground” of national and international laws on pos-
session.102 By not including  these Rota Chamorro narratives of place and 
by adhering to international laws on jurisdiction and land acquisition, the 
tribunal thereby presented itself as a virtuous and morally legitimate appa-
ratus of war time justice. How, then, did the final murder trial manifest the 
court’s application of domestic laws on jurisdiction and international laws 
on espionage and land possession? In the next section, I discuss how the 
commission imposed  these laws on three soldiers of the Imperial Japa nese 
Army in Rota without knowing who, exactly, they executed.
202 chapter 6
The Five Unknown Victims of the War
In his opening statement on January  26, 1949, Judge Advocate and Lieu-
tenant Commander Joseph  A. Regan summarized the four specifications 
of murder levied against Shigeo Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira 
Tokunaga. He explained that “while  there  were five individuals killed,  there 
 were three diff er ent incidents.”103 Representing the prosecution, Lieuten-
ant Commander Regan said, “The killing of two natives on the 25th  of 
June 1944 for which in this trial Tokunaga, alone, is being held responsible. 
On the 5th of July the Spanish  brother Miguel Timoner was killed as a result 
of the activity of all three of the accused. On the same date, Ignacio de la 
Cruz was executed and for this Tokunaga and Takahashi, but not Koyama 
are accused. A few days  later, namely on the 8th  of July the fifth person 
was executed and for this Tokunaga alone is accused.”104 Yet the prosecu-
tion did not discern the identities of the men who died, that is, the four 
Chamorros and the one Spanish national. With the exception of the priest 
Miguel Timoner, the tribunal’s charges did not divulge the names and oc-
cupations of the victims. At best, the Chamorros  were “believed to be” 
Bonifacio  Estabes and Ignacio de la Cruz; the “exact names” of the other 
two men  were “unknown.” Unofficially, however, American investigators 
contemplated  whether anybody actually murdered Miguel Timoner. As one 
intelligence report revealed, American military personnel “have been un-
able to get a single Japa nese to admit that he knows about the execution 
of the priest on Rota. . . .  The Japa nese insist all the  people executed  were 
natives.”105
For  these reasons, none of the accused Japa nese soldiers ever claimed to 
have murdered Miguel Timoner, let alone a Spanish national. Nor did any 
of the Japa nese witnesses recall or document the names of the Chamorro 
men. Without disclosing the names of the five victims, the tribunal then 
premised its proceedings on the dubious nature of their identities. This 
questionable position was likewise compounded by the court’s failure to at-
tract a large pool of Chamorro witnesses from Rota. Lacking the conflicts of 
the birds and lizards in Guam, the commission found no “loyal” Chamorros 
from which to merge their white racisms with native vengeance and retri-
bution. And  because the Rotanese could have levied criticisms against the 
Americans and Japa nese, therefore jeopardizing the court’s legitimacy, the 
tribunal remained relatively  silent on the  matter of native testimonies from 
Rota. With a few exceptions, the trial mainly focused on the knowledge and 
experiences of Japa nese soldiers in the Imperial Army.
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For the prosecution, establishing the role of espionage proved vital given 
the court’s reliance on international laws of war and land possession. One of 
its key witnesses, Major Shigeo Imagawa, emphasized how the militarized 
environment of Rota created the conditions for spying. As he expressed, 
“ After the U.S. forces landed on Saipan on June 15th [1944], what affected 
the Japa nese Army and residents on Rota was the approaching of U.S. ships 
and  there  were frequent false reports which  were spread around the island 
saying that the United States forces had landed on Rota and this resulted 
in confusion.”106 Anybody accused of spying was thus arrested by the mili-
tary police. In Imagawa’s estimation, espionage meant “a person detect-
ing military secrets and disclosing them to the  enemy, and who commits 
subversive activities.”107 Although he did not know the number of  people 
detained and executed by the military police, he did indicate how Cham-
orro gossip informed the Kempeitai in its apprehension of spies among the 
native population.
What especially troubled the Japa nese military was the Chamorro rumor 
that “in the event of a landing by the United States forces, they would at once 
run over to them and ask for their protection, by disclosing information 
of the Japa nese units, and persuade and incite  others to follow them.”108 
With re spect to the five unknown men, Major Shigeo Imagawa believed 
they  were killed for possessing a notebook of army positions, “waving flags 
at planes or spreading cloths on the ground during daytime in an attempt 
to signal to the American planes.”109 As this soldier’s testimony revealed, 
the Japa nese military and police sought to suppress any form of native es-
pionage. The circulation of anti- Japanese rumors— that is, marginal and 
covert perspectives— likewise demonstrated the range by which Chamor-
ros variously understood the Japa nese military occupation. But  because the 
prosecution argued that the five men  were killed as spies without  trials, the 
prosecution determined that the court was obligated to evaluate the actions 
of Shigeo Koyama, Yoshio Takahashi, and Akira Tokunaga.
Regarding the first specification, the prosecution relied on its first 
witness, Yukio Yasui, to discuss the execution of two natives on or about 
June  25, 1944. As a former warrant officer and platoon commander sta-
tioned in Rota, he identified Captain Akira Tokunaga as the person respon-
sible for delivering the order to shoot  these men, one of whom was believed 
to be Bonifacio Estebes. As Yasui stated, Captain Tokunaga instructed him 
to “execute” two natives accused of espionage. In explaining how he at-
tempted to refuse the order, Yasui remarked, “As I had no experience in ex-
ecutions by firing squad, I requested the battalion commander on receipt of 
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this order, that he, the battalion commander take the natives elsewhere.”110 
But Tokunaga dismissed Yasui’s request on the grounds that the execu-
tion should occur immediately for he feared being bombarded by another 
American air raid. Eventually, Warrant Officer Yasui conceded to Captain 
Tokunaga’s wishes and or ga nized the execution in the village of Tatachuk. 
“I ordered six men,” he said, “to be members of the firing squad. . . .  After 
the preparations had been completed at the scene of the execution the bat-
talion commander brought two natives to the scene and read to them their 
sentences of execution.”111 As with  every Japa nese witness, Yasui did not 
know the names of the men; he only recalled that they  were handcuffed.112 
He continued, “I received the two prisoners and blindfolding them I stood 
them in front of the hole, ordering the three men on the firing squad on the 
right- hand side to aim at the victim on the right hand side and the three on 
the left to aim at the victim on the left side. I gave the order to fire.”113
Other soldiers offered more intimate accounts of their roles as executors. 
For example, army Superior Private Kenichi Hosoya remarked, “No  matter 
what kind of crimes  these two men had committed, in my heart I thought 
it very sad to imagine the surprise and sorrow of the wife [sic],  children, 
and aged parents who would be left  behind when the families heard that 
 these two men had been shot and had died.” As a soldier lacking “the power 
to control  these  things,” Kenichi Hosoya then said, “Up to that time  there 
 hadn’t been a moment during which the gun I held felt heavy. I closed my 
eyes, and from the bottom of my heart I fervently prayed for the repose of 
their souls. . . .  I vaguely remember the voice of Platoon Leader yasui giv-
ing the order to shoot and the fact that my arms, hands, and fin gers  were 
all trembling.”114 Corporal Yoshimaro Sato, another member of the firing 
squad, observed, “We could not bear to execute  those holding the same citi-
zenship as ourselves and carried it out in a very solemn manner.”115 Taken 
from investigative rec ords,  these statements did not enter the court rec ords 
as evidence. Yet the American intelligence officials presumed that Hosoya 
and Sato participated in the murder of two Chamorros, a point verified by 
their affidavits. But  because the court had apprehended their commanding 
officers, Hosoya and Sato did not incur any charges.
With regard to the second and third specifications of murder, the pros-
ecution enlisted the support of the only two Rotanese witnesses available 
to the tribunal. They included the former field laborers Ramon B. Blanco 
and Tomas Cruz Manglona, both of whom worked as messengers for the 
Kempeitai headquarters in the village of Tatgua. Along with other Japa nese 
witnesses, they detailed the arrest and execution of Ignacio de la Cruz, a 
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Chamorro, and Miguel Timoner, a Spanish priest, on or about July 5, 1944. 
According to Tomas Cruz Manglona, the Kempeitai police ordered him 
to summon Timoner and de la Cruz. Although he did not know where the 
order originated, he acknowledged having seized the fifty- year- old Span-
ish  brother and the seventy- year- old Chamorro artisan. Whereas Manglona 
characterized Timoner as “on the  whole, white,” he said nothing about the 
physical appearance of de la Cruz.116 But he did note that the priest was an 
“energetic” Spaniard “always dressed in that habit.”117 On the other hand, 
Manglona described de la Cruz as a “man of many trades. He could make 
shoes and he could also make rings.”118
The Kempeitai then escorted Igancio de la Cruz and Miguel Timoner 
to two execution sites, with the former being led to a jungle area beside 
the headquarters and the latter being directed to a nearby shelter with 
chairs and  tables. Approximately 150 meters separated the two locations. 
What linked the second and third specifications of murder, then, was not 
only the simultaneous arrest of de la Cruz and Timoner but the manner in 
which they  were meant to die. Following Captain Akira Tokunaga’s order 
to execute  these men, Second Lieutenant and surgeon Yoshio Takahashi 
attempted to kill them with poison. A witness for the prosecution and a 
former staff member of the medical unit, Yoshizaki Tokuichi identified the 
poison as “potassium cyanide.”119 He also saw Takahashi place the poison 
in coffee cups at the execution sites. Another witness, Corpsman Sergeant 
Major Takashi, recalled, “I left my work and went to the scene of the execu-
tion.  There  were one native and several soldiers. The native was made to sit 
down and Second Lieutenant Takahashi was saying something to him. In 
a  little while some coffee was poured in a cup and a small portion of some 
kind of powder was put into the coffee and mixed.”120 Identifying Takahashi 
as the person who placed powder in the coffee, Corpsman Sergeant Major 
Takashi then stated, “This native drank this coffee but he spilled some from 
his mouth and he  didn’t drink very much. The native who drank this coffee 
pressed his stomach with his hand and fell backwards. In a  little while this 
native who fell down got up and seemed to be in agony and the native was 
in this condition for a  little while.”121
Realizing that the “native” did not immediately die from the poison, 
Second Lieutenant Yoshio Takahashi sent a runner to Captain Tokunaga, 
requesting directions for the botched execution. When the messenger re-
turned, the surgeon was informed to order Private Shigeo Koyama, one 
of the accused, to stab the native. The tribunal thus charged the soldier 
Koyama, the surgeon Takahashi, and the commander Tokunawa with mur-
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dering, by “bayonet,” the priest Miguel Timoner. Several Japa nese suspects 
and witnesses in Guam and Tokyo confirmed that  these three Japa nese na-
tionals killed a man. Yet none of them referenced a foreigner. The second 
and final Rotanese witness, Ramon  B. Blanco, then argued that Koyama 
“stabbed” Ignacio de la Cruz, a Chamorro who did not initially die from the 
poison.122 But specification 3 insisted that de la Cruz expired from potas-
sium cyanide poisoning and not from a bayonet wound. Despite the convo-
luted nature of  these charges and testimonies, the prosecution ultimately 
asserted that Second Lieutenant Yoshio Takahashi staged the two murders 
of Ignacio de la Cruz and Miguel Timoner on or about July 5, 1944.
Shortly thereafter, Tokunaga ordered the execution of the last unknown 
native and suspected spy on July 8, 1944. As per specification 4, only Toku-
naga was charged with killing this man at Tatgua. Suekichi Yoshimura, a 
former engineering warrant officer with the Imperial Japa nese Army, fol-
lowed the order. Now testifying for the prosecution, Yoshimura said, “I was 
ordered to execute a native by the com pany commander.”123 A clearing was 
then made in the jungle near the Kempeitai headquarters.  After forming a 
firing squad of two men, Yoshimura instructed them to shoot the unknown 
native. The Kempeitai officers then buried the three men in unmarked 
graves near their headquarters.
As the only Japa nese national accused of all five specifications of mur-
der, former battalion commander Akira Tokunaga approached the stand 
first. In discussing his history as a military officer, he explained that he re-
ceived his training at army military academies in 1936 and 1939,  after which 
he was transferred to the First Regiment, First Division, in Manchuria. In 
March 1944, he then moved to Rota, where he led the First Battalion, Tenth 
In de pen dent Mixed Regiment. At the young age of twenty- six, he supervised 
the operations of the army unit from March 1944 to September 1945, the 
latter date signifying his surrender to the Americans. But by June  1944, 
Tokunaga noted, Rota had become a “field of  battle,” with its civil admin-
istration barely operating  because of the American assaults in Rota and 
Saipan.124 As a result, he said, “ There was no other way but for the army 
to take over the maintenance of peace and order of the civilians  because 
Saipan Branch Office of the South Seas Government Office had ceased to 
function and the branch office on Rota had been demolished by bombing 
and it was almost impossible for it to function.”125 Given the collapse of the 
civil administration, Captain Tokunaga became the se nior official among 
the civilians and military personnel in Rota. Reflecting on his challenges, 
he said, “It was my first experience since I entered the army in which I was 
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placed in contact with the navy as well as the civilians. I felt that I was un-
equal to carry such an enormous burden of responsibility when I realized 
that I had to stand above all and direct  matters concerning defense, liaison, 
and coordination work of the  whole island, but I exerted all my efforts in 
that direction.”126
In his new role as the military commander of Rota, Captain Akira Toku-
naga then convened the island’s leadership on June 14 to 15, 1944, to discuss 
this shift in governance. At  these meetings, he emphasized that every body 
had to follow military laws, natives had to provide laborers for the construc-
tion of fortifications, and nonmilitary personnel had to reside in newly cre-
ated “safety zones” designated for the Chamorro and non- Chamorro popu-
lations.127 Another stipulation concerned the  matter of “subversive acts.” 
As Tokunaga disclosed, the civil administrators and village representatives 
“ were cautioned to be on the alert for subversive acts and acts of treason 
and spreading rumors,  because such acts  were prevalent.”128 Lookouts and 
patrols  were thus formed, with each group scanning the island for individ-
ual acts of “treason,” a term that placed the discussion in the realm of Japa-
nese laws. By framing the discussion along  these lines, Tokunaga resisted 
the prosecution’s claim that the five unknown victims  were “spies” whose 
murderers could only be judged within the context of international law. In 
Rota, only Japa nese military laws applied during the time when  these men 
died, that is, from June 1944 to July 1944. For the army,  every order was law-
ful in its hierarchy of command responsibility.
 Under  these circumstances, individuals accused of treason suffered the 
penalties of imprisonment or death. As Captain Tokunaga reasoned, five 
natives  were executed for violating the articles on treason in the Military 
Secrets Security Law and the Army Criminal Code. Although espionage 
constituted one of  these acts, itself a treasonous crime, the criminal codes 
explic itly aligned with domestic military laws. On  these  matters, no refer-
ence whatsoever was made to international laws, including the Hague laws 
of war. Take, for instance, article 27 of the Army Criminal Code: “ Those who 
have done the actions described in the following  shall be condemned to 
death: 2.— To spy for the benefit of the hostile powers, or help hostile pow-
ers in espionage. 3.— To convey military secrets to the  enemy powers.”129 
Tokunaga then assigned several soldiers in the Kempeitai to separately ar-
rest and interrogate five Chamorro men sometime in June and July  1944. 
Referring to several letters, secret notebooks, and  bottles and clothes used 
for signaling purposes, the lower- ranking soldiers found that “ these five 
men had conspired in their efforts to detect and gather military secrets, the 
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conditions of the air field, the disposition of troops and armament of the 
military forces, and had passed this information on to the  enemy and  these 
five had been constantly engaged in this work.”130
Other acts of treason included their efforts to “cut telephone wires and 
thereby [obstruct] operational movements.” Continued Captain Toku-
naga, “They signaled to  enemy planes and ships by vari ous methods and 
disclosed the position of the airdrome and of troop concentrations and 
guided the  enemy in bombing and naval bombardment. They spread un-
founded rumors and worked to break down the morale  behind the lines 
and they planned to contact and to guide the American forces in the event 
of an invasion.”131 Shigeo Koyama, one of the three accused Japa nese na-
tionals, also claimed to have seen three incidents of treason unfold in Rota. 
Although Koyama failed to identify any individuals, he said, “When I was 
on the lookout duty from eleven  o’clock in the night till three in the morn-
ing I frequently witnessed flash signals which seemed to be from a flash 
light.”132 On the second example of treason, he “frequently saw signal lights 
which went alternately from green to red. When a signal flare would go up 
from the land then rocket flares could be seen out at sea and it seemed as 
though they  were signaling with each other.”133 Whereas he witnessed  these 
two events from afar, he described the third and final instance of treason 
as occurring only a few moments before his arrival. In one patrol, Koyama 
noticed that burning charcoal “had been laid out in the form of an arrow 
pointing  toward the [Sinapalu] air field in the day and when I saw this again 
it was all white in ashes. . . .  I was able to observe that this form of signal 
could be used both in the day and the night.”134
As  these comments reveal, Captain Akira Tokunaga, Private Shigeo 
Koyama, and the investigating officers in the Kempeitai believed that the 
five Chamorro men had shared information with the American military, a 
point previously disputed by the prosecution and by the lack of any corre-
sponding evidence. And when the court asked Captain Tokunaga to submit 
the  bottles, clothes, and letters used in  these acts of treason, he mentioned 
that all the materials  were lost  after the war. Nor did he or ga nize a trial 
for the accused Chamorros on the premise that they lacked the facilities, 
as well as the capacity to transfer the men to Guam for further judgment.135 
Instead, he wired the commanding general of the Twenty- Ninth Division in 
Guam and sought his counsel. According to Captain Tokunaga, the uniden-
tified commanding general ordered him to execute the five men  because 
they had already been found guilty of the crime of treason. As he stressed, 
“We executed them  because the Japa nese Forces had to defend Rota Island 
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and punished  these traitors in accordance with the laws which demanded 
the penalty of death for acts of treason.”136 Yet the  matter of treason did not 
apply solely to the acts of five men, as Captain Tokunaga may have feared 
most the growing discontent among the wider population of Rota had he 
refrained from murdering the men. As he tellingly noted, “If this was left 
uncontrolled the number of such cases would have increased and would 
only go to accentuate and perpetuate  these acts. The very character of this 
crime imperiled the defense of Rota and, ultimately, the fate of all the armed 
forces and residents on Rota.”137
 Every defendant, then, admitted to having murdered  these unknown 
men, as Tokunaga, Takahashi, and Koyama did not dispute the nature of 
their charges. They merely challenged the authority of the military tribunal, 
its notion of espionage, and its reliance on international laws. As defense 
attorney and naval commander Martin E. Carlson insisted, “It is our con-
tention that the five persons punished in June and July of 1944 on Rota  were 
punished as traitors. International law does not apply in this instance.”138 
Adamant that only Japa nese domestic laws can address treason, he turned 
to American and En glish case laws as providing examples of owing alle-
giance to the country in which one resides. As Carlson asserted, “So we 
see that both En glish cases and United States federal cases hold that even 
aliens can commit treason against the country in which they are domiciled. 
All five persons described as having been killed in the specifications owed a 
duty of allegiance to Japan. The proof is clear and strong that all of  these five 
persons had resided in Rota for many years and  were bound to obey all the 
laws of Japan.”139 He even invoked American treason law in defending the 
right of Japa nese laws in governing native “aliens.” As Carlson concluded, 
the “persons killed  were not spies but  were traitors and saboteurs who com-
mitted overt acts openly as well as by stealth with the intent to give comfort 
and aid to the  enemy, the American invasion force threatening to invade all 
the Mariana Islands including Rota Island.”140
Attorney Junjiro Takano concurred with Commander Carlson’s refer-
ences to treason laws. But rather than call the Rotanese “aliens,” a  legal 
term familiar to American members of the tribunal, Takano used the phrase 
“quasi- Japanese subjects.”141 As he explained, “It is true that the natives of 
Rota Island of the South Seas Mandated Territory did not automatically as-
sume the nationality of the Mandatory, Japan, but if they desired to become 
naturalized subjects of Japan, they  were qualified to do so.”142 Takano as-
serted, “The natives of Rota Island stood in a peculiar relation to Japan. 
Thus, although they did not possess all the identical rights and duties of 
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Japa nese nationals . . .  they  were treated in the same manner in many re-
spects as Japa nese nationals.”143 Comparable to the bare life of the Chamor-
ros and Japa nese in the tribunal, the Rotanese also came  under the laws of 
Japan but  were not entitled to its citizenship. The five men executed in Rota 
 were thus expunged from Japan as nonsacrifices.
With the tribunal’s claims to jurisdiction and land acquisition in Rota 
now at stake, Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Commander Joseph A. Regan 
defended the court’s right to evaluate the actions of Chamorros and Japa-
nese who never subscribed to the U.S. rule of law. On the  matter of treason, 
he referenced the previous case of Samuel  T. Shinohara, a subtext raised 
by the defense counsel. Refuting the implications this trial may have for 
the murder charges at hand, Lieutenant Commander Regan said, “I am 
not  going into the argument by the defense about the Shinohara case and 
the case  here. Shinohara was a Japa nese who came to Guam and lived on 
Guam for many years. I know that Shinohara was tried for treason, or for 
acts which  were called treason, back in about July 1945.”144 Disavowing Shi-
nohara’s position as a Japa nese national and treating him as a residential 
alien who owed allegiance to the U.S. Navy and the United States, the judge 
advocate argued that his treason charge stemmed from having gathered 
“information for the Japa nese.” His abuse of American “properties” consti-
tuted acts of treason that aided the Japa nese military in Guam.145 For  these 
reasons, Regan asserted that “the Shinohara case does not compare with 
the pre sent one  because  here you have natives who presumably actively en-
gaged in the business of spying.”146
Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Commander Regan then remarked, 
“Let me say this, it is no part of the prosecution’s case to prove that  these 
men  were in fact spies. All we have to show, and I am sure we have shown 
it, is that the Japa nese who had the  handling of them believed them to be 
spies.”147 Confirming his ignorance of the victims’ identities and motives, 
he continued, “We  don’t know nor can any of us know  whether Miguel 
Timoner, fifty some odd years old, or Ignacio de la Cruz, in his late sev-
enties, went sneaking around Rota seeking information to pass along to 
the Americans.  We’ll never know that, but we do know from the evidence 
before this court that Tokunaga thought they did  these  things and thought 
they  were spies.”148 As the trial concluded on February 16, 1949, the com-
mission reviewed  these arguments, including petitions for clemency. One 
petition illustrated Tokunaga’s “good and righ teous” character.149 Another 
petition for Takahashi, the surgeon, described him as “humane, diligent, 
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honest.”150 As for Private Koyama, his relatives begged to not lose their 
“prop and beam” of the  family.151
In the end, the tribunal found Tokunaga, Takahashi, and Koyama guilty, 
sentencing them, respectively, to seven years, five years, and one year of 
imprisonment at the Sugamo prison in Japan. Cast as Japa nese militarists, 
their punishment as war criminals and their expulsion as nonsacrifices 
from the nation came on the heels of a par tic u lar American appropriation 
of international laws on espionage and land possession. Making interna-
tional law as its own, the tribunal extended its jurisdiction into Rota, the 
Marianas, and other non- American lands in the former Japa nese empire of 
Micronesia. As the  legal scholar Natsu Taylor Saito argues, American lead-
ers often “rely upon the international law and  legal institutions that justify 
their control over the lands,  peoples, natu ral resources, and markets which 
allow them to maintain their hegemonic status.”152 Had the court addressed 
the testimonies of more than two Rotanese witnesses, however, it would 
have further complicated the logics concerning espionage and treason, if 
not altogether questioned the imperial claims of both Japan and the United 
States. This is not to say, though, that the court entirely suppressed Ro-
tanese agencies, as evidenced in the prosecution’s brief disclosure that one 
victim “wore upon his body a tattooed American flag.”153 As the only refer-
ence to an American tattoo, it appeared as if the tribunal refused to enter-
tain Rotanese affinities with the Americans.
In this regard, the language of spies not only invoked international laws 
for the purpose of suspending American domestic laws so that the Ameri-
can rule of law could be expanded beyond its national borders. Rather, spies 
meant that one aided an  enemy without having a fixed notion of loyalty, as 
spies could represent an indefinite range of citizenships and nationalities 
in international law. What ever the case, the fleeting mention of an “Ameri-
can tattoo” suggested that the tribunal had encountered a subaltern native 
memory that existed outside its domain of influence. Albert Toves, the Ro-
tanese who went by the Japa nese name of Kondo Akira, recalled that two 
Chamorros had this tattoo. One was Ignacio Manglona and another was 
Ignacio Cruz (or potentially Ignacio de la Cruz, one of the natives “believed 
to be” killed). According to Toves, Manglona was “eighty four years old, 
mild mannered and kindly, and maybe a  little senile. He had once worked 
on a whaling ship and had gotten a favorite  whaler’s designed tatooed [sic] 
across his chest: a large heart containing an American flag.”154 The Kem-
peitai killed him for having the American tattoo. As Toves suggested, “So 
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far as I know that was his only crime, but that was enough to get him tied to 
a tree up near where the Rota Hospital now stands, right out in the sun with 
a Japa nese soldier standing near by in the shade to see that no one brought 
him food or  water, and in about a week he was dead.”155
Although Toves did not explain how Ignacio Maglona died, he revealed 
his frustration in not having the ability to assist the el derly man. As he men-
tioned, “It was hard on me to walk by him and hear him beg me for a cup 
of  water, ‘Albert, Albert,’ he would plead, ‘for Christ’s sweet sake bring me 
 water, for the sake of Christ on his cross, for the sake of our ancestors.’ ”156 
Fearful of how the soldier might respond to their interaction, Toves did not 
help Manglona. He instead  imagined a response that reflected the coloni-
zation of all Chamorros— ko’ko and hilitai alike— across the archipelago. 
“ There was nothing I could do,” Toves said, “but explain to myself that 
this was the way  things  were and had to be accepted, just like you  don’t 
argue with earthquakes or typhoons— you just try to live through them.”157 
Ignacio Cruz, “a light- skinned Chamorro and a former seaman,” likewise 
died from bearing the same tattoo. He was accused of being a spy, as was 
 Brother Miguel Timoner. As per Toves’s memory, the Kempeitai beheaded 
Timoner for “waving a handkerchief at an American plane.”158 Another per-
son executed by the Kempeitai was Bonifacio Estebes. But whereas the first 
specification of murder claimed that he was killed by a firing squad, Toves 
said that the Japa nese military beheaded Estebes for pretending to read a 
Japa nese newspaper. Yet the issue of reading was not a charge per se, as the 
Japa nese military only levied the death sentence to any Chamorro “who was 
caught informing himself of the war’s failure.”159 But Estebes was innocent 
of this crime, given that he “was retarded and could read nothing.”160 Based 
on Albert Toves’s observations, the Japa nese military executed at least three 
Chamorros and one Spanish national.  Whether or not  these or other men 
died by bayonet, beheading, firing squad, or poison, the tribunal had clearly 
established one fact: American jurists now viewed Rota as the property and 
possession of the United States.
The Japa nese Militarists of the Mariana Islands
The tribunal’s criminalization and racialization of Japa nese nationals in 
Guam and Rota revealed the historical imbrication between white suprema-
cist punishment and statecraft and native retribution and vio lence. In its 
treatment of seven  trials on assault, battery, and murder, the military court 
transformed  these Japa nese men into militarists, enemies who  were included 
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in the nation only to be excluded as war criminals and violators of interna-
tional law. Part of that metamorphosis entailed the questioning of one’s 
faith in the Japa nese empire. Take, for instance, the comments shared by 
Hirose Ogawa, a naval police officer who was found guilty of assaulting 
seven Chamorros. As he professed, “I was a naval military civilian of the 
Guam Civil Affairs during the Japa nese period. I had to obey the  orders of 
my superiors in the Japa nese period. At the order of my superiors, I beat 
natives. Now,  under the American government, this has become a bad 
 thing.”161 Acknowledging his conversion, he said, “Hereafter, I absolutely 
 will not do this kind of  thing.”162 The naval officer Kanzo Kawachi likewise 
discussed how he shifted from “openly” torturing  people to suppressing 
 these beliefs and learning another brand of imperial justice. He appeared 
to embrace his faith in the American empire, claiming, “From now on I  will 
study the demo cratic system of Amer i ca and  will devote myself according to 
the  orders of Amer i ca which is the world’s leading power.”163
In  these court- induced confessions,  these and other Japa nese nationals 
not only revealed a change in their attitudes about Japan and the United 
States. That they explic itly marginalized the agencies of all Chamorros— 
Guamanians, Rotanese, Saipanese, and  others— demonstrated that the 
birds and lizards never fully inhabited any nation. This disavowal was re-
vealed in their absence of apologies directed to the Chamorro clans affected 
by their vio lence, as well as in their failure to grant Japa nese citizenship to 
Chamorros. And if the “ people of the land” (taotao tano) could be removed 
from their islands as po liti cal agents, then any colonial law could seize a 
territory devoid of native  peoples, if not strip all semblances of them. To 
this effect, the military tribunal prosecuted Japa nese nationals in Rota not 
only for their perceived war criminality but also for their purported claims 
to indigenous lands. By criminalizing their roles as belligerent occupiers 
and soldiers of the Japa nese empire, the court rendered Japan’s sovereignty 
in Rota as unlawful, uncivilized, and ultimately in need of a new po liti cal 
order.164 As the historian Takashi Fujitani astutely argues, the biopo liti cal 
sphere of modern power finds significance in a person “insofar as she or he 
affects the strength of the state,  either positively or negatively.”165
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As the  trials in the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program reveal, the 
logics and tactics of incarceration, militarization, and possession mani-
fested as the U.S. rule of law in Guam.1 At least two points  matter  here. 
First, the military commission established itself to reclaim what Japan had 
illegally seized, namely, the white American property of Guam. White suprem-
acist punishment and colonial statecraft emanated from this juridical claim 
and moral desire. As the critical ethnic studies scholar Dylan Rodríguez ex-
plains, the sanctity of whiteness must be projected and protected for fear of 
nonwhite incursions. As he argues, “Conceptualizing whiteness as a form 
of property, and white civic identity as a collective entitlement to owner-
ship (of property,  Others, and propertied  Others), implies that when ‘non-
whites’ threaten, attack, or steal the common property of white civil society, 
they are actually violating the sanctified materiality, and the vicarious and 
deeply valued collective bodily integrity, of whiteness.”2
Given that the U.S. Navy viewed the bodies and lands of Guam as its own, 
whiteness signaled a collectivity to be protected, a property to manage, and 
a virtue to aver and defend. The navy’s prosecution of Japa nese war crimi-
nals as per the history of anti- Japanese immigration in the United States, on 
the one hand, and as per the global shift to more inclusive regimes of gov-
ernmentality, on the other, attested to  these logics of white possession.3 As 
with the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, its proceedings assessed Japa nese war 
criminality in ways that “helped Americans understand at the same time 
what was good about the Japa nese.”4 The war time ideology of Japa nese sol-
diers  running amok and killing  others with no regard for life underscored 
much of the white American and Chamorro racisms  toward the Japa nese as 
a vilified, monolithic society. But  because the military commission viewed 
Japan as a rival nation, the tribunal dehumanized the Japa nese in a manner 
that nevertheless accorded them a stronger degree of politics, that is, bios 
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or po liti cal life. That is why the court treated the Japa nese as “belligerent” 
occupiers of Guam and Rota and not only as “war criminals” who had to be 
reformed or eradicated from  these islands. And yet the navy knew, like the 
broader American government, that “the continued exclusion of Japa nese 
Americans from the national community threatened to undermine Amer i ca’s 
ability to win the war and the peace that would follow.”5
For  these reasons, the navy’s tribunal represented its counsels, wit-
nesses, and proceedings as humane and virtuous.6 A reporter for the Navy 
News, a popu lar periodical in war time Guam, celebrated this sensibility on 
October 26, 1947, stating, “The bringing to trial and meting out of justice to 
military criminals who over- stepped recognized bounds in World War II is 
in itself a  great accomplishment.  Under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Navy, military courts have successfully prosecuted and punished hundreds 
of the  enemy who committed atrocious crimes against our countrymen.”7 
In construing the personhood of homo sacer, the commission thereby re-
lied on the logics of white possession and property. But whereas the court 
generally viewed the Japa nese as “combatants,” the tribunal judged the Ro-
tanese and Saipanese as “noncombatants.” The former  were bios,  people 
with politics; the latter  were zoē, animals without politics. The crucial 
point is that the laws on war recognized combatants as the only legitimate 
category of personhood in the 1940s, thereby rendering the Rotanese and 
Saipanese men as the animals, the hilitai, and, as such, the most abject bare 
life of the court.8
As demonstrated in the more than one hundred Guamanian and 
Chamorro- Japanese testimonies featured in the  trials, the tribunal relied 
heavi ly on the ko’ko- hilitai relation. This cultural and po liti cal pro cess both 
collapsed and hardened the distinctions between animals and  humans; 
for Chamorros, all lives— animal and  human— are intertwined. But when 
lives are codified by the U.S. rule of law, native rumors determined which 
lives  were more animal or more  human than  others. The ko’ko- hilitai rela-
tion, as testimony, thus gained relevance, meaning, and force in the law. 
Central to this indigenous network of power was the  matter of torture. As 
Guamanians and Chamorro- Japanese witnesses drew on their memories of 
being tortured by the Japa nese police in Guam, they collectively harnessed 
the lessons and power of native reciprocity and retribution. As the second 
and most vital part of my argument, the ko’ko- hilitai relation subsequently 
upheld the logics and tactics of U.S. incarceration, militarization, and pos-
session as true and just.
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Of Torture and Testimony
As many witnesses disclosed, Chamorros in Guam frequently recognized 
the subordinated positions of their faith and their families  under the Japa-
nese regime whenever they,  under torture, used the refrains “Ay Yu’us!” (Oh, 
God!) and “Ay nåna!” (Oh,  mother!). That they employed  these phrases in 
separate interrogations and over a three- year period illustrated their indig-
enous collectivity as Guamanians as much as demonstrating Japan’s incom-
plete proj ect of colonizing them from “American” to “Japa nese” subjects.9 
Very seldom did a person fail to confess; if he did not, he was killed. But 
one’s submission or re sis tance to a confession did not guarantee one’s 
safety. For  these reasons, many  people, mainly men, died from execution 
by bayonet, dynamite, firing squad, hanging, poison, starvation, and  water 
torture. Japanese- appointed Guamanian commissioners called kuchōs and 
sonchōs often assisted in their arrests. As witnesses to  these torture- induced 
interrogations, they affirmed the power of Japan’s empire in Guam only to 
 later testify about Japan’s demise in the navy’s tribunal.
That the Japa nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese interpreters and police offi-
cers tortured many individuals in Guam demonstrated the degree to which 
an ideology of hate, a diminished  legal and moral inhibition for vio lence, 
and a culture of legitimate vio lence against an “ enemy” had congealed along 
the axis of a militarized masculinity.10 As the anthropologist Alexander 
Laban Hinton elaborates, killing another person “tends to become easier 
when perpetrators are desensitized to vio lence, internalize violent ideolo-
gies, dehumanize their victims, undergo moral restructuring so that vio-
lence becomes morally justified, use euphemistic language that masks 
their deeds, and displace responsibility onto figures of authority.”11 For 
the Chamorro men from Rota and Saipan, they clearly embodied a milita-
rized masculinity that served “two essentialized master binaries,” that is, 
the colonized/colonizer and the man/woman.12 As young men, they  were 
expected to follow their obligations with one or more clans and especially 
with their elder relatives. In fact, all of the Rotanese and Saipanese men 
had relations in Guam. Their  labor, construed as che’cho lahi (men’s work), 
was used to farm the land or fish the sea. Yet they required  every accused 
Guamanian— old and young alike—to submit their bodies and thoughts to 
the Japa nese empire. Indeed, torture and the fear of torture increased their 
social status as proper men of the colony, but their overall failure to engage 
in a reciprocal network of power with Guamanians resulted in the severance 
of clan and kin.
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With their newfound masculinity  under the Japa nese empire, they often 
tortured and murdered  others with relative impunity. Their positions as 
police officers shielded them from Guamanian retaliations that may have 
occurred from such an outright violation of inafa’maolek. At the same 
time, the Rotanese and Saipanese men had further transformed the popu-
lar meanings of boys and men,  fathers and sons, and cousins and  uncles 
 under the regime. While their actions  were by no means totalizing, their 
marginalization of alternative masculinities  under Japan’s empire  shaped 
their manhood as hegemonic.13 This brand of militarized masculinity re-
quired one to be tough, in de pen dent (outside of one’s obligations to a 
clan), without emotion, and especially arrogant.14 In the public sphere, for 
example, they flaunted their authority and commanded the obedience of 
their peers. Only a few men resisted this image of themselves, yet  every in-
terpreter and police officer became a modern man of empire in the space 
of the interrogation room. Some Rotanese and Saipanese even subscribed 
to a promiscuous heterosexuality that allowed them to plea sure, with  little 
constraint, in  women from the villages. That they received frequent injec-
tions from the Japa nese hospital for gonorrhea and syphilis revealed not 
only their vio lence against native  women but also their collusion with the 
Japa nese “comfort” system that coerced or employed  women from Asia and 
the Pacific Islands. But unlike their Japa nese supervisors and other authori-
ties who saw themselves as the rightful occupants of the Mariana Islands, 
the Rotanese and Saipanese found in torture a militarized masculinity “ap-
posite to its context, not an indigenous subject replete with power.”15
In other words, the police did not have to utilize torture to exhibit 
 Japan’s sovereignty; that was an order given to and obeyed by their Rotanese 
and Saipanese colonial subjects. Torture thus had many lives: it existed in 
the Japa nese military and police  orders to colonize Guamanians; in Ro-
tanese and Saipanese imaginations of militarized manhood; in the broken 
teeth and bones of native prisoners; in the marked and unmarked graves 
of the murdered; in survivor testimonies of Japa nese, Rotanese, and 
Saipanese vio lence; in American trial proceedings about Japa nese mili-
tary “barbarism” and native “slavery”; in American military and po liti cal 
claims to the properties of Guam and Rota; in Chamorro, En glish, and 
Japa nese translations of everyday and official discourses; and, above all, 
in Chamorro proverbs about reciprocity and retribution. Torture likewise 
enhanced or challenged a nation by producing an “ enemy” from which 
the disciplinary logics of power and paranoia operated. As the critic Anne 
McClintock elaborates, torture produces “the bodies of ‘the  enemy’ and 
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make[s] the prisoners legible as enemies, thereby putatively ‘legitimizing’ 
the occupation.”16
Testimonies of torture, however, did not result in the mass incarcera-
tion of Chamorro men from Rota and Saipan  after the war. For although 
the U.S. Navy construed “blackness” as a “stable racial category in opposi-
tion to whiteness,” its criminalization of Rotanese and Saipanese interpret-
ers and police officers did not result in a carceral apparatus that racialized 
them as “black” and privy to criminal acts.17 What ensued in the aftermath 
of the tribunal was not the construction of prisons for “deviant” Rotanese 
and Saipanese men.18 Instead, Guamanian gossip and retribution acted like 
the claws of the ayuyu (coconut crab) in their attacks against Rotanese and 
Saipanese men from the 1940s to the 1970s. The purpose was to insult and 
injure males who represented Rota and Saipan. The  father of David Sablan, 
for example, once served as a Saipanese interpreter in Japanese- occupied 
Guam. In the late 1940s, David Sablan then pursued his education in Guam, 
where, to his surprise, numerous Guamanians called him “pro- Japanese” 
and “Japa nese lover.” As a young man, Sablan did not understand why Gua-
manians hated him. As he explained, “I was always being threatened and 
had to run away to keep from being beaten up. . . .  I never  stopped to fight; 
I always ran.”19 Antonio Shimabukuro Borja, a Chamorro- Okinawan from 
Rota, confirmed  these Guamanian animosities  toward the Rotanese and 
Saipanese. As Borja noted, he “ didn’t go out much” whenever he visited his 
relatives in Guam  after the war. “I was still scared and Guamanians  didn’t 
like the Chamorros from Rota and Saipan  because of the  things they did on 
Guam.”20
The Men of the Military Colony
With the Rotanese and Saipanese men now portrayed as deviant types, 
the U.S. Navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program turned to its examplars of 
acceptable manhood in the colony. As with the awards given to the Guam 
Combat Patrol for its racist killings of “Japa nese stragglers,” Guamanian 
police officers also received accolades for their ser vice to the military com-
mission (figure C.1). The Guam Gazette, a local periodical, identified two 
Guamanian police officers and former assistants of the Japa nese police 
in par tic u lar: Desk Sergeant Juan A. Roberto and Staff Sergeant Adolfo C. 
Sgambelluri. Written by Judge Advocate and Lieutenant Col o nel Teller Am-
mons, the letters expressed his gratitude. With re spect to Juan Roberto, for 
example, the lead prosecutor of the tribunal claimed, “Now that the cases 
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before the Military Commission involving war crimes on Guam have been 
finished, I wish to express to you my personal appreciation for all the as-
sistance you have given me in bringing to trial  those accused of crimes on 
Guam.” Regarding Adolfo Sgambelluri, the lieutenant col o nel said, “You 
have played a very impor tant part in compiling information upon which to 
prove the charges. . . .  I personally appreciate all the assistance you have 
given, and you have rendered an exceedingly patriotic ser vice to your  people 
on Guam and the Government of the United States.”21
Even some of the emasculated Rotanese and Saipanese interpreters and 
police officers of Japan’s receding empire  later transformed their statuses 
from sacred men to proper men of the American colony. Although the navy 
initially sentenced them to death, confinement for vari ous years, or hard 
 labor for their natu ral life, it commuted the death sentences to forty- five 
years of hard  labor in 1951.  After  these men  were imprisoned for eight years, 
the navy paroled every one so they could re unite with their families in Rota 
and Saipan.22 In the 1960s, for instance, Jose  P. Villagomez became a se-
curity guard for an abandoned American military base in Saipan.23 Luis C. 
C.1.  The Guam Combat 
Patrol’s murder count of 
128 “Japa nese stragglers.” 
The original caption reads, 
“Rec ord board of Japa nese 
stragglers killed by police 
patrols” (no photo number, 
Rec. April 16, 1945). U.S. 
National Archives, College 
Park, Mary land.
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Crisostomo also found employment as a sentry for the Central Intelligence 
Agency, likewise located in Saipan.24 Another interpreter, Elias Parong 
 Sablan, had worked for the Japa nese police in Guam for a month but did 
not incur any criminal charges from the tribunal. He subsequently became 
the chief of police in Saipan.25  Whether they worked as unarmed guards 
for the native police, temporary security personnel, or armed members 
of the Constabulary Force, several men became indoctrinated into another 
sphere of militarized masculinities.26
As with the treason trial of Samuel T. Shinohara, the navy eventually re-
formed some of the Rotanese and Saipanese into low- ranking police offi-
cers of its regime. Given their statuses as formerly convicted war criminals 
and as non- U.S. citizens, they effectively entered a zone of vio lence compa-
rable to the one they previously experienced, as interrogators and torturers, 
 under the Japa nese empire. By becoming police officers for the navy and its 
agencies, they likewise renewed the force of law in Guam, Rota, and Saipan, 
where “male dominance, heterosexism, whiteness, vio lence, and ruthless 
competition” are valued.27 While not  every Rotanese and Saipanese male 
subscribed to this militarized masculinity, as a few pursued other  careers or 
simply returned to their farms, the pro cesses by which the American mili-
tary transformed them from nonsacrificial subjects to potentially sacrifical 
police officers demonstrated that they, too, could have become torturers 
again.28 Of course, the navy’s War Crimes Tribunals Program and its jurists 
never conceded to their histories of torture, let alone slavery.
It appeared as if only the Japa nese, Rotanese, and Saipanese knew the 
po liti cal significance of torture and the vio lence it wielded in exerting the 
power of an empire. Stressing its virtuous high ground, the military tribunal 
subsequently targeted numerous Japa nese nationals for committing atroci-
ties and injuries in the Mariana Islands that stemmed “from cold and criminal 
calculation, committed in total disregard of the elementary consideration 
of  human rights as well as in defiance of the well- established rules of inter-
national law.”29 Disregarding its racist interpretations of laws, the commis-
sion heralded its elimination of the internal and external threats posed by 
the Japa nese government. The tribunal then increasingly viewed Japa nese 
nationals and Japa nese Americans as nonmilitarists, if not as new partners 
in Amer i ca’s Cold War order. As its director, Rear Admiral John D. Murphy, 
stated, “I desire to affirmatively point out that all Japa nese did not subscribe 
to the sinister purposes and practices.” Contrary to the court’s homogeni-
zation of the Japa nese as belligerents, militarists, or traitors, Murphy em-
phasized that they can be welcomed through their ser vice to the U.S. rule of 
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law. As he noted, “Among them  there are untold members who believe in 
right and the princi ples which we ourselves support, as evidenced by  those 
who came forward without expectation of individual gain to lend assistance 
in furtherance of our objectives.”30
As the following native confession comparably illustrates, the threshold 
of the tribunal allowed for the elimination of Japan’s empire and for the 
renewal of the U.S. rule of law in Guam. At the center of this inclusive ex-
clusion resided the accused war criminal and the confluence of native and 
white hegemonies. In this interrogation, the unidentified American intel-
ligence officer confirms this nexus of biopower by asking if the Saipanese 
interpreter and police officer Antonio Camacho can differentiate between 
good and bad be hav ior, between the American and Japa nese empires, and 
between his faith in  family and in God. The former interrogator had now 
become the interrogated. Camacho, a sacred man, confessed to an Ameri-
can intelligence officer representing the new empire:
Q: Do you believe in God?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you believe lying is a sin for which you must answer?
A: Yes. My  mother and the priest have both taught me since childhood 
that to lie is a sin, and must be repaid.
Q: Do you realize that in beating  people as you did in Guam was wrong?
A: Yes. I knew it was wrong all the time, but since I was ordered to do so 
by the Japa nese, I knew they would punish me if I failed to obey  those 
 orders.
Q: Do you want to admit your sins and wrongs to me and ask for mercy?
A: I have already done so. The extent of my wrong- doing was given to 
you the other day. This is all I have done; I have no more to tell you.31
Confession and conversion. Torture and retribution. Indeed, the navy’s 
War Crimes Tribunals Program would have not asserted the U.S. rule of law 
without the active participation of its Guamanian and Chamorro- Japanese 
witnesses. With its reliance on native gossip and vengeance and white 
supremacist statecraft and punishment, the military tribunal established 
the American empire in Guam, Rota, and the Mariana Islands. In the pro-
cess, the commission never perceived Chamorros as citizens of Japan or 
the United States. Nor did the tribunal seek to address their noncitizenship 
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statuses in any way. For each empire, the ko’ko and the hilitai remained 
as animals without politics, zoē, even though Guamanians, Japa nese, Ro-
tanese, and Saipanese all found in torture po liti cal reasons to extend or extin-
guish American or Japa nese rule. Even  today, the U.S. rule of law operates in 
seemingly “exceptional” ways wherein indigenous and settler communities 
are made and remade into homines sacri in Guam and the entire Mariana 
Islands. As the theorist Cary Wolfe warns, to live “ under biopolitics is to live 
in a situation in which we are all always already (potential) ‘animals’ before 
the law— not just nonhuman animals according to zoological classifica-
tion, but any group of living beings that is so framed.”32 But by decolonizing 
this paradigm of biopower, we can utilize gossip and law for reconciliation 
and healing rather than for discipline and punishment.33
From this vantage point, we can also examine the making of biopower 
in terms of the military colony, a paradigm that enabled American and 
Japa nese colonialisms and militarisms to operate as legitimate law in the 
Mariana Islands. Homines sacri thus emerged on the threshold of the navy’s 
tribunal not as a singular, universal, and passive subject of law; rather, 
they surfaced as the court’s nonsacrificial assailants, belligerents, milita-
rists, murderers, perverts, and traitors. This is precisely why we must turn 
to Guam as a paradigm of the military colony if we are to address Giorgio 
Agamben’s philosophy of zoē and bios in colonial and indigenous settings. 
Such efforts can refute claims of American exceptionalism from Germany 
to South  Korea and from Iraq to Guantánamo, demonstrating that military 
bases— and their courts— can function as integral parts of American em-
pire building from the mid- twentieth  century to the pre sent.34
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